Recent models in quantum cosmology make use of the concept of imaginary time. These models all conjecture a join between regions of imaginary time and regions of real time. We examine the model of James Hartle and Stephen Hawking to argue that the various no-boundary attempts to interpret the transition from imaginary to real time in a logically consistent and physically significant way all fail. We believe this conclusion also applies to quantum tunneling (...) models, such as that proposed by Alexander Vilenkin. We conclude, therefore, that the notion of emerging from imaginary time is incoherent. A consequence of this conclusion seems to be that the whole class of cosmological models appealing to imaginary time is thereby refuted. (shrink)

Après avoir donné une idée générale du processus d’individuation chez Husserl, l’étude analyse minutieusement la manière dont la temporalité propre aux actes de la perception interne et externe, du ressouvenir et de la phantasia constitue, d’après les Manuscrits de Bernau, l’individualité de l’objet intentionnel. Une attention toute particulière est accordée à ce qui distingue les objets fictifs des objets idéaux et qui permet de leur attribuer une forme spécifique d’individuation . L’étude apporte également des éclaircissements en ce qui concerne la (...) phénoménologie transcendantale dans son rapport à l’ontologie. (shrink)

Imaginary worlds are extremely successful. The most popular fictions produced in the last few decades contain such a fictional world. They can be found in all fictional media, from novels (e.g., Lord of The Rings and Harry Potter) to films (e.g., Star Wars and Avatar), video games (e.g., The Legend of Zelda and Final Fantasy), graphic novels (e.g., One Piece and Naruto), and TV series (e.g., Star Trek and Game of Thrones), and they date as far back as ancient (...) literature (e.g., the Cyclops Islands in The Odyssey, 850 BCE). Why such a success? Why so much attention devoted to non-existent worlds? In this paper, we propose that imaginary worlds co-opt our preferences for exploration, which have evolved in humans and nonhuman animals alike, to propel individuals toward new environments and new sources of reward. Humans would find imaginary worlds very attractive for the very same reasons, and under the same circumstances, as they are lured by unfamiliar environments in real life. After reviewing research on exploratory preferences in behavioral ecology, environmental esthetics, neuroscience, and evolutionary and developmental psychology, we focus on the sources of their variability across time and space, which we argue can account for the variability of the cultural preference for imaginary worlds. This hypothesis can, therefore, explain the way imaginary worlds evolved culturally, their shape and content, their recent striking success, and their distribution across time and populations. (shrink)

The imaginary has been inseparable, since prehistoric times, from technical artefacs, their forms, functions and uses. Gilbert Durand’s typologies can help to understand better the different technologies, their success, their effects, etc. Can we not go further by looking in the imaginary for one of the keys to technological innovation today which would allow an anthropological renovation of theoretical tools?

A general relation between entropy and an evolutionary superoperator is derived based on the theory of the real-time formulation. The formulation establishing the relation relies only on the framework of quantum statistical mechanics and the standard definition of the von Neumann entropy. Applying the theory of the imaginary-time formulation, a similar relation is obtained for the entropy change due to the change in reservoir temperatures. To show the usefulness of these formulas, we derived the expression for the (...) entropy production induced by some dissipation in an open quantum system as the exemplary model system. (shrink)

We received several commentaries both challenging and supporting our hypothesis. We thank the commentators for their thoughtful contributions, bringing together alternative hypotheses, complementary explanations, and appropriate corrections to our model. Here, we explain further our hypothesis, using more explicitly the framework of evolutionary social sciences. We first explain what we believe is the ultimate function of fiction in general (i.e., entertainment) and how this hypothesis differs from other evolutionary hypotheses put forward by several commentators. We then turn to the proximate (...) features that make imaginary worlds entertaining and, therefore, culturally successful. We finally explore how these insights may explain the distribution of imaginary worlds across time, space, age, and social classes. (shrink)

This edited collection addresses the problem of how the creation of novel spaces of governance relates to imaginaries of connectivity in time.

