Clinical bioethics is big business. There are now hundreds of people who bioethics in community and university hospitals, nursing homes, rehabilitation and home care settings, and some who play the role of clinical ethics consultant to transplant teams, managed care companies, and genetic testing firms. Still, there is as much speculation about what clinically active bioethicists actually do as there was ten years ago. Various commentators have pondered the need for training standards, credentials, exams, and malpractice insurance for ethicists engaged (...) in clinical consultation. Much of the discussion seems to accept an implicit presumption that all clinical ethics consultation practices look pretty much alike. But is this accurate? What do clinical ethicists do, how and where do they do it, and what kind of clinical ethics is useful in the hospital and in other settings? (shrink)

Philosophy gives an account of our experience 1. Philosophy does not begin with rational propositions or presuppositions, but rather with our experience. Dooyeweerd begins A New Critique of Theoretical Thought by contrasting the continuity of our pre-theoretical experience with the way that theoretical experience splits apart this continuity.1 He says later, “The apriori structure of reality can only be known by experience. But this is not experience as it is conceived by immanence-philosophy.”2 Human experience is not limited to our temporal (...) functions of consciousness.3 Our experience is not an ‘Erlebnis’ of mere psychical feelings and sensations,4 but rather “a conscious enstatic5 ‘Hineinleben.’” — the experience of our supratemporal selfhood enter ing into and living within all aspects of temporal reality. (shrink)

I offer a new metacognitive account of the feeling of agency over bodily actions. On this model the feeling of agency is the metacognitive monitoring of two cues: i) smoothness of action: done via monitoring the output of the comparison between actual and predicted sensory consequences of action and ii) action outcome: done via monitoring the outcome of action and its success relative to a prior intention. Previous research has shown that the comparator model offers a powerful explanation of the (...) feeling of agency. However, within the literature there is a growing sense of unease with the model; a consensus seems to be building that the model is not up to the task of explaining all of the new discoveries made regarding the feeling of agency since its inception. Most problematically there are paradigms which deeply challenge the comparator model by suggesting that a weak feeling of agency can be elicited even when no motor prediction is formed. The new account offered here inherits the explanatory power of the comparator model whilst avoiding this problem. (shrink)

Aesthetic preservation is the idea of sparing natural areas from development because of their aesthetic value. In this article I discuss a problem for aesthetic preservation that I call the ‘hidden gems problem’: in certain cases, the natural area under consideration is so remote and/or fragile that few people can actually experience it. In these cases, it becomes unclear how nature's aesthetic value can justify its preservation when development promises practical human benefits. After rejecting some potential responses to the hidden (...) gems problem, I offer a different solution. I argue that we have an aesthetic reason to preserve nature's hidden gems because they are required to produce ‘true judges’ of aesthetic value, who are capable of improving the general quality of taste for landscape. I develop this argument using the example of recent preservationist efforts to save the isolated landscape of Sable Island, Nova Scotia. (shrink)

The risks AI presents to society are broadly understood to be manageable through ‘general calculus’, i.e., general frameworks designed to enable those involved in the development of AI to apprehend and manage risk, such as AI impact assessments, ethical frameworks, emerging international standards, and regulations. This paper elaborates how risk is apprehended and managed by a regulator, developer and cyber-security expert. It reveals that risk and risk management is dependent on mundane situated practices not encapsulated in general calculus. Situated practice (...) surfaces ‘iterable epistopics’, revealing how those involved in the development of AI know and subsequently respond to risk and uncover major challenges in their work. The ongoing discovery and elaboration of epistopics of risk in AI (a) furnishes a potential program of interdisciplinary inquiry, (b) provides AI developers with a means of apprehending risk, and (c) informs the ongoing evolution of general calculus. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 3, Page 46-48, March 2012.

The Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act was passed in 2002 in response to various instances of corporate malfeasance. The Act, designed to protect investors, led to wide-ranging regulation over various actions of managers, auditors and investment analysts. Part of SOX, and the focus of this study, targeted the disclosure by firms of “pro forma” earnings, an alternate (from GAAP earnings), flexible and unaudited measure of firm performance. Specifically, SOX directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to craft regulation which would reduce – (...) and preferably eliminate – any pro forma earnings disclosure which might be “misleading”. Examining earnings press releases over a 3-year period, this study addresses three questions. Were firms disclosing pro forma in a potentially misleading manner, what was the nature of this potentially misleading disclosure, and did SOX affect the disclosure practices? We find the following. In 2001 (prior to SOX), 53 firms – over 10% of all U.S. S&P 500 firms – were disclosing pro forma earnings in a potentially misleading manner. This was being done most commonly by using traditional GAAP terminology (e.g., “net income”) in the press release headline to describe what was later in the press release revealed to be a pro forma amount (i.e., “net income excluding special items”). By 2003 (subsequent to the SEC regulation), potentially misleading disclosure practices were seen in less than 1% of the earnings press releases of S&P 500 firms. This significant reduction suggests that managers, prior to the regulation, were either careless in their pro forma reporting practice, or were intentionally – and unethically – attempting to mislead investors. Either way, we conclude that the SEC regulation was both necessary and effective. (shrink)

The Derveni papyrus is the oldest literary papyrus ever found, and one of the very few from Greece itself, which makes it one of the most interesting new texts from the ancient Greek world to have been discovered this century. The eschatological doctrines and an allegorical commentary on an Orphic theogony in terms of Presocratic physics which it contains make it a uniquely important document for the history of ancient Greek religion, philosophy, and literary criticism. This book is the first (...) to have been published on the text. It includes a full and reliable translation of the Papyrus together with a range of articles by leading European and American classicists who are internationally recognised experts in Greek religion and philosophy. Professor K. Tsantsanoglou, who will publish the papyrus when work on it is complete, presents important new material and has checked all the articles against the Papyrus. Thus for the first time, material is provided which will authorize scholarship upon the Papyrus in a way hitherto impossible, will stimulate further work on it, and will make the book a standard reference work on the subject for years to come. (shrink)

Stoicism deserves everything that Broic$ are doing to its movement. This is because Stoics stuff the value of everything into their own heads, thus denying that external things are good and that other people have intrinsic value. Stoics are psychopathic narcissists and axiological solipsists. And this makes Stoicism easy to coopt into bro-y, shallow, self-help-y garbage.

When prospective parents use in vitro fertilization, many of them hope to generate more embryos than they intend to implant immediately. The technology often requires multiple attempts to reach a successful pregnancy, and couples can cryopreserve any excess embryos so that they have them on hand for later attempts. As part of obtaining informed consent for IVF or cryopreservation, clinics typically ask patients to specify their preferences for the embryos in the event of divorce or death, offering options such as (...) use of the embryos by a specified partner, donation to research, or discarding the remaining embryos. Still, many courts face a recurring problem: the partners dissolve their relationship, and one party wants to use the frozen embryos over the objections of the other. Courts and legislatures have struggled with how to handle these cases, which seem to pit one partner's right to procreate against the other's right not to procreate. In this essay, we use one of the most recent decisions in this line of cases—the Appellate Court of Illinois's decision in Szafranski v. Dunston—to explain the current state of the law and make recommendations for changes. The issue is ripe for revisiting because in the last year, embryo disputes have become a battlefront for larger conflagrations over the moral status of embryos. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between North American beef consumption and deforestation in South and Central America. Some writers have argued that consumption of hamburgers in North America, particularly hamburgers consumed in fast food restaurants, contributes to the depletion of the rainforest in South and Central America. We survey the published policy literature on the causes of rainforest depletion in the region. We also review the published estimates of the rate and extent of clearing of rainforest that has occurred in (...) South and Central America since 1970. Finally, we review the data on beef imports and consumption in Canada and the United States in a effort to assess the importance of South and Central America as suppliers of beef to the North American market. We conclude that the relationship between beef consumption in North America should not be considered an important cause of forest depletion in South and Central America. Domestic policies and market forces in the countries where rainforests are located are the leading causes of rainforest depletion in this region. This lesson seems to have been lost on some popular and even some textbook writers on this subject. (shrink)

