In The Mysteries of Purification (Kitab asrar al tahara), the third of the forty books of the Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihya' 'ulum al-din), Abu Hamid al-Ghazali explains the fundamentals of the purification that is necessary in order to perform the five daily prayers. The book begins with an introduction to the general topic of purity. Al-Ghazali explains the hadith "Purification is half of faith," and reminds readers that, for the earliest Muslims, inner purification was much more important than (...) outer purification. In chapter 1, he considers purification from impurities: What are the impurities and how should they be removed? Over the following chapters, al-Ghazali examines the lesser ablution (wudu), the greater ablution (ghusl), and the "dry ablution" (ablution without water, or tayammum). He discusses the etiquette of the bathhouse and outlines exactly how to clean the body of external things and natural growths; finally, he discusses the beard and practices related to it. (shrink)

The big five personality traits and entrepreneurial mindset are crucial individual-level elements that determine entrepreneurial intention. This study examines the impact of big five personality traits and EM, on EI using the theory of planned behavior. Besides, this study examined the role of entrepreneurial self-efficacy and attitude toward entrepreneurship influences EI. To achieve the research objectives, a quantitative approach was used. Structural equation modeling and path analysis were conducted using SmartPLS software. Data were collected from 270 respondents through online questionnaires. (...) Findings of the study revealed that big five personality traits influence ESE and ATE which led to EI. Finally, the moderating role of entrepreneurial passion was also found to have strong effect on influence ESE and ATE. This study offers evidence and insights that academics, educators, and others involved in the creation or expansion of entrepreneurial knowledge can use as a reference point. (shrink)

Deliverance from error and attachment to the Lord God of Might and Majesty. [al-Munḳidh min al-ḍalāl]--The beginning of guidance. [Badāyat al-hidāyah].

Deformation of ground during tunnelling projects is one of the complex issues that is required to be monitored carefully to avoid the unexpected damages and human losses. Accurate prediction of ground settlement is a crucial concern for tunnelling problems, and the adequate predictive model can be a vital tool for tunnel designers to simulate the ground settlement accurately. This study proposes relatively new hybrid artificial intelligence models to predict the ground settlement of earth pressure balance shield tunnelling in the Bangkok (...) MRTA project. The predictive models were various nature-inspired frameworks, such as differential evolution, particle swarm optimization, genetic algorithm, and ant colony optimizer to tune the adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system. To obtain the accurate and reliable results, the modeling procedure is established based on four different dataset scenarios including preprocessed and normalized, preprocessed and nonnormalized, non-preprocessed and normalized, and non-preprocessed and nonnormalized datasets. Results indicated that PPN dataset scenario significantly affected the prediction models in terms of their perdition accuracy. Among all the developed hybrid models, ANOFS-PSO model achieved the best predictability performance. In quantitative terms, PPN-ANFIS-PSO model attained the least root mean square error value of 7.98 and a correlation coefficient value of 0.83. Overall, the attained results confirmed the superiority of the explored hybrid AI models as robust predictive model for ground settlement of earth pressure balance shield tunnelling. (shrink)

The rapid growth of covert activities via communications network brought about an increasing need to provide an efficient method for data hiding to protect secret information from malicious attacks. One of the options is to combine two approaches, namely steganography and compression. However, its performance heavily relies on three major factors, payload, imperceptibility, and robustness, which are always in trade-offs. Thus, this study aims to hide a large amount of secret message inside a grayscale host image without sacrificing its quality (...) and robustness. To realize the goal, a new two-tier data hiding technique is proposed that integrates an improved exploiting modification direction method and Huffman coding. First, a secret message of an arbitrary plain text of characters is compressed and transformed into streams of bits; each character is compressed into a maximum of 5 bits per stream. The stream is then divided into two parts of different sizes of 3 and 2 bits. Subsequently, each part is transformed into its decimal value, which serves as a secret code. Second, a cover image is partitioned into groups of 5 pixels based on the original EMD method. Then, an enhancement is introduced by dividing the group into two parts, namely k1 and k2, which consist of 3 and 2 pixels, respectively. Furthermore, several groups are randomly selected for embedding purposes to increase the security. Then, for each selected group, each part is embedded with its corresponding secret code by modifying one grayscale value at most to hide the code in a -ary notational system. The process is repeated until a stego-image is eventually produced. Finally, the χ2 test, which is considered one of the most severe attacks, is applied against the stego-image to evaluate the performance of the proposed method in terms of its robustness. The test revealed that the proposed method is more robust than both least significant bit embedding and the original EMD. Additionally, in terms of imperceptibility and capacity, the experimental results have also shown that the proposed method outperformed both the well-known methods, namely original EMD and optimized EMD, with a peak signal-to-noise ratio of 55.92 dB and payload of 52,428 bytes. (shrink)

