The scholar Jin Tian-zhu (1690 ~ 1765) was a Muslim of the Hui 回 ethnic group in the Qing dynasty who adhered to Islamic traditions handed down from generation to generation. In Qing Zhen Shi Yi, Jin Tian-zhu attempts to combine Confucianism and Islam through a simple comparison of their rituals. Jin Tian-zhu expresses his respect for Allah by attesting Allah’s existence and insisting that humans should obey Allah. He admits that in reality, besides Allah, the ruler is also clearly (...) an object of loyalty. In addition, he asserts that it is basic propriety for Muslims to be filial to their parents and that the scope of practice of filial piety must also apply to their ancestors beyond their parents. Jin Tian-zhu further expands his view of zhongxiao 忠孝 by asserting that the ultimate Muslim interest is in renlun 人倫, which he believes must be rectified. (shrink)

ḥeleḳ 1. Halṿaʼah le-or ha-halakhah -- ḥeleḳ 2. Shevitato shel ḳaṭan -- ḥeleḳ 3. Istakal be-oraita uve-ʻalma -- ḥeleḳ 4. Emunah u-misḥar.

Background In the wake of mandates for biomedical research to increase participation by members of historically underrepresented populations, community engagement (CE) has emerged as a key intervention to help achieve this goal.Methods Using interviews, observations, and document analysis, we examine how stakeholders in precision medicine research understand and seek to put into practice ideas about who to engage, how engagement should be conducted, and what engagement is for.Results We find that ad hoc, opportunistic, and instrumental approaches to CE exacted significant (...) consequences for the time and resources devoted to engagement and the ultimate impacts it has on research. Critical differences emerged when engagement and research decisionmaking were integrated with each other versus occurring in parallel, separate parts of the study organization, and whether community members had the ability to determine which issues would be brought to them for consideration or to revise or even veto proposals made upstream based on criteria that mattered to them. CE was understood to have a range of purposes, from instrumentally facilitating recruitment and data collection, to advancing community priorities and concerns, to furthering long-term investments in relationships with and changes in communities. These choices about who to engage, what engagement activities to support, how to solicit and integrate community input into the workflow of the study, and what CE was for were often conditioned upon preexisting perceptions and upstream decisions about study goals, competing priorities, and resource availability.Conclusions Upstream choices about CE and constraints of time and resources cascade into tradeoffs that often culminated in “pantomime community engagement.” This approach can create downstream costs when engagement is experienced as improvised and sporadic. Transformations are needed for CE to be seen as a necessary scientific investment and part of the scientific process. (shrink)

Literary racial impersonation occurs when a narrative work fails to express the perspective of a minority ethnic or racial group. Interestingly, even when these works express moral themes congenial to promoting empathetic responses towards these groups, they can be met with public outrage if the group’s perspective is portrayed inaccurately. My goal in this paper is to vindicate the intuition that failure to express the perspective of a minority group well renders the work defective, both aesthetically and morally. I argue (...) that available frameworks exploring the connections between aesthetic and moral realms of value are inadequate to analyzing this phenomenon and propose a novel connection between aesthetic and moral values. Specifically, I demonstrate that the primary defect of literary racial impersonation is aesthetic and contingently constitutes a moral defect in our current social context. (shrink)

According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.” According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, (...) I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can vary despite constancy in representational content. (shrink)

Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F.

In this chapter, we identify and present predominant debates at the intersection of ethics and imagination. We begin by examining issues on whether our imagination can be constrained by ethical considerations, such as the moral evaluation of imagination, the potential for morality’s constraining our imaginative abilities, and the possibility of moral norms’ governing our imaginings. Then, we present accounts that posit imagination’s integral role in cultivating ethical lives, both through engagements with narrative artworks and in reality. Our final topic of (...) consideration focuses on the possibility of imagination constituting or constructing new ethical or political frameworks. (shrink)

This study explores the views of death in the ideas of Kierkegaard and Heidegger to discuss the educational meaning of death and the direction of death education. What both thinkers have in common...

