Etienne Gilson Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, first delivered as the Richard Lectures in 1937, was published in 1938 and became an immediate success. Not only does it contribute to a major question of debate in Christian, Jewish, and Islamic philosophy and religion in the medieval period but it also insists on the validity of truth obtainable through reason as well as revelation, on rational argument alongside religious faith. This message is as important in the twenty-first century (...) as it was in the fourth century of the young Augustine, the thirteenth of St Thomas Aquinas, and the twentieth of the mature Gilson. (shrink)

In this classic work, the eminent Catholic philosopher Étienne Gilson deals with one of the most important and perplexing metaphysical problems: the relation between our notion of God and demonstrations of his existence. Gilson examines Greek, Christian, and modern philosophy as well as the thinking that has grown out of our age of science in this fundamental analysis of the problem of God. “[I] commend to another generation of seekers and students this deeply earnest and yet wistfully gentle (...) little essay on the most important of all metaphysical—and existential—questions.... The historical sweep is breathtaking, the one-liners arresting, and the style, both intellectual and literary, altogether engaging.” —Jaroslav Pelikan, from the foreword “We have come to expect from the pen of M. Gilson not only an accurate exposition of the thought of the great philosophers, ancient and modern, but what is of much more importance and of greater interest, a keen and sympathetic insight into the reasons for that thought. The present volume does not fail to fulfill our expectations. It should be read by every Christian thinker.” —Ralph O. Dates, _America_. (shrink)

This paper aims to understand the relationship between ignorance and vulnerability by drawing on recent work on the epistemology of ignorance. After elaborating how we might understand the importance of human vulnerability, I develop the claim that ignorance of vulnerability is produced through the pursuit of an ideal of invulnerability that involves both ethical and epistemological closure. The ignorance of vulnerability that is a prerequisite for such invulnerability is, I contend, a pervasive form of ignorance that underlies and grounds other (...) oppressive forms of ignorance. Thus, undoing such forms of ignorance requires working toward a particular form of vulnerability: epistemic vulnerability. (shrink)

English summary: Etienne Gilson states that God is such a sure notion, that it would be useless to attempt to prove His existence. More interesting for this philosopher is to try to understand how a true atheist, one who dogmatically believes that god applies to nothing in reality, would explain such a belief. French description: J'ai souvent ete prie, parfois somme, quelque fois meme mis au defi de donner des preuves de l'existence de Dieu. Je n'ai jamais pu me (...) passionner pour la question. Je me sens si certain qu'une realite transcendante au monde et a moi-meme repond au mot Dieu, que la perspective de chercher des preuves de ce dont je suis si sur me semble denuee d'interet. Non seulement ces preuves ne m'apprendraient rien que je ne sache, mais j'aurais le sentiment de raisonner au profit d'une de ces certitudes acquises d'avance qui causent leurs demonstrations plutot qu'elles n'en resultent. Ceux qui prennent plaisir a gagner au jeu en trichant sont comprehensibles, car ils gagnent quelque chose, mais puisqu'une demonstration faussee ne prouve rien, son auteur n'a rien a gagner. En revanche, justement parce que l'existence de Dieu me parait spontanement certaine, je suis curieux des raisons que d'autres peuvent avoir de dire que Dieu n'existe pas. Pour moi, c'est la non-existence de Dieu qui fait question. Je desire donc connaitre et mettre a l'epreuve quelques-unes des raisons invoquees en faveur de l'atheisme. Je veux dire, de l'atheisme dogmatique et positif, c'est-a-dire de la doctrine qui, apres mure reflexion, conclut comme une certitude rationnelle que rien qui reponde au mot dieu n'existe en realite. Par rien, j'entends aucun etre. (shrink)

With his usual lucidity, Etienne Gilson addresses the idea that "art is the making of beauty for beauty's own sake." By distinguishing between aesthetics, which promotes art as a form of knowledge, and philosophy, which focuses on the presence of the artist's own talent or genius, Gilson maintains that art belongs to a different category entirely, the category of "making." Gilson's intellectually stimulating meditation on the relation of beauty and art is indispensable to philosophers and artists alike.

