Roald Hoffmann's contributions to chemistry are well known; this Nobel laureate has published more than 500 articles and two books. As an "applied theoretical chemist," he has made significant contributions to our understanding of chemical bonding and reactivity, and taught two generations of chemists how to use molecular orbitals for real chemistry. Less well known, however, are Hoffmann's important and insightful contributions to the areas of scholarship surrounding chemistry. Over a career that spans nearly fifty years, Roald (...) class='Hi'>Hoffmann has thought and written copiously about the broader context of chemistry and its relationship to the arts and poetry. This book contains Hoffmann's essays and is organized around several major themes: chemical reasoning and explanation, writing and communicating in science, ethics, art and science, and chemical education. A few are unpublished lectures that are valuable additions to the volume. The editors have the full cooperation of Roald Hoffmann in this project. Most of the published work will be reprinted verbatim, but a few of the essays will be revised to eliminate redundancy. The unpublished lectures will also be edited since they were originally intended to be delivered orally at specific occasions. The editors will provide an introduction to the book, and some introductory material for each section. In introducing the material, they will highlight the intrinsic importance and interest of the ideas, as well as the places where Hoffmann's thought makes novel contributions to cognate areas. (shrink)

Author: Thomas Sören Hoffmann. Translated by Pedro Sepúlveda Zambrano.

CHAPTER ONE THE WORLD AS WILL TO POWER /. What there is for Nietzsche Any philosophical system which claims to be at all comprehensive must answer, ...

The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either (...) by introspective phenomenology or by psychological experiments alone – e.g., vision. (II) There are crucial problems and shortcomings of NCC: (1) Correlation implies neither causation nor identity. (2) There are limitations of empirical access due to the problem of other minds and the problem of self-deception, and (3) due to the restrictions provided by inter- and intraindividual variations. (4) NCC cannot be catched by neuroscience alone because of the externalistic content of representations. Therefore, NCC are not sufficient for a naturalistic theory of mind, (5) nor are they necessary because of the possibility of multiple realization. (III) Nevertheless, NCC are relevant and important for the mind-body problem: (1) NCC reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. (2) But NCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. (3) NCC restrict nomological identity accounts. (4) The investigation of NCC can refute empirical arguments for interactionism as a case study of John Eccles' dualistic proposals will show. (5) The discoveries of NCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone, for which, e.g., a principle of supervenience and a further condition – and therefore philosophical arguments – are required. (shrink)

Ethical theories have been largely focused on finding and clarifying certain amoral principles. However fruitful the communication of moral principles for providing orientation in modern society might be, a serious omission has been made in that the problem of implementation is not addressed. Two fundamental question have neither been raised nor answered: Why should self‐interested individuals follow the proposed moral principles in their daily conduct? Are societal institutions of such a design that is in the power of the individuals to (...) follow these moral principles? It is shown in this article that an economic theory of morals does systematically address these two questions and therefore provides a firm basis for discussing the possibilities and boundaries of following the moral principles inherent in the long history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the distinction between private and public and the difference between ‘public’ and ‘official’. Drawing on a comparative analysis of Asian cities, it looks at the ways in which the local, the national and the global levels, which serve different, sometimes contrasting, interests, are negotiated and reconciled in the city. The chapter suggests that different forms of reconciliation have brought about an alternative ‘insitutionalisation’ of the public space. Such an institutionalisation is reflected in the access to, and dissemination (...) of, information—e.g., access to the media—and, above all, in the control over the common goods. The public sphere is used to voice discontent, leading to a new definition of the ‘common good’; that is, the inclusion, or non-exclusion, of large sections of the population which, though initially marginal, can become significant in shaping urban politics. (shrink)

Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbol systems is considered from a metacognitive perspective. Two examples are discussed in terms of the proposed perceptual symbol theory. First, recent results in research on feeling-of-knowing judgement are used to argue for a representation of familiarity with input cues. This representation should support implicit memory. Second, the ability of maintaining a theory of other people's beliefs (theory of mind) is considered and it is suggested that a purely simulation-based view is insufficient to explain the available (...) evidence. Both examples characterize areas where Barsalou's theory would benefit from additional detail. (shrink)

