One of the sectors for which Artificial Intelligence applications have been considered as exceptionally promising is the healthcare sector. As a public-facing sector, the introduction of AI applications has been subject to extended news coverage. This article conducts a quantitative and qualitative data analysis of English news media articles covering AI systems that allow the automation of tasks that so far needed to be done by a medical expert such as a doctor or a nurse thereby redistributing their agency. We (...) investigated in this article one particular framing of AI systems and their agency: the framing that positions AI systems as replacing and outperforming the human medical expert, and in which AI systems are personified and/or addressed as a person. The analysis of our data set consisting of 365 articles written between the years 1980 and 2019 will show that there is a tendency to present AI systems as outperforming human expertise. These findings are important given the central role of news coverage in explaining AI and given the fact that the popular frame of ‘outperforming’ might place AI systems above critique and concern including the Hippocratic oath. Our data also showed that the addressing of an AI system as a person is a trend that has been advanced only recently and is a new development in the public discourse about AI. (shrink)

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01218-9.

Spontaneity is an almost inevitable commonplace in discussions of Daoism, especially the Zhuangzi. The idea that spontaneity is one of the most important values in the Zhuangzi was presented by Angus Graham for the Anglo-European audience, and divulged among Chinese readers by Liú Xiàogǎn 劉笑敢 and Chén Gǔyīng 陳鼓應. Hungarian psychologist Csikszentmihalyi popularly combined Daoist spontaneity with the idea of flow. In the state of flow the person carries out an activity for the sake of the activity itself--autotelically--and acts with (...) complete spontaneity given that none of their movements requires thought or mediation. My study consists of three parts: First, I deal with different definitions of “spontaneous” and of the term that is commonly translated as “spontaneous” in Chinese texts, zìrán 自然 (literally, so-of-itself), as well as its use in the Zhuangzi. I conclude that spontaneity is not part of the axiological project of the Zhuangzi. Instead, we find that the idea of adapting is related to normative human values and behaviors, whereas spontaneity is a term merely descriptive of natural objects. Second, I analyze the famous Zhuangzian stories of skills, which are often quoted to argue for the value of spontaneity. I conclude that the goal of these stories is to develop a new type of vital attitude as “second nature” or “background ability” (John Searle). Since this attitude is mediated and achieved through effort, it is not spontaneous. Third, I explain the confusion between this “second nature” with “spontaneity” in recent scholarship has led to the so-called paradoxes of non-action and spontaneity (Edward Slingerland). I argue that these paradoxes disappear when we understand the different layers of meaning of wú-wéi and zìrán in the early Chinese textual context. (shrink)

Mercedes Valmisa turns our attention to the relations between truth and practice in classical Chinese philosophy. In this tradition, truth is conceived of, in a pragmatic-like spirit, as a series of embodied beliefs and perspectives that lead to fitting dispositions, emotions, and actions (regardless of whether they accurately describe the world, or whether there are other competing beliefs and perspectives that equally accurately or inaccurately describe the world). This means that we should care about truth because of its normative (...) power to guide our behavior in the most fitting way, not because of a theoretical interest in accurately describing reality. Valmisa Oviedo traces the development of this conception of truth in the Mohists and Zhuangists, leading to two radically different sociopolitical and ethical positions: the Mohists used single-truth discourses to enforce ideological monopolies that could not allow pluralism in values, norms, beliefs, and practices, while the Zhuangists warned us against the dangers of such dogmatism. (shrink)

This paper sets out a novel response to the ‘screening off problem’ for naïve realism. The aim is to resist the claim (which many naïve realists accept) that the kind of experience involved in hallucinating also occurs during perception, by arguing that there are causal constraints that must be met if an hallucinatory experience is to occur that are never met in perceptual cases. Notably, given this response, it turns out that, contra current orthodoxy, naïve realists need not adopt any (...) particular view about the psychological nature of hallucinatory experience to handle the screening off problem. Consequently, room opens up for naïve realists to endorse whatever theory of hallucinatory experience seems to best capture the distinctive nature of such episodes. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza la respuesta que el Estado español, como Estado-nación, está dando a la integración del inmigrante como ciudadano. Frente a quienes consideran que la residencia ha de ser la vía de acceso a la ciudadanía ante la crisis del Estado nación y la movilidad geográfica que impone la globalización económica a las personas, aquí se defiende, por el contrario, la relevancia política de la nacionalidad, como parte alícuota individual de pertenencia al poder constituyente, en relación armónica con un (...) concepto flexible de residencia. La investigación está dividida en cinco apartados, en los que se estudia la nacionalidad y el poder constituyente, las vías de acceso a la nacionalidad española, el conflicto Estado o nación, las peculiaridades de la nacionalidad originaria y , finalmente, los criterios que los Estados utilizan para la selección de la inmigración potencial. El recorrido crítico por la legislación española en materia de nacionalidad y ciudadanía acompañado de los debates teóricos al respecto, ha permitido concluir con una propuesta de lege ferenda centrada en una reforma radical en materia de nacionalidad. (shrink)