This volume of Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics includes selected papers from the 24th Eurasia Business and Economics Society (EBES) Conference, held in Bangkok. The theoretical and empirical papers gathered here cover diverse areas of business and management from different geographic regions; yet the main focus is on the latest findings on evolving marketing methods, analytics, communication standards, and their effects on customer value and engagement. The volume also includes related studies that analyze sustainable consumer behavior, and business strategy-related (...) topics such as cross-border restructuring, quality management standards, and the internationalization of SMEs. (shrink)

This article reviews al‐Ghazālī's conception of Divine Command Theory (DCT) in light of contemporary philosophical developments. There are two well‐known objections against DCT. These include the problem of arbitrariness (PoA), which states that God randomly chose our moral framework for no reason given His capability to choose any moral commands; and the problem of God's goodness (PoGG), which questions God's goodness if morality could be other than what it is. Modern defenders of DCT have attempted to counter these objections through (...) various strategies. This article juxtaposes al‐Ghazālī's interpretation of DCT with modern strategies to illustrate how these two issues are untroubling concerns in al‐Ghazālī's framework. In doing so, it highlights where and how they differ in their approaches. Additionally, it critiques interpretations suggested by some contemporary thinkers who suggest that al‐Ghazālī may not be a strict proponent of DCT. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error. For Ghazālī, I argue, radical scepticism about the possibility of knowledge ensues from intellectualist assumptions about the nature of justification. On the reading that I will propose, Ghazālī holds that foundational knowledge can only be justified via actions that lead to transformative experiences.

ABSTRACT Al-Ghazālī’s engagement with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error has received much attention in recent literature, often in the context of comparing him with Descartes. However, there is one curious text that has gone largely unnoticed by commentators. In his account of how he overcame scepticism vis-à-vis a divine light cast unto his heart, al-Ghazālī makes a cryptic claim that suggests that primary truths are inherent to the mind, and that said cognitive status of primary truths is related to (...) his overcoming of scepticism. Although this one text does not straightforwardly prove that al-Ghazālī is a nativist, I argue that there are other texts that plausibly reveal his nativism. As such, I argue that al-Ghazālī can be read as a nativist, and I reconstruct a way in which his nativism helps explain how he overcomes scepticism. In doing so, I defend the (standard) strong divine interventionist reading of al-Ghazālī’s response to scepticism, against Hadisi’s recent weak divine interventionist reading. (shrink)

This paper clarifies the philosophical connection between Al-Ghazali and Descartes, with the goal to articulate similarities and differences in their famous journeys from doubt to certainty. As such, its primary focus is on the chain of their reasoning, starting from their conceptions of truth and doubt arguments, until their arrival at truth. Both philosophers agreed on the ambiguous character of ordinary everyday knowledge and decided to set forth in undermining its foundations. As such, most scholars tend to agree that the (...) doubt arguments used by Descartes and Al-Ghazali are similar, but identify their departures from doubt as radically different: while Descartes found his way out of doubt through the cogito and so reason, Al-Ghazali ended his philosophical journey as a Sufi in a sheer state of passivity, waiting for the truth to be revealed to him by God. This paper proves this is not the case. Under close textual scrutiny and through the use of basic Husserlian-phenomenological concepts, I show that Al-Ghazali's position was misunderstood, thus disclosing his true philosophic nature. (shrink)

Centuries after his death, al-Ghazali remains one of the most influential figures of the Islamic intellectual tradition. Although he is best known for his _Incoherence of the Philosophers_, _Moderation in Belief_ is his most profound work of philosophical theology. In it_,_ he offers what scholars consider to be the best defense of the Ash'arite school of Islamic theology that gained acceptance within orthodox Sunni theology in the twelfth century, though he also diverges from Ash'arism with his more rationalist approach to (...) the _Quran_. Together with _The Incoherence of the Philosophers_, _Moderation in Belief_ informs many subsequent theological debates, and its influence extends beyond the Islamic tradition, informing broader questions within Western philosophical and theological thought. The first complete English-language edition of _Moderation in Belief_, this new annotated translation by Aladdin M. Yaqub draws on the most esteemed critical editions of the Arabic texts and offers detailed commentary that analyzes and reconstructs the arguments found in the work’s four treatises. Explanations of the historical and intellectual background of the texts also enable readers with a limited knowledge of classical Arabic to fully explore al-Ghazali and this foundational text for the first time. With the recent resurgence of interest in Islamic philosophy and the conflict between philosophy and religion, this new translation will be a welcome addition to the scholarship. (shrink)

