According to Peirce one of the most important philosophical problems is continuity. Consequently, he set forth an innovative and peculiar approach in order to elucidate at once its mathematical and metaphysical challenges through proper non-classical logical reasoning. I will restrain my argument to the definition of the different types of discrete collections according to Peirce, with a special regard to the phenomenon called ?premonition of continuity? (Peirce, 1976, Vol. 3, p. 87, c. 1897).

---Introduction: Appendix A. The Tudor literature on church and state. Appendix B. Crowell's interpreter. Appendix C. James and the Puritans. Appendix D. A conference about the next succession to the crown of England, and other books by Robert Parsons. Appendix E. Bibliography, ---The political works of James I : Basilikon Doron. The trew law of free monarchies. An apologie for the oath of allegiance. A premonition to all Christian monarches, free princes and states. 'A defence of the right of kings, (...) against Cardinall Perron. Speech of 1603-1604. Speech of 1605. Speech of 1607. Speech of 1609-1610. Speech in the Star chamber, 1616. ---Index. (shrink)

I cordially congratulate the book of Roman Solovy, a colleague of religious scholars and like-minded people on theological workshop. The author comprehends the mutual influence of culture and the Church on the break of modern-postmodern-post-postmodern. Unfortunately, the last move fell out of the attention of the author, leaving a sense of incompleteness, not-really-topicality. If the researcher is only going to analyze what the theologians of the "emerging Church" are thinking about "the transition from the modern to the postmodern era," he (...) is going to look for yesterday. After-Postmodernism does not appear in the text, nor as a constant concept, nor as a premonition. However, from the subsequent text, it becomes clear why and in what sense the author regards postmodern as a stage of modernism, that is, the continuation of the past, rather than a bridge to the future. (shrink)

As an artist I am interested in creative states of consciousness and the direct expression of altered states of consciousness in forms such as musical improvisation and the automatic writings and drawings of the Surrealist Artists. I have been investigating a particular spectrum of altered states characterized by an enhanced experience where out-of-the-ordinary information is accessed or an enhanced ability is realized beyond what would ordinarily be possible. Within this realm we would find the ‘peak performance’ state of athletes and (...) musicians, as well as a state of intellectual inspiration where a complex problem is solved and also the phenomenon of premonition. It is related to the ‘flow state’ as described in Flow, The Psychology of Optimal Experience (Mihályi Csíkszentmihályi, 1990) and the experience of the American clairvoyant Edgar Cayce who resolved complex medical ailments when in a self-induced hypnotic trance. Additional examples include Haitian Vodou ritualized possession and all experiences where healing and foretelling of the future takes place through a communion with spirits. It is a broad spectrum that has been described in various ways throughout history and within all cultures. But though the descriptions vary, this spectrum of consciousness shares the common characteristic of accessing extraordinary information or demonstrating extraordinary skill or ability. This article is an attempt to help clarify and define this particular spectrum of consciousness. (shrink)

