Successful tutoring depends in part on child tutors’ ability to recognise and interpret accurately signals of misunderstanding by their tutees. Age- and gender-related differences were investigated in a study which exposed 80 children to a video-recorded episode involving a target child receiving ambiguous instructions in her attempts to move a model car along a designated route on a playmat roadway from one destination to another. The results showed that explicit, general and facial modes of displaying puzzlement by the target child (...) were judged as equally powerful expressions of degree of puzzlement, but 8-10 year olds judged the target child as significantly more puzzled than did 7 year olds. Older children were also more likely to attribute the puzzlement of the target child to the ambiguous instructions than to her verbal or facial expression of puzzlement. Girls were generally more accurate than boys in judging facial expressions and less likely than boys to give wrong or alternatively ambiguous responses when given the opportunity to correct the video-recorded ambiguous instructions. The results throw some light on the developing sensitivities of boys and girls in recognising and attributing failures of understanding by other children. (shrink)

In view of conflicting claims about children's sensitivity to the needs of other children in learning situations, the present study was designed to explore the sensitivity of child and adult tutors in one‐to‐one tutoring interactions. Sixteen adults and 31 11‐ and 9‐year‐olds tutored 47 9‐year‐old tutees on an animal classification task. Tutors were tested on their ability to apply the rules and knowledge they had obtained after training, and tutees were tested after being tutored. On all the verbal and nonverbal (...) tutoring indices adult tutors showed greater sensitivity than child tutors: they were more likely to display behaviours which promoted efficient learning in their tutees. Results suggested that tutors operated on the basis of an implicit theory of teaching which involves three types of sensitivity: sensitivity to the learner's need to have sufficient information for understanding the task, coupled with adequate checks on the learner's understanding; sensitivity to the learner's need to participate actively in the learning process; and sensitivity to differences in learning abilities among individual learners, and being able to accommodate to them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PHILOSOPHY AND STYLE: WITTGENSTEIN AND RUSSELL by John Hughes Was there ever a great philosopher who was not also a distinctive stylist, whose modes of elucidation or comprehension were not inseparable from wholly individual ways of writing? If it is true that this is a fact often noted by commentators or philosophers, it is also true that its implications are somewhat neglected. A study of a philosopher 's characteristic (...) uses of language can suggest a great deal about the relationships between thought and personality—between what is said or written, and how or why. The aim of what follows is briefly to compare Wittgenstein and Russell in these terms, to suggest something of how a study of this kind can deepen our understanding of the personal sources and contexts of philosophy. Russell's daughter Katherine once wrote of her father that although he was "a passionate believer in liberty and equality" he was, in practice, incapable of "fraternity," an aristocrat "who had been taught to think himselfsuperior."1 Such paradoxes and blind spots are, ofcourse, often noted in men of vision and principle, and it would be invidious to lay too uncharitable an emphasis on these words. However, the comment does indicate a track of vision fundamentally characteristic of Russell. In intellectual terms he was capable of imposing upon phenomena of the most diverse kinds a synoptic perspective of supreme sweep and rigor which, nevertheless, coexists with all sorts of necessary simplifi332 John Hughes333 cation, even evasiveness. As an aspect ofthis his prose can come to seem both satisfied in its own superior lucidity, and tendentious. An obvious, if perhaps slighdy unfair, example of the personal aspect of this is a passage from the beginning of the Autobiography: "Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind. These passions, like great winds, have blown me hither and thither... over a deep ocean of anguish, reaching to the very verge of despair...."2 The self-esteem which sustains and is sustained by this prose lacks relation to words, reader, and world. The vocabulary, sentiments, and syntax of this sentence assume an impossible grandeur which merely encloses Russell within his own expansive sense of his destiny. The comparisons here are worth pursuing. Russell depends on a congenial sense of an historic philosophical mission, and is adept at conveying his sense of this to the reader. However, he remains unreflective about the implications or nature of the process, and this may excite orirritate us depending on how we react to thewriter's assumption of our acquiescence in his own estimation of himself. The later Wittgenstein, in contrast, is far more suspicious of the way philosophy can be compromised by self-satisfaction: "A beautiful garment that is transformed (coagulates, as it were) into worms and serpents if its wearer looks smugly at himself in the mirror...."3 As has been implied, for Wittgenstein philosophy, in one aspect, was an attempt to authenticate self-presentation, as it was also an attempt to evade "the edifice of... pride."4 The unremitting grappling with words reveals the man to the reader, while the exacting inner focus and process ofthe philosophy exclude any composed consciousness of self. What of Russell's writing on other topics? Here is an example picked more or less at random from On Education: But that is not the real issue; the real issue is: should we, in education, aim at filling the mind with knowledge which has direct practical utility, or should we try to give our pupils mental possessions which are good on their own account? It is useful to know that there are twelve inches in a foot, and three feet in a yard, but this knowledge has no intrinsic value; to those who live where the metric system is in use it is utterly worthless. To appreciate Hamlet, on the other hand, will not be much use in practical life, except in those rare cases where a man is called upon to kill his uncle; but it gives a man a mental possession which he would be soriy to be without, and makes... (shrink)

