2. Saebyŏngnyŏk chʻodang esŏ on pʻyŏnji.

Cultural differences pose a serious challenge to the ethics and governance of artificial intelligence from a global perspective. Cultural differences may enable malignant actors to disregard the demand of important ethical values or even to justify the violation of them through deference to the local culture, either by affirming the local culture lacks specific ethical values, e.g., privacy, or by asserting the local culture upholds conflicting values, e.g., state intervention is good. One response to this challenge is the human rights (...) approach to AI governance, which is intended to be a universal and globally enforceable framework. The proponents of the approach, however, have so far neglected the challenge from cultural differences or left out the implications of cultural diversity in their works. This is surprising because human rights theorists have long recognized the significance of cultural pluralism for human rights. Accordingly, the approach may not be straightforwardly applicable in “non-Western” contexts because of cultural differences, and it may also be critiqued as philosophically incomplete insofar as the approach does not account for the role of culture. This commentary examines the human rights approach to AI governance with an emphasis on cultural values and the role of culture. Particularly, I show that the consideration of cultural values is essential to the human rights approach for both philosophical and instrumental reasons. (shrink)

Robots and other smart machines are increasingly interwoven into the social fabric of our society, with the area and scope of their application continuing to expand. As we become accustomed to interacting through and with robots, we also begin to supplement or replace existing human–human interactions with human–machine interactions. This article aims to discuss the impacts of the shift from human–human interactions to human–machine interactions in one facet of our self-constitution, i.e., morality. More specifically, it sets out to explore whether (...) and how the shift to human–machine interactions can affect our moral cultivation. I shall structure the article around what Shannon Vallor calls technology-driven moral deskilling, i.e., the phenomenon of technology negatively affecting individual moral cultivation, and shall also attempt to offer a Confucian response to the problem. I first elaborate in detail Vallor’s idea of technology-driven moral deskilling. Next, I discuss three paradigms of virtue acquisition identified by Nancy E. Snow, i.e., the “folk” paradigm, the skill-and-expertise paradigm, and the Confucian paradigm, and show how the Confucian paradigm can help us to respond to technology-driven moral deskilling. Finally, I introduce the idea of Confucian rituals (li) and argue for the ritualizing of machines as an answer to technology-driven moral deskilling. (shrink)

Nearly a decade ago, Rafael Capurro has gradually shifted his attention towards the ideas of message and of messenger. In lieu of ‘information’, he proposes and develops a new direction of research he calls Angeletics that aims to examine the nature of message and messenger, both of which are inherently social. Coincidently, at about the same time, we witnessed the rise of social epistemology in Angelo-American analytic philosophy. This coincidence is interesting, because both Capurro’s Angeletics and social epistemology indicated a (...) departure from individualistic-orientedness in hermeneutics and traditional epistemology respectively. While social epistemology has earned its place and status in academia, especially in North America and Europe, Capurro’s Angeletics has yet to receive similar attention to which it deserves. Part of the reason for this, I think, is because of its formulation and terminology is relatively unfamiliar to those who do not share the same philosophical tradition. Hence, one remedy to this situation is to attempt to translate Angeletics in terms of social epistemology, and this – is the objective of the current paper. (shrink)

Algorithms can now identify patterns and correlations in the (big) datasets, and predict outcomes based on those identified patterns and correlations with the use of machine learning techniques and big data, decisions can then be made by algorithms themselves in accordance with the predicted outcomes. Yet, algorithms can inherit questionable values from the datasets and acquire biases in the course of (machine) learning, and automated algorithmic decision-making makes it more difficult for people to see algorithms as biased. While researchers have (...) taken the problem of algorithmic bias seriously, but the current discussion on algorithmic fairness tends to conceptualize ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness primarily as a technical issue and attempts to implement pre-existing ideas of ‘fairness’ into algorithms. In this paper, I show that such a view of algorithmic fairness as technical issue is unsatisfactory for the type of problem algorithmic fairness presents. Since decisions on fairness measure and the related techniques for algorithms essentially involve choices between competing values, ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness should be conceptualized first and foremost as a political issue, and it should be (re)solved by democratic communication. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to explicitly reconceptualize algorithmic fairness as a political question and suggest the current discussion of algorithmic fairness can be strengthened by adopting the accountability for reasonableness framework. (shrink)