: During the "institutional revolution" between 1870 and 1910 almost two dozen physics institutes were newly erected in Germany. The design of these buildings was largely determined by sets of precautions against various sorts of disturbances. These undertakings were by no means unique. Recent historical studies have identified similar attempts in physics institutes outside Germany. But as yet, hardly a word has been wasted on the necessity of these precautionary measures. It seems to be self-explanatory that disturbances should be precluded (...) from scientific investigations. My paper criticizes this approach. The evidential nature of this assertion rests on the questionable assumption that disturbances are "external factors," which hinder physical research. I examine the 'architecture of disturbance' and show that it is the set of precautions itself which sometimes produces 'disturbing' effects. I then focus on particular sources of disturbance that were taken into account in the design of the buildings, and analyze the aporias that characterize the 'external' definition of disturbances. In conclusion, an alternative understanding of disturbances is offered. Following Michel Serres's concept of the parasite, I suggest that disturbances indicate the "being of relation" in physics research around 1900. From this point of view I finally sketch two novel features that governed the design of physics institutes after the turn of the century. (shrink)

Abductive reasoning takes place in forming``hypotheses'''' in order to explain ``facts.'''' Thus, theconcept of abduction promises an understanding ofcreativity in science and learning. It raises,however, also a lot of problems. Some of them will bediscussed in this paper. After analyzing thedifference between induction and abduction (1), Ishall discuss Peirce''s claim that there is a ``logic''''of abduction (2). The thesis is that this claim can beunderstood, if we make a clear distinction between inferential elements and perceptive elements of abductive reasoning. For (...) Peirce, the creative act offorming explanatory hypotheses and the emergence of``new ideas'''' belongs exclusively to the perceptive side of abduction. Thus, it is necessary to study the roleof perception in abductive reasoning (3). A furtherproblem is the question whether there is arelationship between abduction and Peirce''s concept of``theorematic reasoning'''' in mathematics (4). Both forms of reasoning could be connected, because both arebased on perception. The last problem concerns therole of instincts in explaining the success ofabductive reasoning in science, and the question whether the concept of instinct might be replaced bymethods of inquiry (5). (shrink)

This book aims to develop a philosophical theory of extrinsic properties – of properties whose instantiation by an object does not only depend on what the object itself is like, but also on features of its environment. Various accounts of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction are analysed in detail, and it is argued that the most promising approach to defining this distinction is to consider extrinsic properties as a particular type of relational property. Moreover, it is shown that two key notions in (...) the metaphysics of properties, the supervenience relation and the dispositional/categorical distinction, whose scope is usually restricted to intrinsic properties, can fruitfully be applied to extrinsic properties as well. (shrink)

In this book Tobias Hoffmann studies the medieval free will debate during its liveliest period, from the 1220s to the 1320s, and clarifies its background in Aristotle, Augustine, and earlier medieval thinkers. Among the wide range of authors he examines are not only well-known thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, but also a number of authors who were just as important in their time and deserve to be rediscovered today. To shed further light on (...) their theories of free will, Hoffmann also explores their competing philosophical explanations of the fall of the angels, that is, the hypothesis of an evil choice made by rational beings under optimal psychological conditions. As he shows, this test case imposed limits on tracing free choices to cognition. His book provides a comprehensive account of a debate that was central to medieval philosophy and continues to occupy philosophers today. (shrink)

From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular, which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium and thus (...) the ability to do otherwise, although the ability to do otherwise applies differently to praise and blame. His argument against intellectual determinism is not straightforward, but we construct it by analogy to his arguments against other deterministic threats. The non-determinism of the intellect’s causality with respect to the will results from his claims that practical reasoning is defeasible and that the reasons for actions are not contrastive reasons. (shrink)