This paper is going to re-read Imam Mohammad al-Ghazali’s moral ideas in order to find the responses to the questions of moral psychology. Al-Ghazali, following the Greek and Islamic philosophers, relates each virtue or vice to a particular faculty in man’s soul. Moreover, following the Asharites, he considers the basis of moral good and badness to be religious. Furthermore, having mentioned al-Ghazali and Hume’s opinions as well as their similarities, this writing explains why al-Ghazali’s view on the moral motivation has (...) not encountered Hume’s objections. And finally, it presents the differences between al-Ghazali and the Greek philosophers’ views on virtues and vices as well as evaluates al-Ghazali’s psychological opinions in ethics. (shrink)

Commentators have noticed the striking similarities between the skep­tical arguments of al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error and Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. However, commentators agree that their solutions to skepticism are radically different. Al-Ghazālī does not use rational proofs to defeat skepticism; rather, he relies on a supernatural light [nūr] sent by God to rescue him from skepticism. Descartes, on the other hand, relies on the natural light of reason [lumen naturale] to prove the existence of God, (...) mind, and body. In this paper, I argue that Descartes’ solution is closer to al-Ghazālī’s than commentators have allowed. A close reading of the cosmological argument of the Third Meditation reveals that there is also a type of divine intervention em­ployed in the Meditations, which helps Descartes defeat skepticism. This reading may buttress the case made by some that al-Ghazālī influenced Descartes; but more importantly, it requires us to rethink key features of Descartes’ epistemology. (shrink)

Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) was concerned that early Islamic philosophers were leaning too heavily and uncritically on Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas in developing their models of God and His relation to the world. He argued that their views were not only irreligious, but philosophically problematic, and he defended an alternative view aimed at staying closer to the Qur’an and the beliefs of the ordinary Muslim. Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) responded to al-Ghazali’s critique and developed a sophisticated Aristotelian view. The present chapter explores their (...) views in light of a problem facing any philosophical model of God in Islam or classical theism more generally, the problem of conceiving of God’s nature and relation to the world in a way that places an appropriate distance between God and humans. On the one hand, we want a notion of God that is not overly anthropomorphic, or that does not make him to be too much like us. On the other hand, we want to be able to say something positive and substantive about God. And we want to do this while preserving the harmony of reason and revelation, of philosophy and religion, as much as possible. (shrink)

Ghazālī’s The Incoherence of the Philosophers is an unusual philosophical work for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the author’s explicit disavowalof any of the conclusions contained within it. The present essay examines some of the hermeneutical challenges that face readers of the work and offers anexegetical account of the much-neglected Third Discussion, which examines a key point of Neoplatonic metaphysics. The paper argues that Ghazālī’s maintaining of the incompatibility of metaphysical creationism and Neoplatonic emanationism should (...) not be viewed as simply a rhetorical or dialectical argument, but rather is best understood, to use Ghazālī’s words, as a philosophical “proof.” Essential to this proof in the solution to the argument of the Third Discussion is an implicit theory of metaphorical predication that can be pieced together from several of Ghazālī’s remarks as well as a reductio ad absurdum argument about the very possibility of ethical discourse. (shrink)

Medieval philosophy has often been stereotypically characterized as rigidly reliant on authority and lacking originality. However, the present research challenges this perception by unveiling the lively debates among medieval philosophers in the Islamic World regarding the autonomy of thought for both esteemed scholars and everyday individuals. Rather than passively accepting authoritative doctrines, these philosophers contemplated the extent to which independent reflection should play a role. Surprisingly, their reflections resonate in the contemporary world as we grapple with parallel questions about the (...) balance between authority and individual inquiry in our society. The first part of the paper introduces a timeless challenge faced by medieval Islamic philosophers: the formation of beliefs. This predicament persists today – how much should we rely on authority without critical examination, and when should we subject our beliefs to scrutiny? The paper introduces an Islamic classical tradition followed by Muslim jurists, theologians, and philosophers: the nuanced distinction between Taqlid (following authority) and Ijtihad (independent reasoning) to address this. The perspective of Al-Ghazali, a prominent representative of this tradition, is thoroughly examined, highlighting its contributions and challenges. In its methodological approach, this paper rigorously analyzes primary and secondary sources relevant to Al-Ghazali’s views in Arabic and English. This comprehensive analysis aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the intricate interplay between authority and independent reasoning in the context of medieval Islamic philosophy. (shrink)