The following proposes an interpretation of Husserl's sustained exegetical commentary on Leibniz's metaphysics from 1922 (Hua XIV 298300), with reference to textual and historical resources. The leading historical index for the following interpretation is a minor contribution to Leibniz scholarship from 1917 by Dietrich Mahnke, a work with which Husserl was intimately familiar. Textual references are to works by Husserl which would have been available to Mahnke- i.e., the Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen—I as well as relevant notes and lectures from (...) the period ni question. Husserl's brief manuscript from 1922, I claim, can be read as a critique of the Mahnke interpretation that attempts to provide a more expansive and thorough-going phenomenological explication of Leibniz' doctrine of universal harmony. Thereby, Husserl offers some important clues as to how he himself understands his own uses of the terms "monad" and "monadology." The phenomenological reformation of Leibnizian Monadology must be understood as a methodological reconception with internal reference to Husserl's own theory of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

This study identifies the roles of consumers’ ethical orientations and CSR motives and the dynamics of these two variables on the subsequent consumers’ attitudinal and behavioral responses to CSR—perceived corporate authenticity and pro-firm behavioral intentions. To examine the impact of individual consumers’ ethical orientations, the authors measured consumers’ ethical orientations such as deontology and consequentialism through a Web-based survey conducted in Korea and in the USA. Further, to investigate the role of perceived CSR motives, the authors measured the perception of (...) a company’s business-oriented motives and society-oriented motives in conducting CSR. Results demonstrate the different role of ethical orientation in impacting consumers’ responses across these countries. Consumers’ consequentialist orientation appears to be positively associated with pro-firm behavioral intention in both the Korean and the US studies. In the Korean study, Consumers’ deontological orientation reduces perceived corporate authenticity when corporate motives seem business-oriented. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

This paper studies ‘minority’ initiatives to organize sports games. A meta-analysis of published data in the literature identifies the formal appearance taken by each of these initiatives under the Olympic model. But it also conduces to build a number of indicators to answer a series of questions about their logic and strategies. All the initiatives studied are based on an ambivalent posture that, while based on the denunciation of a discriminating space, claim access to it. By an astonishing paradox, ‘non-normative’ (...) actors are driven to reclaim a model that, under cover of Universal, aims to establish a norm that is situated and dated. In practice, they use two types of strategies: a strategy for participation in the Olympics to transform them into a space which represents a fight against exclusion, or a strategy to create alternative events. Whatever the strategy, these initiatives are implemented according to their objectives. Differentiated in their forms—participatory or autonomy—they are also in their purpose. The comparison of these initiatives shows that ultimately, beyond strategies and logic inherent in different social, historical and organizational contexts, the mobilizations of the actors reveal the same ambivalence about the sports model conveyed by the Olympic institution. (shrink)

Scientists now agree that common diseases arise through interactions of genetic and environmental factors, but there is less agreement about how scientific research should account for these interactions. This paper examines the politics of quantification in gene–environment interaction research. Drawing on interviews and observations with GEI researchers who study common, complex diseases, we describe quantification as an unfolding moral economy of science, in which researchers collectively enact competing “virtues.” Dominant virtues include molecular precision, in which behavioral and social risk factors (...) are moved into the body, and “harmonization,” in which scientists create large data sets and common interests in multisited consortia. We describe the negotiations and trade-offs scientists enact in order to produce credible knowledge and the forms of discipline that shape researchers, their practices, and objects of study. We describe how prevailing techniques of quantification are premised on the shrinking of the environment in the interest of producing harmonized data and harmonious scientists, leading some scientists to argue that social, economic, and political influences on disease patterns are sidelined in postgenomic research. We consider how a variety of GEI researchers navigate quantification’s productive and limiting effects on the science of etiological complexity. (shrink)