001. 王陽明의 철학사상 002. 현대의 시대적 상황 003. 양명학의 형성 배경 004. 기존 학설과 양명학 005. 왕양명의 심즉이론 006. 왕양명의 지행합일체 007. 왕양명의 치량지론 008. 왕양명의 이상사회 사상 009. 왕양명의 군사사상 010. 왕양명의 영향과 전개 011. 동, 서의 양명학 012. 한국의 양명학 013. 양명학의 조선 전래 014. 양명학에 대한 비판 015. 전래 초기의 양명학 수용 016. 조선조 양명학의 태두 정제두 017. 하곡 이후의 양명학 018. 겸곡 박은식의 양명학 019. 애당 정인보의 양명학.

This study investigates the relationship among ethical philosophy, thinking style, and managerial ethical decision-making. Based on the premise that business ethics is a function of culture and time, we attempt to explore two important questions as to whether the national differences in managerial ethical philosophies remain over time and whether the relationship between thinking style and ethical decision-making is consistent across different national contexts. We conducted a survey on Korean managers’ ethical decision-making and thinking style and made a cross-cultural, cross-temporal (...) comparison with the results presented by previous studies that surveyed Korean and US managers with the same questionnaire at different points in time. Our analysis revealed that Korean managers have become more reliant on rule utilitarianism for ethical decision-making over the last two decades, which is dominantly used by US managers, corroborating our convergence hypothesis built on social contracts theory. However, as opposed to previous research, we found that managers with a balanced linear and nonlinear thinking style do not necessarily make more ethical decisions compared to those with a predominantly linear or nonlinear thinking style. This study contributes to international business ethics literature by presenting a theoretical framework that may explain the convergence of ethical philosophies employed by managers in different national contexts over time, and that the relationship between thinking style and managerial ethical decision-making may not be universal, but contingent on contextual factors. (shrink)

To live in this world is to live in the midst of evil. The reality of evil seems all too real and yet ever-perplexing in that it scoffs at any attempt to make rational sense of the world. Can we dare to insist, as traditional theodicy does, that such a world is not only created by but is also under the providence of God who is seen as perfect in both goodness and power? Many find such an attempt incredulous if (...) not scandalous. David Griffin, a foremost process philosopher of religion and the leading proponent of process theodicy, too, finds the traditional theistic theodicy philosophically and theologically unsatisfactory.1 The main reason for its failure, Griffin thinks, lies in the traditional .. (shrink)

A closer look at the theories and questions in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology shows the absence and marginality of non-Western philosophical traditions in the discussions. Although, increasingly, some philosophers have sought to introduce non-Western philosophical traditions into the debates, there are few systematic attempts to construct and articulate general accounts of ethics and technology based on other philosophical traditions. This situation is understandable, for the questions of modern sciences and technologies appear to be originated from the West; (...) at the same time, the situation is undesirable. The overall aim of this paper, therefore, is to introduce an alternative account of ethics of technology based on the Confucian tradition. In doing so, it is hoped that the current paper can initiate a relatively uncharted field in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology. (shrink)

Global engineering ethics is the engineering ethics’ response to globalization. It plays a major role in the received narrative about the need for a global engineering ethics, which is often illustrated by stories of some engineers A (of culture X) who interact with people or organizations of culture Y, and as a result encounter conflicts between their (i.e. culture X’s) ethical values and culture Y’s ethical values that generate ethical conundrums to the engineers. Global engineering ethics is thus needed to (...) help engineers to navigate through these ethical conundrums. However, the received narrative is insufficient in attending to the different nature and scope of ethical challenges for engineers and engineering practices in a globalized context, or so I shall argue. To understand these differences, I elaborate three basic presuppositions that create the need for global engineering ethics and explain their various interpretations. These presuppositions will then form the basis of my discussion of current approaches to global engineering ethics. I also argue that global engineering ethics is not merely reactive but also proactive, but the existing approaches have paid insufficient attention to the proactive dimension of global engineering ethics. So, I will end this chapter by arguing for the importance of the proactive dimension and exploring what it demands from engineers and engineering practices. (shrink)

