De esta extensa e intensa producción sobresale su Tratado sobre la naturaleza, De natura rerum. Escrito probablemente entre el 612 y el 615, el texto da cuenta de los fenómenos naturales y sus causas; es la cosmología física de Isidoro que, además, está siempre acompañada de una interpretación mística alegórica de cada hecho natural. Es también un desmonte de las supersticiones astrológicas de la astrología tan presentes en la península ibérica, por influjo, entre otros, de los priscilianos y las interpretaciones (...) catastróficas de hechos naturales desde el Apocalipsis. (shrink)

This article aims at a philosophical reflection on depression, from a melancholic standpoint; in order to do this, it explores the etymological, paremiological, historical and conceptual references of such term, having as a result a thesis: Before melancholy, an affirmation of life is likely from Spinoza’s conatus and Seneca’s tranquillity of mind.

Con base en El nombre de la Rosa de Umberto Eco se intenta mostrar la relación poder, saber y lenguaje desde la figura del laberinto tipo rizoma, sin centro ni periferia, siempre estructurable, nunca estructurado. Para hacerlo se plantean dos paradigmas hermenéuticos para descifrar los textos como laberinto. El primero se simboliza en Jorge de Burgos: todo texto es monosemántico y unidimensional, lo que políticamente lleva a fanatismos jacobinos y dogmáticos. El segundo se materializa en Guillermo de Baskerville: los textos (...) son polisemánticos y su semiosis es ilimitada, de modo que no hay textos definitivamente escritos, leídos e interpretados. Hay que habitar el mundo desde la duda como gozosa búsqueda ad infinitum, lo que se traduce políticamente en una lucha contra todo tipo de jacobismos. La conclusión es, desde este último paradigma, que la hermenéutica mora los textos desde Babel, no desde Pentecostés. Es el contraste entre la seriedad hermenéutica de Burgos y la sonrisa hermenéutica de Baskerville. (shrink)

El artículo intenta mostrar las contradicciones en que incurre el académico con su afirmación: “Nada es verdad, todo vale”; el santo argumenta que esta tesis escéptica derrumba tanto el saber como el obrar y pone en peligro la convivencia de la humanidad. Se concluye probando que un argumento contra los académicos es la amistad y el habitar místicamente el mundo.

CONTENIDO: El medioevo de los ilustrados - El medioevo de los marxistas - El medioevo de Michel Foucault - El medioevo de la historia de las mentalidades - El medioevo de Humberto Eco - Los escritos neotestamentarios San Pablo y el helenismo - La escolástico y los escolásticos.

El artículo intenta leer el poema parmenídeo en contra vía de la interpretación tradicional que ve en eléata al filósofo del ser, negador del devenir. Esta dicotomía tradicional opone la vía de la verdad y la vía de la opinión y descalifica el proemio como mero exordio poético, místico y religioso, sin ninguna importancia para el poema en sí. Se establece así la separación radical entre ser y devenir, ser y aparecer y el pensar sólo se ocupa del ser en (...) tanto unidad, inmovilidad, lejos del movimiento. La reflexión intenta hermenéuticamente polemizar con esta perspectiva mostrando la unidad del poema desde el proemio mismo. Este, lejos de ser una formalidad lírica, es el pórtico de entrada al templo del poema. Como en un pórtico sacral, el proemio es la escalinata que establece la unidad del poema, derribando la dicotomía destructiva. Desde el proemio copulan ser–devenir, ser–pensar, ser–aparecer en una unidad que hace del tó eón como physis una totalidad envolvente que concilia la contrariedad en una compensación armoniosa como concordia de los contrarios. (shrink)

El artículo intenta mostrar cómo la mística del Maestro Eckhart es la sumersión en la nada silente de Dios como plenitud vacía y vacío pleno, en el desierto de la abundancia divina del no ser del ser de Dios, gracias al cumplimiento de la voluntad divina como ascenso que la cumple sin cumplirla. Para ello, analiza la vida, la obra y el pensamiento del Maestro con base en sus textos El libro del consuelo divino, El fruto de la nada, Vida (...) eterna y conocimiento divino, Ecos de la Edad Media. Termina con un epílogo en el que se analiza el grano de mostaza en donde se aclara lo del desierto abundante de la nada silente de Dios como el de muchos nombres sin nombre. (shrink)

Reseña del libro: Vargas, Guillén, Germán. Cárdenas Mejía, Luz Gloria. Retórica, Poética y formación. De las pasiones al entimema. Universidad Pedagógica Nacional. Universidad de Antioquia. Bogotá, 2005.

