Moral distress is a well-documented phenomenon for health care providers (HCPs). Exploring HCPs’ perceptions of participation in moral distress interventions using qualitative and quantitative methods enhances understanding of intervention effectiveness. The purpose of this study was to measure and describe the impact of a two-phased intervention on participants’ moral distress. Using a cross-over design, the project aimed to determine if the intervention would decrease moral distress, enhance moral agency, and improve perceptions about the work environment. We used quantitative instruments and (...) explored participants’ perceptions of the intervention using semi-structured interviews. Participants were from inpatient settings, within three major hospitals of a large, urban healthcare system in the Midwest, United States. Participants included nurses (80.6%) and other clinical care providers. Using generalized linear mixed modeling we assessed the change in each of the outcome variables over time controlling for groups. Interviews were audiotaped and professionally transcribed. The written narratives were coded into themes. The change in scores on study instruments trended in the desired direction however did not meet statistical significance. Qualitative interviews revealed that intervention effectiveness was derived from a combination of learning benefits, psychological benefits, and building community that promoted moral agency. Findings demonstrate a clear link between moral distress and moral agency and suggest that Facilitated Ethics Conversations can enhance the work environment. Findings provide insight for developing evidenced-based approaches to address moral distress of hospital nurses. (shrink)

Ellen Furlong and Laurie Santos helpfully summarize a number of fascinating studies of certain influences on both human and monkey behavior. As someone who works primarily in philosophy, I am not in a position to dispute the details of the studies themselves. But in this brief commentary I do want to raise some questions about the inferences Furlong and Santos make on the basis of those studies. In general, I worry that they may be overreaching beyond what their own data (...) suggests. (shrink)

Across mammals, when fathers matter, as they did for hunter-gatherers, sex-similar pair-bonding mechanisms evolve. Attachment fertility theory can explain Schmitt's and other findings as resulting from a system of mechanisms affording pair-bonding in which promiscuous seeking is part. Departures from hunter-gatherer environments (e.g., early menarche, delayed marriage) can alter dating trajectories, thereby impacting mating outside of pair-bonds.

Ofrezco una exposición, tanto apreciativa como crítica, de la interpretaciónpropensista de la probabilidad que Karl Popper introdujo en 1957 y desarrollóen numerosas publicaciones durante los 35 años siguientes.

Philosophers have recently argued, against a prevailing orthodoxy, that standards of knowledge partly depend on a subject’s interests; the more is at stake for the subject, the less she is in a position to know. This view, which is dubbed “Pragmatic Encroachment” has historical and conceptual connections to arguments in philosophy of science against the received model of science as value free. I bring the two debates together. I argue that Pragmatic Encroachment and the model of value-laden science reinforce each (...) other. Drawing on Douglas’ argument about the indispensability of value judgments in science, and psychological evidence about people’s inability to objectively reason about what they care about, I introduce a novel argument for Pragmatic Encroachment. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that values “fill the logical gap” of underdetermination of theory by evidence, namely, values affect our choice between two or more theories that fit the same evidence. The underdetermination model, however, does not exhaust the roles values play in evidential reasoning. I introduce WAVE – a novel account of the logical relations between values and evidence. WAVE states that values influence evidential reasoning by adjusting evidential weights. I argue that the weight-adjusting role of values is distinct (...) from their underdetermination gap-filling role. Values adjust weights in three ways. First, values affect our trust in the testimony of others. Second, values influence the evidential thresholds required for justified epistemic judgments. Third, values influence the relative weight of a certain type of evidence within a body of multimodal discordant evidence. WAVE explains, from an epistemic perspective, rather than psychological, how smokers, for example, can find the same evidence about the dangers of smoking less persuasive than non-smokers. WAVE allows for a wider effect of values on our accepted scientific theories and beliefs than the effect for which the underdetermination model allows alone; therefore, science studies scholars must consider WAVE in their research and analysis of evidential case studies. (shrink)