**** A reprint of Gilson's estimable book of 1936 (Sheed and Ward) (endorsed by BCL3). These 20 lectures were delivered as Gifford Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of Carnap's philosophy. Against that reading, Oliveira and Psillos argue (...) that within Carnap's philosophy there is no place for the Kuhnian theses of incommensurability, holism, and theory-ladenness of observations. This paper presents each of those readings and argues that Carnap and Kuhn have non-opposing views on holism, incommensurability, the theory-ladenness of observations, and scientific revolutions. We note at the very end - without dwelling on the point, however - that they come apart on other matters, such as their views on metaphysics and on the context of discovery/justification distinction. (shrink)

Le present livre repose sur la conviction profonde et inveteree chez son auteur, que l'art n'est pas une facon de connaissance, mais qu'il releve au contraire d'un ordre distinct de celui du connaitre, qui est l'ordre du faire ou, s'il est permis de s'exprimer ainsi, de la factivite. Il s'agit donc ici uniquement de philosophie, en commencant par le commencement, qui consiste a chercher, au moins brievement, quel genre de question de philosophie doit se poser au sujet de l'art. A (...) partir de la, reflechissant en metaphysicien a la lumiere des premiers principes, on s'est efforce d'eclaircir successivement les notions principales a mesure qu'elles s'offraient a l'esprit. (shrink)

This essay argues that dominant responses to the COVID-19 pandemic redouble disparities in vulnerability to harms because these responses simply attempt to return to conditions prior to the outbreak of the virus. Although the widespread impact of COVID-19 has made interdependence more vivid, the underlying sociocultural devaluation of vulnerability, relationality, and dependency has intensified structural inequalities. People who were already disempowered and disadvantaged have been consigned to even more precarious conditions. A feminist ethical perspective avows vulnerability, relationality, and dependency as (...) conditions that are both unavoidable and central to life. Such a perspective thus provides insight into why some dominant responses to the virus are unjust and what more ethical and more socially just responses to the pandemic, which foster social health as well as physical health, might look like. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to discuss the meaning of Lacan's uses of the structural paradigm. The investigation will emphasize the function of this use in terms of relations between psychoanalysis and history of sciences. Freud, in order to establish the epistemological identity for psychoanalyses was impelled to choose between Naturwissenschaften or Geisteswissenschaften. By assuming the natural sciences model Freud has created what one can call a certain epistemological discomfort: model and object seems not to fit each other. (...) The influence of Koyre's work is here remarkable. Lacan's uses of structural paradigm may be seemed as a strategy to create a new space for psychoanalysis in science. Only a structuralist science could formulate a conception of the subject that is nor naturalistic, nor psychological. This is showed particularly in what concerns the category of cause. (shrink)

In this final edition of his classic study of St. Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson presents the sweeping range and organic unity of Thomistic philosophical thought. The philosophical thinking of Aquinas is the result of reason being challenged to relate to many theological conceptions of the Christian tradition. Gilson carefully reviews how Aquinas grapples with the relation itself of faith and reason and continuing through the existence and nature of God and His creation, the world and its creatures, especially (...) human beings with their power of intellect, will, and moral life. He concludes this study by discussing the life of people in society, along with their purpose and final destiny. Gilson demonstrates that Aquinas drew from a wide spectrum of sources in the development of his thought-from the speculations of the ancient Greeks such as Aristotle, to the Arabic and Jewish philosophers of his time, as well as from Christian writers and scripture. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas offers students of philosophy and medieval studies an insightful introduction to the thought of Aquinas and the Scholastic philosophy of the Middles Ages, insights that are still revelant for today. (shrink)

Si l'histoire de la pensee medievale inclut celle de ses influences, comme l'histoire de la pensee moderne celle de ses sources, il est alors doublement legitime de se demander ce que peut nous apprendre sur la pensee cartesienne sa confrontation historique avec la pensee medievale, au contact de laquelle elle s'est formee, et a l'encontre de laquelle elle s'est developpee. Prenant la suite de travaux anterieurs, cet ouvrage d'Etienne Gilson envisage tout d'abord la confrontation dans une perspective genetique (en (...) cherchant dans certaines doctrines medievales les sources de theses cartesiennes comme l'inneisme, l'etude des meteores ou de la circulation sanguine), avant de considerer plus precisement le rapport de la metaphysique cartesienne et de la metaphysique medievale a travers l'examen de certains points de doctrine particulierement delicats. C'est ici notamment que sont rencontres et eclaircis les problemes de la critique cartesienne des formes substantielles, du dialogue de Descartes avec saint Augustin a l'occasion du cogito, avec saint Thomas dans la preuve de l'existence de Dieu par la causalite de l'idee, et avec saint Anselme dans la preuve dite ontologique. Le caractere novateur de la pensee cartesienne se trouve ainsi etabli avec une acuite inedite. (shrink)