It is hard to disagree with the idea of responsible innovation (henceforth, RI), as it enables policy-makers, scientists, technology developers, and the public to better understand and respond to the social, ethical, and policy challenges raised by new and emerging technologies. RI has gained prominence in policy agenda in Europe and the United States over the last few years. And, along with its rising importance in policy-making, there is also a burgeoning research literature on the topic. Given the historical context (...) of which RI emerges, it should not be surprising that the current discourse on RI is predominantly based on liberal democratic values. Yet, the bias towards liberal democratic values will inevitably limit the discussion of RI, especially in the cases where liberal democratic values are not taken for granted. As such, there is an urgent need to return to the normative foundation of RI, and to explore the notion of ‘responsible innovation’ from nonliberal democratic perspectives. Against this background, this paper seeks to demonstrate the problematic consequences of RI solely grounded on or justified by liberal democratic values. This paper will cast the argument in the form of a dilemma to be labelled as The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma and use it to illustrate the problems of the Western bias. (shrink)

The ethics of geoengineering has gained momentum in recent academic debate. The current debates, however, is typically framed in terms of (i) the first-order question about the moral permissibility of geoengineering, and (ii) the second-order question about the distributive and compensatory issues associated with geoengineering. Both (i) and (ii) are central to decision-making about geoengineering, but they have not cover all ethical issues related to geoengineering. I argue that a preoccupation with (i) and (ii) may lead to an oversight of (...) post-implementation scenarios (PISs), which introduce different ethical issues relevant to decision-making on geoengineering. More specifically, I use the requirement of maintenance for geoengineering as an example to draw attention to PISs, and to illustrate the limit of the existing discussion in the ethics of geoengineering. (shrink)

Recently, amid growing awareness that computer algorithms are not neutral tools but can cause harm by reproducing and amplifying bias, attempts to detect and prevent such biases have intensified. An approach that has received considerable attention in this regard is the Value Sensitive Design (VSD) methodology, which aims to contribute to both the critical analysis of (dis)values in existing technologies and the construction of novel technologies that account for specific desired values. This article provides a brief overview of the key (...) features of the Value Sensitive Design approach, examines its contributions to understanding and addressing issues around bias in computer systems, outlines the current debates on algorithmic bias and fairness in machine learning, and discusses how such debates could profit from VSD-derived insights and recommendations. Relating these debates on values in design and algorithmic bias to research on cognitive biases, we conclude by stressing our collective duty to not only detect and counter biases in software systems, but to also address and remedy their societal origins. (shrink)

Technology has become a major subject of philosophical ethical reflection in recent years, as the novelty and disruptiveness of technology confront us with new possibilities and unprecedented outcomes as well as fundamental changes to our ‘normal’ ways of living that demand deep reflection of technology. However, philosophical and ethical analysis of technology has until recently drawn primarily from the Western philosophical and ethical traditions, and philosophers and scholars of technology discuss the potential contribution of non-Western approaches only sparingly. Given the (...) global nature of technology, however, there is an urgent need for multiculturalism in philosophy and ethics of technology that include non-Western perspectives in our thinking about technology. While there is an increased attention to non-Western philosophy in the field, there are few systematic attempts to articulate different approaches to the ethics of technology based on other philosophical and ethical traditions. The present edited volume picks up the task of diversifying the ethics of technology by exploring the possibility of Confucian ethics of technology. In the six chapters of this volume, the authors examine various ideas, concepts, and theories in Confucianism and apply them to the ethical challenges of technology; in the epilogue the editors review the key ideas articulated throughout the volume to identify possible ways forward for Confucian ethics of technology. -/- Harmonious Technology revives Confucianism for philosophical and ethical analysis of technology and presents Confucian ethics of technology as another approach to the ethic of technology. It will be essential for philosophers and ethicists of technology, who are urged to consider beyond the Western paradigms. More broadly, the volume will be of interest to students and scholars in the fields of philosophy, science and technology studies, innovation studies, political science, and social studies. (shrink)

