African philosophers such as Olusegun Oladipo, Lansana Kieta, Kwama Nkrumah and Kanu Ikechukwu proposed to revisit the semantic of the word “development”. From their viewpoint, instead of seeing economic growth as the DNA of development, we should actualize the notion as rather aiming at the universalities of cultures, which could ensure progress and development. Further aspects such as a) the worldview of the Bantu, b) the distribution of resources in large national giant nations as Nigeria, and c) faith-based organization and (...) development with Obiora Ike, justify a closer reading of the concept. It shows that people-oriented development is better adapted to Africa than abstract concepts, which may not include strong reference to the African traditions and belief systems. Sustainable and integrative development should include all major faith groups, which are all part of development, understood as a social and economic investment with social responsibility and faith. (shrink)

Martin Luther King Jr. cannot be said to have addressed the problem of terrorism in general because he proposed his philosophy of non-violence resistance within the context of the oppression, injustice, segregation, violence and discrimination suffered by the African Americans. Nevertheless, his philosophy captured ways by which we can fittingly address the problem of terrorism. Many of the methods of non-violence given by Martin Luther King Jr. are of paramount importance in the face of terrorism. His philosophy is basically important (...) today in Nigeria owing to the fact that our unity as a country is threatened by the recurring activities of terrorism and as such we are at a cross road in the history of our country, where drastic decisions have to be taken to address this perilous trend. The philosophy of non-violent resistance as proposed by Martin Luther King Jr. is a veritable step towards a working solution, as it is not only an outcry against terrorism of any sort, but also an ideology that frowns against any form of action that results in the taking of human life or the carnage that comes with violence. His non-violent resistance theory which he developed after a deep study of Mahatma Gandhi’s theory of non-violence, is a radical approach towards the fight against violence of any sort inflicted on the African Americans of his time, an action borne of a passionate fight against racism. So, to aptly address the problem of terrorism in Nigeria, it is necessary we consult and apply some principles of the philosophy of non-violence resistance as postulated by Martin Luther King Jr. (shrink)

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part describes the events leading up to the Protestant Reformation, including Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between the commandments of God and the counsels of God. The second part describes the anti-supererogationist views of the Reformers, Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon. The third part examines the views of a contemporary figure, Joseph Allen, whose Protestant commitment leads him to espouse anti-supererogationist views. The fourth part explains why contemporary Protestants are by and large open to (...) acknowledging the possibility of supererogation. (shrink)

In the business ethics literature, many argue that managerial decision making ought to be improved by more robust ethical concerns. Some see the virtue of “practical wisdom” as the key for improved managerial decision making. However, because of the epistemic limitations confronting decision makers in the face of irreducible market complexity, there is a risk that practical wisdom, employed in the context of day‐to‐day managerial decision making, becomes an impractical concept. Nevertheless, if the attempt to incorporate virtue ethics (and its (...) related concepts) into business practices is laudable, if indeed a virtuous life is worth pursuing and practical wisdom plays an essential role toward that end, it is important to attempt to salvage practical wisdom and uncover its appropriate usage. Thus, this article pursues two major ends. First, upon surveying some of the prominent and standard usages of the term, it articulates concerns, rooted in epistemic limitations, about the way that practical wisdom appears in business ethics literature. Second, it offers a new way forward for understanding “practical wisdom.” By contextualizing day‐to‐day, rule‐based managerial decision making within the ethical value of the market order, practical wisdom reappears as the higher‐order capacity to pursue vocations, as morally worthwhile projects, in business. (shrink)

It has now been more than 50 years since H. L. A Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin first squared off in perhaps the most celebrated jurisprudential debate of the twentieth‐century (1959–1967). The central issue in that dispute—whether the state may criminalize immoral behavior as such—continues to be debated today, but in a vastly changed legal landscape. In this article I take a fresh look at the Hart‐Devlin debate in the light of five decades of social and legal changes.