Studies resolve the applied subject of how heavenly faith might be perceived inside the Monotheistic confidence customs. Subsequent to recognizing a few conceivable states of faith inside the thoughtful writing, scholars exhibit two or three faith situations for exhibiting that heavenly belief isn't just reasonably conceivable (for example, viable with heavenly premonition). Yet, that heavenly belief is foremost understood as specific belief category - helpful belief. Specifically, research contends that heavenly belief targets motivating humanity's reliability. Scholar raises a design of (...) a general philosophy that forgoes "elective prospects" opportunity for "real succession" opportunity. Researchers believe that behaving openly doesn't mean an opportunity to perform in any case, & that behaving uninhibitedly is the opportunity part of ethical obligation. Utilizing such logical contraptions, scholars demonstrate that they might provide different significant components of a religious philosophy that utilizes just the thought of performing unreservedly. According to McNabb, divine foreknowledge is comprised of trustworthiness. For example, if God knows at creation time that I will get the coffee by tomorrow for breakfast, then it is sure that I will get it for breakfast. God cannot be mistaken about what He knows; what is in the past cannot be changed. God's foreknowledge includes not just knowing future actions but also knowing all factual statements about the future. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Killing God, Liberating the “Subject”: Nietzsche and Post-God FreedomMichael LackeyIIndeed, we philosophers and “free spirits” feel, when we hear the news that “the old god is dead,” as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectations. 1After God’s death, if Michel Foucault is to be believed, the death of the subject followed quite naturally. But how, one might ask, did that (...) fateful event of God’s death necessarily lead to the demise of that most noble animal? Answering this question is crucial, for once we understand how, for Nietzsche, God’s existence and His metaphorical participation in the creation of humanity are most destructive of what is most vital within the human, then we will see how, in killing God and His crown of creation, Nietzsche does not become the quintessential nihilist; rather, he becomes, to his mind, the first sane voice crying in the intellectual wilderness: make way the coming of a new human, a “subject” which can only become a “self “ when it paradoxically learns to overcome its very constructed “self.” Nietzsche’s logic therefore runs as follows: so long as God exists, a subject which overcomes itself cannot come into being; for as Richard Schacht rightly notes, the God-hypothesis serves as a support for the traditional subject-hypothesis in Nietzsche’s writings. So to produce a self-overcoming subject Nietzsche must first kill what he considers that stodgy old tyrant of the soul. But this raises the question of how one goes about doing away with [End Page 737] God. In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche gives his reader a puzzling answer to this question when he says that he fears that “we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar” (“Reason,” 5). 2 Given Nietzsche’s logic, to kill off God he needs to eliminate belief in grammar, and once God is dead, he can then do away with the subject. In what follows I will show how Nietzsche tries to eliminate God and the traditional subject through his extended analysis of what it means to “believe in grammar.”IIIf there is today still no lack of those who do not know how indecent it is to “believe”—or a sign of decadence, of a broken will to live—well, they will know it tomorrow. 3To understand what it means to believe in grammar, it is best to note how Nietzsche contrasts belief and freedom. More starkly, we could say that for Nietzsche to have faith means, necessarily, to lack freedom; or to be free means, necessarily, to reject faith. Nietzsche makes this clear in the fifth book of GS when he says: “Once a human being reaches the fundamental conviction that he must be commanded, he becomes ‘a believer.’ Conversely, one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses” (§ 347). I isolate this passage not in order to outline Nietzsche’s criticism of belief but rather to understand how Nietzsche defines freedom by contrasting it with belief. Such an analysis of course begs the question how it is possible that belief necessarily precludes freedom. Intuitively, it would seem that belief and freedom entail no contradiction. For instance, given two choices, to believe in God or not to believe in God, I exercise my freedom in choosing one belief over the other. With this example, it would seem that belief necessarily presupposes freedom. So how is it that Nietzsche concludes that freedom and belief are irreconcilable?That Nietzsche considers faith obscene is clear when he tells us in AC that belief of any kind is a “sign of decadence” (§ 50) which leads to “self-alienation” (§ 54). In fact he goes so far as to claim that faith is actually “slavery in a higher sense” (§ 54). To see why belief implies slavery we must first understand what Nietzsche means by faith. While the standard view suggests that faith is... (shrink)