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Ioan Petru Culianu has written a book about the emergence of modern science and religious behavior starting from the Aristotelian concept of phantasia. An essential premise for discussing problems of modern cultural and religious importance is the proper understanding of memory and philosophical grounds for such concepts as memory and (...) recollection. Aristotelianism has been repeatedly mentioned as a main source of memory concepts, along with Plato, later Roman tradition and then mediaeval reconsiderations of Aristotelian texts. In my study I am following in parallel both Aristotle’s theory of memory and imagination and modern theories concerning Aristotelian epistemology and build arguments for the thesis that modern theories concerning the importance of induction in Aristotle’s epistemology miss an important link, namely, the key function of memory techniques for understanding the whole of Aristotle’s theory of knowledge. Memory is the domain of technique or art ( techne ) but not the grounding site for science. Truth and false are not an issue for Aristotle’s theory of knowledge because sensibility and theoretical intellect cannot be false. Memory, imagination and recollection as functions of an intermediary link are the most fluid and uncontrollable parts of the cognitive psyche, as they function as necessary bridges from corporeal sensitive knowledge to intellectual formal understanding. Memory is still corporeal as a function but delivers images for the intellectual activity. The whole process of knowledge depends on such a fluid and non rigorous function. Aristotle suggests natural memory can be pointed as the very cause for imperfection of knowledge. Human being is thus an insolvable epistemic duality since science needs memory but memory itself is rather the object of custom, art and technique. Science and religion have, according to such Aristotelian premise, a necessary common imaginary. (shrink)

Existe-t-il véritablement, du point de vue cognitif et épistémologique, une distance insurmontable entre grandes et petites mythologies, entre les récits fondateurs sur lesquels reposent nos références culturelles et littéraires et toutes ces métaphores qui façonnent et orientent en profondeur nos expressions langagières et les objets qui nous entourent et qui, elles aussi, racontent une histoire? Si aucune société ne peut vivre sans mythes, nul ne saurait vivre ni signifier sans métaphore. Et si Œdipe ou Philoctète sont des signifiants lourds de (...) sens capables de générer une pléiade de configurations poétiques sans cesse renouvelées, Levi’s, Coca-Cola ou Apple ne sont pas moins, bien qu’à une dimension et à un degré différent, des noms qui se sont progressivement érigés au statut de mythes contemporains grâce à une habile stratégie où image et récit fondateur se renforcent et se légitiment réciproquement. En tant que force qui harmonise l’ordre et le désordre, le chaos et le cosmos, la symétrie et la dissymétrie, la Loi et la dimension de la fête et du jeu, Apollon et Dionysos, la vie intérieure et l’expérience du monde ; bref, en tant que principe médiateur et réunificateur de l’univers, de la forme et du sens, la métaphore est ainsi l’un des noms possibles de l’imaginaire. L’autre nom, c’est évidemment l’Amour. En effet, du Moyen Âge à l’époque contemporaine, l’amour, en tant que construction à partir d’une image-écran médiatrice, est toujours une quête du sens, un acte de signification, c’est-à-dire un processus dynamique mettant en relation les éléments disjoints du monde et de notre expérience. From a cognitive and epistemological perspective, does an insurmountable distance really exist between big and small mythologies, between founding narratives on which our cultural and literary references are based, all of the metaphors that fashion and orient the depth of our linguistic expression, and the objects that surround us, which, in their own way, tell a story? A society cannot live without myths; nor would one know how to live or to signify without metaphors. If Oedipus or Philoctetus are heavily loaded with meaning and capable of generating a constellation of constantly renewing poetic configurations, Levi’s, Coca-Cola or Apple do no less. Despite being at a different dimension and degree, these names have been progressively built up to the status of contemporary myths by way of a clever strategy in which image and founding story provide reciprocal reinforcement and legitimization. As a harmonizing force of order and disorder, of chaos and cosmos, of symmetry and asymmetry, of the Law and the dimension of party and play, of Apollo and Dionysus, of interior life and the experience of the world, in short, as a mediating and reunifying principle of the universe, of form, and of meaning, metaphor is one possible name for the imaginary. Its other name is, obviously, Love. In fact, from the Middle Ages to contemporary times, love, as a construction growing forth from a mediating image-screen, has always been a quest for meaning, an act of signification, a dynamic process connecting the fractal elements of our world and of our experience. (shrink)

