This important collection of more than twenty original essays by prominent Kant scholars covers the multiple aspects of Kant’s teaching in relation to his published works. With the Academy edition’s continuing publication of Kant’s lectures, the role of his lecturing activity has been drawing more and more deserved attention. Several of Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, logic, ethics, anthropology, theology, and pedagogy have been translated into English, and important studies have appeared in many languages. But why study the lectures? When they (...) are read in light of Kant’s published writings, the lectures offer a new perspective of Kant’s philosophical development, clarify points in the published texts, consider topics there unexamined, and depict the intellectual background in richer detail. And the lectures are often more accessible to readers than the published works. This book discusses all areas of Kant's lecturing activity. Some essays even analyze in detail the content of Kant's courses and the role of textbooks written by key authors such as Baumgarten, helping us understand Kant’s thought in its intellectual and historical contexts. Contributors: Huaping Lu-Adler; Henny Blomme ; Robert Clewis; Alix Cohen; Corey Dyck; Faustino Fabbianelli; Norbert Fischer; Courtney Fugate; Paul Guyer; Robert Louden; Antonio Moretto; Steve Naragon; Christian Onof; Stephen Palmquist; Riccardo Pozzo; Frederick Rauscher; Dennis Schulting; Oliver Sensen; Susan Shell; Werner Stark; John Zammito; Günter Zöller. (shrink)

Perceptual constancies have been studied by psychologists for decades, but in recent years, they have also become a major topic in the philosophy of mind. One reason for this surge of interest is Tyler Burge’s (2010) influential claim that constancy mechanisms mark the difference between perception and mere sensitivity, and thereby also the difference between organisms with genuine representational capacities and ‘mindless’ beings. Burge’s claim has been the subject of intense debate. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that we cannot (...) hope to settle this debate (as well as related debates in the philosophy of mind) without a clear and substantive theoretical account of what perceptual constancies are. In the first part of this paper, I argue that the standard definitions in the literature fall short of providing such an account. Still, as I aim to show in the second part of the paper, by taking a closer look at some of the paradigm examples, it is possible to construct a plausible general account of perceptual constancies that is both clear and substantive, and that can serve as a firm foundation for settling debates like the dispute about Burge’s ‘constancy mechanism criterion’ for perception. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Engaging in sexting, such as sending or receiving of sexual words, pictures, or videos via technology, is a common behavior in minors and a rising trend. This study aimed to understand the ethical dilemmas that clinicians face when working with minors that engage in sexting under current mandated reporting standards. For this study, 178 graduate students and licensed clinicians who work with minors in the state of California completed an online survey involving vignettes concerning issues of sexting behaviors in (...) adolescents. Participants were asked to read each vignette and answer a series of questions regarding their knowledge and attitudes related to the presented issue and whether or not they would breach confidentiality in each case. Results indicated that participants, who had undergone specific training in issues of social media and technology, were significantly more likely to have more declarative knowledge of mandated reporting requirements, however, their reporting behavior was not significantly different from those, who had not previously had any training. Younger clinicians tended to report less than older clinicians. This study highlights the discrepancy that exists between the knowledge of mandated reporting standards relevant to sexting behaviors and clinicians’ reporting practice. (shrink)

This Element provides a comprehensive introduction to contemporary theories of mental content. After clarifying central concepts and identifying the questions that dominate the current debate, it presents and discusses the principal accounts of the nature of mental content (or mental representation), which include causal, informational, teleological and structuralist approaches, alongside the phenomenal intentionality approach and the intentional stance theory. Additionally, it examines anti-representationalist accounts which question either the existence or the explanatory relevance of mental content. Finally, the Element concludes by (...) considering some recent developments in the debate about mental content, specifically the “explanatory turn” and its implications for questions about representations in basic cognitive systems and the representational character of current empirical theories of cognition. (shrink)

Liberal representationalism is the view that even some internal states of very simple organisms like plants or bacteria count as genuine representations. This view has been heavily criticized by many authors, including myself. In a recent paper, Marc Artiga attempts to defend liberal representationalism against these criticisms. One of his main targets is an argument of explanatory exclusion that he ascribes to Burge, Ramsey, Rescorla, Sterelny and me (among others). In this paper, I reply to Artiga by distinguishing the exclusion (...) argument that he focuses on from what is, in my view, the real explanatory challenge for liberal representationalism, and I argue that none of the considerations put forward by Artiga in defense of the liberal view provide an adequate answer to this challenge. (shrink)

Two welcome extensions of evolutionary thinking have come to prominence over the last thirty years: the so-called ’extended evolutionary synthesis’ (EES) and debate about biological kinds and individuals. These two agendas have, however, remained orthogonal to one another. The EES has mostly restricted itself to widening the explanations of adaptation offered by the preceding ’modern evolutionary synthesis’ by including additional mechanisms of inheritance and variation; while discussion of biological kinds has turned toward philosophical questions of essential vs. contingent properties of (...) life forms and realist vs. epistemological approaches to categorization and classification. Here we attempt to broaden the explanatory scope of evolutionary theory by linking these two agendas. We expand on the mechanistic orientation of the EES, using new understandings of networked systems of components in order to engage the distinct intellectual challenge of the origination of “historical kinds”. With this phrase we designate a subset of natural kinds that acquires, through evolutionary processes, a quasi-independent lineage-history. Such kinds emerge in both biology and culture, and we enlarge the limited number of historical kinds that have thus far been recognized in evolutionary biology in a series of paradigmatic exemplars, from genes and cell types to rituals and music. For each exemplar we discern specific mechanisms by which it arose and persists; comparing these, we suggest a general unity in the ways in which diverse historical kinds originate. (shrink)

Mohr Siebeck publishing company, Tuebingen, Germany. Academic books since 1801 in the fields of theology, philosophy, law.