From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. when grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about (...) one's settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases it is condoned, even admired as shrewd bargaining. Because of the difficulty in verifying someone's settlement preferences, it is hard to establish a basis for trusting the revelations of the other party, especially in competitive negotiations with relative strangers. (shrink)

To the memory of Alan WhiteThe idea of mental representation occupies a rather prominent place in much contemporary discussion, both in philosophy and cognitive science, and not as a particularly controversial idea either. My reflections here, however, are intended to douse much of that discussion with some cold water. I should emphasize at the outset that I have no problems at all with the very idea of mental representation. What I find quite unsatisfactory is the philosophical or doctrinal underpinning of (...) much current theorising about it. Anyway, I shall suggest that talk of mental representation needs at least to be supplemented with, if not actually replaced by, a distinct notion of mental presentation, which cannot be reduced to it. But I start with the notion of an impression. (shrink)

There have traditionally been two schools of thought regarding moral ideals and their relationship with moral duty. First, many have held that moral agents at all times have a duty or obligation to realize or attain moral ideals, or at least they have a duty to strive to realize or attain them. A second school of thought has maintained that attaining or pursuing moral ideals is supererogatory or beyond the call of duty. Recently a third school of thought has been (...) articulated by Robert Audi in his essay “Wrongs Within Rights.” In this paper I express agreement with Audi, and it will be my suggestion that the resources of virtue ethics can profitably be employed to illustrate how his view avoids problems which plague the two traditional schools of thought. (shrink)

This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation . This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's ‘truth-conduciveness’ problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology (...) that attempt to link correlation and confirmation by utilizing a conditional evidential independence condition. Several properties of focused correlation are also highlighted. Introduction Correlation Measures 2.1 Standard covariance and correlation measures 2.2 The Wayne–Shogenji measure 2.3 Interpreting correlation measures 2.4 Correlation and evidential independence Focused Correlation Conclusion Appendix CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In this article, I expand upon Slavoj Zižek’s “anamorphic” reading of Alfonso Cuarón’s Children of Men. In this reading, Zižek distinguishes between the film’s ostensible narrative structure, the “foreground,” as he calls it, and the “background,” wherein the social and spiritual dissolution endemic to Cuaron’s dystopian England draws the viewer into a recognition of the dire conditions plaguing the post-9/11, post-Iraq invasion, neoliberal world. The foreground plots the conventional trajectory of the main character Theo from ordinary, disaffected man to self-sacrificing (...) hero, one whose martyrdom might pave the way for a new era of regeneration. According to Zižek, in this context the foreground merely entertains, while propagating some well-worn clichés about heroic individualism as demonstrated through Hollywood’s generic conventions of an action-adventure/political thriller/science-fiction film. Zižek contends that these conventions are essential to the revelation of the film’s progressive politics, as “the fate of the individual hero is the prism through which … [one] see[s] the background even more sharply.” Zižek’s framing of Theo merely as a “prism” limits our understanding of the film by not taking into account its status as an adaptation of P.D. James’ The Children of Men. This article offers such an account by interpreting the differences between the film and its literary source as one informed by the transition from Cold War to post-9/11 neoliberal conceptions of identity and politics. To articulate the terms of this argument and its implications, I turn to another narrative depicting the identity and politics at the end of history, Francis Fukuyama’s infamous The End of History and the Last Man, published the same year as James’ novel, both offering meditations on the Cold War and speculations on its aftermath. Incorporating these two texts into Zižek’s anamorphic paradigm contributes to our understanding of the film’s message regarding the “state of things” during the post-9/11 era, as well as the Cold War era that preceded it, as perceived through the eyes of Theo adapted to suit the respective dystopian conditions of the novel and film. (shrink)

The theory of lower previsions is designed around the principles of coherence and sure-loss avoidance, thus steers clear of all the updating anomalies highlighted in Gong and Meng's "Judicious Judgment Meets Unsettling Updating: Dilation, Sure Loss, and Simpson's Paradox" except dilation. In fact, the traditional problem with the theory of imprecise probability is that coherent inference is too complicated rather than unsettling. Progress has been made simplifying coherent inference by demoting sets of probabilities from fundamental building blocks to secondary representations (...) that are derived or discarded as needed. (shrink)

Bipartism is the common view that the nature of an intentional state can be wholly explained in terms of (a) its horizontal relations with other such states (as well as peripheral inputs and outputs); and (b) its vertical relations with the world. Extrapolating from Nagel, I try to show that bipartism is fundamentally mistaken. Some intentional states are conscious states, and thus there is something it is like to be in them. This phenomenology is of a piece with such states’ (...) interpretability: to know what it is like to be X at least involves being able to interpret X’s conscious intentional states. But a bi‐partist account of an intentional state is not, by itself, interpretational. So bipartist accounts, at least of conscious intentional states, are incomplete: they fail to capture their phenomenology. (shrink)

Gregory Rocca's nuanced discussion prevents Aquinas's thought from being capsulized in familiar slogans and is an antidote to unilateralist or monochrome views about God-talk.