Mythological language is sometimes understood as a way of representing, by concrete imagery, more abstract notions. In this paper, we will pose some metaphysical questions about the possibility of such a representation. These questions will serve to motivate a brief tour of Mishkāt al-Anwār (Niche of Lights)—Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s commentary on the famous ayat al-nur (“verse of light”) of the Qur’an—wherein is discussed, among other things, how symbolic imagery is possible, and “the respect in which the spirits of the meanings (...) are specified within the frames of the similitudes.”. (shrink)

Al-Ghazālī's Maqāsid al-falāsifa is an intelligent reworking of Avicenna's Dānesh-name . It was assumed by Latin scholastics that the Maqāsid contained the views of Al-Ghazālī himself. Very well read in Latin translation, it was the basic text from which the Latin authors gained their knowledge of Arabic logic. This article examines the views on the form and matter of the syllogism given in the Maqāsid and considers how they would have been viewed by a Latin reader in the thirteenth century.

This article studies Ghazali’s viewpoint regarding Satan or Iblis. Ghazali’s interpretation of Satan is very different from that of traditional ones. Despite the Koran’s negative portrayal of Satan, Ghazali elaborates a new transformative theology of Satan. He defends Satan and considers him as the paragon of lovers in self-sacrifice. According to him, Satan’s refusal to bow down before God’s creation, Adam, signifies that Satan alone manifests the purest devotion to God’s oneness and is thus the unrivalled champion of tawhid. Ghazali’s (...) sympathetic understanding of Satan is a logical outcome of his theory of love. He depicts Satan not only as a sincere worshipper, but also as a true lover. He loves God even though he curses and casts him out. Because of being cursed, he has acquired a long life and a position of power over the whole world. (shrink)

I will in this paper attempt to extract a positive doctrine on the substantiality of the human soul from Ghazali"s critique of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition. Rather than reflecting on the possibilities and limitations of intercultural dialogue, my aim is to directly engage in such dialogue. Accordingly, I will not suppose that we need to develop and apply external standards according to which one of the two philosophical traditions addressed here, Western and Islamic, may turn out to be superior. Up (...) to a certain point, Western and Islamic philosophy are virtually indistinguishable regarding their style, the main topics, and the arguments discussed, which both take over from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Further, at least up to Ghazali, no Islamic philosopher actually employs standards of rationality that would differ from the standards also accepted in the West. Ghazali himself would certainly be at least as disturbed by a valid philosophical objection to his claims as any other serious philosopher. He does not pursue another kind of project, but submits to the same standards of truth and validity, as far as philosophical argument reaches. His point is, of course, that these standards do not reach as far as some philosophers suppose. But this, again, is not a particularly "Islamic� insight. (shrink)

The paper offers a critical examination of Ghazali’s main arguments against the views of the philosophers on causation. The authors argue that Ghazali’s definition of miracles as "departure from the usual course of events" carries at least two meanings, only one of which is in conflict with necessary causal relations. The authors also argue that Ghazali’s desire to uphold the possibility of miracles need not constrain him to repudiate the idea of necessary connection, since he is able to explain miracles (...) in ways that are compatible with belief in causality and necessary connection. The authors conclude by examining some arguments to the effect that Ghazali’s attempt to hold on to both miracles and necessary connection is inherently unstable, and explore directions which Ghazalians may take in order to counter these arguments. (shrink)

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this (...) paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position is incoherent. (shrink)