Chemical structures are among the trademarks of our profession, as surely chemical as flasks, beakers and distillation columns. When someone sees one of us busily scribbling formulas or structures, he or she has no trouble identifying a chemist. Yet these familiar objects, which accompany our work from start to end, from the initial doodlings (Fig. I) to the final polished artwork in a publication (Fig. II), are deceptively simple. They raise interesting and difficult questions about representation. It is the intent (...) of this article to reflect upon molecular graphics. (shrink)

Wicked problems—that is, problems that can be framed in a number of different ways, depending on who is looking at them—pose ethical challenges for professionals that have scarcely been recognized as such. Even though wicked problems are all around us, they are rarely addressed in education. A reason for this failure might be that wicked problems pose almost insurmountable challenges in educational settings. This contribution shows how students can learn to cope with wicked problems in problem-based learning projects that are (...) structured by the Reflect! platform. (shrink)

This paper revisits the often debated question Can machines think? It is argued that the usual identification of machines with the notion of algorithm has been both counter-intuitive and counter-productive. This is based on the fact that the notion of algorithm just requires an algorithm to contain a finite but arbitrary number of rules. It is argued that intuitively people tend to think of an algorithm to have a rather limited number of rules. The paper will further propose a modification (...) of the above mentioned explication of the notion of machines by quantifying the length of an algorithm. Based on that it appears possible to reconcile the opposing views on the topic, which people have been arguing about for more than half a century. (shrink)

As a committee of the National Academy of Engineering recognized, ethics education should foster the ability of students to analyze complex decision situations and ill-structured problems. Building on the NAE’s insights, we report about an innovative teaching approach that has two main features: first, it places the emphasis on deliberation and on self-directed, problem-based learning in small groups of students; and second, it focuses on understanding ill-structured problems. The first innovation is motivated by an abundance of scholarly research that supports (...) the value of deliberative learning practices. The second results from a critique of the traditional case-study approach in engineering ethics. A key problem with standard cases is that they are usually described in such a fashion that renders the ethical problem as being too obvious and simplistic. The practitioner, by contrast, may face problems that are ill-structured. In the collaborative learning environment described here, groups of students use interactive and web-based argument visualization software called “AGORA-net: Participate – Deliberate!”. The function of the software is to structure communication and problem solving in small groups. Students are confronted with the task of identifying possible stakeholder positions and reconstructing their legitimacy by constructing justifications for these positions in the form of graphically represented argument maps. The argument maps are then presented in class so that these stakeholder positions and their respective justifications become visible and can be brought into a reasoned dialogue. Argument mapping provides an opportunity for students to collaborate in teams and to develop critical thinking and argumentation skills. (shrink)

_The Arcades Project_, the monumental unfinished work of cultural criticism by Walter Benjamin, is the German philosopher’s effort to comprehend urban modernity through the 19th-century Parisian shopping arcade. _The Arcades: Contemporary Art and Walter Benjamin_ combines artworks with archival materials and poetic interventions to form an original, multifaceted response to this collagelike cultural text. Jens Hoffmann astutely pairs works by thirty-six well-known and emerging artists, including Lee Friedlander, Andreas Gursky, Pierre Huyghe, and Cindy Sherman, with the thirty-six “Convolutes,” or (...) themes, in Benjamin’s text. Bound into the main volume is a graphic novelette, from the imagination of Vito Manolo Roma, of Benjamin’s dream the night before he committed suicide while fleeing the Nazis. Scholarly essays by Hoffmann and Caroline A. Jones, texts selected by the poet Kenneth Goldsmith, reproductions of Benjamin’s handwritten notes, and a list of the main Paris arcades discussed by him round out this extraordinary publication. (shrink)

We study model theory of fields with actions of a fixed finite group scheme. We prove the existence and simplicity of a model companion of the theory of such actions, which generalizes our previous results about truncated iterative Hasse–Schmidt derivations [13] and about Galois actions [14]. As an application of our methods, we obtain a new model complete theory of actions of a finite group on fields of finite imperfection degree.