Some imaginary cases lead us to surprising conclusions. Unfortunately, there exists the danger of being so distracted by these conclusions that the imaginary cases themselves escape critical examination. Using the now famous ticking time-bomb scenario as an example, I propose a simple methodology to help us better understand what role a given imaginary case should be playing in ethical discourse. In particular, I hope to show why the ticking time-bomb scenario fails to have any probative (...) value as a counter-example to anti-torture policies. Despite this, I argue that there is still an important role for cases like the ticking time-bomb scenario, as they can motivate study about some of our intuitive moral commitments. This in turn may lead us to a better understanding of what moves us to surprising ethical evaluations in the first place. (shrink)

As technologies of ocean exploitation emerged during the late 1960s, science policy and diplomacy were formed in response to anticipated capabilities that did not match the realities of extracting deep-sea minerals and of resource exploitation in the deep ocean at the time. Promoters of ocean exploitation in the late 1960s envisaged wonders such as rare mineral extraction and the stationing of divers in underwater habitats from which they would operate seabed machinery not connected to the turbulent surface waters. Their (...) promises coincided with others' fears that nuclear weaponry would be placed on the seabed. Those who lacked the technological capability to extract minerals from the seabed also had concerns that other nations would exploit their resources. Scientific imaginaries caused uncertainty in the international community—especially in the “Global South.” The UN called the “Law of the Sea” conferences to mediate emerging geopolitical tensions caused by these imaginaries of exploitation of ocean resources. These conferences became a site where lawmakers projected futures rather than merely responding to past or present dilemmas. Diplomats' negotiations, with their basis in anticipation of the future uses of science and technology, reveal the role of scientific imaginaries within complex negotiations. Here, we see the impact of the distinction (or blurring) of the real and the imagined on the balance of relations between Global North and South increasing global imbalances of resources and power. This article's analysis of such scientific diplomacy provides a valuable example of the power of scientific imaginaries to have a global impact. (shrink)

Technology tends toward perpetual innovation. Technology, enabled by both political and economic structures, propels society forward in a kind of technological evolution. The moment a novel piece of technology is in place, immediately innovations are attempted in a process of unending betterment. Bernard Stiegler suggests that, contra Heidegger, it is not being-toward-death that shapes human perception of time, life, death, and meaning. Rather, it is technological innovation that shapes human perception of time, life, death, and meaning. In fact, (...) for Stiegler, human evolution has always been part of technological evolution. While one can quibble with the notion of human-technology co-evolution, there is something to be said for the way in which human perception of time, of ageing, and of death seems to be judged against the horizon of perpetual evolution of technological innovation. In this technological imaginary, of which modern medicine is constituent, ageing and death seemingly may be infinitely deferred, and it is this innovating deferral that shapes the contemporary social imaginary around ageing and death in modern medicine. Yet, the reality of living (which is to say ageing) and dying always manifests itself differently than the scripts given to us by the technological imaginary with its myth of endless innovation. In fact, I shall argue that, where the Church created an ars moriendi, the technological imaginary gives us an ars ad mortem when it becomes clear that ageing and death cannot be infinitely deferred. And further, I shall argue that the Church must revivify its ars vivendi—that is to say, its liturgies, its arts, its technics—as a counter narrative to the myth of perpetual innovation that shapes the technological imaginary. (shrink)