Explore's al-Ghazāli's skeptical methodology in Deliverance from Error.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ghazali and Demonstrative Science MICHAEL E. MARMURA I MEDIEVALISLA_MICtheologians subjected Aristotle's theory of the essential efficient cause to severe criticism and rejected it. This criticism and rejection finds its most forceful expression in the writings of Ghazali (al-Ghaz~li) (d. 1111).1 In his Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), he argues on logical and empirical grounds that the alleged necessary connection between what is habitually regarded as the natural (...) efficient cause and its effect cannot be proven. He does not, however, take an agnostic stand on this question but proceeds to affirm two points: (1) that there is no causal agency in natural things; (2) that all natural events are the direct creation of God. Ghazali, moreover, does not confine such divine action to the realm of the inanimate and the irrational, in his al-Iqtis.~d fi-l-Ftiqad (The Golden Mean of Belief), he affirms the doctrine that the individual human act, like any other occurrence in the world, is also the direct creation of God. Causal efficacy resides in God alone. But the divine act, for Ghazali, is not an essential act. It does not proceed as the necessary consequence of divine essence. It is the arbitrary decree of the divine will, an attribute coeternal, but not identical with divine essence. Ghazali thus denies essential action altogether. In all this, he gives expression to the occasionalism of the Islamic school of dogmatic theology (kal~m) to which he belonged, the Ashcarite school. Ghazali had also a keen interest in logic. He wrote logical treatises for his fellow theologians, encouraging them to master this art as a tool to rebutt their doctrinal opponents. The~ treatises, in the main, sum up and explain the logic used by the Islamic philosophers--a logic that reflects the Stoic and Aristotelian traditions. Ghazali recognizes formal logic to be philosophically neutral, and hence in no way conflicting with his theology." He does not confine himself to formal logic in these expositions, however, but discusses Aristotelian demonstration. And it is in his statements on demonstration that we seem to be confronted with paradox. Demonstrative science, as understood by the Islamic philosophers, rests on the theory of essential causes and functions in terms of it. Indeed, in his reply to Ghazali's rejection of essential efficient causes in nature, Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (d. 1198) argues Texts frequently referred to in the notes will be abbreviated as follows: Demonstration: Ibn Sin~, Al-Shifa~; Logic V.; Demonstration, ed. A. E. Affifi,revised by I. Madkur (Cairo, 1956). Iqti~dd: A1-Ghaz~li, Al-Iqtisad Fi-l-ICtiqad(Cairo: no date). Metaphysics: Ibn Sin~, A1-Shif~: al-Ilah~yat (Metaphysics), ed. C. C. Anawati, S. Dunya, and S. Zayd, revised by I. Madkur (2 vols.; Cairo, 1960). MI: AI-Ghaz~lI,MiCyaral-CIlm,ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1961). TF: A1-Ghaz~ll, Tahafut al-Falasifa, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut, 1927). TT: Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Tahafut al-Tahafut, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, 1930). 2 TF., pp. 15-17. [1831 184 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY that such a rejection would render demonstrative science impossible. We would have no true knowledge; at best, only opinion. 3For this staunch defender of Aristotle, the theory of natural efficient causality constitutes a necessary condition for demonstrative science. Yet Ghazali in his writings does not deny the claim that demonstration gives us certain knowledge about the natural order. On the contrary, he seems to be affirming this in both his Tahdfutand the logical treatise he appended to this work, Mi~jdral-CIlm(The Standardfor Knowledge).If Ghazali does in fact uphold this claim for demonstration, then he must either deny that the theory of essential efficient causality is a necessary condition for demonstrative science, or fall into contradiction. At first glance, Ghazali's position in the Micy~r,where he gives his most comprehensive treatment of demonstration, is highly ambiguous and suggests contradiction. He seems for the most part to be reproducing the essentials of the Aristotelian demonstrative theory. Although in one section he reaffirms his rejection of necessary causal connection in nature, he nonetheless continues to use such terms as "cause," "effect," "necessity" and "certainty" in what appear to be... (shrink)

Many scholars of modern philosophy link the discussion of the necessary nature of causality inexorably with the name of the David Hume. Yet, long before Hume, the issue of necessary causality had been taken up by the Medieval Islamic philosopher Al-Ghazali. The purpose of this paper will be to examine Al-Ghazali’s views concerning the necessary nature of causality in his work ’The Incoherence of the Philosophers’ with particular reference to the issue of whether there is a complete rejection of causality, (...) and whether Ghazali’s rejection of necessary causality entails that he holds to some sort of occasionalism. (shrink)