In this elegant, smoothly written book, David Carr provides nothing less than a defense of both Kantian and Husserlian versions of transcendental philosophy against Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics. Carr’s Paradox of Subjectivity is organized into four parts. In the first part, Carr provides a synopsis of Heidegger’s interpretation of traditional metaphysics. Part two is devoted to a reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental theory of subjectivity. The third part deals with Husserl’s conception of transcendental subjectivity. Finally, in part four, Carr proposes to (...) show that, for both Kant and Husserl, transcendental subjectivity is a purely methodological implement, which cannot in turn be reified into serving the role traditionally reserved for metaphysical substance. Instead, transcendental subjectivity is to be understood as itself a critical regard of traditional metaphysics. Moreover, such a strictly methodological conception of transcendental subjectivity cannot be assimilated into Heidegger’s conception of metaphysics. Consequently, Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics cannot be extended as a critique of either Kant or Husserl. (shrink)

I argue Leibniz could not have been a dualist since his notion of matter is not defined by extension but by mentalistic "primitive passive force." So Leibniz was some kind of idealist. However, Leibniz was neither a phenomenal idealist like Berkeley nor a conceptualist idealist like Hegel. Instead, despite some suggestions in favor of the latter kind of idealism, Leibniz must be regarded as an idealist who admitted extraconceptual considerations irreducible to materialism.

In this paper, I defend Husserl against Derrida's critique that Husserl's phenomenology is of a piece with the "the metaphysics of presence." I show much of Derrida's critique can be met by what Husserl calls "genetic phenomenology.".

Islamic philosophy; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf, 1250-1325; Muslim scholars; 13th century; history.

Islamic philosophy; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf, 1250-1325; Muslim scholars; 13th century; history.

This book is a survey of Kant's three Critiques that makes use of an "interpretive concept" that Nuzzo calls "transcendental embodiment" . According to Nuzzo, if we think of Kant as holding that there is something like the " a priori of the human body" or body as "the transcendental site of sensibility," which "displays a formal, ideal dimension essential to our experience as human beings" , then our understanding of Kant will be greatly improved. That is because the "notion (...) of transcendental embodiment provides the unifying thread of Kant's epistemology, moral philosophy, aesthetics and teleology of living nature" .The main body of the book is divided into three parts, each corresponding to one of the three Critiques. In turn, each part is divided into three chapters.For some grip on what Nuzzo means by "transcendental embodiment," the first chapter of the first part is the most helpful. What is behind this "interpretive concept" is Kant's argument against Leibnizian nominalism about space from "incongruent counterparts." Kant's argument is that there can be two. (shrink)

A historically persistent way of reading Leibniz regards him as some kind of conceptualist. According to this interpretation, Leibniz was either an ontological conceptualist or an epistemological conceptualist. As an ontological conceptualist, Leibniz is taken to hold the view that there exist only concepts. As an epistemological conceptualist, he is seen as believing that we think only with concepts. I argue against both conceptualist renditions. I confront the ontological conceptualist view with Leibniz’s metaphysics of creation. If the ontological conceptualist interpretation (...) were right, then Leibniz could not invoke compossibility as a criterion of creation. But since he does invoke compossibility as a criterion of creation, the ontological conceptualist approach cannot be right. I confront the epistemological conceptualist interpretation with Leibniz’s assertion of non-conceptual content. Since Leibniz acknowledges non-conceptual content at least when it comes to metaphysical knowledge, Leibniz could not have been an epistemological conceptualist either. So, Leibniz could not have been a conceptualist at all. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that by “Monade” the later Husserl means roughly what he meant by “das reine Bewußtsein” in the period of Ideas I. Of both consciousness and Monade, Husserl claims that objects of perception are immanent to them. I describe this claim as “quasi-representationalist” just because it bears enough similarity to some versions of contemporary representationalism. Since Husserl also claims that perceptual objects are publicly accessible, the inevitable conclusion seems to be that parts of perceptual consciousness must (...) also be publicly accessible. So strong internalist, Cartesian or idealist, interpretations of Husserl must be wrong. By the same token, if perceptual objects are necessarily physical, it then seems Husserl must agree that the physical can be, in some sense, immanent to consciousness. (shrink)

