Ground s’enfronta al xoc de l’art contemporani plantejant, a manera de reflexió filosòfica, aquelles preguntes «grolleres» que semblaven confinades en la resposta de l’home del carrer o del crític reaccionari: no és una xorrada aquesta pila de rajoles al museu? No obstant això, la seua intenció no és fer-nos prendre partit a favor o en contra de determinades obres d’art del Minimal o del Conceptual. El que batega al fons del llibre de Ground és una defensa de l’art contemporani quan (...) reivindica la seua intel·ligibilitat com un tret centralment constitutiu d’aquest. Una defensa que passa, necessàriament, per mantenir en peus la vigència de la pregunta que dóna títol al llibre, a pesar dels intents recents per anul·lar-la o per relegar-la a una desautorització ingenuista i/o reaccionària de «tot» l’art contemporani. (shrink)

We hypothesise that the sarcolemma of an actively growing myofibre has different properties to the sarcolemma of a mature adult myofibre. Such fundamentally different properties have clinical consequences for the onset, and potential therapeutic targets, of various skeletal muscle diseases that first manifest either during childhood (e.g. Duchenne muscular dystrophy, DMD) or after cessation of the main growth phase (e.g. dysferlinopathies). These characteristics are also relevant to the selection of both tissue culture and in vivo models employed to study such (...) myopathies and the molecular regulation of adult myofibres. During growth, multinucleated myofibres increase enormously in size and volume with dramatic increases in length (up to ∼600 mm). This is in striking contrast with most mononucleated cells such as fibroblasts, that remain at a relatively small size (∼10–20 µm diameter). The consequences of a dynamic, expanding sarcolemma during growth, compared with that of an adult myofibre of a fixed length, are discussed with respect to various aspects of muscle biology. (shrink)

ED455370 - Lifelong Learning, Equity and Inclusion. Proceedings [of the] UACE Conference (Cambridge, England, March 29-31, 1999).

Must We Mean What We Play? INTRODUCTION It was Sir Thomas Beecham who said,'The English do not care for music-but they love the noise it makes.'Sir Thomas was, of course, given to making acerbic swipes but this one has always seemed to me to have.

El text d’Ian Ground la traducció del qual transcrivim a continuació va ser llegit a l’acte de presentación del seu llibre ¿Arte o chorrada? (València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València / Col•lecció Estètica & Crítica, 2008) el dia 9 de juny de 2008 a l’Aula Magna de l’edifici del Carrer La Nau de la Universitat de València, amb la presència, a més d’Ian Ground, de Romà de la Calle (en qualitat de Director de la col•lecció Estètica & Crítica) i (...) de mi mateix, Salvador Rubio (en qualitat de traductor, editor i autor de la introducció del llibre). El text va ser llegit en anglés pel seu autor, alternat, paràgraf per paràgraf, amb la lectura de la traducció castellana. Hem preferit que el text traduit aparega ací en castellà, exactament igual al que va ser llegit a l’esmentat acte de presentació. La reflexió que ens proposa Ian Ground, en cara que específicament concebuda per a aquest acte, no necessita cap presentació i pot ser llegida perfectament com un text autònom. Tanmateix, em permet precedir-la amb unes quantes observacions que no pretenen sustituir les meues paraules a l’acte (on, naturalment, els agraïments eren els protagonistes) ni tampoc la introducció del llibre ja publicada, i a la qual es pot remetre directament el lector d’aquest article. (shrink)

Cora Diamond’s discussions of the ethics of our treatment of animals offer a critique of conceptions of morality which regard our ethical responses as founded on reasons which ought to be reasons for anyone. Diamond takes issue with accounts of our treatment of animals based on their possession of capacities which are shared with us. She offers instead a concept of the moral life, as a form of life—inherited, shared and negotiated—only within which can moral reasons count as reasons at (...) all. Our fellow creatures have some share in this life, but one that must be recognized as partial and problematic.In this discussion, we offer an account which is consistent with Diamond’s general perspective. But one which also offers a more generous account of ways in which the discoveries of the ethological sciences dynamically reshape the place of animals in our shared moral life. (shrink)

Environment and the Arts: Perspectives on Environ- mental Aesthetics. Edited by ARNOLD BERLEANT . Ashgate. 2002. pp. 192. C ONSISTING of twelve chapters, and an extended introduction, this volume provides a leading-edge anthology of reflections on environmental aesthetics.