Este artículo discute los aportes de Quentin Skinner al análisis de las imágenes en la retórica política del Renacimiento y explora una elucidación teórica sobre su funcionamiento argumentativo aplicando la teoría de los actos de las imágenes de Horst Bredekamp. Después de revisar las dimensiones de la retórica de Skinner, el trabajo se enfoca en el examen del lugar que ocupan las imágenes en los argumentos retóricos. Para esto discute algunas imágenes icónicas del Renacimiento italiano e inglés como el Fresco (...) de Siena de Lorenzetti y el frontispicio del “Leviatán” de Hobbes. El trabajo establece que, a lo menos, tres figuras retóricas renacentistas que elaboraban imágenes con fines persuasivos servían de manera eficaz para construir abstracciones políticas, ficciones y para modificar significados de conceptos políticos. En términos visuales, el funcionamiento de estas tres figuras discursivas encuentra una explicación en la teoría de los de las imágenes que Bredekamp. El artículo concluye que, si bien la vinculación de los conceptos retóricos y visuales de ambos autores puede ser ejemplificada con el análisis de una sección del frontispicio del “Leviatán”, la viabilidad de utilizar este ensamblaje como modelo teórico para el examen de otras imágenes renacentistas depende, entre otras consideraciones, de la posibilidad de asociarlas a textos, contextos y a la comprensión de la recepción de los argumentos en una discusión específica. (shrink)

The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.

1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...) particulars have constituents, the fundamental claim of the Bundle Theory is: (BT) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y constitutes x if and only ify is a universal and x instantiates y. 2 The standard and supposedly devastating objection to the Bundle Theory is that it entails or is committed to a false version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Armstrong 1978: 91, Loux 1998: 107), namely: (Pll) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every universal z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is instantiated byy, then x is numerically identical with y. The most famous counterexample to the Identity of Indiscernibles is that put forward by Max Black, consisting of a world where there are only two iron spheres two miles apart from each other, having the same diameter, temperature, colour, shape, size, etc (Black 1952: 156). Let us from now on think of the properties of the spheres in this world as universals. The possibility of this world, which I shall hereafter refer to as 'Black's world', makes (Pll) false.' And according to common philosophical opinion this means that the Bundle Theory is false.. (shrink)

In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as strict implication but (...) restricts the field of application of the principle to purely contingent truths (i.e. those that contain no necessary proposition at any level of analysis). But a conjunction of purely contingent truths strictly implies its conjuncts. So this version of the principle is committed to the Conjunction Thesis. The same is true of the version of the principle where entailment is understood in the sense of systems T, R, and E of relevant logic, since in these systems conjunctions entail their conjuncts. I argue that the Conjunction Thesis is false because a truthmaker is that in virtue of what a certain proposition is true and it is false that, for example, what the proposition that Peter is a man is true in virtue of is the conjunctive fact that Peter is man and Saturn is a planet (or the facts that Peter is a man and that Saturn is a planet taken together). I also argue against other versions of the principle. (shrink)

In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like (...) 'a has the property F', that is, sentences stating that a particular has a certain property. Finally I show how answering these questions in this way transforms the Problem of Universals, traditionally conceived as the One over Many, that is, the problem of explaining how different particulars can have the same properties, into the Many over One, that is, the problem of explaining how the same particular can have different properties. The Problem of Universals is the problem of the Many over One. (shrink)

In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section (...) 2, we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In Section 3, we shall argue that even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the ‘dull option’ that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and, though they imply revising the logic in Milne’s reasoning, this is not one of the possible revisions he considers. In Section 4, we shall suggest that Milne’s proof requires an implicit appeal to semantic principles and notions. In Section 5, we shall point out that there are two important dissimilarities between M and the Gödel sentence. Section 6 is a brief summary and conclusion. (shrink)

Jamin Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking is one of the most important books on truthmaking, full of important ideas from beginning to end. One of the most interesting parts of the book is Asay's attack on the explanation-first truthmaking. Explanation-first truthmaking is the explanatory project of explaining why truths are true. This is in contrast with ontology-first truthmaking, the project defended by Asay, and which is the project of answering the fundamental ontological question “What is there?”. Asay thinks explanation-first truthmaking (...) should be abandoned because it is problematic and it offers no benefits over those of ontology-first truthmaking. In this brief paper, I argue that he has not established the problematicity of explanation-first truthmaking, and that explanation-first truthmaking offers benefits over ontology-first truthmaking. (shrink)

Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...) Sufficient Reason (sect. 3), some attempts to demonstrate the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason (sect. 4), and one attempt to demonstrate the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (sect. 5). The main results of the chapter are summarized in a short conclusion (sect. 6). (shrink)

In this paper two deductive systems associated with relevance logic are studied from an algebraic point of view. One is defined by the familiar, Hilbert-style, formalization of R; the other one is a weak version of it, called WR, which appears as the semantic entailment of the Meyer-Routley-Fine semantics, and which has already been suggested by Wójcicki for other reasons. This weaker consequence is first defined indirectly, using R, but we prove that the first one turns out to be an (...) axiomatic extension of WR. Moreover we provide WR with a natural Gentzen calculus. It is proved that both deductive systems have the same associated class of algebras but different classes of models on these algebras. The notion of model used here is an abstract logic, that is, a closure operator on an abstract algebra; the abstract logics obtained in the case of WR are also the models, in a natural sense, of the given Gentzen calculus. (shrink)

This chapter is a discussion of Class and Resemblance Nominalism. According to the traditional versions of these theories, properties are classes of particulars. Thus, the property of being red is the class of red particulars, and the property of being square is the class of square particulars. Several objections have been advanced against these theories, and one of the most powerful of such objections is the so-called Coextension Difficulty, according to which Class and Resemblance Nominalism have to wrongly identify distinct (...) but coextensive properties. After discussing the nature of Class and Resemblance Nominalism, some problems of these theories and how they can be deal with, the superiority of Class and Resemblance Nominalism over other theories of properties and the superiority of Resemblance Nominalism over Class Nominalism, I concentrate on the Coextension Difficulty. With respect to this I argue that Class and Resemblance Nominalism can be developed in such a way that they admit properties without identifying them with classes, and this allows them to avoid the Coextension Difficulty, since such versions of these theories are not forced to wrongly identify distinct but coextensive properties. Thus the Coextension Difficulty is not a lethal problem for Class and Resemblance Nominalism. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...) falling into a vicious infinite regress, and (b) even if resemblance nominalism had to admit a universal of resemblance, this would not make it pointless to avoid postulating other universals. (shrink)

Careerism refers to an individual’s propensity to achieve their personal and career goals through nonperformance-based activities. We investigated the role of several dispositional predictors of careerism, including Five-factor model personality traits, primary psychopathy, and exchange ideology. Based on data from 131 respondents, as expected, we observed that emotional stability was negatively correlated with careerism. Primary psychopathy and exchange ideology explained additional variance in careerism after accounting for FFM traits. Relative importance analyses indicated that psychopathy and exchange ideology were equally important (...) in predicting careerism. We highlight the need for future research efforts investigating the combined effects of contextual factors—particularly, human resource practices—and individual differences to understand careerism in the workplace. (shrink)

The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument. In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird and Stoneham (...) 2005). I shall defend the subtraction argument* from Alexander Paseau’s (2006) objection that because a crucial premise of the subtraction argument* may have no plausibility independent from Metaphysical Nihilism, the subtraction argument* is not suasive. Although Paseau focuses on the subtraction argument*, I shall point out that Efird and Stoneham could reply to Paseau’s objection in the same way. Thus there are (at least) two suasive versions of the subtraction argument that establish Metaphysical Nihilism. But are those two arguments equally good? I shall argue that the subtraction argument* is preferable to Efird and Stoneham’s argument. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Modal Realism, the thesis that there exist non-actual possible individuals and worlds, can be made compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that it is possible that nothing concrete exists. Modal Realism as developed by Lewis rules out the possibility of a world where nothing concrete exists and so conflicts with Metaphysical Nihilism. In the paper I argue that Modal Realism can be modified so as to be compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism. Such a modification makes (...) Modal Realism neither incur further theoretical costs nor lose its theoretical benefits. Thus such a modification constitutes an improvement of Modal Realism. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument’s premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the question (...) van Inwagen wanted to answer. (shrink)

In Section 21 of his fifth letter to Clarke Leibniz attempts to derive the Identity of Indiscernibles from an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to God´s act of creation, namely that God has a reason to create the world he creates. In this paper I argue that this argument fails, not just because the Identity of Indiscernibles is false, but because there is a counterexample to one of the premises that Leibniz cannot satisfactorily rule out.

