A new look at the professional training of a higher school teacher, in particular, a teacher of general technical disciplines and teaching methods for technology, the disclosure of their creative potential is based on contemporary methodological approaches. Let’s consider in more detail each of the indicated approaches. The emergence of the information society is one of the signs of the transition of civilization into the noosphere. With the introduction of integrated communication networks, the possibilities of direct communication of individuals on (...) a global scale are expanding. The introduction of computer and communication technologies into the daily life of people and into production makes a great socio-economic impact on the post-industrial society and causes such powerful social changes, it turns into a completely new type – an information society, the structure and dynamics of which is based on the production of information, and not material values, as it was before. Information in such a society becomes a social and productive value. Hence the new features of society: a certain hierarchy of prestige, a specific type of education, information technology that provides a balance of dynamics and social statics, a fundamentally different manage-ment system, etc. Analysis of the introduction of degree training in higher pedagogical educational institutions of Ukraine allows us to identify general approaches in the implementation of master’s programs, in particular: their focus on the bachelor’s degree; variability, flexibility and mobility of master’s education, taking into account current socio-economic trends and regional needs; scientific and practical pedagogical direction and individual approaches in the organization of the educational process. (shrink)

This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.

In this paper, we explore Fregean metatheory, what Frege called the New Science. The New Science arises in the context of Frege’s debate with Hilbert over independence proofs in geometry and we begin by considering their dispute. We propose that Frege’s critique rests on his view that language is a set of propositions, each immutably equipped with a truth value (as determined by the thought it expresses), so to Frege it was inconceivable that axioms could even be considered to be (...) other than true. Because of his adherence to this view, Frege was precluded from the sort of metatheoretical considerations that were available to Hilbert; but from this, we shall argue, it does not follow that Frege was blocked from metatheory in toto. Indeed, Frege suggests in Die Grundlagen der Geometrie a metatheoretical method for establishing independence proofs in the context of the New Science. Frege had reservations about the method, however, primarily because of the apparent need to stipulate the logical terms, those terms that must be held invariant to obtain such proofs. We argue that Frege’s skepticism on this score is not warranted, by showing that within the New Science a characterization of logical truth and logical constant can be obtained by a suitable adaptation of the permutation argument Frege employs in indicating how to prove independence. This establishes a foundation for Frege’s metatheoretical method of which he himself was unsure, and allows us to obtain a clearer understanding of Frege’s conception of logic, especially in relation to contemporary conceptions. (shrink)

This book comprises material on colour which was written by Wittgenstein in the last eighteen months of his life. It is one of the few documents which shows him concentratedly at work on a single philosophical issue. The principal theme is the features of different colours, of different kinds of colour and of luminosity—a theme which Wittgenstein treats in such a way as to destroy the traditional idea that colour is a simple and logically uniform kind of thing. This edition (...) consists of Wittgenstein's basic German text, together with an English translation. (shrink)

The purpose of this note is to acknowledge a gap in a previous paper, "The complexity of revision," and to provide a corrected version of the argument.

Henry Leonard and Karel Lambert first introduced so-called presupposition-free (or just simply: free) logics in the 1950’s in order to provide a logical framework allowing for non-denoting singular terms (be they descriptions or constants) such as “the largest prime” or “Pegasus” (see Leonard [1956] and Lambert [1960]). Of course, ever since Russell’s paradigmatic treatment of definite descriptions (Russell [1905]), philosophers have had a way to deal with such terms. A sentence such as “the..

John Rawls’ use of a contractarian strategy for justifying basic principles of justice has raised the hope that a similar strategy might work for a theory of right and moral principles generally. I want to show that this hope cannot be fulfilled.In what follows I interpret contractarianism in a Rawlsian way on the grounds that his is the most plausible version of the doctrine we are likely to get. I am not however concerned with the details of Rawls’ argument for (...) justice but instead with an idea that appears to underlie the contractarian strategy. In order to avoid the complications of Rawlsian exegesis, I choose to discuss the doctrine as it might be used to justify a moral principle of mutual assistance and not as Rawls in fact uses it to justify principles of justice. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the classes of all continuous $\mathcal {L}$ -(pre-)structures for a continuous first-order signature $\mathcal {L}$. We characterize the moduli of continuity for which the classes of finite, countable, or all continuous $\mathcal {L}$ -(pre-)structures have the amalgamation property. We also characterize when Urysohn continuous $\mathcal {L}$ -(pre)-structures exist, establish that certain classes of finite continuous $\mathcal {L}$ -structures are countable Fraïssé classes, prove the coherent EPPA for these classes of finite continuous $\mathcal {L}$ -structures, and (...) show that actions by automorphisms on finite $\mathcal {L}$ -structures also form a Fraïssé class. As consequences, we have that the automorphism group of the Urysohn continuous $\mathcal {L}$ -structure is a universal Polish group and that Hall’s universal locally finite group is contained in the automorphism group of the Urysohn continuous $\mathcal {L}$ -structure as a dense subgroup. (shrink)

