In the basic model of Condorcet’s jury theorem and in the literature that follows, an odd-numbered group of voters is assumed so that the simple majority rule can be used. We show that this assumption is not necessary either in Condorcet’s basic model or in the general framework of dichotomous choice. We first apply simple majority rule to an even-numbered homogeneous fixed-size committee. We then provide a justification for using simple majority rule for an even-numbered heterogeneous fixed-size committee when (...) the competence structure of the committee members is not common knowledge. (shrink)

In online social networks, the audience size commanded by an organization or an individual is a critical measure of that entity’s popularity and this measure has important economic and/or political implications. Such efforts to measure popularity of users or exploit knowledge about their audience are complicated by the presence of fake profiles on these networks. In this study, analysis of 62 million publicly available Twitter user profiles was conducted and a strategy to identify automatically generated fake profiles was established. Using (...) a combination of a pattern-matching algorithm on screen-names and an analysis of update times, a reasonable number of highly reliable fake user accounts were identified. Analysis of profile creation times and URLs of these fake accounts revealed their distinct behavior relative to a ground truth data set. The characteristics of friends and followers of users in the two data sets further revealed the very different nature of the two groups. The ratio of number of followers-to-friends for ground truth users was ∼1, consistent with past observations, while the fake profiles had a median ratio ∼30, indicating that the fake users we identified were primarily focused on gathering friends. An analysis of the temporal evolution of accounts over 2 years showed that the friends-to-followers ratio increased over time for fake profiles while they decreased for ground truth users. Our results, thus, suggest that a profile-based approach can be used for identifying a core set of fake online social network users in a time-efficient manner. (shrink)

ABSTRACTChristopher Achen and Larry Bartels’s Democracy for Realists offers a compelling critique of voters’ role in democratic politics and underscores the importance of group identity to vote choice. Even so, there may be grounds for attributing greater policy meaning to elections than Achen and Bartels acknowledge. Politicians have an incentive to respond to widely shared views in the electorate; this can often make it difficult to detect issue voting even when ordinary citizens’ issue preferences are critical. Group-based voting also (...) may have policy content. Understanding the connections between group identity and policy substance constitutes an important challenge for future work building upon Achen and Bartels’s foundation. (shrink)

Compared with non-union workers, union workers take more of their compensation in the form of insurance. This may be because unions choose democratically, and democratic choice mitigates adverse selection in group insurance. Relative to individually-purchased insurance, we show that group insurance chosen by an ideal profit-maximizing employer can be worse for every employee, while group insurance chosen democratically can be much better. The reason is that democracy can fail to represent the preferences of almost half the group.

From a 1996 survey comparing the views of economists and ordinary voters, Bryan Caplan deduces several biases—anti‐market, anti‐foreign, pessimistic, and makework biases—to support his thesis that voters are rationally irrational, i.e., that, aware of the inconsequentiality of their votes, they rationally indulge their “preferences” for public policies that have harmful results. Yet if the standard of comparison is the public’s opposition to harmful policies, rather than the level of its opposition relative to that of economists, the “biases” disappear. (...) In absolute terms, voters support free trade and are against protectionism, such that free‐trade agreements are more prevalent among democratic, rather than autocratic, regimes. Finally, the protectionist policies that are adopted in this country are the product of interest‐group politics, not of voters’ wrongheaded policy preferences. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse the ideological differences between extreme rightwing parties and their voters in the Flemish and Walloon part of Belgium. Extreme right-wing ideology consists of five core elements: racism, extreme ethnic nationalism, the leadership principle, anti-parliamentarianism and an anti-leftist attitude. All these attitudes refer to the basic value of rightwing extremism: the belief in the inequality of individuals and groups. An analysis of the ideology of the Vlaams Blok in Flanders shows that it adheres to (...) these core elements of extreme right-wing ideology. An analysis of the attitudes and motives of the voters of this party, however, shows that they cannot be considered as right-wing extremists. The ideological gap between the Vlaams Blok and its electorate is due to the strategy of this party, since it cultivates 'two faces': a populist, moderate face in order to attract votes, and a radical extreme rightwingface in order to recruit and motivate militants. In Wallonia, less is known about the ideology of right-wing parties and that of their voters. Current research however, suggests that the conclusions from Flemish research may very well be generalized to Wallonia as well. (shrink)

Voters have many motivations. Some vote on the issues. They vote for a candidate because they share that candidate's policy positions. Some vote on performance. They vote for a candidate because they think that candidate will produce the best outcomes in office. Some vote on group identities. They vote for a candidate because that candidate is connected to their social group. This paper is about these motivations. I address three questions. First, which of these motivations, were it widespread, would (...) be best for intrinsic democratic values? Second, how do the motivations of actual American voters affect the value of American democracy? Third, what motivations should individual American voters have? I argue that widespread issue voting would be best, followed by performance voting, followed by group voting. I argue that American voters do not much contribute to the value of American democracy. Their behavior makes it hard to achieve many democratic values. Finally, I argue that, were America an ideal democracy, American voters would have reason to vote on the issues. But, in their non-ideal democracy, American voters merely have reason to avoid voting on privileged group identities. (shrink)