To the woman, God said, “I will greatly multiply your pain in child bearing; in pain you shall bring forth children, yet your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you.”Genesis 3:16There is now a well-established body of literature documenting the pervasive inadequate treatment of pain in this country. There have also been allegations, and some data, supporting the notion that women are more likely than men to be undertreated or inappropriately diagnosed and treated for their (...) pain.One particularly troublesome study indicated that women are more likely to be given sedatives for their pain and men to be given pain medication. Speculation as to why this difference might exist has included the following: Women complain more than men; women are not accurate reporters of their pain; men are more stoic so that when they do complain of pain, “it's real”; and women are better able to tolerate pain or have better coping skills than men. (shrink)

Historically, biocentrists have ascribed interests to organisms via an account of function. One promising account of function for this purpose is the organizational or autopoietic account of function, according to which some entity x has a function of self-maintenance when the parts of x contribute to the goal of self-maintenance. In this paper, I will present the autopoietic account of interests and provide some reasons for thinking that this account is promising. I will also present a possible issue for the (...) biocentrist who uses the autopoietic account of function given the following two claims: what it means to be a biological “self” is ambiguous, and the autopoietic account of interests relies on a self boundary. I argue that the proponent of this account then needs to choose a definition of individual and explain why that definition is morally relevant. Otherwise, the proponent of the autopoietic account has not given an account of what constitutes a harm or a benefit for a biological individual, and there are good reasons to believe that this is a necessary component of any account of interests. (shrink)

The author presents Gernot Böhme’s median mode of being theory, which attempts to find an anthropological middle ground between the rational and the irrational, the spiritual and the corporeal and the active and passive in human experience. Böhme’s reflections on the median mode of being are normative in character and linked to the concept of “sovereign man,” which he strongly defends and whose main characteristics Hoffmann outlines in the first part of the essay. Among others, Hoffmann argues against (...) Böhme’s excessive emphasis on the controlling/restrictive functions of awareness at the cost of those functions which serve to protect and stimulate life, his non-distinction between the distance to a cognized object and its intellectual instrumentalisation, and his rather one-sided tendency to seek the sources of European rationalism in the Socra-tean tradition. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Neue Rechte betreibt seit 2000 eine umfangreiche Literaturpolitik. Aktionen im Literaturbetrieb, eigene Publikationen sowie ein expandierender Literaturjournalismus werden mit zunehmendem Geschick und Erfolg dazu genutzt, neurechte Ideologien im Kulturbetrieb zu verankern. Dies zeigte sich u.a. in der 2020 um die Schriftstellerin Monika Maron geführten Debatte, die der Aufsatz zum Ausgangspunkt nimmt, um die wichtigsten metapolitischen Strategien neurechter Literaturpolitik vorzustellen: eine Veränderung des Lektürekanons, eine politische Funktionalisierung von Ästhetik und ästhetischer Erziehung sowie literaturbetriebliche Aktionen. Abschließend wird am Streit um den (...) Debutroman von Simon Strauß diskutiert, wie sich angemessen auf neurechte Literaturpolitik reagieren lässt.The New Right is pursuing an extensive literary policy since 2000. Activities in the literary business, publications and an expanding literary journalism are used to implant new-right ideologies in the cultural establishment with increasing skill and success. This became apparent, among other things, in the 2020 debate surrounding the writer Monika Maron, which the essay takes as its starting point in order to present the most important meta-political strategies of new-right literary politics: a change in the reading canon, a political functionalization of aesthetics and aesthetic education, as well as activism in the literary business. Finally, the controversy surrounding the debut novel by Simon Strauß will be used to discuss how to react appropriately to new-right literary politics. (shrink)

Metaphysical nihilism is the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Thomas Baldwin (1996) offers an argument for metaphysical nihilism. The premisses of the argument purport to provide a procedure of subtraction that can be iterated until we reach a world where no concrete objects exist. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997) finds fault with Baldwin’s argument, modifies it, and claims to have proved metaphysical nihilism. My primary aim is to show that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s alleged proof rests on a false assumption. The (...) assumption is that, necessarily, if there are no concrete* objects (in the sense Rodriguez-Pereyra defines), then there are no concrete objects. My secondary aim, with which I begin, is to formulate and then strengthen a succinct version of the subtraction argument. (shrink)

