An essay review of David McPherson's book "The Virtues of Limits". After summarising the main claims, I suggest some points of contact with the Buddhist and Confucian traditions. I then argue that McPherson should draw out the pessimism latent in his discussion, and be more sympathetic to varieties of moral quietism.

Experimental philosophy of religion is the project of taking the tools and resources of the human sciences—especially psychology and cognitive science—and bringing them to bear on issues within philosophy of religion toward explicit philosophical ends. This paper introduces readers to experimental philosophy of religion. §1 explores the contours of experimental philosophy of religion by contrasting it with a few related fields: the psychology of religion and cognitive science of religion, on the one hand, and natural theology, on the other. §2 (...) offers a brief history of experimental philosophy of religion. The goal in this section is to highlight the ancient pedigree of this emerging area of research; as the contemporary experimental philosophy of religion literature expands and proliferates, it’s important to remember that this field has deep historical roots. Then, §3 focuses on the following questions: Why should we care about experimental philosophy of religion? And why is it needed? (shrink)

The objective of this article is to introduce the debate regarding how to organize the competing definitions of intellectual humility. Some of the main accounts will be presented, but the focus will be on the categorizations of these conceptions, i.e., the ways to organize them. Two categorizations will be examined: the epistemic categorization and the dispositional categorization. I will offer a detailed examination of both, clarifying their differences and highlighting their relevance to understanding intellectual humility. Furthermore, I will explore how (...) these categorizations relate to key topics in the ongoing debates surrounding the analyses. I will suggest four criteria for evaluating the categorizations and apply them to the discussion about how to categorize intellectual humility accounts, arguing that the epistemic categorization is superior to the dispositional categorization. In doing so, I also emphasize the relevance of these taxonomic matters to the first order philosophical debate concerning the definition of intellectual humility. (shrink)

This paper develops an interpretation of Hume’s accounts of the obligation and value of justice. According to my interpretation, Hume takes the obligation of justice to depend (in part) on the conventions that define the rules of justice realizing a distinctive form of value, which I call functional value. Properly understanding Hume’s accounts, I argue, requires revisionary understandings of his accounts of both the set of things susceptible to fundamental moral evaluation and his view of the nature of utility.

In this article I draw on existing theory in a project of synthesis and integration to develop a terminological, conceptual, and graphic model for understanding the scope of critical thinking. I begin by showing why the idea of critical scope matters. I then develop a model that maps the scope of critical thinking across individual, sociocultural, and existential domains, in conjunction with the ontological, epistemological, emotional, and political dimensions. Building on this, I outline the relationships between contexts, critical frameworks, and (...) metacritique as essential to understanding the scope of critical thinking. The model also includes a means for organising the attributes (character traits) of critical thinkers. This project provides resources to encourage and guide critical thinking at a more expansive scope in education, society, and daily life by helping people to understand the contours and potential confines of criticality. This has profound implications for education and society, helping to improve the rigour, reach, and diversity of critical thinking. This model is far from complete, and designed to invite ongoing engagement, including critique. It is intended as a rubric to prompt and inspire, not as a device to ‘measure’ or ‘assess’ critical thinking. Educationally, the intention is to provide resources for understanding, negotiating, and facilitating critical thinking at an expansive scope. (shrink)

Scientism has none of the virtues of science or philosophy, so let's do away with it.

Within the limited, but growing, literature on small business ethics almost no attention has been paid to the issue of social responsibility within ethnic minority businesses. Using a social capital perspective, this paper reports on an exploratory and qualitative investigation into the attitudinal and behavioural manifestations of CSR within small and medium-sized Asian owned or managed firms in the U.K., with particular reference to the distinctive factors motivating organisational responses. It offers alternative explanations of entrepreneurial behaviour and suggests areas for (...) further research. (shrink)

I advance arguments in favour of PKF as an articulation of a central sense of the predicate ‘true’, and show how it illuminates the relationship between that sense and the ‘external’ notion of truth found in such claims as ‘An utterance of the Liar Sentence does not say anything, and so is not true’.