In §21 of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik asks us to consider the forms: a a2 = 4 and a a > 0 and notices that they can be obtained from a φ(a) by replacing the function-name placeholder φ(ξ) by names for the functions ξ2 = 4 and ξ > 0 (and the placeholder cannot be replaced by names of objects or of functions of 2 arguments).

This considerably revised second edition of Wittgenstein's 1914-16 notebooks contains a new appendix with photographs of Wittgenstein's original work, a new preface by Elizabeth Anscombe, and a useful index by E.D. Klemke. Corrections have been made throughout the text, and notes have been added, making this the definitive edition of the notebooks. The writings intersperse Wittgenstein's technical logical notations with his thoughts on the meaning of life, happiness, and death. "When the first edition of this collection of remarks appeared in (...) 1961 we were provided with a glimpse of the workings of Wittgenstein's mind during the period when the seminal ideas of the _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ were being worked out. This second edition provided the occasion to be struck anew by the breadth, rigor, and above all the restlessness of that mind."—T. Michael McNulty, S. J., _The Modern Schoolman_. (shrink)

In a recent paper Robert J. Richman joins a host of doubters who question Gettier's claim that knowledge is not justified true belief. Richman's scepticism of Gettier's counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge stems from what he says are two basic defects in the examples. One defect is that Gettier employs the Principle of Deducibility for Justification which Richman argues is false. The second defect is based on “the obvious consideration that a belief which is justified on the basis (...) of one set of facts or assumptions need not be justified on the basis of a different set.” I shall consider each of these alleged defects and argue that Richman has not shown that in fact they are defects and that Gettier's counterexamples do in fact show that knowledge is not justified true belief.The Principle of Deducibility for Justification states that for any proposition P, if P entails Q and S correctly deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then Sis justified in believing Q. (shrink)

Este trabajo, hasta hoy inédito. fue leído en inglés durante el Coloquio Wittgenstein realizado en la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú en julio de 1989 con la participación de la autora. Cora Diamond, Juan Bautista Ferro, Peter Geach, Mario Montalbetti y Jorge Secada. La versión original que se publica ahora acompañada de mi traducción al castellano incorpora algunos agregados y correcciones que la profesoraAnscombe hizo en el manuscrito durante y después de la lectura del trabajo. Los únicos cambios que he (...) introducido yo en el texto inglés son unas mínimas alteraciones y correcciones gráficas y una corrección ortográfica evidente.Las menciones a términos del original inglés que he incluido en el texto en castellanovan entre corchetes angulares. Salvo las notas, éstas son las únicasinterpolaciones que he hecho en el cuerpo del artículo. (shrink)

The analysis of a previous paper (see Ref. 1), in which the possibility of a Finslerian generalization of the equations of motion of gravitational field sources was demonstrated, is extended by developing the Finslerian generalization of the gravitational field equations on the basis of the complete contractionK = K lj lj of the Finslerian curvature tensorK l j hk (x, y). The relevant Lagrangian is constructed by the replacement of the directional variabley i inK by a vector fieldy i (x), (...) so that the notion of osculation may be regarded as the key concept on which the approach is based. The introduction of the auxiliary vector fieldy i (x) is shown to be of physical significance, for the field equations refer not only to the proper field variables but also to a special coordinate system associated withy i (x) through the Clebsch representation of the latter. The status of the conservation laws proves to be similar to that in the theory of the Yang-Mills field. By choosing a special Finslerian metric function we elucidate in detail the structure of the field equations in the static case. (shrink)

One of the most important insights that Russell had in presenting his philosophy of language was his view of singular definite descriptions. Russell held that singular phrases of the form ‘the so-and-so’ should not be viewed as names, but rather incomplete symbols which can be said to have meaning only in a context. We should not represent the sentence The inventor of bifocals is bald.as a simple subject-predicate sentence of the form ‘Fa.’ but rather as a complex existential sentence. According (...) to Russell we should analyze as There is a unique x such that x invented bifocals and x is bald.Moreover, if Russell's analysis is correct then the proposition expressed by will be true in a given circumstance provided that there is a unique inventor of bifocals who is bald in that circumstance. (shrink)