Extreme loss of skeletal muscle mass (atrophy) occurs in human muscles that are not used. In striking contrast, skeletal muscles do not rapidly waste away in hibernating mammals such as bears, or aestivating frogs, subjected to many months of inactivity and starvation. What factors regulate skeletal muscle mass and what mechanisms protect against muscle atrophy in some species? Severe atrophy also occurs with ageing and there is much clinical interest in reducing such loss of muscle mass and strength (sarcopenia). In (...) the meat industry, a key aim is optimizing the control of skeletal muscle growth and meat quality. The impaired response of muscle to insulin resulting in diabetes, that is a consequence of the metabolic impact of increasing obesity and fat deposition in humans, is also of increasing clinical concern. Intensive research in these fields, combined with mouse models, is reviewed with respect to the molecular control of muscle growth (myogenesis) and atrophy/hypertrophy and fat deposition (adipogenesis) in skeletal muscle, with a focus on IGF‐1/insulin signaling. BioEssays 28: 994–1009, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

身のまわりの卑近な事柄を根本から考え直してみたい。そんな欲求が人々の心をとらえている。看護する自分に、哲学はそのための力を与えてくれるだろうか。知識・科学・心・モラルといった主題にそって看護の主要な問 題をとりあげ、哲学ならではの思索の道筋を示す。「考える看護」の面白さが実感できる「ナースのための哲学入門」。.

I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account what grounds facts of the form a=b. In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that a=b partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity.

Several philosophical issues in connection with computer simulations rely on the assumption that results of simulations are trustworthy. Examples of these include the debate on the experimental role of computer simulations :483–496, 2009; Morrison in Philos Stud 143:33–57, 2009), the nature of computer data Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013; Humphreys, in: Durán, Arnold Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013), and the explanatory power of (...) computer simulations :277–292, 2008; Durán in Int Stud Philos Sci 31:27–45, 2017). The aim of this article is to show that these authors are right in assuming that results of computer simulations are to be trusted when computer simulations are reliable processes. After a short reconstruction of the problem of epistemic opacity, the article elaborates extensively on computational reliabilism, a specified form of process reliabilism with computer simulations located at the center. The article ends with a discussion of four sources for computational reliabilism, namely, verification and validation, robustness analysis for computer simulations, a history of successful implementations, and the role of expert knowledge in simulations. (shrink)

On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is. Metaphysics so conceived is concerned with such questions as whether properties exist, whether meanings exist, and whether numbers exist. I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what. Metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist (of course they do!) The question is whether or not they are fundamental.

Introduction: Natural necessity, being, and becoming -- Accentuate the negative -- Diffracting dialectic -- Opening totality -- Constellating ethics -- Metacritique I : philosophy's primordial failing -- Metacritique II : dialectic and difference -- Conclusion: Natural necessity and the grounds of justice : natural necessity as material meshwork.

I identify one neglected source of support for a Kripkean reading of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: the analogy between rules and epistemic grounds and the existence of a Kripkean anti-privacy argument about epistemic grounds in On Certainty. This latter argument supports Kripke’s claims that the basic anti-privacy argument in the Investigations (a) poses a question about the distinguishability of certain first-person attributions with identical assertability conditions, (b) concludes that distinguishability is provided by third-person evaluability, and (c) is a general (...) argument, not one about a specific kind of alleged rules. (shrink)

Anwander questions "the role that Pogge assigns to benefiting from injustice in the determination of our duties toward the victims of injustice... challenging his claim that there is a negative duty not to benefit from injustice.".

We define a notion of difference-making for partial grounds of a fact in rough analogy to existing notions of difference-making for causes of an event. Using orthodox assumptions about ground, we show that it induces a non-trivial division with examples of partial grounds on both sides. We then demonstrate the theoretical fruitfulness of the notion by applying it to the analysis of a certain kind of putative counter-example to the transitivity of ground recently described by Jonathan Schaffer. First, (...) we show that our conceptual apparatus of difference-making enables us to give a much clearer description than Schaffer does of what makes the relevant instances of transitivity appear problematic. Second, we suggest that difference-making is best seen as a mark of good grounding-based explanations rather than a necessary condition on grounding, and argue that this enables us to deal with the counter-example in a satisfactory way. Along the way, we show that Schaffer's own proposal for salvaging a form of transitivity by moving to a contrastive conception of ground is unsuccessful. We conclude by sketching some natural strategies for extending our proposal to a more comprehensive account of grounding-based explanations. (shrink)

What explains why we are subjects for whom objects can have value, and what explains which objects have value for us? Axiologicians say that the value of humanity is the answer. I argue that our value, no matter what it is like, cannot perform this task. We are animals among others. An explanation of the value of objects for us must fit into an explanation of the value of objects for animals generally. Different objects have value for different animals. Those (...) differences depend on differences in animal natures and, in particular, on the diverse characteristic capacities of different animals. Once we invoke animal natures, there is nothing for the value of animality, including the value of humanity, to explain. (shrink)

This rich, subtle and hugely ambitious book might also have been called “why (and how) metaphysics matters”. Cooper's themes are the tensions implicit in the relation of contingent human beings to the world and the implications of those tensions, and of putative means of their.