In recent years the concept of “user’s rights” has gained considerable currency in discussions of the limits of intellectual property in general, and of copyright in particular. Those arguing in favour of the public domain and increased limitations on copyright have increasingly sought to fight fire with fire – to place substantive user’s rights against the claims of intellectual property. User’s rights have in some jurisdictions received explicit Supreme Court imprimatur and they are expressly recognised in key charters of human (...) rights. Yet there is a residual uncertainty about the appropriateness of this language. Is it correct, as a general conceptual and normative matter, to speak of the broad liberties citizens have regarding access to ideas and information as rights? The few treatments dealing directly with this question have argued – often from a Hohfeldian footing – that ascriptions of user’s rights are inappropriate. Even commentators largely sympathetic to the public domain have found themselves drawn to this conclusion. In this paper, I vindicate the general applicability of rights language by arguing these deflationary accounts are mistaken – and are mistaken even in terms of the theories of rights they themselves deploy. (shrink)

Reading Grant Gillett (2009) is a bit like watching a supreme tightrope artist: his balance is always impeccable and his footing sure; and yet one cannot help occasionally holding one's breath. Ove...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Epigrams of PhilodemosBarbara Hughes FowlerDavid Sider, ed. The Epigrams of Philodemos. With introduction and commentary. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. vi 1 259 pp. Cloth, $65.David Sider’s edition of Philodemos’ epigrams is exemplary. It includes a preface stating the reason for such a production; an introduction which treats the life of Philodemos, his connections with Piso and the Epicureans on the Bay of Naples, (...) the Herculaneum papyrus, his contribution to the epigrammatic [End Page 311] form, a comprehensive treatment of his metrics, his place in the Greek Anthology, and a review of the manuscripts and of early printed editions (1494–1600) of his works; and Sider’s explanation of his arrangement of the poems, with a list of seven suggested emendations. This is followed by a concordance of printed editions and of manuscripts. Sider treats thirty-eight epigrams, including some of doubtful attribution and two which are, for metrical and other reasons, almost certainly not by Philodemos. The commentary is followed by a detailed discussion of P. Oxy. 3724, testimonia relating to Philodemos, an extensive bibliography, an index of passages cited, and a general index.The text, translations, and commentary are distinguished not only by their learning, which is prodigious, but by their literary sensitivity. If Sider discusses meter, he shows how it relates to the subject matter of the epigram at hand. On his epigram 8 (AP 10.21), a frantic prayer to Aphrodite, he says, “Unusually for Philodemos, there is no A-caesura in any of the four hexameter lines, which produces a rushed quality.” Again on his epigram 25 (AP 5.306) he remarks, “Not only do we have a rare spondaic fourth foot, it is especially surprising after three dactyls, for whereas DDDDDS is among the commonest of metrical shapes,... dddsds is one of the rarest (indeed, only here in Phil.). The result is a heaviness in these words which emphasizes the contrast with the preceding.” The preceding lines are a girl’s description of her would-be lover’s passionate kisses; the following lines are her complaint that when she is ready, he is unable or unwilling to make love.Another astute remark is on 12 (AP 5.132): “Given the greater variety of sibilants in Oscan than in Latin or Greek, there may be the additional point that the notion of the elegant Sappho sung by a Campanian is funny, esp. if in recital Phil. exaggerated the sibilants of ” Again, on 3 (AP 9.570) Sider suggests that may refer to Xantho’s doll-like quality—as opposed, for instance, to the eighteenth-century idea that she was a bee.Informing Sider’s literary judgments is a fascinating array of facts, including that is a Phrygian loan word, that the pigeon was the sacred bird of the Galloi, the variable price of figs, that goose, lamb, kid, and hare livers were eaten, the cheapness of good tripe sausage, that eunuchs wore women’s clothing, and that muzzles were not used in races but were used in the training of horses.A major thrust of Sider’s commentary is his belief that certain of Philodemos’ epigrams can be read in the light of his Epicureanism. Although 13 (AP 5.24) may owe as much to the epigrammatic tradition as to Epicurean doctrine, Sider’s note on Epicurean notions of the composition of the soul as comprised of both rational and irrational parts is of value. So the same soul both foretells and, foretelling, desires. On 27 (AP 11.44), an invitation to Piso to come to dinner on the Twentieth, an Epicurean holiday, Sider is more persuasive, for he compares the epigram to a passage of Philodemos’ On Epicurus which discusses [End Page 312] Epicurus’ own invitation to attend a feast. On 28 (AP 11.35), a description of foods brought by friends for a dinner, Sider comments, “A poem listing the modest ingredients for a meal which would be appropriate for Epicureans.” He also reads 29 (AP 9.412) as an Epicurean commentary: today we must enjoy our simple repast, for tomorrow we, like Antigenes and Bakkhios, may die. On 31 (AP 11.318... (shrink)