Literature for children is often designed to stimulate imagination through variants of the “real” world that we inhabit, expanding their potential for construing different possible worlds – variants that include imaginary characters like animals with human traits or toys that are somehow animated and conscious. Here we will examine one version of Margery William’s classic nursery tale The Velveteen Rabbit, or How Toys Become Real, where the theme of “real” and imaginary characters and worlds is construed both linguistically (...) and pictorially. We will show how the theme is construed in both text and image, and how the two complement one another, together keeping the two worlds apart while at the same time representing the Velveteen Rabbit’s transformation from toy rabbit to real rabbit. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the issue of truth-telling in non-fictional narratives of (in)justice. Based on examples of rape narratives, domestic abuse narratives, human trafficking narratives and asylum seeker narratives, I examine the various difficulties in telling the truth in such stories, particularly those related to various culturally conditioned ideas of how the world works, which at the same time form the basis of, among other things, legal discourse and officials’ decision-making processes. I will also demonstrate that such culturally conditioned (...) ideas, which are the basis of official discourse, can be considered within the category of both the social imaginary of the just world in the Taylorian sense of the term, and the social master narrative, which in the case of stories of (in)justice is often based on the just world hypothesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Imaginary Interview*Jillian WeiseQ:Are you disabled?A:It depends. I need context.Q:Are you rendered incapable?A:I am awake and sober.Q:Are you limited by parts of the body?A:My arms are not wings.Q:Are you entitled to certain rights?A:Yes, I am disabled.Q:The U.S. Government disagrees.A:You read the letter?Q:“Due to the subject’s advanced education, the subject is no longer disabled.”1A:It was a love letter. They could have written it better. I would’ve preferred something with a (...) little more feeling, such as: “Dear Jillian: We are breaking up. We saw you outside the building with the statue of the lion. We saw you trespass through the halls and take from the shelves a number of hardbacks and take from the woman with glasses her suggestions. You have been made too erudite, too learned. If you want to protest, if you want to continue our relationship, then un–educate yourself. It would be helpful if you worked at a factory or could not find work. It would be helpful for something inside you to hurt.”Q:You seem bothered by the letter from the government.A:No more bothered, I guess, than if the government sent a letter rescinding my name.Q:The name disability is important to you then?A:It is important. It is very, very important. No, it is not important. I hardly think of it. It vexes me and I need it and I should not say it that often. Today, for example, I said: You must not use the word disability too much in this interview. After all, you do not like the word, and you have named yourself cyborg, so there is no reason to use the word you already rejected. After that thought came the voice of the Director, who said, “When you use the word disability, people think accommodations, people think favors. Best not to use it.” And after that came the voice of a writing mentor: “I just don’t like the word disabled in this piece. Is there a way to write the piece without using the word?”Q:What is disability like?A:It is like crowding under an umbrella, except your head sticks out, and your hair gets wet, and there are no cabs. Plus, this is somebody else’s umbrella.Q:Respond to this symbol.A:That is where I park my car.Q:What do you have?A:I do not know. The doctors named the condition. They gave it a three–word, nine syllable Latin name. Now I go to other doctors and they say, “What do you have?” and I say the Latin name, and they say, “What?” and I repeat the name, and they say, “How do you spell it?” Also—and I think this is important—the prognosis for the condition reads, “No reported cases have survived past the age of two.” Therefore, I am either dead with the condition. Or I am alive with a different one. Or the medical dictionary is fiction.Q:What is the condition?A:I am a cyborg.Q:When did you begin calling yourself a cyborg?A:Rephrase the question. [End Page 219]Q:When did you become a cyborg?A:2007.Q:Where?A:I cannot say the name of the office. The prosthetist posted a photo of me online, and in the photo I am not wearing any pants. I am wearing the cyborg leg for the first time and without any pants. I am so embarrassed. I do not want you to find the photo online. This is before we knew each other. This is before we knew what we meant to each other.Q:I have to tell you: when I first saw you, I thought, “She looks like a woman who could be taken advantage of online.”A:Yes, that is the problem with having it physical. When it is physical, people make all kinds of assumptions. She needs help. She is lop–sided. She must be so, so sad. I thought of another definition: looked at, done to, and dissed... (shrink)

This article contrasts the notion of a Deleuzian imaginary with that articulated by various film theorists during the 1970s and 1980s. Deleuze offers us, I argue, a way to conceive of the imaginary in the cinema in a positive way; that is, as something which opens up new expressions of the real. By contrast, for film theorists of the 1970s and 1980s, the imaginary was primarily conceived as a negative concept, as something which offered merely escapes or (...) fraudulent distortions of the real. A Deleuzian imaginary for the cinema can be articulated, I argue, by way of the films of Jean Renoir. (shrink)