One goal of normative multi-agent system theory is to formulate principles for normative system change that maintain the rule-like structure of norms and preserve links between norms and individual agent obligations. A central question raised by this problem is whether there is a framework for norm change that is at once specific enough to capture this rule-like behavior of norms, yet general enough to support a full battery of norm and obligation change operators. In this paper we propose an answer (...) to this question by developing a bimodal logic for norms and obligations called NO. A key to our approach is that norms are treated as propositional formulas, and we provide some independent reasons for adopting this stance. Then we define norm change operations for a wide class of modal systems, including the class of NO systems, by constructing a class of modal revision operators that satisfy all the AGM postulates for revision, and constructing a class of modal contraction operators that satisfy all the AGM postulates for contraction. More generally, our approach yields an easily extendable framework within which to work out principles for a theory of normative system change. (shrink)

According to Brentano in a much-quoted passage,Every psychological phenomenon is characterized by…intentional inherent existence of … an object… In the idea something is conceived, in the judgement something is recognized or discovered, in loving loved, in hating hated, in desiring desired, and so on.

It is known that for two given countable sets of unary relations A and B on ω there exists an infinite set H ⫅ ω on which A and B are the same. This result can be used to generate counterexamples in expressibility theory. We examine the sharpness of this result.

In January of the year a.d. 69, Marcus Salvius Otho, disappointed in his attempt to be named Galba's heir and successor, fomented revolt among the praetorian guard. Trading on the praetorians’ own discontent at not receiving the donative, he began to win over the soldiers’ favour. Tacitus relates that, when the attitude of the soldiers seemed ripe, Otho himself came forth and began to implore them directly ; and after he accepted the oath of loyalty from the entire classicorum legio, (...) he felt ready to hold a speech encouraging the men to complete the deed by ousting Galba. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that self-respect is ‘perhaps the most important’ primary good and that its status as such gives crucial support to controversial ideas like the lexical priority of liberty. Given the importance of these ideas for Rawls, it should be no surprise that they have attracted much critical attention. In response to these critics, I give a defense of self-respect that grounds its importance in Rawls’s moral conception of the person. I show that this (...) understanding of self-respect goes well beyond giving support to the lexical priority of liberty, also supporting Rawls’s still more controversial view of public reason. On my account, taking self-respect seriously requires the coercive enforcement of public reason. This is a novel argument for public reason, in that it grounds the idea in justice as fairness and mandates its coercive enforcement. (shrink)

This clear, learner-friendly text helps today's students bridge the gap between everyday culture and critical thinking. The text covers all the basics of critical thinking, beginning where students are, not where we think they should be. Its comprehensiveness allows instructors to tailor the material to their individual teaching styles, resulting in an exceptionally versatile text.

The structural view of rational acceptance is a commitment to developing a logical calculus to express rationally accepted propositions sufficient to represent valid argument forms constructed from rationally accepted formulas. This essay argues for this project by observing that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface calls for a theory that both (i) offers the facilities to represent accepting less than certain propositions within an interpreted artificial language and (ii) provides a logical calculus of (...) rationally accepted formulas that preserves rational acceptance under consequence. The essay explores the merit and scope of the structural view by observing that some limitations to a recent framework advanced James Hawthorne and Luc Bovens are traced to their framework satisfying the first of these two conditions but not the second. (shrink)

Although implicit tests of positive and negative affect exist, implicit measures of distinct emotional states are scarce. Three experiments examined whether a novel implicit emotion-assessment task, the rating of emotion expressed in abstract images, would reveal distinct emotional states. In Experiment 1, participants exposed to a sadness-inducing story inferred more sadness, and less happiness, in abstract images. In Experiment 2, an anger-provoking interaction increased anger ratings. In Experiment 3, compared to neutral images, spider images increased fear ratings in spider-fearful participants (...) but not in controls. In each experiment, the implicit task indicated elevated levels of the target emotion and did not indicate elevated levels of non-target negative emotions; the task thus differentiated among emotional states of the same valence. Correlations also supported the convergent and discriminant validity of the implicit task. Supporting the possibility that heuristic processes underlie the ratings, group differences were stronger among those who responded relatively quickly. (shrink)