The article addresses the contributions psychoanalytic theory, particularly its concepts of transference and counter-transference, can make to our understanding of reflexivity in intercultural education (IE). After the introduction, the article is organized into three parts. The first part is a psychoanalytic discussion that focuses on the concepts of transference and counter-transference. The second part elaborates on the concepts of transference and counter-transference by presenting examples through existing studies in the fields of multicultural and IE and psychoanalysis to illuminate what it (...) would mean to psychoanalytically understand aspects of intercultural relations and reflexivity. In the third section, while contending that this article does not exclude other forms of reflexivity or delimit the danger of uncritically accepting the potentials for reflexivity, it offers the implications drawn from the discussions in the first and second sections by concluding that psychoanalysis is an area of inquiry that forces us to question how unconscious forces affect our interaction with students, the curriculum, and the meaning we give to teaching and learning experiences. The article concludes that reflexivity in IE can benefit from considering the effects of transference and counter-transference. (shrink)

This paper is about activities of ‘community of inquiry’ on the basis of Lipman’s model applied at a kindergarten in Seoul, Korea. The activities of community of inquiry, basically, includes a series of activities, for example, reading textbooks, making up questions, discussing on themes, working out exercises and further responding. At the beginning of P4C lessons, young children had difficulties in reading texts with no pictures, and making up questions. Having philosophy lessons repeatedly, they were accustomed to the activities, felt (...) joy of thinking by themselves, and enjoyed dialoguing with friends and discussing together. The young children in the community of inquiry showed intimacy and curiosity about the stories written by Dr, Chung, which described typical Korean young child’s daily life and were full of situations experienced in their families and kindergartens. The young children were interested in inquiring philosophical aspects of the stories, tried to think by themselves like philosophers, and finally could achieve the goals of P4C, in short, to think by themselves, to cultivate ethical and aesthetic mind, and to harmonize with others. (shrink)