At 435c-d and 504b ff., Socrates indicates that there is a "longer and fuller way" that one must take in order to get "the best possible view" of the soul and its virtues. But Plato does not have him take this "longer way." Instead Socrates restricts himself to an indirect indication of its goals by his images of sun, line, and cave and to a programmatic outline of its first phase, the five mathematical studies. Doesn't this pointed restraint function as (...) a provocation, moving us to want to begin the "longer way" and to make use of its conceptual resources to rethink Socrates' images? I begin by finding a double movement in the complex trajectory of the five studies: they both guide the soul in the "turn away from what is coming to be ... [to] what is" (518c) and, at the same time, lead the soul back, albeit in the medium of pure intelligibility, to the sensible world; for the pure figures and ratios that they disclose constitute the core structures of sensible things. I then draw on what Socrates says about geometry and harmonics to address three fundamental questions that he leaves open: the nature of the Good in its responsibility for truth and for the being of the forms; the relations of forms, mathematicals, and sensibles as these are disclosed by dialectic; and the bearing of the philosopher's discovery of the Good on his disposition towards his community and the task of ruling. I close by marking six sets of further questions that these reflections bequeath for dialogues to come. (shrink)

After years of activism and scholarship concerning patriarchal social structures, many contemporary societies have made substantial progress in women’s rights. The shortfall, and the work ahead, is well known. Even in societies where the most progress has been achieved, males continue to dominate at key levels of power. Yet, essentialism appears to be widely, although not yet entirely, discounted. In helping to illuminate the social ontology of patriarchy and thereby helping to defuse its injustice, scholars have made proposals of patriarchy’s (...) origins; however, these appear not to be optimally consistent with historical and prehistorical facts. This article offers a different account of patriarchy, arguing that this one can not only explain how such a social condition originated and why it persists, but also point to what may be necessary to do in order to undo it. While I do not contend this ontology of patriarchy is the best possible, it provides a good example of the many issues at stake which an account of patriarchy must explain and points to how we should seek the best ontology as a way of both understanding contemporary societies and suggesting how to rectify a long-standing injustice. (shrink)

Cet article discute l’analyse en termes de DP qui domine actuellement dans la grammaire générative chomskienne, à savoir, l’idée que la tête du groupe nominal est le déterminant, plutôt que le nom. Nous commençons par une discussion des notions de tête et de dépendance et passons en revue différents critères classiques permettant de décider quel élément est la tête dans une construction donnée. Sur base de ceux-ci, nous proposons une série d’arguments suggérant que la position classique est en réalité la (...) bonne et que c’est bien le nom qui est la tête du groupe nominal. Nous étudions ensuite une série d’arguments et d’analyses spécifiques qui ont été avancés en faveur de l’analyse en termes de DP et montrons pourquoi nous ne les considérons pas comme convaincants. En conclusion, nous notons que le choix entre les analyses NP et DP n’est peut-être pas une question empiriquement décidable si l’on s’autorise les représentations syntaxiques très abstraites qui sont actuellement en vogue dans le cadre de la linguistique générative chomskienne. (shrink)

Rethinks the soul in plant-like terms rather than animal, drawing from nineteenth-century philosophy of nature.

Debates rage over what kind of literature we should read, what is good and bad literature, and whether in the global, digital age, literature even has a future. But what exactly is literature? Why should we read literature? How do we read literature? These are some of the important questions J. Hillis Miller answers in this beautifully written and passionate book. He begins by asking what literature is, arguing that the answer lies in literature's ability to create an imaginary (...) world simply with words. On Literature also asks the crucial question of why literature has such authority over us. Returning to Plato, Aristotle and the Bible, Miller argues we should continue to read literature because it is part of our basic human need to create imaginary worlds and to have stories. Above all, On Literature is a plea that we continue to read and care about literature. (shrink)

The ninth volume of the new edition of the Opera omnia of Erasmus is the third tome of the fourth ordo 'moralia continens' and entirely devoted to the edition of the Moriae encomium by Clarence H. Miller. It was Erasmus' own wish that the Moriae encomium should be published under this 'ordo'; v. Ep. I to Botzheim, 30 January 15 2 3, p. 40, II. 9-10; and Ep. 2283 to Boece, 15 March 1530, 1. 1°4. For the editorial principles (...) of the new Erasmus edition we refer the reader to the General introduction of volume 1,1 and to the Prefaces of the other volumes published until now. To our deep regret we have to report the death of Professor S. L. Greenslade, a member ofthe 'Conseil International', and of Professor Myron P. Gilmore. The passing away of these eminent scholars and devoted friends of our new edition is a heavy loss to our project. As new members of the 'Conseil International' were elected C. Augustijn, Amsterdam, Ch. Bene, Grenoble, V. Branca, Venice, Mrs. M. Cytowska, Warsaw, F. Heinimann, Basle. The editorial board was also enlarged; the new membres are: C. L. Heesakkers, Leyden, H. J. de Jonge, Leyden, J. Trapman, The Hague Ooint-Secretary). The editorial board and the editor of the present volume thank all libraries who put books, photostats, microfilms and bibliographical material at their disposal. Referring to the copyright notice on the verso of the title page, and to the agreements made with the authors, the editorial board feels bound to repeat that no part of the volumes which have appeared or will appear under its responsibility can be published without prior permission of the copyright owner. (shrink)