The title question of the paper has its empirical origin in the form of an individual’s existential experience arising from the personal use of a computer, which we attempt to describe in the first section. The rest of the entire paper can be understood as a philosophical essay answering the question posed. First the connection between the main problem of the article and its “premonition” by mankind, which was expressed in the form of ancient myths and legends, is briefly suggested. (...) After shortly discussing the problems that early considerations of AI focused on, i.e. whether machines can think at all, we move on to reformulate our title question, about the possibility of outsmarting AI. This outsmarting will be understood by us in a rather limited way as to prevent a machine from completing its implemented task. To achieve this objective, after softly clarifying the basic terms, an analogy is built between the “outsmarting” of a machine by a human (the target domain) and the playing of a mathematical game between two players (the base domain), where this outsmarting is assigned a “winning strategy” in the certain game. This mathematical model is formed by games similar to Banach-Mazur games. The strict theorems of such games are then proved and applied to the target of the analogy. We then draw conclusions and look for counter-examples to our findings. The answer to the title question posed is negative, and it is not clear how far it should be taken seriously. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 30.4 (2000) 59-82 [Access article in PDF] Bombing and the Symptom Traumatic Earliness and the Nuclear Uncanny Paul K. Saint-Amour Many used the Japanese word bukimi, meaning weird, ghastly, or unearthly, to describe Hiroshima's uneasy combination of continued good fortune and expectation of catastrophe. People remembered saying to one another, "Will it be tomorrow or the day after tomorrow?" One man described how, each night he was on (...) air-raid watch, "I trembled with fear.... I would think, "Tonight it will be Hiroshima." These "premonitions" were partly attempts at psychic preparation, partly a form of "imagining the worst" as a magical way of warding off disaster. —Robert J. Lifton, Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima (1967) Robert J. Lifton's pathbreaking work on the survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima focuses on the psychological aftermath of the bomb, but opens with a brief and surprising section called "Anticipation." Given the instantaneous and unprecedented devastation caused by the first atomic bomb, the anticipation of so singular an experience is just as difficult to imagine as its subsequent assimilation. In fact, the unassimilable nature of traumatic violence would seem to depend in some way upon the impossibility of its anticipation, as Lifton implies: "Neither past experience nor immediate perceptions—the two sources of prior imagination—could encompass what was about to occur." Yet Lifton also records an expectant, premonitory atmosphere in Hiroshima during the weeks before the bombing, a compound of past experience and immediate perceptions that, while inadequate to "encompass" the eventual experience of the bomb, cannot simply be dismissed as speculation that found an accidental correlate in the nuclear event. While no one in Hiroshima knew ahead of time what would occur on August 6, 1945, many had noted the city's eerie exemption from conventional bombardment and speculated as to the reasons for it. During the summer of 1945, a series of rumors circulated in Hiroshima, rumors attributing the sparing of the city, variously, to its modest military and industrial significance; to the presence of prominent foreigners there, possibly including President Truman's mother; to important American prisoners-of-war supposedly held in the city; to the number of its citizens who had emigrated to the US; to the presence of large numbers of American spies living among its citizens; to its physical appeal in the eyes of Americans who had saved the city as a site for their postwar occupation villas; and, most wishfully, to the wartime grace of a cartographic error: "We thought that perhaps the city of Hiroshima was not on the American maps" [Lifton 15-17]. 1 Other inhabitants [End Page 59] of the city feared that Hiroshima appeared all too prominently on US maps, but had been set aside for "something unusually big"—perhaps the inundation of the city by floodwaters that could be released by the bombing of a massive upstream dam. Still others spoke of a "special bomb" [PWRS 220-22; Lifton 17]. All these rumors responded to citizens' impression that their city had been in some way singled out, and the term bukimi—also meaning "ominous" or "uncanny"—spoke to the suspended question of whether Hiroshima and its inhabitants had been singled out for preservation or for annihilation.The survivors who recollected their anticipatory bukimi years after the bombing may have retrospectively amplified their memories of weird expectation, perhaps as a way of attempting to master an incommensurable and singular event by installing it within a narrative of causality, continuity, even prophecy. Nonetheless, the bukimi experienced by inhabitants of Hiroshima should not be understood as pure retrospection, nor as groundless hunch, since it arose from a series of empirical observations later revealed to have a single and coherent origin in US military strategy. By the summer of 1945, most Japanese cities whose size and military-industrial importance were similar to Hiroshima's had already been bombed with incendiaries: those who lived in Hiroshima had watched waves of American bombers fly past on their way to other targets, while the dozen or so bombs that had fallen accidentally on... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 30.3 (2000) 106-113 [Access article in PDF] To Die With Others Alphonso Lingis One dies as one dies—as anyone, everyone dies, as all that lives dies. Do we not know that when we lie dying—when, bedridden, hospitalized, removed from our home and workplace, we no longer exercise our skills, launch initiatives, are depersonalized, and can do nothing but wait for the end in increasing passivity and prostration? Did (...) we not learn something of the death that will be our death from every death we witnessed or noticed about us? And when someone with whom we shared our life dies, do we not feel that something of ourselves has died too? In several senses of the word, we die with others. My Own Death It is strange then to see that in philosophy one's own death and the death of others have been separated. Socrates makes learning how to die the subject matter of philosophy and makes philosophy the daily practice of dying. He speaks of the relief he will feel when the opacity of his body will be broken. His last words—Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius—say that life is the sickness for which death is the cure. Did not Socrates here in fact claim to know two things that he did not know—what death is, that is, that death is a relief; and what life is, that is, that life is sickness?Socrates had seen men die; he had committed himself to defend Athens in war, he had killed men in battle. He does not speak of how they died, nor of the relief he felt when they died.Socrates died the way he did in order to demonstrate his belief that the soul is of its own nature immortal. Heidegger, proclaiming the end of the metaphysics launched by the Platonic Socrates, makes one's own death again the central topic it had been for Socrates. Heidegger is convinced that death is not an accident that befalls a life that of its own nature would endure like inanimate things endure. He sets out to show that we die of our own nature, that our life casts itself with all its forces unto its end.Death and Nothingness Heidegger also claims to know what death is: that death is nothingness. He identifies it—it is this one thing, nothingness. Yet he also insists that my death is utterly my own. From the opening pages of Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych, Heidegger draws the affirmation that witnessing the death of others is not the source of my sense of my own mortality. At the wake, I have only seen the body of another immobilized, tranquilized, but still fully, completely, there. I have not seen annihilation. But annihilation is what my death will be for me. This I sense in anxiety, that sense of being cast adrift, the environment no longer supporting me, sustaining me—and which is a premonition of being cast into nothingness.Death is ungraspable, unconfrontable; it has no front lines. Is it not too much to say that I know it is nothingness? Must we not rather say that death is the unknown? [End Page 106]I cannot say, strictly speaking, that I die, since—dying a violent death or not—I am conscious of only part of the event. And a great share of the terror I experience at the idea of death derives perhaps from this: bewilderment at remaining suspended in the middle of a seizure whose outcome I can never know because of my unconsciousness. This kind of unreality, this absurdity of death, is (without taking into account the physical suffering by which it might be accompanied) its radically terrible element, and not, as some may think ("Après moi le déluge!" "Since there's nothing after death, why are you afraid?" "What's the difference to you, since you won't be here any more?" etc....), what might make it acceptable. [Leiris 50] We do not know that death is nothingness—nothingness is not some thing one knows. But nothingness is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 47, no. 1. © 2021 by Bettina Judd 13 mitochondrial eve brainstorming the archive Bettina Judd what if we were to recover the first utterance of our selves? before black (but happen to be, in this moment of looking back, black.) before african (or african descended. from a place that would be called africa. from the first large place surrounded by waters.) before woman (and all of (...) the lies told therein.) what would we be? would we able to utter our own names? would i hear myself when called if i ever recovered me? -*the archive would be my dreams the intensity of elders’ eyes things that could not be said lest we all fall apart where shattered in the first place, the first time. uncover what? my marrow? this pelvic bone you once called home? you a child of children, a memory-premonition 14 Bettina Judd why you want so bad to remember all the things i’ve willfully forgotten? the hungers i’ve stuffed with human flesh? the joys i’ve chosen to live and in living would not write them down? uncover what? go. live. be a forest of your own dreams. be a mystery for your own children... (shrink)