Philosophy of action in the context of Classical China is radically different from its counterpart in the contemporary Western philosophical narrative. Classical Chinese philosophers began from the assumption that relations are primary to the constitution of the person, hence acting in the early Chinese context necessarily is interacting and co-acting along with others –human and nonhuman actors. This book is the first monograph dedicated to the exploration and rigorous reconstruction of an extraordinary strategy for efficacious relational action devised by Classical (...) Chinese philosophers in order to account for the interdependent and embedded character of human agency –what the author has denominated “adapting” or “adaptive agency” (yin 因). As opposed to more unilateral approaches to action also conceptualized in the Classical Chinese corpus, such as forceful and prescriptive agency, adapting requires great capacity of self and other-awareness, equanimity, flexibility, creativity, and response, which allows the agent to co-raise courses of action ad-hoc: unique and temporary solutions to specific, non-permanent, and non-generalizable life problems. Adapting is one of the world’s oldest philosophies of action, and yet it is shockingly new for contemporary audiences, who will find in it an unlikely source of inspiration to deal with our current global problems. This book explores the core conception of adapting both on autochthonous terms and by cross-cultural comparison, drawing on the European and Analytic philosophical traditions as well as on scholarship from other disciplines, opening a brand-new topic in Chinese and comparative philosophy. (shrink)

This paper challenges the view that contentment leads to personal freedom and autonomy and argues for a relational and exercise concept of de facto freedom in the Zhuangzi 莊子. I first review influential interpretations of freedom in the Zhuangzi that equate freedom with contentment and nonfrustration, starting with Guo Xiang's 郭象 (d. 312 CE). By putting these interpretations in dialog with contemporary social philosophy (Christman, Meyers, Pettit, Elster, and Khader), I reflect on the two seminal problems of the psychologizing causal (...) and procedural approaches that allow the interpretation of freedom as contentment: the “happy slave” problem and the “sour grapes” problem. Proving this account of freedom inadequate, I argue for a different interpretation of freedom in the Zhuangzi that resembles a weakly substantive and constitutive account of freedom and autonomy in modern‐day social philosophy terms, such as Marina Oshana's. The theory of freedom that I analyze in the Zhuangzi, however, helps us correct the risk of material determinism of the constitutive account, offering a description of relational freedom and autonomy as constituted by socio‐material conditions but not determined by them. (shrink)

The first contribution, by Mercedes Valmisa, begins by repositioning the Zhuangzi 莊子 as a whole within pre-Qin thought under the impact of newly excavated materials. Moving away from the traditional classification of texts according to schools, it focuses instead on varying approaches to life issues. Centering the discussion on life situations and changes we have no control over, including the unpredictable vagaries of fate (ming 命), it outlines several typical responses. One is adaptation, finding ways to go along with (...) what life demands, and even availing oneself of the new opportunities it brings about. Another is a turning inward, a focus on the inner self, holding on to ethical and other standards and making sure on does the right thing regardless of the outcomes of one's actions. While the former appears in several chapters of the Zhuangzi, notably in chapter 6, the latter is central to the Qiongda yishi 窮達以時 (Failure and Success Depend on Opportunity), a manuscript excavated at Guodian. However tempting it may be to characterize one approach as Daoist and the other as Confucian, they both appear within the Zhuangzi together with a third approach to fate, showing the fluidity of philosophical discussion and the futility of thinking along the lines of traditional boundaries. (shrink)