This article aims at an active dialogue between Ulrich Beck and East Asia with respect to cosmopolitan imagination. Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology requires a reflective cosmopolitan publicness to cope with various kinds of global risks. We therefore extract three different layers of publicness from neo-Confucianism – survival-oriented, deliberative, and ecological – and argue that Beck’s cosmopolitan vision can be better conceptualized when properly linked to, or founded upon, the Tianxiaweigong normative potentials of neo-Confucianism. In so doing our intention is to make (...) Beck’s implicit (Asian) sensibilities and the implicit Asian (cosmopolitan) orientations explicit, as a double process of cosmopolitan self-reflection and dialogue. We also draw attention to the analysis of the cosmopolitan actor in East Asia. Finally, we note that the cosmopolitan future of East Asia still remains uncertain and that reconciling global risk politics, national interests and cosmopolitan morality presents a big challenge to second modern transformation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes and Husserl. The Philosophical Project of Radical BeginningsMichael K. ShimPaul S. MacDonald. Descartes and Husserl. The Philosophical Project of Radical Beginnings. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. Pp. 285. Paper, $21.95.The enormous influence exerted by Descartes on Husserl's phenomenological philosophy cannot be underestimated. Not only is Husserl quite open and explicit about his philosophical debt to Descartes, but the fundamental motivation of the phenomenological [End (...) Page 593] method (directed towards apodeicticity and the purification of consciousness) would most likely be meaningless without reference to the Cartesian precedent. Consequently, almost every exegetical approach to Husserlian phenomenology has at least mentioned the relevance of the Cartesian tradition. Unfortunately, rare has been the phenomenological treatment of Descartes current with the latest scholarship. As an exception to this general shortcoming, MacDonald's book is a most welcome entry into Husserl scholarship.One of MacDonald's main theses is that Descartes and Husserl shared similarities in historical circumstances and, thus, shared similar motives for their "radical beginnings" in philosophy. With regards to Descartes' historical circumstances, by providing a breathtaking overview of sixteenth-century skepticism, MacDonald gives a cogent account of what led to Descartes' attempted construction of an absolute epistemological foundation for philosophy. However, the "conceptual confusions and collapses" of neo-skepticism will "survive the Cartesian overthrow and, like a persistent contagion" (31) reappear in the form of nineteenth-century psychologism. MacDonald does a convincing job of highlighting the skeptical profile of psychologism by providing systematic parallels between the mainstays of neo-skepticism and nineteenth-century psychologism: namely, distrust of objective knowledge, subjective reductionism and epistemological relativism. Accordingly, what motivates Husserl's epoché has both historical and systematic resources in the Cartesian reduction. The point itself is nothing new, and Husserl himself stresses the skepticism of nineteenth-century psychologism, but the scholarship and erudition that inform MacDonald's detailed historical account is to be commended.The truly ambitious aspect of the book, however, is the painstakingly worked out systematic comparison between the respective philosophical projects. In this respect, MacDonald takes two correlated approaches. The first approach takes up the metaphors of discovery and "voyage of exploration" (5) common to both thinkers' writings in order to explicate the meaning of philosophical transformation or "conversion," a "cognitive-affective reorientation of the whole self" (227). However, these metaphors are to be understood as symptomatic of deeper formal parallels between the two thinkers.The second approach begins with the daring claim that "Descartes' and Husserl's formal ontologies are... functionally equivalent" (95), a claim MacDonald proposes to reinforce by examining the structural parallels between Descartes' simple-complex dyad on the one hand and Husserl's part-whole theory as introduced in the Third Logical Investigations. This claim is brought into relief by a reformation of Descartes' conception of "ideas." Rather than restrict the Cartesian conception of ideas to "objective content," MacDonald emphasizes the act-quality of Cartesian ideas (125-7). Thereby an intentional conception of Cartesian ideas is made possible. Anyone familiar with Husserl should not find this surprising: what MacDonald is trying to suggest is a division of Cartesian ideas into noesis and noema, with the "material" aspect of act-ideas finding phenomenological restoration in Husserl's "hyletic data." With these elements in place, MacDonald largely succeeds in constructing a fuller and richer than usual comparison between methodical doubt and the phenomenological reduction (151ff), centered on a non-mystical eidetic intuitionism. MacDonald's ultimate conclusion is [End Page 594] that Husserlian phenomenology, as "first philosophy," is thoroughly consistent with Cartesian metaphysics, now understood as "second philosophy" (243).MacDonald's systematic conclusions are much bolder than one might think, since they are adduced by running against the letter of Husserl's own interpretation of Descartes. The background claim is that Husserl himself did not fully appreciate his debt to Descartes, and it is this exegetical failure that has led to his eventual abandonment of the "Cartesian Way." However, in order to make such an assertion, MacDonald would be obligated to demonstrate the Cartesian influences on the phenomenological pillars of the later Husserl: i.e., temporalization, genetic analysis and the theory of intersubjectivity—as programmatically outlined in the Fourth and... (shrink)

This paper aims to deal with the change of sexual discourse through the rise of a feminist movement in Korea from a constructivist point of view. First, the paper discusses the Confucianism of the Chosun dynasty as an historical background of the issue of sexuality (since Confucianism still has a far-reaching grip and effect on many aspects of everyday life in Korea). Second, it deals with chastity ideology and the double standard of sexuality between men and women as ongoing Confucian (...) sexual discourses. Third, it focuses on three themes: (1) the change from sex for procreation to sex for pleasure, (2) the change from genitally-oriented sexuality to intimacy- or relationship-oriented sexuality, and (3) the change from a woman as a sexual object to a sexual subject as part of the changes of sexual discourses. Fourth, it tries to show clashes and/or alliances between the Confucian and feminist discourses on sexuality, which make up the process of the social construction of sexuality. This shows that sexuality is a socio-historical construction in Korea as elsewhere. (shrink)