Despite US policy documents which recommend that in areas of environmental risk, interaction between scientific experts and the public move beyond the so-called “Decide, Announce, and Defend model,” many current public involvement policies still do not guarantee meaningful public participation. In response to this problem, various attempts have been made to define what counts as sufficient or meaningful participation and free informed consent from those affected. Though defining “meaningfulness” is a complex task, this paper explores one under-examined dimension that concerns (...) the relationship between consent and the idea that citizens should be sufficiently informed: epistemic capacity. This paper will look at some of the work on meaningful participation and consent, give a definition of epistemic capacity, and argue that only a community with sufficient epistemic capacity can have the understanding and competence to give informed enough consent and thus participate meaningfully. (shrink)

This article seeks to address the question of humanity and animality through an elaboration of what will be called here the ‘nonhuman demand’. It aims to problematize the category of the ‘posthuman...

Charles Taylor is a philosopher concerned with morality and the nature of the identity of individuals and groups in the West. This book offers an evaluation of Taylor's conception of self, and its moral and political possibilities.

This paper maintains that at the heart of the post-Reformation debates over the extra Calvinisticum lies the question of what it means to name God’s presence in the world – that is, to say where God is. Because the Lutheran position insists that there can be no proper identification of God’s presence in the world that does not take its bearings from talk about Jesus’ presence, it serves as a means of preventing Christian God-talk from becoming detached from the flesh-and-blood (...) realities of human existence. In this way, the denial of the extra Calvinisticum is a corollary of a theology of the cross – that is, the principle that talk about God is normed by the concrete reality of Jesus. At the same time, the Lutheran genus maiestaticum is rejected as making just the sort of move to which Luther himself objected in the doctrine of transubstantiation: a metaphysical explanation of Jesus’ presence in the world rather than a simple appeal to miracle. (shrink)

Mainstream moral beliefs about war seem to be inconsistent with mainstream moral beliefs about self-defense such as the imminence requirement, the requirement to retreat, and restrictions on responses to conditional threats. The chapter argues that these apparent inconsistencies are actually the result of the necessity principle applied to environments with different nonmoral social facts. War takes place in the anarchy of international relations, where a lack of effective cosmopolitan security institutions makes it necessary to confront nonimminent threats, stand one’s ground, (...) and respond to conditional threats in order to defeat and deter aggression. Self-defense, on the other hand, usually occurs in societies with effective police. In such an environment, it is unnecessary for private citizens to take similar actions to defeat and deter aggression. This is a good reason to believe that mainstream moral beliefs about war are closer to the true morality of war than recent critics claim. (shrink)

Proposes a new theory of communication called "comparative media theory.".

This volume brings scholarly attention to the Midwest and to how broader concerns of environmental ethics manifest. Consisting of eight essays, a wide range of topics is covered, such as agrarian ethics and Stoicism, the Dakota access pipeline and Indigenous women's activism, philosophy of law and species classification, environmental justice and the Flint water crisis, hog farming and anti-microbial drug resistance, science education standards and climate change education, virtue ethics and ecological restoration, and environmental pragmatism and the Clear Water Act; (...) and more. Each accessibly written chapter brings multidisciplinary complexity to bear on this complex region. The authors include philosophers working in environmental ethics and other subfields of philosophy, and together with scholars in fields such as environmental sociology, American Indian studies, and environmental studies, they provide a fresh and necessary perspective on the American Midwest. (shrink)

We discuss delusions with religious components, suggesting that there are kinds of 'radical epistemic injustices' which involve conflicting metaphysical claims, specifically concerning the difficulties of interpreting religious testimonies within a naturalistic framework.