Standard responses to the knowledge argument grant that Mary could know all of the physical facts even while trapped inside her black‐and‐white room. What they deny is that upon leaving her black‐and‐white room and experiencing red for the first time, Mary learns a genuinely new fact. This paper develops an alternate response in a grounding physicalist framework, on which Mary does not know all of the physical facts while trapped inside the room. The main thesis is that Mary does not (...) know certain phenomenal facts while trapped inside the room, whereby these facts classify as physical due to being wholly and fully metaphysically grounded in the underlying fundamental facts which are themselves entirely physical. (shrink)

It is undeniable that the assumption of sincerity is important to assertion, and that assertion is central to the transmission of beliefs through human testimony. Discussions of testimony, however, often assume that the epistemic importance of sincerity to testimony is that of a (fallible) guarantee of access to the actual beliefs of the speaker. Other things being equal, we would do as well or better if we had some kind of unmediated access to the beliefs of the other person, without (...) the risks involved in the overt act of speaking, and the assumption of sincerity in speech is the closest we can come to this access. Contrary to this picture, I argue that sincerity has a quite different epistemic role to play in testimony than that of an indicator of the speaker's beliefs. The epistemology of testimony requires reference to the speaker as agent, and not just the speaker's beliefs, as well as a sense of 'expression of belief' that links it to the specifically addressive relation to another person. (shrink)

Beauty is a contested concept insofar as it seeks to mark a categorical distinction among the sources of pleasure, typically in terms of oppositions such as objective/subjective, universal/particular, necessity/contingency. Kant represents a culmination of this tradition in defining the judgment of beauty in terms of the requirement for universal agreement, modeling the judgment of beauty as closely as possible to ordinary factual judgments. A different tradition of thinking about beauty, however, while still seeking to mark a categorical distinction by reference (...) to the idea of necessity, finds the relevant sense of necessity not in conditions of agreement but necessities of erotic love and the sense of requirement felt toward its objects. This paper explores the consequences of taking this other tradition seriously, using Proust as a representative exemplar, as a way both of making sense of some of the features Kant ascribes to the concept of the beautiful, while avoiding the paradoxes stemming from his focus on the conditions for universal agreement. (shrink)

The Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience states that microphysical duplicates cannot differ in their intrinsic properties. According to Merricks :59–71, 1998a, Objects and persons, Oxford University Press, 2001), however, this thesis is false, since microphysical duplicates can differ with respect to the intrinsic property of consciousness. In my view, Merricks’ argument is plausible, and extant attempts to reject it are problematic. However, the argument also threatens to make consciousness appear mysterious, by implying that consciousness facts fail to be microphysically determined and (...) that there can be brute and inexplicable differences in consciousness between material things. The paper therefore develops an account that can respect the soundness of Merricks’ argument while avoiding these problematic consequences. At the heart of the proposal is the idea that consciousness can be microphysically grounded despite failing to microphysical supervene. The proposed view also has the interesting consequence that consciousness is an intrinsic property despite depending on extrinsic factors for its instantiation. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Comienzo este artículo con unos interrogantes que ayuden a situarse personalmente en este tema, y a entrar en diálogo con lo que aquí vamos a decir, porque la inclusión tiene que ver con los valores y las actualidades de cada persona: ¿La inclusión es un reto para mí? ¿Qué experiencias de inclusión vivo y hago vivir? ¿Qué experiencias de exclusión vivo y hago vivir?

This paper presents an empirical study that analyzes everyday practices regarding the health care and education of middle class families grounded in a phenomenological perspective. Everyday practices are linked to the system of expectations and goals built around practices, constituting a configurations of meaning that involves both aspects of the Life-World, which is affected by social class and other social determinants that define areas of experiences and opportunities for social interaction. In this sense, we see that social class and gender (...) intersect each other, enabling and limiting horizons of expectations for children, raising specific jurisdictions to males and females. Finally, we reflect on how the constitution of meanings and everyday practices influences the construction of social relations of the educational and health environments. (shrink)