The received view in mainstream philosophy is that violence is an ‘act’, to be defined in terms of ‘force’ and ‘intentionality’. This approach regrettably and inexcusably tends to prioritise the agent performing the act of violence in question. This paper argues that we should resist this tendency, in order to prioritise the victim or survivor of violence, and her personal experience, not that of the perpetrator. Starting from an analysis of the devastating impact of violence that characterises the experience of (...) sexual violation and its aftermath, based on the memoirs of Susan Brison (philosopher) and Alice Sebold (novelist), we will then proceed to argue that violence should not be thought of merely in terms of an ‘act’, but also as an ‘experience’, the difference being that an act is temporally determinate while an experience is temporally indeterminate. With the help of a phenomenological approach, we will argue that violence has time-indeterminate intended and unintended consequences; these are the ripples of violence. Finally, some of the moral, legal and political implications of acknowledging the temporal indeterminacy of violence will be highlighted. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay elaborates how an imbalanced reciprocity between inhabitants of places of relative safety and places of greater precarity results from pursuing security on the basis of a reactive fear of vulnerability. It analyzes a range of features that shape the complex forms that vulnerability takes with a particular focus on how the constitution of places as rhetorically and corporeally secure or not renders different groups of people secure and/or subject to heightened exposure to harm. This analysis suggests that vulnerability (...) is better conceived as a process than a quality, mediating between conceptions of vulnerability as a universal condition and as a highly specific empirical condition. Finally, by departing from the negative, reactive view of vulnerability that animates the supposition of the boundedness of selves and places, an alternative conception of security that neither equates it with invulnerability nor opposes it to vulnerability can be developed. (shrink)

When Gilson died in 1978, a great deal of his work on the history of philosophy, and specifically God, the primacy of existence or esse over essence, and the impact of Christianity on philosophy had been translated. A significant amount of material, however, has not yet appeared into English. The publication of Medieval studies represents a vital step in bringing these important works into the English-speaking world. The opening piece revisits a battle now won (and won in great measure (...) by Gilson’s efforts), namely the fight to acknowledge the very existence of medieval philosophy and win its place in the academic world. But the article also makes the effort--which becomes a connecting thread throughout the nine articles--to pinpoint the uniqueness of what Gilson calls Christian philosophy. All the articles give an insight into the great synthetic visions articulated by the better-known works of Gilson like The Spirit of Medieval philosophy. "The Middle Ages and ancient naturalism" contrasts Renaissance humanists and Reformers with the medievals on the defining issue of their attitude toward nature to understand who actually stands closer to the Greeks. In his examination of the Latin Averroist Boethius of Dacia’s book on the eternity of the world, Gilson finds that Boethius never expresses the view attributed to Latin Averroism that there are contradictory truths in religion and philosophy. The closing article studies the profound influence of the great Muslim thinker Avicenna on Latin Europe drawing a parallel between Avicenna’s work and that of the great Christian medievals like Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. (shrink)

With Dostoyevsky's Idiot and Aquinas' Dumb Ox as guides, this book seeks to recover the elemental mystery of the natural law, a law revealed only in wonder. If ethics is to guide us along the way, it must recover its subordination; description must precede prescription. If ethics is to invite us along the way, it cannot lead, either as politburo, or even as public orthodoxy. It cannot be smugly symbolic but must be by way of signage, of directionality, of the (...) open realization that ethical meaning is en route, pointing the way because it is within the way, as only sign, not symbol, can point to the sacramental terminus. The courtesies of dogma and tradition are the road signs and guideposts along the longior via, not themselves the termini. We seek the dialogic heart of the natural law through two seemingly contradictory voices and approaches: St. Thomas Aquinas and his famous five ways, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky's holy idiot, Prince Myshkin. It is precisely the apparent miscellany of these selected voices that provide us with a connatural invitation into the natural law as subordinated, as descriptive guide, not as prescriptive leader. -- back cover. (shrink)

CHAPTER I LOGICISM AND PHILOSOPHY In the preface to his Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel rightly remarks that knowing a philosophical system is something more ...

Dans sa these de 1913, La liberte chez Descartes et la theologie, Etienne Gilson inaugure le geste qu'il prolongera dans l'Index scolastico-cartesien et les Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien: situer l'oeuvre de Descartes dans le contexte intellectuel de son epoque. S'il est certain qu'avec Descartes la philosophie tout entiere semble prendre un nouveau depart, il n'en est pas moins sur que cette pensee s'est formee sous l'influence de la theologie scolastique (...) a laquelle Descartes fut initie lors de ses etudes chez les Jesuites. Etienne Gilson se propose ainsi d'eclairer de cette influence les definitions cartesiennes de la liberte. Notion cardinale de sa philosophie, la liberte fut en effet, avant Descartes, l'objet de nombreuses reflexions theologiques: elle se presente donc comme le point de rencontre privilegie de ces deux systemes de pensee. Par cette entree dans l'oeuvre de Descartes, Etienne Gilson nous invite a la lire d'un oeil neuf: c'est ainsi qu'il nous permet, par exemple, de deplacer le coeur de l'apport cartesien de la definition de la liberte humaine (pour laquelle il emprunte beaucoup aux grands penseurs scolastiques) a celle de la liberte divine. Des lors, Descartes se revele plus fidele a la tradition scolastique qu'il ne l'affirme: n'en transformant les cadres que lorsqu'il s'y trouve contraint par les exigences de sa physique, il s'efforce de minimiser autant que possible les modifications qu'il y applique. (shrink)