: Al-Ghazali on Power, Causation, and 'Acquisition' Edward Omar Moad In Al-Iqtişādfial-I'tiqād (Moderation in belief ), at the end of his chapter on divine power, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali writes, "No created thing comes about through another [created thing]. Rather, all come about through [divine] power." A precise understanding of what al-Ghazali means by this statement requires an understanding of his conception of power. Here, we will articulate this conception of power and show how it renders a distinctive occasionalist thesis that (...) follows from al-Ghazali's doctrine of the pervasiveness of divine power. Second, we will review an argument by al-Ghazali against natural necessity and show that the argument turns on the clear implication that, on empirical grounds, al-Ghazali's conception of power is the only understanding of causation that we have. This follows from an epistemology of power held by al-Ghazali that bears basic similarities to that of John Locke. Third, we will address the tension between such an epistemology of power and the implications of occasionalism with a look at al-Ghazali's discussion of the theory of kash, or 'acquisition.'. (shrink)

There are two ways in which Ghazali contributes to the discussion of whether God exists: by arguing for the existence of God, and by arguing against certain views which, in his opinion, stand in the way of truly believing that God exists. In this paper I examine Ghazali’s argument from creation and his refutation or the philosophers’ second proof for the eternity or the world. My purpose will be to argue that: firstly, Ghazali’s argument and his refutation are based on (...) incompatible views of time, and cannot, therefore, both be maintained. Secondly, Ghazali fails to establish the one interesting premiss which he employs in his argument from creation. (shrink)

The theological foundations of Ghazali's causal theory are fully expressed in the chapter on the attribute of divine power in his al-Iqtiād fi al-I'tiqād. The basic doctrine which he proclaims and argues for is that divine power, an attribute additional to the divine essence, is one and pervasive. It does not consist of a multiplicity of powers that produce a multiplicity of effects, but is a unitary direct cause of each and every created existent. In a defense of the doctrine (...) of kasb, Ghazali argues that power in all animate creatures is created directly by God and that there is created with it the object of power, normally, but erroneously regarded as its effect: the object of power is in fact directly created by God. It exists with the created power, but not by it. In his critique of the Mu'tazilite theory of the generated act he again denies that created power has any causal efficacy and denies that inanimate things have any causal efficacy. What one normally regards as the effects of inanimate causes are in reality their concomitants, directly caused by divine power. The discussion of kasb, the longest in the chapter, includes Ghazali's spirited defense of it against possible objections. The defense, however, as will be shown, is not immune against criticism. At the same time, the discussion of kasb, central as it is, has to be understood in the context of the chapter as a whole, whose intricate arguments remain integrated and unified. Hence a brief exposition of the chapter's arguments will first be given, followed by a critical comment on some aspects of Ghazali's defense of kasb. This is then followed by an annotated translation of the entire chapter, a chapter so very basic for the study of Ghazali's position on causality. (shrink)

Al-Ghazālī and the Idea of Moral Beauty rethinks the relationship between the good and the beautiful by considering the work of eleventh-century Muslim theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. A giant of Islamic intellectual history, al-Ghazālī is celebrated for his achievements in a wide range of disciplines. One of his greatest intellectual contributions lies in the sphere of ethics, where he presided over an ambitious attempt to integrate philosophical and scriptural ideas into a seamless ethical vision. The connection between ethics and aesthetics (...) turns out to be a signature feature of this account. Virtue is one of the forms of beauty, and human beings are naturally disposed to respond to it with love. The universal human response to beauty in turn provides the central paradigm for thinking about the love commanded by God. While al-Ghazālī's account of divine love has received ample attention, his special way of drawing the good into relation with the beautiful has oddly escaped remark. In this book Sophia Vasalou addresses this gap by offering a philosophical and contextual study of this aspect of al-Ghazālī's ethics and of the conception of moral beauty that emerges from it. This book will be of interest to scholars and students in Islamic ethics, Islamic intellectual history, and the history of ethics. (shrink)

_Mu__ḥ__ammad Ghazālī (d. 1111) influenced some of the key metaphysical teachings of Shia Safavid philosophers, most prominently, Mullā __Ṣ__adrā Shīrāzī (d. ca. 1636). In this paper, I argue that Mullā __Ṣ__adrā reads Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037) through the lens of Mu__ḥ__ammad Ghazālī’s Sufi Ash__ʿ__arism to offer a solution to the problem of freewill in the Islamic context. In his adaptation of causal necessity from Ibn S__ī__n__ā__, Mull__ā_ _Ṣ__adrā argues that “necessity” as a concept is co-extensional with “existence” because in reality (...) all that is the case is necessarily so. On the other hand, all things including voluntary actions and will are only relatively existent since the only independent existence is that of God. I demonstrate that like Ibn Sīnā, Mullā __Ṣ__adrā acknowledges the existence of a causal chain in which all intermediary causes including human freewill have causal power. But, similar to Ghazālī’s account, all human acts including voluntary ones are from God since in Mullā __Ṣ__adrā’s universe freewill is a lower degree of God’s Will. For Mullā __Ṣ__adrā, the acquisition of action by human beings in the case of voluntary actions, a notion that he adopts from Ghazālī, is the same as “acquiring” existence from God’s existence._. (shrink)