Can we make wise policy decisions about still‐emerging technologies—decisions that are grounded in facts yet anticipate unknowns and promote the public's preferences and values? There is a widespread feeling that we should try. There also seems to be widespread agreement that the central element in wise decisions is the assessment of benefits and costs, understood as a process that consists, at least in part, in measuring, tallying, and comparing how different outcomes would affect the public interest. But how benefits and (...) costs are best weighed when making decisions about whether to move forward with an emerging technology is not clear. Many commentators feel that the weighing is often inadequate or inappropriate. Those who argue for a “precautionary” approach to the weighing do so precisely because they feel the need for a restraint on the dominant decision‐making tools and processes for assessing outcomes.This Hastings Center special report examines those tools and processes, taking the method known as cost‐benefit analysis as a starting point. In U.S. governance, CBA, sometimes informed by risk assessment, is the most widely used and extensively studied method, and authoritative reports on genetic and reproductive technologies often use language suggestive of cost‐benefit analysis. There is also a long‐running debate about the role of values in CBA and other formal impact assessment mechanisms—and about how those mechanisms compare to the precautionary principle. The guiding idea in the report is to engage in a close examination of the strengths and limits of CBA for ensuring that emerging technologies are used in ways that square with the public's values, drawing on applications of synthetic biology to illustrate and sharpen the analysis and then considering corrections to CBA and some alternative methodologies that handle values differently. (shrink)

Should we hold that the natural history of our artistic capacities and responses is relevant to aesthetic judgement in the way that the history of making of particular artworks is? Distinguishes between what is explanatory within the aesthetic, and what is merely explanatory of the aesthetic. Facts about the natural history of artistic capacities and responses are more apt to fall into the first second than into the first. But there are odd cases where the facts of natural history do (...) impinge on what we might call the space of aesthetic reasons. (shrink)

Many theorists have been attracted to the idea that literature can help us penetrate the mystery of time. Argues that the track record of the works they appeal to is poor. Finds some common ground with the literary philosophers, and suggests ways in which fiction might tell us things about time; But alsosuggests that there is very little to be hoped for from this programme. A belief to the contrary is largely the result of a misunderstanding about what counts as (...) a question about time. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: * Introduction * Shrinking Gaps? * Strengthening Supernatural Arguments * Note * References * Further Reading.

Examines recent changes and future developments in human geography.

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Concerns about the sacred—common in everyday moral thinking—have crept into bioethics in various forms. Further, given a certain view of the metaphysics of morals that is now widely endorsed in Western philosophy, there is in principle no reason that judgments about the sacred cannot be part of careful and reasoned moral deliberation.

Just as the existence of practical akrasia has been treated as important evidence for the existence of our practical agency, the alleged absence of epistemic akrasia—cases in which a believer believes some proposition contrary to her considered judgments about what she has most reason to believe—has recently been marshaled as grounds for skepticism about the existence of similar forms of epistemic agency. In this paper, I defend the existence of epistemic agency against such objections. Rather than argue against the impossibility (...) of epistemic akrasia, I argue that the impossibility of epistemic akrasia is actuallycompatible withthe existence of epistemic agency. The crucial mistake, I argue, is that skeptics about epistemic agency are failing to distinguish carefully between differences in the structure of believing and acting and differences in the structure of normative reasons to believe and normative reasons to act. I show that once these ‘environmental’ differences are properly distinguished, we can see that absence of epistemic akrasia provides no reason to doubt that practical and epistemic agency are on a par with one another. (shrink)

At the fore of concern within Whitehead scholarship are the main interpretive issues revolving around the relationships of God, creativity, and the world. Some critics have charged that Whitehead’s mature thought suffers from a lack of coherence in his formulation of the relationship between God and creativity as they function in cosmic generativity, a charge proven difficult to overcome. Such critics have posed the following question. In light of Whitehead’s commitment to the Ontological Principle, how can God and creativity stand (...) as separate formative elements in the world’s creative advance? This question illustrates, some say, how the separation of God from creativity within Whitehead’s process philosophy.. (shrink)

Under the human flourishing theory of property, owners have obligations, positive as well as negative, that they owe to members of the various communities to which they belong. But are the members of those communities limited to living persons, or do they include non-living persons as well, i.e., future persons and the dead? This Article argues that owners owe two sorts of obligation to non-living members of our generational communities, one general, the other specific. The general obligation is to provide (...) future generations with the basic material background conditions that are necessary for them to be able to carry out what I call life-transcending projects that their forebears have transmitted to them. The specific obligation is project-specific; that is, its purpose is to enable successive generational community members to whom particular life-transcending projects have been forwarded to be carried out in their way. The future generational members to whom the project is transferred must also be given whatever resources or goods are necessary to carry the project forward in its intended way. I argue further that each generational community owes its predecessors the obligation to accept life-transcending projects transmitted to them by their forebears and make reasonable efforts to carry those projects forward into the future. The obligation is based on the past generational community members’ dependency on their successors for the projects to continue into the future, a matter that is constitutive of the project creators’ flourishing. This obligation is defeasible, rather than absolute, however. (shrink)