George Santayana (1863–1952) believed that a philosophy of orthodox common sense exists beneath all major systems of philosophy and religion. This philosophy is a form of naturalism. It begins with the assumption that we are animals generated by and sustained for a time within a vast impersonal physical cosmos that is the sole source of power. Although rational argumentation cannot justify this assumption, our actions repeatedly confirm it, and we could not live without it. Another central feature of Santayana’s philosophy (...) of naturalism is that we are conscious as well as active animals. The inner light of awareness, or what he calls “spirit,” arises by the activities of the physical body but is itself powerless. Our experience of the world is rendered in the morally charged signs of human cognition, and these may be aesthetically appreciated for their own sake in imagination, granting us the possibility of contemplative respite from the exigencies of life. Santayana’s philosophy is atheistic and holds out no religious hope of redemption. Still, it is celebratory of the life of consciousness and offers a path toward naturalistic spirituality. (shrink)

John Pecham was a Franciscan theologian who took both a strongly anti-Thomist position and a strongly anti-Averroist position in late-13th-century debates in philosophy of mind. Following a successful career as a theologian, Pecham was Archbishop of Canterbury from 1279 until his death in 1292. Pecham is one of a number of Franciscan philosophers who advocated for what has become known as the “Binarium Famosissimum,” or the two famous and related doctrines of the plurality of forms and universal hylomorphism.1 These two (...) doctrines were vigorously opposed by Thomas Aquinas. They had a history prior to the 13th century, with an embryonic presence in the work of Augustine and then fuller expression in Avicebron... (shrink)

Parts and wholes come in an infinite variety, but in each instance something, namely relations, joins the parts together to make them into a whole rather than an Aristotelian "heap." The ontological status of relations is the subject of this dissertation. ;The question of whether relations are real presupposes some method of determining what is real. A modified version of Whitehead's ontological principle, or the idea that only real things can have effects on other things, serves as the test of (...) the reality. If any effects result from a whole but not from a collection of parts, then a whole differs from its parts and relations are real. Such effects can manifest themselves in two ways: parts themselves may somehow be affected by being joined into a whole or some new property may emerge with a whole that cannot be attributed to the parts taken separately. If one discovers either type of effect, then relations are real. ;The first section of the dissertation is an historical examination on the question of the reality of the relations. In the first chapter, the positions of Hume, Parmenides and Whitehead are considered but ultimately rejected. The second chapter examines the positions of Aristotle and Wittgenstein, thinkers for whom relations are in some cases real, while the third examines Plato's idea on relations. ;In the fourth chapter, a distinction between two types of relations is drawn. The difference between these relations is found in whether or not the parts joined are affected by being in a whole. Static relations are those which join parts into a whole without affecting those parts, while parts joined by dynamic relations are affected by being in a whole. Both static and dynamic wholes possess emergent properties which come into being only when parts are joined into wholes. ;The second section focuses on the consequences of the reality of relations in philosophy, specifically in ethics, logic and the philosophy of space and time. (shrink)

Voegelin's analysis of mystery is central to his philosophies of conscience existence and history, and plays a crucial role in his critique of modernity. In his view, because human consciousness is a "knowing questioning" that can inquire about what lies beyond the scope of finite intelligence and imagination--that can affirm, for example, a "ground" of being, the ultimate meaning or nature of which transcends all possible knowing from the perspective of finite participation in the process of reality--we can explicitly understand (...) that our existences are embraced by a mystery of transcendent meaning. When such explicit recognition takes place--when consciousness differentiates dimensions of "immanent" and "transcendent" meaning-- everything that pertains to the decisive core of existence becomes haunted by the same dead center of ignorance. The objects of our deepest concerns, such as the ultimate purpose of moral striving, or the meaning of history, are revealed as humanly unknowable in any definitive sense. Such insight into the fact of transcendent meaning has, in Western culture, introduced serious problems into personal and political life. One set of problems concerns the difficulties entailed in explicitly accepting mysteries and in orienting oneself by their truths. A second concerns the temptations of ignoring or denying them. Western modernity has notoriously rejected transcendent meaning and mystery, and in so doing has established cultural conditions tending to promote skewed moral, educational and political ideals. Voegelin's analysis of mystery is part of a therapeutic critique of those conditions, as is his philosophy of myth. Myth, Voegelin argues, is the precise symbolic instrument for the articulation of transcendent meaning, since the myth does not claim to be definitive--it is a likely story that accords with accurate knowledge about reality--and so doesn't violate our awareness of the limitations of human perspective, and the myth tells a story that makes sense, in a context of ultimate meaning, of our experiences of purpose and struggle, risk and failure, desire and achievement. (shrink)