Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusion.

“The primary purpose of this book has been to provide a single source of containing the basic information about systematic and theoretical psychology which any student of psychology should have. It is mainly directed at the senior undergraduate major and the beginning of the graduate student.”-Publisher.

During the past decade, a fairly extensive literature on the digital divide has emerged. Many reports and studies have provided statistical data pertaining to sociological aspects of ‘the divide,’ while some studies have examined policy issues involving universal service and universal access. Other studies have suggested ways in which the digital divide could be better understood if it were ‘reconceptualized’ in terms of an alternative metaphor, e.g. a ‘divide’ having to do with literacy, power, content, or the environment. However, with (...) the exception of Johnson and Koehler, authors have tended not to question ‐ at least not directly ‐ whether the digital divide is, at bottom, an ethical issue. Many authors seem to assume that because disparities involving access to computing technology exist, issues underlying the digital divide are necessarily moral in nature. Many further assume that because this particular ‘divide’ has to do with something that is digital or technological in nature, it is best understood as a computer ethical issue. The present study, which examines both assumptions, considers four questions: What exactly is the digital divide? Is this ‘divide’ ultimately an ethical issue? Assuming that the answer to is ‘yes,’ is the digital divide necessarily an issue for computer ethics? If the answer to is ‘yes,’ what can/should computer professionals do bridge the digital divide? (shrink)

Thinking and being -- Being and becoming -- Becoming and acting.

Commentaar op het levenswerk van Spinoza waarin een houvast op het ethische denken van deze filosoof gegeven wordt.

In response to Anton Froeyman's paper, “Virtues of Historiography,“ this article argues that philosophers of history interested in why historians cherish such virtues as carefulness, impartiality, and intellectual courage would do wise not to classify these virtues unequivocally as either epistemic or moral virtues. Likewise, in trying to grasp the roles that virtues play in the historian's professional practice, philosophers of history would be best advised to avoid adopting either an epistemological or an ethical perspective. Assuming that the historian's virtuous (...) behavior has epistemic and moral dimensions (as well as aesthetic, political, and other dimensions), this article advocates a non-reductionist account of historical scholarship, which acknowledges that the virtues cherished by historians usually play a variety of roles, depending on the goals they are supposed to serve. Given that not the least important of these goals are epistemic ones, the articles concludes that virtue ethical approaches, to the extent that they are focused on the acquisition of moral instead of epistemic goods, insufficiently recognize the role of virtue in the pursuit of such epistemic aims as knowledge and understanding. (shrink)

We introduce an implication-with-possible-exceptions and define validity of rules-with-possible-exceptions by means of the topological notion of a full subset. Our implication-with-possible-exceptions characterises the preferential consequence relation as axiomatized by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor, 1990]. The resulting inference relation is non-monotonic. On the other hand, modus ponens and the rule of monotony, as well as all other laws of classical propositional logic, are valid-up-to-possible exceptions. As a consequence, the rules of classical propositional logic do not determine the (...) meaning of deducibility and inference as implication-without-exceptions. (shrink)

Neuropsychologische visie op de aanwezigheid van de vrije wil.

Utopias are much more prone to realization than people would have thought possible, according to Berdiaeff. In the twentieth century, we have witnessed realized totalitarian utopias (such as the ‘really existing socialism’ in East Germany). In the twenty-first century, late modern, capitalist society seems well under way towards the construction of another kind of realized utopianism. Recent developments in today’s health care system (changes in the very meaning of health and care, in medicine and nursing, and even in the ethics (...) of care) all point in the same direction: the growing hold of the utopian mind (the expression is Kolnai’s) on crucial aspects of human life and society. Must we not agree with Berdiaeff that insight in the new ‘realized’ utopianism should induce us to dream ‘of a non-utopian society less “perfect”, but more free’? (shrink)

Summary At the beginning of this century most scholars believed that the document inserted in Dem. 24.20–23 was authentic. It regulated the legislative procedure practiced by the Athenians in the fourth century B.C. which was introduced shortly after the restoration of the democracy in 404/403 B.C. But in his monograph “The Documents in the Attic Orators” (Oxford 2013), 80–102, Mirko Canevaro rejected the document at Dem. 24.20–23 as a late forgery. I responded with the article “The Authenticity of the Law (...) about nomothesia Inserted in Demosthenes Against Timokrates 20–23”, Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies 56 (2016), 438–476. In Klio 100 (1) (2018), “The Authenticity of the Document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3, the Procedures of nomothesia and the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων”, 70–124, Canevaro contested my arguments and restated his view that the document must be a late forgery. This article is my response to Canevaro’s article. (shrink)