The voting power of a voter—the extent to which she can affect the outcome of a collective decision—is often quantified in terms of the probability that she is critical. This measure is extended to a series of power measures of different ranks. The measures quantify the extent to which a voter can be part of a group that can jointly make a difference as to whether a bill passes or not. It is argued that the series of these measures allow (...) for a more appropriate assessment of voting power, particularly of a posteriori voting power in case the votes are stochastically dependent. Also, the new measures discriminate between voting games that cannot be distinguished in terms of the probability of only criticality. (shrink)

What is the relationship between electoral and economic performance? Previous literature posits that poor economic performance hurts the incumbent at the ballot box because overall economic performance serves as a competence signal, which voters can readily access at low costs. Building on an emerging economic voting literature exploring heterogeneity in the electorate, this article argues that social groups are affected differently by various dimensions of economic performance and that their sociotropic sanctioning of incumbents is contingent on the retrospective (...) performance of these dimensions. It theorizes how four social groups—low-skilled workers, pensioners, public sector employees, and high-income individuals—are differently affected by each of four economic dimensions: unemployment, inflation, stock market performance, and public spending; as a result, they penalize the incumbent to varying extents. Results from a multilevel logistic regression analysis from four modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems containing around seventy electoral contexts are consistent with the argument. (shrink)

In representative democracies, referendum voting and parliamentary elections provide two fundamentally different methods for determining the majority opinion. We use three mathematical paradoxes – so-called majority voting paradoxes – to show that referendum voting can reverse the outcome of a parliamentary election, even if the same group of voters have expressed the same preferences on the issues considered in the referendums and the parliamentary election. This insight about the systemic contrarieties between referendum voting and parliamentary elections sheds a new (...) light on the debate about the supplementary value of referendums in representative democracies. Using this insight, we will suggest legal conditions for the implementation of referendums in representative democracies that can pre-empt the conflict between the two methods for determining the majority opinion. (shrink)

The Federalist, justifying the Electoral College to elect the president, claimed that a small group of more informed individuals would make a better decision than the general mass. But the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that the more independent, better-than-random voters there are, the more likely it will be that the majority among them will be correct. The question thus arises as to how much better, on average, members of the smaller group would have to be to compensate for (...) the epistemic costs of making decisions on the basis of that many fewer votes. This question is explored in the contexts of referendum democracy, delegate-style representative democracy, and trustee-style representative democracy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT While democratic states may manipulate public opinion and mobilize society to serve their interests, a focus on such active efforts may distract us from the passive, default condition of ignorance‐based state autonomy. The electorate’s ignorance ensures that most of what modern states do is unknown to “society,” and thus need not even acquire social approval, whether manipulated or spontaneous. Similarly, suggestions that democratic states may be “captured” by societal groups must take cognizance of the factors that enable elites (...) to serve the interests of specific societal groups at the expense of the larger society. Bringing studies of voter ignorance into the analysis of state’s autonomy from society provides a novel approach to the study of democratic states’ autonomy, while also serving to explain how societal “capture” of state policies is possible. (shrink)

In a voting context, when the preferences of voters are described by linear orderings over a finite set of alternatives, the Maximin rule orders the alternatives according to their minimal rank in the voters’ preferences. It is equivalent to the Fallback bargaining process described by Brams and Kilgour (Group Decision and Negotiation 10:287–316, 2001). This article proposes a characterization of the Maximin rule as a social welfare function (SWF) based upon five conditions: Neutrality, Duplication, Unanimity, Top Invariance, and (...) Weak Separability. In a similar way, we obtain a characterization for the Maximax SWF by using Bottom Invariance instead of Top Invariance. Then, these results are compared to the axiomatic characterizations of two famous scoring rules, the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule. (shrink)

In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result (...) of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule. (shrink)

White American voters have realigned among the two dominant parties by income and education levels. This article argues that the interaction of education and income provides a more insightful—and stark—display of this change than treating them individually. Each group of voters is associated with distinctive “first dimension” views of economic redistribution and “second dimension” preferences concerning salient sociopolitical issues of civic and cultural liberties, race, and immigration. Macro-level hypotheses are developed about the changing voting behavior of education-income voting (...) groups along with micro-level hypotheses about the propensity of vote switching. The hypotheses are tested with data from the American National Election Studies 1952–2016. A profound realignment is revealed between white voters and the two main US parties that is consistent with the theoretical expectations developed in the article. (shrink)