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident is an entity (...) with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates. The aim of this paper is to clarify Leibniz’s notion of substance in the Discourse with a view to explaining how that definition successfully distinguishes between substances and accidents. (shrink)

Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently (...) advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed. (shrink)

Leibniz’s short letter to the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati of 1689 is a short but interesting text on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, to which it is entirely dedicated. Since there is no watermark in the paper of the letter, the letter is difficult to date, but it is likely that it was written during Leibniz’s stay in Rome, sometime between April and November of 1689 (A 2 2 287–8). When addressing the letter, Leibniz wrote ‘Casani’, but this (...) seems to be a mistake and the real addressee is thought to be Ludovico Casati, nephew of Paolo Casati, the Jesuit mathematician. The letter, reproduced in the Berlin’s Academy edition of Leibniz’s works, was first published by Gerhardt in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie in 1892 (Gerhardt 1892: 53–54). It also appears in Robinet’s Iter Italicum (Robinet 1988: 134–35). But neither Gerhardt nor Robinet provide a philosophical discussion of the letter, and I am not aware of any other philosophical discussion of it. Furthermore, as far as I know, the letter has never been translated into any language. Thus I shall here provide a transcription (from A 2 2 288–89) and a translation of the letter into English, and a philosophical discussion of its treatment of the Identity of Indiscernibles. (shrink)

Desde la tradición de los estudios de gubernamentalidad y sus resonancias en las sociologías políticas y de la educación, en este artículo se recuperan los debates vigentes en torno a las nociones de gubernamentalidad, gobierno y biopolítica desarrolladas en la vasta obra de Michel Foucault y sus continuadoras/es para enlazarlas con las discusiones sobre el objeto de estudio y el campo teórico de la política educativa, enfatizando el potencial analítico que ofrece su grilla de inteligibilidad para los fenómenos educativos propios (...) de las sociedades posdisciplinares. En esa dirección, este trabajo esboza una serie de propuestas epistemológicas, teóricas y metodológicas producidas a partir de una investigación empírica recientemente finalizada (Aguirre, 2022), de corte descriptivo y de carácter cualitativo. En vistas a estos propósitos, se producen diálogos interdisciplinares a la vez que se tensionan y discuten algunos supuestos clásicos y tradicionales de la política educativa, para incitar una renovación analítica que posibilite el estudio de las relaciones sociales de autogobierno y gobierno de las/os otras/os en tanto articulaciones históricas entre el saber, el poder y la subjetividad. Finalmente, se exponen algunos indicios y propuestas para el abordaje sociológico de los fenómenos educativos contemporáneos, que convocan y promueven la necesidad de producir ciertos desplazamientos epistemológicos en el campo teórico de la política educativa, así como invitan a la reconfiguración de sus objetos de estudio en el marco de la adscripción a un enfoque posestructuralista. (shrink)

Science-engaged theology has emerged as a new way of conducting research within the vast field of science and religion, with the aim of, at least in one way of understanding it today, solving theological puzzles. In this article we suggest that an analysis of the diversity of approaches in which thirteenth-century philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas engaged theological questions with the best knowledge of the natural world available at the time allows twenty-first century science-engaged theologians to move forward the discussion (...) about the different ways of engaging theology with the contemporary natural sciences. (shrink)

El denominado “problema de los términos teóricos” que inicialmente formuló Sneed surge de la interpretación que de los términos teóricos hace la concepción heredada. Esta lectura no se condice con la interpretación indirecta de los términos teóricos que Carnap realiza al utilizar postulados. Estos textos proponen una interpretación holística de las teorías científicas, sólo adecuadamente tratada en una semántica de mundos posibles. Andreas proporciona un tratamiento modal de los términos teóricos; nosotros presentamos estos resultados en términos de modelos de Kripke; (...) luego los extendemos con el fin de que sean capaces de distinguir entre axiomas y oraciones teóricas, generando un modelo capaz de tratarlos de manera diferenciada y que aporte nuevos resultados lógicos y filosóficos. (shrink)

This article addresses the concept of ‘anarchaeological reading’ proposed by Erin Graff Zivin, putting it at stake, on the one hand, in the reading of the temporal disjunction of the Borges reader of the question of eternity in Plato and, on the other, in the pointing out of the colonially regimented interpretation of the link between Yagán Indians and fox-dogs in southern Patagonia made by a European ‘Indian hunter’ at the end of the nineteenth century.