In the past few years, several democratic governments have published their National AI Strategies (NASs). These documents outline how AI technology should be implemented in the public sector and explain the policies that will ensure the ethical use of personal data. In this article, I examine these documents as political texts and reconstruct the political imaginary that underlies them. I argue that these documents intervene in contemporary democratic politics by suggesting that AI can help democracies overcome some of the (...) challenges they are facing. To achieve this, NASs use different kinds of imaginaries—democratic, sociotechnical and data—that help citizens envision how a future AI democracy might look like. As part of this collective effort, a new kind of relationship between citizens and governments is formed. Citizens are seen as autonomous data subjects, but at the same time, they are expected to share their personal data for the common good. As a result, I argue, a new kind of political imaginary is developed in these documents. One that maintains a human-centric approach while championing a vision of collective sovereignty over data. This kind of political imaginary can become useful in understanding the roles of citizens and governments in this technological age. (shrink)

To understand Lacan’s thinking process on vision, the entirety of his teaching must be taken into consideration. Until the 60s, the visual field is the imaginary, the constitutive principle of reality in its phenomenal giving to the experience of a subject. This register is the opposite of the field of the word with the L schema and, subsequently, as subordinated to the symbolic system according to the model of the optical schema of the inverted flower vase of Bouasse. It (...) is only with the 1964 seminar that Lacan makes a daring turnaround through which the visual becomes a sign of the emergence of a real that is irreducible to both reality and the mediation of the subject of knowledge. The split that separates reality and the real is reproduced in Lacan within the visual field, which is, on the one hand, the cardinal principle of the consistency of the experience of reality, and on the other, it is an element of irreducibility to reality. This produces a cascade of consequences: first of all, the modification of the presentation of the mirror stage. Unlike the voice, which through prosody, tone, and volume, finds some strips with which anchor itself imaginatively to reality, the gaze, invisible and elusive, escapes the imaginary grasp. Captured in myths, it reveals its power and ability to annihilate—as in the myth of Medusa’s gaze—or to make people fall in love but only with a narcissistic love that leads inexorably to death as in the myth of Narcissus. The gaze is elusive because the subject is dependent on it in the field of desire. Like the voice, it is about the desire on which the subject is supported; it is one of the objects on which the phantom depends. In our opinion, thanks to this characteristic, the gaze object can make remote psychoanalytic treatment possible through easily accessible videoconferencing tools and, at the same time, create new conditions within it that should be carefully evaluated to understand its implications in the session itself. (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo se desarrolla una aproximación epistemológica a las significaciones sociales, comprendidas como una entidad central que urde la composición simbólica de la realidad. Para ello, se despliega un trabajo teórico y reflexivo con el objetivo de esclarecer las tres significaciones sociales que aquí se establecen: imaginarios sociales, representaciones sociales y re-presentaciones discursivas. Al mismo tiempo, se procura presentar una taxonomía en planos de significación, correspondiente a las particularidades y ámbitos de acción de los imaginarios sociales (plano profundo), (...) representaciones sociales (plano medio de transición) y re-presentaciones discursivas (plano superficial). Este trabajo epistémico, que aporta en la clarificación conceptual de las tres nociones tratadas, ofrece un sustento teórico para futuras investigaciones y una nueva forma de abordar las significaciones sociales. Abstract In this work, an epistemological approach to social meanings is developed, understood as a central entity that weaves the symbolic composition of reality. To do this, a theoretical and reflective work is deployed with the aim of clarifying the three social meanings established here: social imaginaries, social representations, and discursive re-presentations. At the same time, it seeks to present a taxonomy in planes of meaning, corresponding to the particularities and fields of action of social imaginaries (deep plane), social representations (middle plane of transition) and discursive re-presentations (superficial plane). This epistemic work, which contributes to the conceptual clarification of the three notions discussed, offers theoretical support for future research and a new way of approaching social meanings. (shrink)

Models such as the simple pendulum, isolated populations, and perfectly rational agents, play a central role in theorising. It is now widely acknowledged that a study of scientific representation should focus on the role of such imaginary entities in scientists’ reasoning. However, the question is most of the time cast as follows: How can fictional or abstract entities represent the phenomena? In this paper, I show that this question is not well posed. First, I clarify the notion of (...) representation, and I emphasise the importance of what I call the “format” of a representation for the inferences agents can draw from it. Then, I show that the very same model can be presented under different formats, which do not enable scientists to perform the same inferences. Assuming that the main function of a representation is to allow one to draw predictions and explanations of the phenomena by reasoning with it, I conclude that imaginary models in abstracto are not used as representations: scientists always reason with formatted representations. Therefore, the problem of scientific representation does not lie in the relationship of imaginary entities with real systems. One should rather focus on the variety of the formats that are used in scientific practice. (shrink)