There is widespread concern that the nature of mass politics changed during the late twentieth century, and indeed changed largely for the worse, in most post-industrial societies. The standard arguments are familiar and widely rehearsed. You can hear them echoed everyday, whether in simple or sophisticated versions, in the press, scattered in political speeches, and published in academe. Some arguments are cast in strictly empirical terms, but many popular accounts have strongly normative overtones.The intellectual roots lie in the classics of (...) political sociology from the late 1950s and mid-1960s, captured perhaps just as the era of traditional party campaigns was passing, notably the work of Maurice Duverger on mass-branch political parties and Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset on social cleavages and electoral behaviour.The standard view emphasizes the consequences of the significant shift from direct party-oriented linkages between citizens and the state towards indirect media-oriented linkages in representative democracies. In the traditional model of election campaigns that characterized the ‘golden age’ of West European party politics, running from the expansion of the mass franchise in the late nineteenth century until at least the mid-twentieth century, party loyalists characteristically selected parliamentary representatives based on long-standing social cleavages and stable ideological cues.The core cleavages of class, religion, region, and language gave a collective meaning to party support and united people with shared identities and social roots who strived for broadly similar political ideals. As illustrated in Figure 1, in traditional campaigns political leaders communicated with grass-roots party loyalists via elected representatives and core party activists, using direct face-to-face channels of persuasion, organization and mobilization, such as local meetings, party newsletters, candidate pamphlets, doorstep canvassing, and town-hall speeches, supplemented by partisan newspapers.Collective organizations and traditional interest groups such as unions and churches, local cooperatives, community groups, and workers’ clubs, mobilized many citizens at the margins of political power and linked their interests to political parties. Support by party loyalists was regarded as a sign of trust in the ability of elected leaders to translate their programmatic principles into concrete policy actions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOur constitutional system is more sensitive to public sentiment than Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels suggest in Democracy for Realists. Even if our system is not micro-responsive—maintaining fidelity to public opinion, or to campaign promises, in every detail of public policy—it is macro-responsive: politicians grasp core public expectations and do their best to meet them. While Achen and Bartels show that group loyalties decisively shape perceptions and expectations, people often revise these perceptions and expectations based on experience. Because we are (...) more than the creatures of groups and parties, democracy works better—and is better—than the authors suggest. (shrink)

Following the rise in use of online communication in electoral campaigns throughout the world, this article deals with the use of blogs by politicians in Europe. Through the approach of Critical Discourse Analysis, it analyzes blog posts written by the European Parliament incumbents running for the European Parliament elections in 2009, from four different EU states and ideological backgrounds, and at the same time the four largest political groups in the European Parliament. The purpose of the study is to (...) reveal the campaign strategy and dominant discourses through the analysis of the format, style and appeals. The findings reveal the differences in discourses between four political blogs, which result from the different use of language and appeals. (shrink)

Drawing on five months of ethnography among rank-and-file Soka Gakkai members, this article takes issue with the conventional view of Komeito and Gakkai political socialization as one of group identity. It uses interviews and primary sources from Gakkai socialization practice to document how the two organizations appeal to Gakkai members by promoting the Komeito policy agenda, and how Gakkai members use the same arguments in search of non-Gakkai votes for the party. Social ties remain important, but they are vehicles for (...) this policy message, not a justification for supporting Komeito. This makes Komeito leadership far more constrained in its political choices than is currently recognized. The article finishes by showing how this theory explains variation in Komeito electoral support better than a social identity alternative. (shrink)

In his Populist Democracy: A Defence (1993), Torbjörn Tännsjö suggests, roughly, the following necessary and sufficient conditions for a democratic collective choice: If the majority of a given group of voters prefer A to B, then the collective choice is A rather than B; and if the majority of voters had preferred B to A, then the collective choice would have been B rather than A. Moreover, the preference of a voter is equated with the one she is (...) showing by the act of voting (e.g., by putting a ballot in a box). Tännsjö’s definition has the advantage of being simple, naturalistic, and, to the best of my knowledge, more exact that most other definitions proposed in the literature. As such, I think it is a useful starting point for a discussion of how to define democratic decision making. As we will see below, such a discussion can be quite illuminating and generate interesting and fruitful questions regarding how to understand democracy. Tännsjö claims that his definition is in line with common language use, i.e., that it is a lexical definition. Pace Tännsjö, I shall show that it departs from common language use since it has a number of counterintuitive implications in regards to which decisions and methods that are classified as democratic or undemocratic. I shall suggest a number of amendments to avoid these drawbacks and incorporate these amendments in a definition of a democratic collective choice. The result is a definition of a democratic decision that is superior to Tännsjö’s, or so we will argue. It will be acknowledged, however, that it still has some shortcomings that future efforts need to rectify, or that it might not be possible to give a 1 simple and naturalistic definition of democracy that is sufficiently in line with common language use. To avoid a possible misunderstanding, let me add that I don’t think there is necessarily one correct way of defining a democratic decision (although there might be a common kernel) and I certainly don’t suggest that the definition proposed here is the only way of explicating the ordinary language use of the term “democracy”.. (shrink)

Populists in the EU often call for restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights. These calls are often demagogic and parochial. This paper aims to show what exactly is both distinct and problematic with these populist calls from a normative point of view while not necessarily reducible to demagogy and parochialism. The overall aim of the paper is not to argue that all populists call for such restrictions nor to claim that all calls for such restrictions are populist. The (...) purpose of the paper is rather humble. It only aims to show that populist calls for restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights are characterised by two normatively problematic arguments that target two different subsets of the citizenry: what I dub for the purpose of this paper the moralists and the immoralists. It is the way populists address these two subsets of the citizenry, as well as the fact that they could simultaneously appeal to the concerns of both groups, that makes populist approaches to welfare rights both conceptually distinct to other approaches as well as potentially politically appealing to a more diverse population of voters. (shrink)