[Anne:] “I can't, I'm in the depths of despair. Can you eat when you are in the depths of despair?”“I've never been in the depths of despair, so I can't say,” said Marilla.“Weren't you? Well did you ever try to imagine you were in the depths of despair?”” No, I didn't.”“Then I don't think you can understand what it's like. It's a very uncomfortable feeling indeed. When you try to eat a lump comes right up in your throat and you (...) can't swallow anything, not even if it was a chocolate caramel.”—L.M. Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables.Emotion, as a “suprarational” property, transcends rationality in that it can be thought of as a group, contextual rather than as a solely individual trait, and thus is a higher order property, as the above quote suggests. This proposal arises from a metatheoretical analysis of models available to broach questions of emotion. I use metatheoretical in the sense of both the context of theory production and the theory of theory. From the first arose the idea that emotion, through the use of irrationality, has surfaced as a working equivalent to inexplicability or rational relativity, and can be modelled more adequately as suprarational, with a unique nature in its own right. The latter led me to propose that the concept of emotion as contextual, a higher order group level property, is possible and tentatively profitable. (shrink)

죽음의 문제는 모든 사람들의 인생에 있어서 매우 중요한 과제 가운데의 하나라고 말할 수 있다. 사람들이 죽음에 직면했을 때, 마땅히 어떠한 태도를 취해야만이 죽음의 공포로부터 자유로워 질 수 있을 것인가 하는 문제는 대부분의 사람들이 상당히 중시하는 문제라고 할 수 있다. 이러한 죽음의 문제와 관련하여 고대 중국사상에서는 다음과 같은 중요한 개념을 도출하고 있는데, 그것은 바로 ‘형신’이라고 하는 것이다. ‘형’은 인간의 육체를 의미하고, ‘신’은 인간의 정신 혹은 영혼, 의식 등을 의미한다. 고대 중국의 사상가들은 이 두 개념 사이의 관계에 대하여 저마다 각기 다른 시각을 (...) 가지고 접근하여, 두 개념 사이의 복잡하고 다양하게 얽혀있는 관계망을 분명하게 규명하고자 했다. 또한 그들은 이러한 규명 작업을 통하여 사람들에게 생명의 진정한 이치를 이해하고자 했다. 위진남북조 시기는 중국 역사에 있어서 다양하게 사상이 발전했던 시기 가운데의 하나였다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 풍조는 양한시기에 사상의 주류를 독점했던 경학이 동한 왕조가 멸망한 후에 주도적인 지위를 상실하게 되자, 각양각색의 학술사상이 우후죽순처럼 출현한 결과로 파생된 현상이라고 할 수 있다. 다른 한편으로는 동한 시기 말기에 발생한 정치적 소요는 사회적 혼란을 야기하여 일반 백성들의 삶은 매우 참혹한 지경에 이르렀고, 게다가 사방에서 일어난 황건적의 난동으로 인간의 생명은 매우 경시되었다. 라함은 이러한 시대적 아픔을 통감하고 삶과 죽음의 문제에 관한 자신의 견해를 담은 을 집필하여 세상 사람들에게 삶과 죽음의 공포로부터 자유로워 질 수 있는 여건을 마련해준다. 본문에서는 라함의 의 기본적인 문제들에 대하여 ‘형신’의 의미와 ‘갱생’의 의미 및 연원 그리고 을 지필하게 된 이유와 갱생론과 인과응보설의 관계를 중심으로 논의를 진행했다. (shrink)

"As a distinctive philosophy, religious humanism emphasizes man's place in an unfathomed universe, reason as an instrument for discovering the truth, free inquiry as a condition for discerning meaning and purpose, and happiness as a fundamental value. "Man's uniqueness emerges partly from homo sapiens' capacity to employ symbols effectively. For this reason, Willard's provocative book is not a celebration of controversy but a sophisticated study exploring the grounds of man's knowledge. Drawing upon phenomenologists such as Alfred Schultz, psychologists such (...) as George Kelley, and argumentation philosophers such as Stephen Toulmin, Willard makes a genuine contribution to intellectual inquiry by extending essential consideration about human knowledge. The [author] demonstrates how 'secular sources' provide a fundamental resource in developing religious understanding from argumentative interactions. "Highly insightful and intellectually refreshing... _Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge_ provides thought-provoking reading for humanists concerned with rational inquiry, communication theory, religious philosophy, and liberal education." _--Religious Humanism_. (shrink)

This book brings together disparate strands of ToM research, lays out historical roots of the idea, and indicates better alternatives.

This is an edited collection of original essays that combine philosophy, phenomenology, and literature to reflect on modern ideas about orientation and disorientation, grounds and groundlessness.