International observers and critics often attack China's Internet policy on the basis of liberal values. If China's Internet is designed and built on Confucian values that are distinct from, and sometimes incompatible to, liberal values, then the liberalist critique ought to be reconsidered. In this respect, Mary Bockover's “Confucian Values and the Internet: A Potential Conflict” appears to be the most direct attempt to address this issue. Yet, in light of developments since its publication in 2003, it is time to (...) re-examine this issue. In this paper, I revisit Bockover’s argument and show why it fails. Using social media as an example, I offer an alternative argument to show why the Internet remains largely incompatible with Confucian values. I end this paper by suggesting how to recontextualise the Confucian way of life and to redesign social media in accordance to Confucian values in the information society. (shrink)

The topic of this thesis is about one of the simplest linguistic expressions in our natural languages, names. The debate about the meaning of names has a longstanding history in philosophy of language. One camp, as known as Millianism, maintains that a name only contributes its referent to the meaning of sentence which contains it, and the other camp, as known as Descriptivism, maintains that a name is disguised definite description. My thesis aims to contribute to this continuing debate. Millianism, (...) which holds that a name n only contributes its referent to the meaning of the sentence which contains it, seems to have problem in explaining the cognitive role of names. For, it seems intuitive true that a rational person will take ‘Superman is Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ to have different meaning, even though the names have the same referent. Also, if we substitute co-referring names in belief ascriptions, e.g. ‘Lois believes that Superman flies’ and ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’, their truth-values appear to change. The intuitions as such come into conflict with Millianism, and appear to show that the view is false. In this thesis, I will examine two Millian responses to the above problems. I shall criticize a response famously defended by Salmon and (early-)Soames, and to defend a version of Millianism proposed by Soames, which, while holding that a name only contributes its referent to the meaning of a sentence which contains it, allows a speaker to assertively utter these sentences and belief ascriptions to assert something beyond the meaning of them. So, the meaning of the two sentences ‘Superman is Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ is just the same; and, the belief ascriptions ‘Lois believes that Superman flies’ and ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’ do not differ in truth-value. But, a speaker can assert something in fact different in meaning or truth-value via these sentences and ascriptions. In the thesis, I shall show that this version of Millianism is preferable to the one defended by Salmon and (early-)Soames. (shrink)

Philosophers have talked to each other about moral issues concerning technology, but few of them have talked about issues of technology and the good life, and even fewer have talked about technology and the good life with the public in the form of recommendation. In effect, recommendations for various technologies are often left to technologists and gurus. Given the potential benefits of informing the public on their impacts on the good life, however, this is a curious state of affairs. In (...) the present paper, I will examine why philosophers are seemingly reluctant to offer recommendations to the public. While there are many reasons for philosophers to refrain from offering recommendations, I shall focus on a specific normative reason. More specifically, it appears that, according to a particular definition, offering recommendations can be viewed as paternalistic, and therefore is prima facie wrong to do so. I will provide an argument to show that the worry about paternalism is unfounded, because a form of paternalism engendered by technology is inevitable. Given the inevitability of paternalism, I note that philosophers should accept the duty to offer recommendations to the public. I will then briefly turn to design ethics, which has reconceptualised the role of philosophers and, in my mind, fitted well with the inevitability of paternalism. Finally, I shall argue that design ethics has to be supplemented by the practice of recommendation if it is to sustain its objective. (shrink)

Qualifying post-Westphalian sovereign statehood as a 'power' as argued for in Hendrik Berkhoff's political theology, this book addresses the decades-long theological-spiritual debate between Christian realism and Christian pacifism in U.S. foreign policy and global Christian circles. It approaches the debate by delving into the pacifist Anabaptist political theology and delineates empirically how sovereign statehood in post-colonial Africa and Asia has fallen into the hands of the devil Satan, as a 'fallen power' in the Foucaultian terms of power structures, techniques and (...) episteme. While the book offers intervention schemes and options, it holds that Christian statecraft remains the source of hope to effectively address a number of serious global issues. By extension, the book is thus an invitation to ignite debates on the suitability of Christian statecraft and the nexus between spirituality and world politics, making it especially interesting for scholars and students in the fields of International Politics, Politics of Asian and African States, Post-colonial Studies and Political Theology.. (shrink)