This stimulating new international study of the state of democracy today contributes towards improving and deepening our understanding of the democratic process, both in new and old democracies. It brings together a leading group of international experts in the fields of politics, economics, sociology, journalism, anthropology and law. It covers key themes that have a bearing on the quality and sustainability of democratic practices and relates them to policies in specific countries or regions. A special concern of the book is (...) to identify and evaluate policies aimed at securing improvements in democratic practices. Most countries in the world today have embraced democracy. The rise of democracy has strengthened support for human rights and is making possible the resolution of many conflicts through political and legal means. In many countries, however, the state of democracy is a cause of concern. Countries that have recently become democratic are often unable to satisfy elementary social and economic aspirations of their citizens and many continue to restrict basic civil and political freedoms. Voters’ apathy, distrust of politicians, media manipulation and corruption are issues that also trouble citizens in old established democracies. This book was previously published as a special issue of _Democratization._. (shrink)

Populism and tribalism are increasingly prevalent characteristics of so-called democratic societies. In this paper, I shall explore some of the reasons for this trend, including conceptual confusions about the nature of identity and the collectivist/individualist dichotomy; the decline of legitimate media outlets and their replacement by social media and their attendant narratives which have little regard for truth telling, consistency or moral norms; and the failure of voters to uphold their responsibilities as democratic citizens. I shall argue that while (...) populism presupposes a formal democratic framework, it is actually incompatible with and, accordingly, a genuine threat to, democracy. I shall propose an epistemological and ethical framework based on the unifying concept of personhood which overrides the various tribes, groups, collectives and associations with which we identify, and which are, mistakenly, taken to constitute our actual identities. I shall also juxtapose notions of narrative and dialogue to suggest ways in which tribalism and polarization can be challenged. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most effective form of challenge is prevention, which underscores the importance of teaching children, from a young age, to be powerful thinkers. Powerful thinking is not merely an important educational tool; it is key to becoming persons who are self-aware, aware of others like them, and mutually aware of the world itself. Our identities as persons may be regarded as preconditions for asking and responding to what I call “the Big Questions” (including “How should I live?” “What are my responsibilities and obligations to others?”, and “How can I contribute to making the world a better place?”). It is here that philosophy for children and the community of inquiry have important roles to play. (shrink)

During presidential campaigns, party members often operate Facebook pages or groups concurrently with the official communications of their respective political parties. However, there is limited evidence regarding the true motivations of these partisans, and how their efforts supplement the online strategies of the parties. Our study is based on interviews conducted with party members who ran Facebook pages to support a candidate during the 2022 French presidential campaign. It sheds light on how they managed their Facebook pages, often autonomously, (...) to serve as supplementary tools to their grassroots tactics and ultimately to bring the campaign closer to the voters. This finding highlights the emergence of a hybrid model of online campaign organization, the partisan-managed campaigning model, which challenges both the traditional top-down model, in which the campaign is managed by the central party, and the more recent citizen-initiated campaign model. (shrink)

The exit-poll survey of May 21, 1995, the day of the national election, contained after the question of the actual voting behaviour for the Chamber, an open-ended question asking the motives of this voting behaviour. 3547 voters were questioned in the Flemish part of Belgium. Because the exit-poll questioning was done on election day, the voters could not be influenced by the election results and the explanations given by experts in the media. Categorisation of the answers was done (...) by content analysis. The categorisation scheme was developed on the basis of the existing theories of voting behaviour. On this basis an overview is given of the cognitive and affective spontaneous motives the voters are given for their voting behaviour. The inter rater reliability is very high. With a HlCLASS analysis a motive profile for every party is developed. The results indicate that party identification in a broad sense is still one of the most important explanations ofvoting behaviour. But they also make clear that the stability in voting behaviour is very unsure for an important group ofvoters. The two sources of instability are short term ad hoc motives and a-politic or anti-politie motives among a still growing group of voters. (shrink)

This Second Edition of A New Environmental Ethics: The Next Millennium for Life on Earth offers clear, powerful, and often moving thoughts from Holmes Rolston III, one of the first and most respected philosophers to write on the environment and often called the "father of environmental ethics." Rolston surveys the full spectrum of approaches in the field of environmental ethics and offers critical assessments of contemporary academic accounts. He draws on a lifetime of research and experience to suggest an outlook, (...) and even hope, for the future. This forward-looking analysis, focused on the new millennium, will be a necessary complement to any balanced textbook or anthology in environmental ethics. The First Edition guaranteed "to put you in your place." Beyond that, the Second Edition, asks whether you want to live a "de-natured life on a de-natured planet." Key Updates in the Second Edition - Covers the worsening environmental situation due to actions of the Trump administration, including withdrawal from the Paris accord and from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change - Includes information on legislation in key U.S. states aimed to ameliorate the damage done at the Federal level - Increases coverage of group knowledge, group agreement and disagreement, and group action in collective environmental ethics, as distinguished from individual knowledge and action - Examines the deleterious effects of online consumer behavior - Explains how a loss of solidarity among a nation's citizens and even a larger solidary among humanity leads to environmental degradation - Offers new analysis of the effects of epistemic bubbles, echo chambers, and fake news on the behavior of voters and consumers - Provides an extended critique of the Anthropocene Epoch, and the prospect of geo-engineering Earth to become a synthetic environment. (shrink)