Classical virtue ethics offers an attractive alternative to mainstream ethical theories because it sees the moral life as the proper pursuit of happiness. It advocates this principle of action: "My goal is to be and to act in a way that is good for me." This invites the response that it is egoistic. We see in the literature both peremptory dismissals of virtue ethics, and the complacent suggestion that virtue ethics is unobjectionable because only "formally egoistic." My thesis is that, (...) instead, classical virtue ethics is not egoistic in any sense. We should begin by noting that its principle of action can be read in two ways: My goal is to be and to act in a way that is good for me. My goal is to be and to act in a way that is good for me. ;The first two chapters make explicit the difference between these principles, only the first of which is egoistic, and distinguish several kinds of egoism. Chapters 3 through 5 comprise a historical study which makes clear two important truths. First, neither Aristotle nor his followers fit any of the egoistic profiles developed; they endorse the second reading of the principle. Second, it is the development of a dualism of ultimate principles, maturing in John Duns Scotus, that makes virtue ethics look egoistic. Scotus posits two basic affections of the will, for justice and for advantage, and holds that the first acts as a moral constraint upon the second. With the spread of Scotus's influence, which continues today, theories failing to posit some special moral principle to restrain the desire for happiness will look egoistic. ;The final two chapters survey recent virtue theories. I argue that some of them have been distorted by the influence of dualism, and that some are egoistic. I end by considering the theories of Foot and MacIntyre, and show that here we see plausible ethical theories which have escaped the influence of dualism and avoided egoism by modeling themselves on classical ethical theory. I conclude that virtue ethics is not susceptible to the egoism objection. (shrink)

In these essays, Hugh J. McCann develops a unified perspective on human action. Written over a period of twenty-five years, the essays provide a comprehensive survey of the major topics in contemporary action theory. In four sections, the book addresses the ontology of action ; the foundations of action ; intention, will, and freedom; and practical rationality. McCann works out a compromise between competing perspectives on the individuation of action ; explores the foundations of action and defends a volitional (...) theory; argues for a libertarian view of both the formation and the execution of intention; and considers the question of consistency in rational intentions, as well as the relationship between practical and theoretical reasoning. -/- Among the original features of McCann's work are his defense of both fine- and coarse-grained actions and his arguments for a noncausal theory of the relation between intention and action. He also suggests that intentions need not be consistent, either with each other or with beliefs about success. And he contends that intention formation is an intrinsically ratiocinative procedure, distinct from reasoning about what action would be best. (shrink)

While the early Platonic dialogues have often been explored and appreciated for their ethical content, this is the first book devoted solely to the epistemology of Plato's early dialogues. Author Hugh H. Benson argues that the characteristic features of these dialogues- -Socrates' method of questions and answers, his fascination with definition, his professions of ignorance, and his thesis that virtue is knowledge- -are decidedly epistemological. In this thoughtful study, Benson uncovers the model of knowledge that underlies these distinctively Socratic (...) views. What emerges is unfamiliar, yet closer to a contemporary conception of scientific understanding than ordinary knowledge. (shrink)

Hugh H. Benson explores Plato's answer to Clitophon's challenge, the question of how one can acquire the knowledge Socrates argues is essential to human flourishing-knowledge we all seem to lack. Plato suggests two methods by which this knowledge may be gained: the first is learning from those who already have the knowledge one seeks, and the second is discovering the knowledge one seeks on one's own. The book begins with a brief look at some of the Socratic dialogues where (...) Plato appears to recommend the former approach while simultaneously indicating various difficulties in pursuing it. The remainder of the book focuses on Plato's recommendation in some of his most important and central dialogues-the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic-for carrying out the second approach: de novo inquiry. The book turns first to the famous paradox concerning the possibility of such an inquiry and explores Plato's apparent solution. Having defended the possibility of de novo inquiry as a response to Clitophon's challenge, Plato explains the method or procedure by which such inquiry is to be carried out. The book defends the controversial thesis that the method of hypothesis, as described and practiced in the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic, is, when practiced correctly, Plato's recommended method of acquiring on one's own the essential knowledge we lack. The method of hypothesis when practiced correctly is, then, Platonic dialectic, and this is Plato's response to Clitophon's challenge. (shrink)