t. 1. Rasshiri︠a︡i︠u︡shchai︠a︡si︠a︡ vselennai︠a︡ absoli︠u︡ta -- t. 2. Kosmo-antropo-sot︠s︡io-prirodogenez cheloveka -- t. 3. Antropologicheskai︠a︡ istoriosofii︠a︡.

ch. 1. Filosofii︠a︡ russkikh revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ionnykh demokratov i estestvoispytateleĭ.

Opening the round table, I. T. Frolov, editor-in-chief of Voprosy filosofii, stated that discussing problems of this type today, the task lies not so much in emphasizing their general and traditional aspects but in finding a scientific and practical solution to new problems of interaction of man and nature that can now be solved only on a global scale. Furthermore, he observed that discussion of these problems as questions of morality, in terms of pessimistic or optimistic evaluation, is very important (...) but certainly entirely inadequate. Not only social and philosophical but many political conclusions follow from a discussion of problems of interaction between man and nature. Investigation and solution of these problems, which require concrete scientific and practical approaches, may facilitate the development of such policies as peaceful coexistence, strengthening of neighborly treaty relations, and so forth. Solving these problems will help peoples come closer together and contribute to the firmer establishment of peace throughout the world. (shrink)

_Purpose_ of the research is to study the originality of interpretation of death in the lyrics of Ukrainian diaspora in Canada in the context of the opposition "foreign land – motherland", based on its existential development in philosophical anthropology and culture of the last two centuries. Its implementation presupposes, first of all, analysis of the forms of development and disclosure of the death motif by figurative and artistic means. _Theoretical basis__._ The author uses the well-founded tradition of interpreting the death (...) motif in philosophical literature of the last centuries, i.e. non-classical and modern philosophical thought. _Originality._ The present study is an attempt at systematization of the notions of death in Ukrainian poetry in Canada in the second half of the 20th century. It is based on the study of artistic texts and the worldview of Ukrainian emigrants. Appeal to the fiction of the Ukrainian Diaspora allows illustrating the originality of philosophical understanding of death in the context of the national culture. _Conclusions_. Reference to Ukrainian-Canadian poetry allows expanding the space of philosophical understanding of death in the form of figurative fiction. Concretizing the character of their interpretation of the motif of death, it is necessary to focus attention on its two basic forms of manifestation: existential, associated with living abroad, and sacrificial death for the benefit of the homeland. Thus, the motif of death occupies a significant place in the lyrics of representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. The concept of human death is closely connected with the concept of life, which is concretized through their meaningful comprehension. This is a matter of interpretation of despair and loneliness motifs, as well as the illumination of the images of a foreign land, which is one of the features of emigrant literature in general. (shrink)

The paper is a continuation of two previous papers , in which I have discussed the issues of extent and measurement. It gives an account of classical views of Brian Ellis and Karel Berka on the process of measurement. First it examines Ellis‘ terms such as arrangement, order, range, fundamental, associative and indirect measurements. Then it analyses Berka‘s terms such as quantity, quality, value, dimension and naming/labelling.