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This chapter contrasts Derrida's strategies of “deconstruction” with Paul de Man's. It shows how each characteristically puts an essay together to make it performatively effective. The author's primary concern is to understand better Derrida's rhetorical strategies in his essays by contrasting them with de Man's. He begins the comparison with a description of de Man's essay. Unlike de Man's essay, Derrida's “Faith and Knowledge” does not end in a climactic unforeseen concluding formulation. It just sort of stops, without by any (...) means having exhausted the energy of repetition with a difference, or “iterability,” that has generated section after section, followed by a short unnumbered coda in italics and parentheses. The author concludes that the juxtaposition of an essay by de Man and an essay by Derrida demonstrates their radical differences in rhetorical strategy. (shrink)

This book contributes to current bioethical debates by providing a critical analysis of the philosophy of human death. Bernard N. Schumacher discusses contemporary philosophical perspectives on death, creating a dialogue between phenomenology, existentialism and analytic philosophy. He also examines the ancient philosophies that have shaped our current ideas about death. His analysis focuses on three fundamental problems: the definition of human death, the knowledge of mortality and of human death as such, and the question of whether death is 'nothing' to (...) us or, on the contrary, whether it can be regarded as an absolute or relative evil. Drawing on scholarship published in four languages and from three distinct currents of thought, this volume represents a comprehensive and systematic study of the philosophy of death, one that provides a provocative basis for discussions of the bioethics of human mortality. (shrink)

On June 16, 1966, the New England Journal of Medicine published “Ethics and Clinical Research” by Henry K. Beecher. Beecher’s account of 22 examples of unethical contemporary clinical research shook up the medical profession and helped pave the way for U.S. federal regulation of research involving human subjects. Five decades later, in this issue of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, we pay tribute to the lasting significance of this whistle-blowing article and to the remarkable contributions of Henry Beecher. Beecher was (...) a pioneer in anesthesiology as an academic discipline and in research on pain and the placebo effect. He was an early and influential champion of randomized placebo-controlled... (shrink)

Exile in the Maghreb: Jews under Islam, Sources and Documents, 997–1912. By Paul B. Fenton and David G. Littman. Madison, NJ: FairLeigh Dickinson University Press, 2016. Pp. xxxv + 627. $60, £39.95 ; $57, £39.95.

Senior service colleges provide professional education to prepare military and government civilians for public service at the senior levels of strategy and policy. Inclusive in the program of study...

Traditionally, philosophers have ascribed moral agency almost exclusively to humans. Early writing about moral agency can be traced to Aristotle and Aquinas. In addition to human moral agents, Aristotle discussed the possibility of moral agency of the Greek gods and Aquinas discussed the possibility of moral agency of angels. In the case of angels, a difficulty in ascribing moral agency was that it was suspected that angels did not have enough independence from God to ascribe to the angels genuine moral (...) choices. Recently, new candidates have been suggested for non‐human moral agency. Floridi and Sanders suggest that artificially intelligence programs that meet certain criteria may attain the status of moral agents; they suggest a redefinition of moral agency to clarify the relationship between artificial and human agents. Other philosophers, as well as scholars in Science and Technology Studies, are studying the possibility that artifacts that are not designed to mimic human intelligence still embody a kind of moral agency. For example, there has been a lively discussion about the moral intent and the consequential effects of speed bumps. The connections and distributed intelligence of a network is another candidate being considered for moral agency. These philosophical arguments may have practical consequences for software developers, and for the people affected by computing. In this paper, we will examine ideas about artificial moral agency from the perspective of a software developer. (shrink)