In treating human nature as a ‘moral entity’, imposed by God for reasons into which man could have no direct insight, Samuel Pufendorf reconfigured the architecture of natural law thought in a fundamental way. For this meant that rather than deducing norms from a nature in which they had been embedded by God and could be discerned by self-reflective reason, man had to derive them by observing the requirements of the exigent condition in which he happened to find himself; and (...) it further meant that such observation would be gathered via erudite citation of humanist authorities, rather than from philosophical reflection or introspection. As a result of this reconstruction, Pufendorfian natural law was opened to the normative structure of historically existing juridical-constitutional orders, for which it supplied both a propaedeutic and an abstract rationale. At the same time, however, theological and philosophical forms of natural law, based on normative moral anthropologies, continued unabated, this giving rise to a partitioning of the field into an introspective philosophy of law, and an observational legal humanism. (shrink)

I think it will be generally admitted that if Oxford philosophers have any claim to have added in recent years to the store of our philosophical ideas, it lies in their published works on the theory of conduct. I don’t think it can be claimed that, even in this sphere, they have given us many new and illuminating positive truths. After reading Mr. Ross, Professor Prichard, and Mr. Joseph, we are left, I think, with the impression that the whole subject (...) is much more intricate and puzzling than we should have thought possible. I intend in this paper to try and discover what is true in the theories of these three moralists on one of the most difficult and puzzling of ethical problems, viz., “What Renders a Right Act Right?” Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, in the main, stand together; it is regrettable that Professor Prichard's published work is so very meagre. And if in quoting from his article in Mind , 1912, on “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake,” I am doing him an injustice in attributing to him any views which he no longer holds, I am sorry; but modesty in publishing has its penalties, and anyhow, the article is too guilty an offender to get off free, for its annoying subtleties started the whole trouble, and led indirectly to Some Problems in Ethics and the Right and the Good. (shrink)

This paper, the first of two on science and technology in Modern China, sets out to estimate the success of China's technology strategy since 1949. It focuses on a clarification of such key terms as ‘appropriate technology’ and ‘alternative technology’. We argue that any statement about technology policy or its success involves an analysis of institutions as well as physical artifacts or production processes. A review of Chinese economic development in terms of technological phases suggests that recent changes designed to (...) improve the capacity of the Chinese technological system to absorb advanced technology from outside are not, in fact, a denial of the past, but are one measure of the reasonable success of past technological strategies. (shrink)

I develop a multilevel, holistic view of persons, emphasizing embodiment, emotions, consciousness, and the social self. In successive sections I draw from six sources: 1. Theology. The biblical understanding of the unitary, embodied, social self gave way in classical Christianity to a body‐soul dualism, but it has been recovered by many recent theologians. 2. Neuroscience. Research has shown the localization of mental functions in regions of the brain, the interaction of cognition and emotion, and the importance of social interaction in (...) evolutionary history and child development. 3. Artificial intelligence. Some forms of robotics use embodied systems that learn by interacting with their environment, but the possibilities for emotion, socialization, and consciousness in robots remain problematic. 4. Relations between levels. Concepts that can help us relate studies of neurons and persons include the hierarchy of levels, the communication of information, thebehavior of dynamic systems, and epistemological and ontological emergence. 5. Philosophy of mind. Two‐aspect theories of the mind‐brain relation offer an alternative between the extremes of eliminative materialism and the thesis that consciousness is irreducible. 6. Process philosophy. I suggest that process thought provides a coherent philosophical framework in which these themes can be brought together. It combines dipolar monism with organizational pluralism, and it emphasizes embodiment, emotions, a hierarchy oflevels, and the social character of selfhood. (shrink)

Nurse Ethicists bring a unique perspective to clinical ethics consultation. This perspective provides an appreciation of ethical tensions that will exist beyond the consult question into the moral space of patient care. These tensions exist even when an ethically preferable plan of action is identified. Ethically appropriate courses of action can still lead to moral dilemmas for others. The nurse ethicist provides a lens well suited to identify and respond to these dilemmas. The nurse–patient relationship is the ethical foundation of (...) nursing practice and this relational ontology is well suited to addressing ethical dilemmas that exist prior to and beyond the initial consult question. This paper will describe one nurse ethicist’s phronetic and pragmatic approach to a clinical ethics consult elucidated through feminist ethics and systems thinking. This paper will describe the theoretical basis for this method, present a case, and describe how this consultation approach provides a rich analysis based around relationships and responsibilities that also highlights the important ethical tensions within the social structure that exists around the patient and continue after the consult question is answered. (shrink)