Critics have argued that behaviorism must necessarily be inadequate to account for complex human behavior whereas cognitive psychology is adequate to account for such behavior. Recently, Fodor has focused this criticism on certain situations in which humans choose among a set of alternatives. We argue that this criticism applies to forms of behaviorism that are reductionistic but not to non-reductionistic behaviorisms like that of Skinner. Non-reductionistic behaviorism can be used to interpret human choice situations of varying degrees of complexity. Such (...) interpretations run into difficulty in accounting for certain aspects of verbal behavior, but so do cognitive theories. Although nothing, in principle, prohibits either type of theory from accounting for complex human behavior, neither current behavioral theory nor current cognitive theory is developed enough at the present time to do so. (shrink)

First published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Discusses the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of moral judgments, hoping to illuminate it by contrasting moral and aesthetic judgments. In her critical assessment of the nature of moral judgments, Foot concludes that some such judgments (as e.g. that Nazism was evil) are definitely objective. The concept of morality here supplies criteria independent of local standards, which function as fixed starting points in arguments across local boundaries, whereas, by contrast, aesthetic truths can ultimately depend on locally determined criteria. (...) More problematic is the apparently different relation of moral and of aesthetic judgments to rational choice. Individuals may have no reason to choose what is beautiful, but we think that they must always have reason to choose what is morally right, which raises one of the most difficult problems in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Darwin hypothesized that some animals, when selecting sexual partners, possess a genuine “sense of beauty” that cannot be accounted for by the logic of natural selection. This hypothesis has been notoriously controversial. In this chapter I propose that the concept of agency can be useful to operationalize the “sense of beauty”, and can help identify the conditions under which one can infer that animals are acting as (aesthetic) agents. Focusing on a case study of the behavior of the Pavo cristatus, (...) I identify the types of evidence that would allow for the inference of agency through aesthetic choice. (shrink)

De indruk overheerst dat het vertrouwen in instellingen tanende is. Toch wordt deze indruk niet altijd ondersteund door bevragingen en statistieken. Als die indruk een mythe is, dan is de echte vraag: waarom worden we dan tot deze mythe aangetrokken? In dit essay wil ik ons verlangen naar vertrouwen plaatsen in een cultuur en in een denkkader waarin vrijheid en zelfbeschikking blijven primeren, en kijken naar hoe er vandaag theoretisch wordt nagedacht over vertrouwen en publiek beleid. Het valt te betwijfelen (...) of we het vertrouwen dat we zoeken op die manier zullen vinden. (shrink)

The relationship between international order and justice has long been central to the study and practice of international relations. For most of the twentieth century, states and international society gave priority to a view of order that focused on the minimum conditions for coexistence in a pluralist, conflictual world. Justice was seen either as secondary or sometimes even as a challenge to order. Recent developments have forced a reassessment of this position. This book sets current concerns within a broad historical (...) and theoretical context; explores the depth and scope of this presumed solidarism amidst the difficulties of acting on the basis of a more strongly articulated liberal position; and underscores the complexity and abiding tensions inherent in the relationship between order and justice. Chapters examine a wide range of state and transnational perspectives on order and justice, including those from China, India, Russia, the United States, and the Islamic world. Other chapters investigate how the order-justice relationship is mediated within major international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the global financial institutions. (shrink)

We propose that measures of information integration can be more straightforwardly interpreted as measures of agency rather than of consciousness. This may be useful to the goals of consciousness research, given how agency and consciousness are “duals” in many (although not all) respects.

This 'paper' was intended as the first chapter of a book. It sketches Aristippus'theory of ethics, and discusses various objections to it (Plato, Aristotle, etc.).

The Sallustian Suasoriae are far from being works whose origin and authenticity can be claimed as matters of earth-shaking importance. As forms of composition their interest is mild; linguistically they are less valuable than bizarre; and as historical records theysuffer from the defect of most Suasoriae—that the author cannot advise about the past and is compelled to deal chiefly with the potentialities of the future. But in spite of this it is not without reason that in Germany much attention has (...) been paid to these few pages of Latin during the last twenty years. If they are what they seem to be, their evidence, such as it is, must at least be taken seriously. And this evidence is not without promise; for not only do these pieces contain several scraps of otherwise missing information largely about the prosopography of the last century B.C., but in general they purport to express the views of Sallust—a man who was no fool, even if his ability was not so great as has some-times been alleged—on the political and economic difficulties of Rome during the closing phase of the career of Julius Caesar. Material of this kind cannot lightly be neglected; but at the same time the significance, both of the author's suggestions and of his casual references to events inthe past, will depend to a great extent on the author having been Sallust himself, and not a member of some rhetor's establishment writing perhaps a hundred years or more after the events with which he pretends to be contemporary. So though there may be no welcome for yet another addition to the literature of a subject whose bibliography is already long, it may still be worth while to make some observations which will perhaps help to show that, wherever the true conclusion about the authenticity of these pamphlets may lie, at least it does not lie in the direction which has been taken in recent years by several scholars—in particular by Pöhlmann and Eduard Meyer. (shrink)