The article considers the process of identity constructing in modern culture. As a result of the case analysis, the author conceptualizes the modern identity construction strategy as an individualization of identity. The worldview foundations of this strategy are revealed. It is proposed to distinguish two paradigms of identity on the basis of the function of social representation: I-as-image and I-as-symbol. The author connects the tendency of individualization and delegitimation of social institutions in modern culture with the process of transition from (...) a symbolically oriented type of consciousness to a type of consciousness focused on figurative perception. (shrink)

Predvaritelʹnye zamechanii︠a︡ -- Konformizm, ili Spasenie zdesʹ i seĭchas -- Soprotivlenie, ili Risk -- Nasilie, ili Nakazannai︠a︡ smertʹ -- Gedonizm, ili Poisk utrachennoĭ realʹnosti -- Tradit︠s︡ii︠a︡, ili Prisposablivai︠u︡shcheesi︠a︡ soprotivlenie -- Bessoznatelʹnoe, ili Aksiologicheskai︠a︡ mashina mozga.

Chaos theory of the 1977 Nobel Prize laureate I. Prigogine allows to consider any religious system as a dissipative structure, the development of which corresponds to the leading characteristics of chaotic systems. It should be noted that dissipative structures are called systems whose activity creates chaos, which destroys the existing order and, at the same time, is the basis for the emergence of self-organization and higher-order order. Modern scientific studies have proved the universal nature of nonlinear systems, have shown that (...) isolated systems do not exist in the world at all - everything is interconnected. This fully applies to the development of religious systems. (shrink)