The leading question of this paper is: Where does the normativity of the ethics of science and technology come from? This is a challenging question given that the traditional reservoirs of convenience (like metaphysical universalism) are no longer at our disposal the way they used to be. The paper is divided into eight sections: (1) It is specified what challenges a non-foundationalist justification and normativity has to meet. (2) A three-dimensional conception of responsibility is developed based on the human triangular (...) I–We–World relations. (3) The concepts of bounded responsibility and bounded ethics of science and technology are formulated. (4) The principle of reflective equilibrium is introduced as a principle of rationality, and it is shown how this principle generates rational and reasonable justifications in the ethics of science and technology. (5) Against this background, a reconception of internal and external responsibilities of science is given. (6) The type of responsibility demanded is exemplified by today’s climate research. (7) The paper argues for a hand-in-hand model of uncertainties in the sciences and for ethical obligations to preserve the conditions of human life on earth. The ethical argument is spelled out in terms of ethical care, preservation, and precaution. (8) Additionally, some arguments are developed to answer the question of why it is reasonable at all to preserve human life on earth. (shrink)

A revision of the author's thesis, Z'urich, 1973.

If one takes Heidegger at his word then his philosophy is about pursuing different "paths" of thought rather than defining a single set of truths. This volume gathers the work of an international group of scholars to present a range of ways in which Heidegger can be read and a diversity of styles in which his thought can be continued. Despite their many approaches to Heidegger, their hermeneutic orientation brings these scholars together. The essays span themes from the ontic to (...) the ontological, from the specific to the speculative. While the volume does not aim to present a comprehensive interpretation of Heidegger's later thought, it covers much of the terrain of his later thinking and presents new directions for how Heidegger should and should not be read today. Scholars of Heidegger's later thought will find rich and original readings that expand considerations of Heidegger's entire oeuvre. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt at presenting a convincing reading of the first sentences of PI § 109, especially of its third sentence. There Wittgenstein mentions what he calls "the pneumatic conception of thought", which by Miss Anscombe is translated as "the conception of thought as a gaseous medium". By comparing the relevant sentences with their sources in Wittgenstein's manuscripts and additional parallels it is found that Anscombe's rendering is liable to be misleading. Wittgenstein's notion of "pneuma" is likely to (...) be inspired by a conception of the kind elucidated by Oswald Spengler, for instance, according to whose account pneuma is to be understood as a sort of body (Seelenkörper). If you take this as your central image, the pneumatic conception alluded to in PI § 109 is one which can be tracked down in Wittgenstein's early as well as in his middle-period work. In this remark (PI § 109), Wittgenstein tries to mention both helpful and misleading features of his earlier ways of thinking, and what he now calls the "pneumatic conception" can be seen to be the foil for both sorts of features. The central idea is that the core of language contains a scaffolding of rules whose ("pneumatic") substance is the same as that of our thought. In accordance with this view the logical structure of thought is held to be identical with that of language and reality—a notion which fits parts of the Tractatus as well as parts of the original "grammatical" conception developed in the early 1930ies. (shrink)

Philosophical logicians proposing theories of rational belief revision have had little to say about whether their proposals assist or impede the agent's ability to reliably arrive at the truth as his beliefs change through time. On the other hand, reliability is the central concern of formal learning theory. In this paper we investigate the belief revision theory of Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson from a learning theoretic point of view.

A generalization of Příkrý's forcing is analyzed which adjoins to a model of ZFC a set of order type at most ω below each member of a discrete set of measurable cardinals. A characterization of generalized Příkrý generic sequences reminiscent of Mathias' criterion for Příkrý genericity is provided, together with a maximality theorem which states that a generalized Příkrý sequence almost contains every other one lying in the same extension.This forcing can be used to falsify the covering lemma for a (...) higher core model if there is an inner model with infinitely many measurable cardinals – changing neither cardinalities nor cofinalities. Another application is an alternative proof of a theorem of Mitchell stating that if the core model contains a regular limit θ of measurable cardinals, then there is a model in which every set of measurable cardinals of K bounded in θ has an indiscernible sequence but there is no such sequence for the entire set of measurables of K below θ. (shrink)

The aim of this volume is to explore new approaches to the problem of the constitution of the various aspects of sociality and to confront these with received ideas. Many of the contributions are devoted to a rather holistic and antireductionist conception of social objects, groups, joint actions, and collective knowledge. The topics that are dealt with are: (a) the question of the ontological status of social objects and their relation to physical objects; (b) collective agency; and (c) the question (...) whether there can be shared knowledge and shared beliefs, a rather new topic in the discussion of the social aspects of personal life. (shrink)