Aunque durante años hemos asistido a un persistente interés sociológico por la dimensión subjetiva de las prácticas de clase, hasta la fecha pocos son los estudios que han abordado esta problemática desde la perspectiva fenomenológica. Tomando como punto de partida autores que nos antecedieron en esta tarea, el objetivo del presente trabajo es reflexionar sobre los fundamentos de la teoría fenomenológica de Schutz sobre la acción social y su conceptualización de las tipificaciones para el análisis del sentido común y las (...) prácticas de clase. En la primera sección proponemos una breve discusión conceptual en torno a la definición del mundo de la vida proveniente de la teoría de Schutz y su utilidad para el análisis de la estructura social en la línea teórico-metodológica que analiza la reproducción intra-clase y las relaciones entre clases. A continuación resumimos las ideas y conceptos de Weber sobre las clases sociales, acción social y tipo ideal, para luego establecer sus nexos y relaciones con Schutz. Por último, e incorporando la resignificación y complejización que Schutz da a los términos weberianos, proponemos el uso de herramientas fenomenológicas para el análisis de clase. (shrink)

Maimonides looks for the true axiom for a demonstration of the existence of God, and he finds it in the universal fact of movement. His logical argumentation is as follows: given the hypothesis of the eternity of the Universe, of its eternal movement, if we can think of a First Mover, that Mover has all the characteristics of the First Principle according to Aristotle; the characteristics of eternity and to be essentially moving. Maimonides' contribution to the Aristotelian theory of the (...) First Principle is precisely the crossing of the invisible barrier between the physical proof of the First Mover and the metaphysical proof of the First Principle. By transforming Aristotle's corollary into the postulate that supports the whole proof, Maimonides avoids the aporia of the First Principle being confused with the First Mover. But setting a postulate, that is, a proposition whose opposite is equally possible, at the foundations of the theory, transforms what was meant to be "a true and indubitable proof" into a scientific theory in the modern sense of the term: a theory that can be accepted as true only regarding certain parameters or system of propositions. If there was creation of the world in time, then no doubt there is a Creator. If the world is eternally moving, then it has a Mover that is essentially moving, incorporeal, one and eternal itself, namely the divinity. (shrink)

Les femmes communistes espagnoles reconstituèrent leur organisation en 1945, dans l’exil français, afin de mobiliser les réfugiées dans la résistance antifranquiste. Les figures d’héroïnes évoquées dans la revue Mujeres Antifascistas Españolas, tiennent une place importante dans la culture politique de ces femmes. Des récits, où réalité et fiction se mêlent, mettent en scène vierges guerrières et mères héroïques. Si l’héroïsation individuelle ou collective (les treize roses de Madrid) confine parfois au mythe, sans remettre en cause le système traditionnel de genre, (...) elle permet d’inscrire ces héroïnes dans l’histoire de l’Espagne et dans la mémoire collective des opposants au régime du général Franco. (shrink)

Among the legacies of Elizabeth Anscombe's 1957 monograph Intention are the introduction of the notion of 'practical knowledge' into contemporary philosophical discussion of action, and her claim, pursued throughout the book, that an agent's knowledge of what he is doing is characteristically not based on observation.' Each idea by itself has its own obscurities, of course, but my focus here will be on the relation between the two ideas, how it is that the discussion of action may lead us to (...) speak of non-observational knowledge at all, and how this notion can be part of the understanding of a kind of ordinary knowledge that we have reason to consider practical rather than speculative. Anscombe mentions several quite different things under the heading of 'non-observational knowledge', and she first introduces the notion of the nonobservational for purely dialectical purposes, associated with the task of setting out the field she wants to investigate, in a way that ... (shrink)

Intentionality (‘directedness’, ‘aboutness’) is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, John Searle’s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review recent discussions (...) of intentionality, including some recent explorations of the history of the concept (paying particular attention to Anselm), and suggest some ways the phenomenological approach of Husserl and Heidegger can still offer insights for contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness. (shrink)

remarks some lessons about self-knowledge (and some other self-relations) as well as use them to throw some light on what might seem to be a fairly distant area of philosophy, namely, Sartre's view of the person as of a divided nature, divided between what he calls the self-as-facticity and the self-as-transcendence. I hope it will become clear that there is not just perversity on my part in bringing together Wittgenstein and the last great Cartesian. One specific connection that will occupy (...) me here is their shared hostility to the idea of theoretical certainty as our model for the authority of ordinary self-knowledge, and their relating of such a theoretical model to specific forms of self-alienation. This, in turn, is related to another concern they share, a concern with the difficulties, philosophical and otherwise, in conceiving of oneself as but one person in the world among others. (shrink)