The emphasis that the modernity gives to disengagement and beginning leads one to think that the modernity itself is in fact a culture that initiares crisis. Even if there is no initial crisis, it can be created through the ambivalent nature of modernity. Behind the concept of crisis lies the notion that history is a continuous process or movement that opens the door to nihilistic understanding which stems from the idea of contemporary life and thought alienation through the pessimistic meaning (...) of the word. There is a dialectical relationship between the ideas of modernity and progress, and the decadence, and the main theme of Nietzsche's philosophical career. Since the death of Hegel, who made the idea of crisis plausible, everything is nothing but a counter-movement not only in Germany, but also in Europe. The first of these counter-movements is romanticism with its objection to the mind which is liberated from the bonds of tradition. The main thesis of the present article is, between reactiveness of romanticism -on the surface- and the modernity; from one side romanticism's consuming modernity, which is its mirror image, while at the same time feeding from it and modernity's manipulating the ideas developed against it and monopolizing them thanks to its ambivalent nature. For this purpose, following an an anti-enlightenment thinker Nietzsche's, anti-romantic footsteps which at the same time feeds from the romantic heritage, an attempt will be made to analyze the relationship between modernity and romanticism. Another goal of this article is to allow a comparison of how the intellectual development in the West finds its response on the modernization process of our country by probing how the modernization experience of early period Islamist's who experienced this process in a feeling of "backwardness" and with a wounded consciousness and anxiety has led to a shallow romantic worldview. SummaryRomance and romanticism are the main topics of this article. Romanticism is a period, whereas romance is a spiritual attitude not limited to this period, therefore, even today it’s existence is felt. In other words, it is not specific to the Germans. This term is often used to correspond to certain aspects of European intellectual life in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for instance between 1790 and 1850. In its extremely diverse definitions, the most "romantic" definition in our opinion, belongs to Novalis: “I'm romanticizing by giving a high meaning to ordinary things, a mysterious reputation to the ordinary, the honor of the unknown to the known, an infinite look to the finite.” The rejection of existing social reality, the experience of loss, the melancholic longing and the search for loss are the main components of the romantic motive. This study is based on the argument that there is a dialectical relation between romanticism and modernity, which is known as an opposing movement against enlightenment thought. The intellectual feature, which contains the opposite of modernity itself, makes this argument plausible. In addition, the view of modernity as a crisis culture due to the emphasis on disengament and beginnings offers us the possibility to establish a relationship between modernity, which accepts itself as decadence, and romance. Behind the concept of crisis lies the idea that history is a continuous process or movement opening the door to the nihilist understanding in which modern life and thought are alienated in a pessimistic sense. Thus, Allan Megill defines historicism as a prerequisite for nihilism. According to the author, Prophets of Extremity, if the history has no direction to be changed, maintained or lost when wandering in history, it also cannot have a "crisis". The suggestion of "God is dead" is the most concise expression of this crisis. In this crisis state of nihilism, it is a completely forlorn condition of living in the present. Today, which is in the absolute forlorn state; the savior declares his belief that he is devoid of all sorts of features, things that let us reconcile with the current situation of things. In the face of this situation, when people see that the present becomes completely forlorn, they move in two opposite directions with a desire to regenerate culturally: They either have to go back to the past or head for the future. However, every attempt to determine what the future or the past posess will require them to be real, belonging to the present. This will return us to the forlorn state. Nietzsche embraces both opposing sides, but does not attempts choose between them. This is the place where Nietzsche dictates that today is corrupt taking a radical attitude against romanticism fed by the notion of crisis. The fact that modernity has given up its critique of reason, which is revealed by its dialectic, had a great influence on Nietzsche's putting distance between himself and romantics. That is to say, in response to enlightened thought, although romantics speak of unity, apparently, they could not prevent emergence of emotion against mind, local against the universal, individual against social, in other words, the emergence of the second values, which they believed that these were belittled and despised by Enlightenment. Therefore, romantics seem like they could not save themselves from being caught in the web of dialectics in the account they entered that is based on the subject-object distinction in cartesian thought. It is because modernity acts with the consciousness that the life is established on the occurrence and decadence. Based on this, we can say that decadence is inevitable. This decadence (distortion) from the outside may be through movements developed against it, or experienced within itself (even if no one attempts to destroy it). Modernity, with the awareness that it cannot escape from the decadence, wants to arbitrate itself by turning this decadence in its favor by manipulating it. In other words, the modernity dramatizes the feeling of crisis considering itself decadence and the seemingly contradictory ideas of avant-garde and decadence become almost synonymous. It must be the reason why Nietzsche identifies modernity with decadence Modernity manages to put the decadence in its body at the center of attraction by producing self-opposing movements, monopolizing and manipulating. In short, both romanticism and avant-garde movements are the movements that are emerged not against modernity but from itself. Just like an apple worm, they both consume modernity and feed on it. They act as a mirror. Although they seem to criticize, as movements that have emerged from it, they allow the modernity to complete and correct the deficiencies. As a result of this, we can say that romantic critical movements are developed against the world and are shaped by modernity, beginning with the idea of enlightenment, and moved forward in the track of modernity.While romanticism developed in the West as opposed to modernity, in Ottoman-Turkish thought, it was seen as the rhetoric of retardation and regretting of backwardness from civilization. It is inevitable that the experience of modernization in a sense of backwardness, with a wounded consciousness and urgency, will open up space for romance. In our modernization adventure starting with Tanzimat, it is a fact that there has not been a drastic reckoning due to Enlightenment on an intellectual basis, industrialization on an economic basis, programs of revolutionary and nationalist formations on a political basis. Therefore, in Turkish thought, it is not possible to talk about a critical tradition developed against modern paradigm. The status of being audience to what was being experienced in Europe, resulting from superiority was transformed into grudge due to the defeats in the military field. Due to the decadence experienced in the present, inability to find the solution to the problems of its age, melancholic state of mind because of being stuck in the golden age experienced in the past, in the case of a preference, led to a romantic world view because of the appeal of its simplicity to imitate what was once lived in the past. Thus, it is very natural that the direction of Namık Kemal, the cult personality of Islamist-Turkish thought, is towards the past even when talking about progress and civilization. Seeing the 19th century Europe as a re-implementation of ideas and institutions that are actually Islamic, Namık Kemal, in our opinion, showed us a clear example of a typical Islamist romanticism and an example of occidentalist approach regarding that the West learned the civilization from Muslims. In fact, the exact equivalent of this approach displayed in Turkish cogito without even knowing that it is romantic, emerging in the personality of Namık Kemal and in the feeling of backwardness,with a hectic and injured consciousness, is kitschization. So much so that, the state of being kitsch also explains the current situation of Islamic geography which is far from creating a tradition for at least a century, and it clearly tells the usual romantic end. (shrink)