The Islamic Medieval Philosopher al-Ghazᾱlî, known to the Latins as Algazel, was influential in the shaping of the intellectual philosophic movements in the thirteenth century. Though Ghazali’s predecessor Ibn Sînᾱ and successor Ibn Rushd received the philosophic credit due to them, Ghazali’s own philosophic ideas have not been significantly assessed; and hence Ghazali’s “fame” lies, we are told, in being responsible for the decline of Medieval Philosophy, especially Islamic Philosophy, a claim that is extremely difficult to prove. But be that (...) as it may, the intellectual movement in Europe during the thirteenth century pursued the intellectual Islamic heritage, not just of Avicenna and Averroës, but also that of Ghazali. Granted that Ghazali’s philosophic ideas did not assume a definite pattern in the philosophic literature—as was the case with Avicenna and Averroës—still a careful study of Ghazali’s works will reveal how profound and widespread his influence was on Western Medieval scholars. A case in point is the influence of Ghazali on Saint Thomas Aquinas—who studied the works of the Islamic philosophers, especially Ghazali’s, at The University of Naples. Thus in the course of the subsequent analysis, similarities between Ghazali and Aquinas will reveal themselves. The aim of this paper, however, does not consist in delineating their refutations of the arguments of the philosophers that one finds in Ghazali’s and Aquinas’s works. Rather I shall primarily deal with their discussion of the principle of causality and then indicate how the works of Ghazali have played an important role in the shaping of the philosophic ideas of Aquinas. (shrink)

: The "major Islamic philosophers," writes Deborah Black, "produced no works dedicated to aesthetics, although their writings do address issues that contemporary philosophers might study under that heading." The emergent theme in this essay is that classical Islamic philosophy may be studied within a framework of aesthetics. To achieve this goal, the metaphysics of Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111) and the aesthetics of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) will be brought together.

This short book, based on authentic sources, outlines the story of Imam al-Ghazali's life.

Muhammad Abed Al-Jabri is a famous philosophical and scientific figure in contemporary Arab thought. He is the author of the philosophy of "the Arab mind" and "the criticism of the Arab mind." He tried to establish his theory of looking at the ancient Arab heritage and modern Arab thought. He also tried to view them according to the critical vision criteria, which he laid the methodological foundations for in his essential philosophical writings, especially in the critique of the Arab mind (...) trilogy. In this study, I seek to analyze and study various aspects of his analytical and critical approach towards Al-Ghazali and his theoretical creativity. As well as revealing the specificity of his position on the intellectual path of Al-Ghazali himself, based on the sequence of his books, Al-Jabri considered Al-Ghazali's personality as a large and complex problem, so that It is challenging to define entirely and accurately. However, this does not exclude him from the possibility of defining the criteria of science in general and philosophy in particular. In this research, I tried to reveal that the position of Al-Jabri himself represents in some sense the continuation of the problematic and complexity of Al-Ghazali himself. Al-Jabri raised more problems than the answer to them. And the controversy remains and is getting stronger. The research into the personality and works of Al-Ghazali seems to have been and will remain for a long time due to the problematic character of Al-Ghazali himself, the diversity and differences of his intellectual, creative writing, and his tortuous nature. Hence, this study constitutes a contribution in this field. (shrink)

Occasionalism is the doctrine that God is the sole immediate cause of all events, to the exclusion of any causal participation on the part of creatures. While this doctrine clearly has interesting implications with regard to causation and the philosophy of natural science, few have noticed that it also seems to entail, not only that creatures have no causal power whatsoever, but that they are completely devoid of intrinsic natures, conceived as intrinsic dispositional properties. In this paper, I will outline (...) what is probably the first systematic argument for occasionalism, mounted by the eleventh-century Muslim, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, and show how the implication in question follows from this argument. (shrink)