Previous research using immersive virtual reality (VR) has shown that after a short period of embodiment of White people in a Black virtual body their implicit racial bias against Black people diminishes. Here we tested the effects of some socio-cognitive variables that could contribute to enhancing or reducing the implicit racial bias. The first aim of the study was to assess the beneficial effects of cooperation within a VR scenario, the second aim was to provide preliminary testing of the hypothesis (...) that empathy and political attitudes could contribute to implicit bias about race, while the third aim was to explore the relationship between political attitudes and empathy. We had (Caucasian) participants embodied in a Black virtual body and engaged either in a cooperative (Coop group) or in a non-cooperative (Neutral group) activity with a confederate experimenter embodying another Black avatar. Before and after VR, we measured participants’ implicit racial bias by means of Implicit Association Test (IAT) and their perceived closeness toward the confederate experimenter. Before VR we also assessed participants’ political attitudes and empathy traits. Results revealed that, as compared to the Neutral group, the Coop group showed lower IAT scores after the social interaction. Interestingly, in the Neutral but not the Coop group the perceived closeness toward the confederate experimenter was associated with the initial racial bias: the more the participants reduced their distance, the more they reduced their IAT score. Moreover, reported traits of empathy and political attitudes significantly explained the variance observed in the initial implicit bias, with perspective-taking, empathic concern, and personal distress being significant predictors of the IAT scores. Finally, there was a relationship between political attitudes and empathy: the more participants considered themselves as left-wing voters, the higher their perspective-taking and empathic concern scores. We discuss these findings within the neuroscientific and social cognition field and encourage scholars from different domains to further explore whether and under which conditions a given manipulation for reducing racial bias could be efficiently transposed in VR. (shrink)

This article investigates how voters made sense of the Dutch EU constitutional referendum. Based on a series of focus group interviews, it identifies what information people based their understandings on, and traces the relations they draw between concepts in their own accounts of their vote choices. Applying a cognitive connectionist perspective on the construction of meaning, it models people's considerations as paths across semantic networks. It finds that people shared considerable parts of the knowledge underlying their constructions, but used (...) this information quite differently. They strategically selected frames from their information environment, and reframed contrary arguments to fit their constructions. Yes- and No-voters drew in systematically different additional information, while simultaneously engaging idiosyncratic concerns to personalize their accounts. People's understandings are thus informed and constrained, but by no means determined, by public discourse. Highlighting people's activity and creativity, this paper calls for a stronger audience perspective in political communication research. (shrink)

An electoral evaluation of a set of expert opinions proceeds by treating the experts as voters. Although this method allows us to formalise our naive views about how to take expert advice, the formalisations are plagued by paradoxes which parallel those found in literature on social aggregation devices. This parallel suggests that our naive views about taking expert advice are in as much need of revision as our naive views about deriving group preferences from individual preferences. * I am (...) indebted to Joseph Hanna for a number of criticisms and corrections to a previous draft. (shrink)

The human history relates to the history of communication, which has also been a co-driver of human development. Communication integrates the knowledge, organization and power of a society.Today, there is an increasing debate over the importance of politicians' mutual communication, communication with voters and the media, the role of public relations in politics, and communication with the civil society. Thus, political communication and the creative use of the media remain the essential component of any individual involved in politics or (...) even of a political group.In this study, political communication in North Macedonia is presented in the context of political efforts into the integration process in European Union (EU), by observing all the stages within the process so far. From the content and the issues addressed, it is clear that policymakers face the challenges of communication (as is the case in many countries aspiring the European integration).In this paper, the premises of genuinely political communication strategy are analyzed separately, assessing them in the context of the political communication theory. It will be shown that successful communication is an important tool for convincing citizens that EU provides a better quality of life and work. (shrink)

In each of two experiments, college students were assigned to two ad hoc groups that competed in a dart-throwing contest. On each trial, one contestant from each team threw a single dart at a standard dart board, trying to come as close as possible to hitting the bull's-eye. Also on each trial, the other participants judged the likelihood that both the Team A contestant and the Team B contestant would come closer to hitting the bull's-eye. In both experiments, participants (...) exhibited a strong wishful thinking effect. They judged the likelihood that their own team members would come closer to be greater than the likelihood that the opposing team members would come closer. Experiment 2 suggested that it was participants' desires, as opposed to some other variable associated with team membership, that influenced their predictions. Experiment 2 also showed that the size of the effect did not depend on whether participants believed that their predictions had been influenced by their team membership. These results help bridge the gap between previous experimental laboratory studies, which have produced inconsistent results, and correlational field studies of sports fans and voters, which have consistently produced large effects. (shrink)

Abstract:San Diego, California, is the eighth largest city in the United States and one of the least affordable cities in the world. Many people in San Diego experience significant ramifications from competition for space. Currently, the southern side of downtown San Diego is the hottest area for development in San Diego county. This article examines the redevelopment of Barrio Logan, a small Latino community that borders downtown San Diego. Barrio Logan is a part of San Diego's third oldest community. The (...) study interviewed ten planning board members who participated in redevelopment and rezoning processes and provided thematic data. In addition, ten U-T San Diego newspaper articles also provided data on a referendum initiated by the marine industry to repeal adopted zoning ordinances. The data are used to discuss the construction of personal, group, and institutional social reality that influenced the outcome of the redevelopment and rezoning processes. The successful Barrio Logan Redevelopment Project Area process was about both the restoration and the sociopolitical empowerment of the community. Due to that redevelopment process, Barrio Logan has begun to emerge as a vibrant, exciting community. A subsequent redevelopment effort, the Barrio Logan Community Plan Update (BLCPU), focused on instituting new zoning ordinances to address the incompatible land uses and toxins in Barrio Logan. Industry in the community has resisted these types of changes to the zoning ordinances for decades. This resistance culminated with a referendum that repealed the BLCPU, which had been passed by the San Diego City Council. The marine industry's central selling vision of jobs influenced a majority of San Diego City voters outside of Barrio Logan to reject the Plan 1A version of the BLCPU. The reasons for and ramifications of the rejection of Plan 1A are discussed and steps Barrio Logan and the other San Diego redevelopment districts could take to improve their chances of winning a future referendum election are recommended. (shrink)