The great philosopher and historian of philosophy, Etienne Gilson, sets out to show that final causality or purposiveness and formal causality are principles for those who think hard and carefully about the world, including the world of biology. Gilson insists that a completely rational understanding of organisms and biological systems requires the philosophical notion of teleology, the idea that certain kinds of things exist and have ends or purposes the fulfillment of which are linked to their natures-in other (...) words, formal and final causes. His approach relies on philosophical reflection on the facts of science, not upon theology or an appeal to religious authorities such as the Church or the Bible. (shrink)

This volume takes a unique approach, dealing specifically with issues at the intersection of food and agricultural systems, environmental degradation, and climate change. It fills a gap in the literature on food and environmental justice in the context of global climate change offering a scholarly, yet accessible, analysis of the issues.

As concerns about violence, war, terrorism, sexuality, and embodiment have garnered attention in philosophy, the concept of vulnerability has become a shared reference point in these discussions. As a fundamental part of the human condition, vulnerability has significant ethical import: how one responds to vulnerability matters, whom one conceives as vulnerable and which criteria are used to make such demarcations matters, how one deals with one’s own vulnerability matters, and how one understands the meaning of vulnerability matters. Yet, the meaning (...) of vulnerability is commonly taken for granted and it is assumed that vulnerability is almost exclusively negative, equated with weakness, dependency, powerlessness, deficiency, and passivity. This reductively negative view leads to problematic implications, imperiling ethical responsiveness to vulnerability, and so prevents the concept from possessing the normative value many theorists wish it to have. When vulnerability is regarded as weakness and, concomitantly, invulnerability is prized, attentiveness to one’s own vulnerability and ethical response to vulnerable others remain out of reach goals. Thus, this book critiques the ideal of invulnerability, analyzes the problems that arise from a negative view of vulnerability, and articulates in its stead a non-dualistic concept of vulnerability that can remedy these problems. (shrink)

Both Foucault and Deleuze define ethics as a form of creative activity. Yet, given certain ontological features indicated by both thinkers, ethics must be more than just creative and critical activity. Forgoing a transcendent ground for ethics, the ontological condition of ethics – what Foucault calls liberté and Deleuze calls the plane of immanence – is an opening for change that makes possible normalizing modes of existence as well transformative ones. In this context, ethics must be a practice that comprehends (...) the dangers of such open-ended creation. The concept of problematization, emphasized by Foucault and Deleuze, leads to an enhanced understanding of their conception of ethics. On this understanding, ethics is a practice of problematization requiring a determination and assessment of the most pressing problems to which one must respond rather than attempt to solve once and for all. Ethics is necessarily a responsive engagement with the problems of one’s present. (shrink)

Theology and the Cartesian Doctrine of Freedom, now for the first time available in English,was Étienne Gilson's doctoral thesis and part of a larger project to show the medieval roots of Descartes at a time when the very existence of medieval philosophy was often ignored. Young Descartes was sent to La Flèche, one of the Jesuits schools that offered a complete philosophical program, and Descartes would have had the same philosophical training as a Jesuit. There is some controversy about (...) the exact dates of Descartes's stay at La Flèche and consequently about his philosophy instructor. By Gilson's calculations François Véron taught Descartes for three years. Véron eventually left the Jesuits to be free to engage in extraordinarily aggressive anti-Calvinist polemics. If anything, Véron's overbearing manner may have contributed to Descartes antipathy toward Scholastic philosophy. (Whatever Descartes's objections to its philosophy curriculum, later in life he recommended la Flèche as the best school in France.) Descartes,s great intellectual mission in life was not his mathematics but his physics, which was understood as a part of philosophy. We see him navigate the shoals of heated theological and religious strife in his attempt to articulate the metaphysical foundations(and in particular a philosophical vision of God) for his physics or theory of nature. As a layman, he always pleaded ignorance in technically theological matters. He presented himself as a loyal Catholic, quite sincerely in the portrait Gilson paints. (shrink)