This paper leads us in reflections regarding the ontological status of a situation inspired by two main sources: the Zhuangzi--a multifarious compilation from Warring States China (ca. 4th c. BCE)--and José Ortega y Gasset's (1883-1955) Unas Lecciones de Metafísica (Some Lessons in Metaphysics)--the transcripts of a course on metaphysics by a Spanish philosopher of the early 20th century. Much as other ontologically subjective entities and events, situations do not preexist the intentional subject: instead, they are created alongside our act of (...) noticing. In Classical Chinese, shi , commonly rendered "propensity" and the closest the language comes to our concept of situation, denotes a dynamic process that incorporates the conscious subjective agent as well as other entities as constitutive elements. Here a situation is not reducible to the discrete phenomena and events that we can discern within a given space-time; rather, it necessitates our thinking about it to arise. These ontological reflections are important for a philosophy of action. They help us notice the role of attention in the creation of situations--as in the creation of worlds--hence the importance of understanding what the agent notices and fails to notice, what we privilege as worthy of our attention and what passes inadvertent among the world's plural affordances. The relational affordances that we actualize and reify as constituting a situation depend on what we are socialized and educated to see when looking at the world, thus situations and agents co-create one another over time. This acknowledgement is crucial to retrain our agency in order to illuminate our blind spots, overcome our uncritical certainties which generate absolutist tendencies, and move beyond fixed, reduced, and contingent corners from which to interpret the world. (shrink)

This book explores the future of critique in view of our planetary condition. How are we to intervene in contemporary constellations of finance capitalism, climate change and neoliberalism?

Early Chinese texts make us witnesses to debates about the power, or lack thereof, that humans had over the course of events, the outcomes of their actions, and their own lives. In the midst of these discourses on the limits of the efficacy of human agency, the notion of ming 命 took a central position. In this article, I present a common pattern of thinking about the relationship between the person and the world in early China. I call it the (...) reifying pattern because it consisted in thinking about ming as a hypostasized entity with object-like features. Although external and independent, ming was not endowed with human qualities such as the capacities for empathy, responsivity, and intersubjectivity. The reification of fate implied an understanding of ming as an external, amoral, and determining force that limited humans without accepting intercommunication with them, thereby causing feelings of alienation, powerlessness, and existential incompetence. I first show that the different meanings of ming hold a sense of prevailing external reality, and hence can be connected to the overarching meaning of fate. Then, I offer an account of the process of reification of fate in early China and its consequences, theoretical and practical, through cases study of received (Mengzi 孟子) and found (Tang Yu zhi dao 唐虞之道) texts. I end with some reflections on the implications of ming as a nonpersonal and nonsubjective type of actor for both early Chinese and twenty-first-century accounts of agency. (shrink)

This chapter presents an analysis of Wang Bi’s (226-249 CE) hermeneutics and reception theory via the concept of “forgetting” (wang 忘) in his essay “Clarifying the Images” (Ming xiang 明象).

This paper is concerned with the paradox of decrease. Its aim is to defend the answer to this puzzle that was propounded by its originator, namely, the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus. The main trouble with this answer to the paradox is that it has the seemingly problematic implication that a material thing could perish due merely to extrinsic change. It follows that in order to defend Chrysippus’ answer to the paradox, one has to explain how it could be that Theon is (...) destroyed by the amputation without changing intrinsically. In this paper, I shall answer this challenge by appealing to the broadly Aristotelian idea that at least some of the proper parts of a material substance are ontologically dependent on that substance. I will also appeal to this idea in order to offer a new solution to the structurally similar paradox of increase. In this way, we will end up with a unified solution to two structurally similar paradoxes. (shrink)

The Escuela Feminista de Teología de Andalucía [the Andalusian School of Feminist Theology], held a conference titled ‘Feminine Mysticism and Counterculture: A Rebellious Genre’ October 15-17, 2009 at the University of Seville. This annual seminar is held thanks to an agreement between the University of Seville and EFETA, with the direct support of the research group ‘Escritoras y Escrituras,’ whose principal researcher is Mercedes Arriaga. The guest of honour at this year’s conference was Lisa Isherwood, who kindly presented EFETA (...) with the opportunity to publish some of the seminar’s papers in Feminist Theology, and who we here in Spain thank wholeheartedly for her contributions. Before presenting the texts that were selected for this edition, we would like to take this opportunity to explain a little about the EFETA project. (shrink)