Deregulation of the political process could be an instrument to reduce the overwhelming power of specialised interest groups and tighten the links between voters and politicians. But deregulation causes serious problems. Reputation pooling by international political enterprises depends on a transnational public sphere which is quite unrealistic. And political enterprises are not capable of shaping candidates for public service. Putting political finance in the hands of voters simply moves lobbying activities to the level of voters and (...) does not change the asymmetrical influence of interest groups. Above all, the idea that political enterprises exchange experts in parliament does not fit into the crucial principle of parliamentary government and political responsibility. (shrink)

I am interested in the “rational irrationality hypothesis” about voter behavior. According to this hypothesis, voters regularly vote for policies that are contrary to their interests because the act of voting for them isn’t. Gathering political information is time-consuming and inconvenient. Doing so is unlikely to lead to positive results since one's vote is unlikely to be decisive. However, we have preferences over our political beliefs. We like to see ourselves as members of certain groups (e.g. “rugged individualists”) (...) and being part of those groups depends on having certain beliefs (e.g. about welfare spending). Even if a decrease in welfare spending would be bad for me, I might still benefit by believing in and, consequently, voting for a decrease since my vote is unlikely to make a difference but getting to see myself as a rugged individualist will make a noticeable difference to my wellbeing. It is sometimes argued that this hypothesis fails for empirical reasons. I will argue that things are worse: it is conceptually incoherent. I will do so by first showing that it is a rationalizing explanation and then argue that rationalizing explanations must be reflectively stable from the agent's perspective. The rational irrationality hypothesis is not. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe idea that the crowd could ever be intelligent is a counterintuitive one. Our modern, Western faith in experts and bureaucracies is rooted in the notion that political competence is the purview of the select few. Here, as in my book Democratic Reason, I defend the opposite view: that the diverse many are often smarter than a group of select elites because of the different cognitive tools, perspectives, heuristics, and knowledge they bring to political problem solving and prediction. In this (...) essay I defend my epistemic argument against proceduralist democrats; the value of model thinking against empiricists; the bracketing of fundamental value diversity against critics who see such diversity as an essential feature of politics; the intelligence of the masses in the face of voter ignorance and systematic biases; and the normative priority of democracy over market mechanisms. I also consider challenges to my use of Hong and Page's formal results, the epistemically proper selection method for representatives, and the role of deliberation in problem solving. I finally chart three avenues for further research. (shrink)

Politics is full of people who don't care about the facts. Still, while not caring about the facts, they are often concerned to present themselves as caring about them. Politics, in other words, is full of bullshitters. But why? In this paper I develop an incentives-based analysis of bullshit in politics, arguing that it is often a rational response to the incentives facing different groups of agents. In a slogan: bullshit in politics pays, sometimes literally. After first outlining an (...) account of bullshit, I discuss the incentives driving three different groups of agents to bullshit: politicians, the media, and voters. I then examine several existing proposals to combat bullshit in politics, arguing that each will fail because they ignore the relevant underlying incentives. I conclude somewhat pessimistically that a certain amount of bullshit in politics is inevitable. (shrink)

Negative campaigning is a central component of political campaigns in the United States. Yet, until now, most evidence has suggested that negative campaigning has little effect on voters. How can we reconcile the findings of a plethora of empirical studies with the methods of political elites? This book cuts through to the central issue: how such advertising influences voters' attitudes and their actions during campaigns. Focusing on U.S. senatorial campaigns, Kim Fridkin and Patrick Kenney draw from surveys, experiments, (...) facial expression emotion tests, content analyses, and focus groups. They develop the "tolerance and tactics theory of negativity" and demonstrate the divergent effects of tone and content on voter outcomes. Using their new framework, they find that harsh messages seen as relevant to the opponent's ability to govern are indeed likely to be noticed and acted upon. (shrink)

Amongst other methods, political campaigns employ microtargeting, a specific technique used to address the individual voter. In the US, microtargeting relies on a broad set of collected data about the individual. However, due to the unavailability of comparable data in Germany, the practice of microtargeting is far more challenging. Citizens in Germany widely treat social media platforms as a means for political debate. The digital traces they leave through their interactions provide a rich information pool, which can create the necessary (...) conditions for political microtargeting following appropriate algorithmic processing. More specifically, data mining techniques enable information gathering about a people's general opinion, party preferences and other non-political characteristics. Through the application of data-intensive algorithms, it is possible to cluster users in respect of common attributes, and through profiling identify whom and how to influence. Applying machine learning algorithms, this paper explores the possibility to identify micro groups of users, which can potentially be targeted with special campaign messages, and how this approach can be expanded to large parts of the electorate. Lastly, based on these technical capabilities, we discuss the ethical and political implications for the German political system. (shrink)