A key challenge for probabilistic causal models is to distinguish non-causal probabilistic dependencies from true causal relations. To accomplish this task, causal models are usually required to satisfy several constraints. Two prominent constraints are the causal Markov condition and the faithfulness condition. However, other constraints are also needed. One of these additional constraints is the causal sufficiency condition, which states that models must not omit any direct common causes of the variables they contain. In this paper, I argue that the (...) causal sufficiency condition is problematic: (1) it is incompatible with the requirement that the variables in a model must not stand in non-causal necessary dependence relations, such as mathematical or conceptual relations, or relations described in terms of supervenience or grounding, (2) it presupposes more causal knowledge as primitive than is actually needed to create adequate causal models, and (3) if models are only required to be causally sufficient, they cannot deal with cases where variables are probabilistically related by accident, such as Sober’s example of the relationship between bread prices in England and the sea level in Venice. I show that these problems can be avoided if causal models are required to be monotonic in the following sense: the causal relations occurring in a model M would not disappear if further variables were added to M. I give a definition of this monotonicity condition and conclude that causal models should be required to be monotonic rather than causally sufficient. (shrink)

Several authors have recently claimed that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is hyperintensional, i.e., that there are cointensional properties P and Q, such that P is intrinsic, while Q is extrinsic. In this paper, I aim to defend the classical view that whenever P and Q are cointensional properties, then P and Q are either both intrinsic or both extrinsic. I first argue that the standard characterization of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction involves dependence claims: intrinsic properties are those properties (...) whose instantiation by x only depends on what x is like in itself, whereas extrinsic properties are those properties whose instantiation by x may also depend on what other individuals are like. I then consider a number of examples supposed to show that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is hyperintensional and argue that none of them succeeds if the dependence characterization of the distinction is taken seriously. (shrink)

The possible-worlds analysis of propositions identifies a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true. This analysis has the hitherto unnoticed consequence that a proposition depends for its existence on the existence of every proposition that entails it. This peculiar consequence places the possible-worlds analysis in conflict with the conjunction of two compelling theses. One thesis is that a phrase of the form ‘the proposition that S’ is a rigid designator. The other thesis is that a proposition (...) which is directly about an object – a singular proposition – depends for its existence on the existence of the object. I defend these theses and conclude that the cost of the possible-worlds analysis is prohibitively high. (shrink)

The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true if and only if it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by James Van Cleve (1996) and Terrence Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally illegitimate in a similar sense that unsophisticated epistemic (...) theories of truth are widely acknowledged to be. Sustained analysis reveals that the unrestricted formal legitimacy argument is firmly grounded in first person conceivability evidence. (shrink)

A property is intrinsic iff individuals have it in virtue of how they themselves are, not in virtue of their relations to other individuals; a property is extrinsic iff it is not intrinsic. Being a cube and being an electron are intrinsic properties; being next to a cube, and being repelled by an electron are extrinsic properties. The debate about the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties revolves around the following two questions: (1) Can the distinction be analysed in terms (...) of other, better understood notions, and if so, what should such an analysis should look like? (2) What are the general characteristics of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction? I first describe several attempts to define the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction: the loneliness test proposed by Langton and Lewis, combinatorial accounts, and approaches based on the notion of grounding. I point out that any successful analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction invokes notions based on substantial metaphysical assumptions, such as the notions of grounding or natural property. I then discuss the general features of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction and argue that the distinction is hyperintensional and vague. (shrink)

This paper intends to show that Aquinas gives a non-deterministic account of free decision. Angelic sin is the eminent test case: ex hypothesi, angels are supremely intelligent and not subject to ignorance, passions, or negatively disposing habits. Nothing predetermines their choice; rather it ultimately depends on their freedom alone. All angels acted based upon reasons, but why certain angels acted for an inadequate reason whereas others for an adequate reason cannot be fully explained. Thomas's action theory allows him to explain (...) angelic choice as contingent and selfdetermined. The salient features of this explanation are transferable to human free decision. (shrink)