From the outset the Belgian press has been a political press. The catholic and liberal newspapers, however, have never been tightly linked to the corresponding political parties, whereas the socialist and communistnewspapers depend officially from their respective political party so that they can be considered as real party-papers.Of the 39 Belgian newspapers 20 can be defined as catholic, 7 as liberal, 7 as socialist and 1 as communist ; 4 newspapers call themselves «neutral», but on several political occasions they heve (...) nevertheless taken up position. Among these 39 newspapers only 19 can be considered as «independent» : of the 20 catholic newspapers 16 belang to 5 different newspaper chains ; 7 of the liberal dailies are owned by only 3 newspaper groups; 3 of the 7 socialist papers belang to the same chain and 3 of the so-called «neutral» dailies are published by only one group.From the circulation figures of the Flemish press it emerges that the catholic and liberal newspapers make some progress, while the socialist dailies are constantly regressing. The total circulation of the Frenchspeaking newspapers is slightly receding, but here again the socialist newspapers are the big losers. It should be noticed that only the circulation figures of the Flemish newspapers are officially ascertained, whereas the major part of the French-speaking newspapers do not allow such an official control.From this it is clear that in Belgium there exists a real disproportion between the number of readers of political opinionnewspapers and the voters for the corresponding political parties. For the moment the number of readers of catholic newspapers surpasses the amount of voters for the CVP-PSC-party in an considerable way. This also applies to the liberal press, where the amount of readers outnumbers the voters for the PW-PLP-party. On the other hand, the number of readers of socialist newspapers even does not amount to half of the numbers of voters for the BSP-PSB-party. (shrink)

Without drastic adjustment, this system cannot last much longer," writes Van Reybrouck. "If you look at the decline in voter turnout and party membership, and at the way politicians are held in contempt, if you look at how difficult it is to form governments, how little they can do and how harshly they are punished for it, if you look at how quickly populism, technocracy and anti-parliamentarianism are rising, if you look at how more and more citizens are longing for (...) participation and how quickly that desire can tip over into frustration, then you realize we are up to our necks." Not so very long ago, the great battles of democracy were fought for the right to vote. Now, Van Reybrouck writes, "it's all about the right to speak, but in essence it's the same battle, the battle for political emancipation and for democratic participation. We must decolonize democracy. We must democratize democracy." As history, Van Reybrouck makes the compelling argument that modern democracy was designed as much to preserve the rights of the powerful and keep the masses in line, as to give the populace a voice. As change-agent, Against Elections makes the argument that there are forms of government, what he terms sortitive or deliberative democracy, that are beginning to be practiced around the world, and can be the remedy we seek. In Iceland, for example, deliberative democracy was used to write the new constitution. A group of people were chosen by lot, educated in the subject at hand, and then were able to decide what was best, arguably, far better than politicians would have. A fascinating, and workable idea has led to a timely book to remind us that our system of government is a flexible instrument, one that the people have the power to change. (shrink)

Drawing on the distinction between dominance and prestige as two evolutionarily grounded strategies for attaining status in human groups, this essay examines an underappreciated feature of Donald Trump's appeal to the millions of American voters who elected him president in 2016—his uncanny ability to channel primal dominance. Like the alpha male of a chimpanzee colony, Trump leads through intimidation, bluster, and threat, and through the establishment of short-term, opportunistic relationships with other high-status agents. Whereas domain-specific expertise confers status (...) in the prestige paradigm, dominant leaders derogate expertise in order to establish a direct, authoritarian connection to their constituency. Trump's leadership style derives readily from his personality makeup, which entails a combustible temperament mixture of high extraversion and low agreeableness, a motivational agenda centered on extreme narcissism, and an internalized life story that tracks the exploits of an intrepid warrior who must forever fight to win in a Hobbesian world of carnage. (shrink)

In a recent paper, María Pía Méndez (2022) offers an epistemic critique of epistocracy according to which the sort of politically well-informed but homogenous groups of citizens that would be empowered under epistocracy would lack reliable access to information about the preferences of less informed citizens. Specifically, they would lack access to such citizens’ preferences regarding the form that policies ought to take—that is, how these policies ought to be implemented. Arguing that this so-called Information Gap Problem militates against (...) epistocracy, Méndez instead recommends that we respond to problems created by widespread voter ignorance by improving the flow of information between political actors by adopting some participatory democratic institutions. In this paper I argue that the severity of the Information Gap Problem for epistocracy is overstated. After first sketching some background (Section 1), I argue that it is hard to see why information about citizens’ preferences for the form that policies ought to take is important enough that the expected costs of epistocracy outweigh its expected benefits if it selectively empowers people who lack access to such information (Section 2). Moreover, different forms of epistocracy are less threatened by the Information Gap Problem, assuming it is indeed a problem. For some forms of epistocracy, it may be no problem whatsoever. However, I conclude by suggesting that Méndez touches upon some more serious problems for epistocracy (Section 3). First, even setting aside the Information Gap Problem, there are open questions about the possible epistemic inferiority of epistocracy relative to democracy. Second, more comprehensive accounts of political competence that move beyond the possession of sufficient levels of political information are much harder to reliably test for, thus complicating the task of devising effective epistocratic selection mechanisms. Lastly, epistocracy arguably creates a serious risk of abuse that may outweigh any other benefits it brings. More research is needed to determine how (and whether) epistocrats can respond to such challenges. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to consider the advantages and disadvantages of pollster and sociological approaches to electoral research.The article shows that conducting electoral research in modern election campaigns is carried out equally by pollster (for purely political purposes) and sociological (for scientific and sociological purposes) technologies. It has been proven that optimal results can be achieved by combining pollster and sociological approaches to electoral research. It was determined that today the organization of an effective election campaign requires equally (...) sociologists-pollsters and sociologists-analysts, the result of whose work is respectively collected empirical data and an analytical product, scientific expertise.It has been demonstrated that pollster and sociological approaches to conducting electoral research differ not only in the concepts of public opinion and the styles of its research, but also in the subject field. The electorate as a subject of electoral research acquires different content for different approaches. The pollster approach is more likely to understand the electorate as a circle of voters who vote for one or another party or candidate for an elected position and, in fact, are supporters of a certain political force or personality, while representatives of the sociological approach mostly consider the electorate as a collection of all citizens who vested with the right to vote and who exercise or do not exercise it under specially created conditions. It is argued that the integration of the subject fields of electoral polling and electoral sociological research will allow more effective and productive use of analytical potential in the election campaign, since such an organization of patronage work will help not only to record the results of electoral research, but also to predict the trends of electoral choice, the flow of votes, the reactions of electoral groups to specific political events. The availability of systematic ideas about the types of voters and their personal profiles will help to meaningfully approach the understanding of the electorate. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In its attempt to prove that voters, politicians, and bureaucrats are motivated by the public interest, Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics overlooks a great deal of public-choice research, to which much has been added during the two decades since it was published. The importance of self-interest at both the micro and macro levels of politics becomes clear once one looks not simply at the ?inputs? of a democracy but at its ?outputs? as well. The prevalence of (...) interest groups, the dysfunction of the United States tax code, the lobbying by unions for their members? self-interest, the earmarks in the Patriot Act, the numerous cases of corruption in Western democracies, and the dissatisfaction of citizens with their governments? failings all point to the importance of self-interest in politics. (shrink)

In certain judgmental situations where a “correct” decision is presumed to exist, optimal decision making requires evaluation of the decision-makers’ capabilities and the selection of the appropriate aggregation rule. The major and so far unresolved difficulty is the former necessity. This article presents the optimal aggregation rule that simultaneously satisfies these two interdependent necessary requirements. In our setting, some record of the voters’ past decisions is available, but the correct decisions are not known. We observe that any arbitrary evaluation (...) of the decision-makers’ capabilities as probabilities yields some optimal aggregation rule that, in turn, yields a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. Thus, a skill-evaluation equilibrium can be defined as an evaluation of decisional skills that yields itself as a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. We show that such equilibrium exists and offer a procedure for finding one. The obtained equilibrium is locally optimal and is shown empirically to generally be globally optimal in terms of the correctness of the resulting collective decisions. Interestingly, under minimally competent (almost symmetric) skill distributions that allow unskilled decision makers, the optimal rule considerably outperforms the common simple majority rule (SMR). Furthermore, a sufficient record of past decisions ensures that the collective probability of making a correct decision converges to 1, as opposed to accuracy of about 0.7 under SMR. Our proposed optimal voting procedure relaxes the fundamental (and sometimes unrealistic) assumptions in Condorcet’s celebrated theorem and its extensions, such as sufficiently high decision-making quality, skill homogeneity or existence of a sufficiently large group of decision makers. (shrink)

This study investigates bath the relationship between evaluation of personality traits of party-leaders and party identification, and the evaluation of personality traits as a determinant of voting behaviour. One month before the Belgian national elections of November 81 201 voters evaluate personality traits of four welt known leaders of the main Flemish political parties.Factor analysis indicated three main dimensions in the evaluation of personality traits of politicians : reliability, expertness and self-control. The personality profiles of every party-leader were quite (...) similar when comparing the profiles of groups of subjects with different party preferences. However, subjects who identificated with a certain party rated the party-leader of this party more favorable on all personality traits than did subjects who identificated with another party. These discrepancies in favorableness were rather small for expertness and selfcontrol, but big for reliability and attractiveness. Analysing determinants of voting behaviour we differentiated four types of voters. Convinced voters were determined mainly by party preference and political views. Policyoriented and routine-voters taak into account in the first instance their political views and secondly their party preference. Personality traits of party-leaders functioned as the main determinant only for the voting behaviour of our indifferent subjects. Between these personality traits, mainly the evaluation of expertness had predictive power. (shrink)

The prospect of using genome technologies to modify the human germline has raised profound moral disagreement but also emphasizes the need for wide-ranging discussion and a well-informed policy response. The Hinxton Group brought together scientists, ethicists, policymakers, and journal editors for an international, interdisciplinary meeting on this subject. This consensus statement formulated by the group calls for support of genome editing research and the development of a scientific roadmap for safety and efficacy; recognizes the ethical challenges involved in clinical reproductive (...) applications of genome editing but, importantly, rejects the idea that human reproductive germline modification is necessarily morally unacceptable; and highlights the importance of meaningful engagement in discussions of genome editing and the development of regulation and oversight mechanisms to govern future uses of such technologies. (shrink)