This paper examines Castoriadis’ concept of time as ontological creation in relation to the activation of the project of autonomy. We argue that since Castoriadis presents as a practitioner of the creation of time as radical autonomous thinking, this is the standpoint from which to assess his claims. Through an examination of Castoriadis’ claim that the practice of autonomy depends upon it being activated by a willing singularity who accepts the Chaos of society and of the world, we (...) argue that Castoriadis’ position presupposes an effective contrast between the autonomy of significance that he advocates and the heteronomy of insignificance that he laments. If, as we suggest, both these orientations accept the Groundlessness of the world, then Castoriadis’ appeal to the awareness of a willing singularity is not sufficient to distinguish the practice of radical autonomy. To this extent, his elucidation of the radical imaginary time of ontological creation remains incomplete. (shrink)

The modern constitution is predominantly understood as a way of instituting and limiting power, and is expected to contribute to (societal) stability, certainty, and order. Constitutions are hence of clear sociological interest, but until recently they have received little sociological attention. I argue that this is unfortunate, as a sociological approach has much to offer in terms of a complex and historically sensitive understanding of constitutions and constitutionalism. Constitutional sociology has particular relevance in contemporary times, in which the meaning of (...) constitutions and constitutionalism is uncertain, and subject to contestation, and possible transformation. The constitutional sociology developed here is phenomenologically inspired and stresses the importance of understandings of the modern constitution as ‘embedded’ in constitutional imaginaries. Rather than as a visible and rationally designed construct, constitutional sociology understands constitutionalism as ultimately a ‘field of knowledge’. The suggestion is that this field of knowledge or ‘modern constitutional horizon’ is characterized by a tension between two ultimate markers, in terms of what Castoriadis has identified as the social imaginary significations of mastery and autonomy. Mastery and autonomy form prominent constitutional orientations, historically taking the form of solidified, instituted meanings, identified here as the modernist and the democratic imaginaries. In the last section, the two instituted constitutional imaginaries will be ‘unpacked’ in specific components (state sovereignty, absoluteness, fabrication, endurance, and distrust regarding the modernist imaginary; indeterminacy, creativity, dynamism, self-government and popular sovereignty regarding the democratic one). In conclusion, I suggest that constitutional sociology might significantly help elucidating the potential losses and heteronomous tendencies that may result from the contemporary uncertainty and possible metamorphosis that affects the modern constitution. (shrink)

This paper examines Castoriadis’ concept of time as ontological creation in relation to the activation of the project of autonomy. We argue that since Castoriadis presents as a practitioner of the creation of time as radical autonomous thinking, this is the standpoint from which to assess his claims. Through an examination of Castoriadis’ claim that the practice of autonomy depends upon it being activated by a willing singularity who accepts the Chaos of society and of the world, we (...) argue that Castoriadis’ position presupposes an effective contrast between the autonomy of significance that he advocates and the heteronomy of insignificance that he laments. If, as we suggest, both these orientations accept the Groundlessness of the world, then Castoriadis’ appeal to the awareness of a willing singularity is not sufficient to distinguish the practice of radical autonomy. To this extent, his elucidation of the radical imaginary time of ontological creation remains incomplete. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It is commonly argued that Kierkegaard’s famous observation that life can be understood backward, but must be lived forward excludes the possibility of intellectual preparation to life. This article suggests the view that, while it is not the case that Kierkegaard has an elaborate vision of thinking about the possibilities of life one faces, he engages the notion of imaginary construction [experimentere] to propose existential prototypes for mental exploration that prepare us for life lived forward. It is concluded (...) that the person capable of imaginary construction has to be able to be firmly in control of the possibilities she faces. In Kierkegaard’s view, such a control requires the grasp of the opposite temporal directions – to be both looking at one’s past and future. Kierkegaard’s employment of such a double temporal vision of existence is modelled on Janus Bifrons, the two-faced god who is effectively able to simultaneously look both backward into the past and forward into the future. (shrink)

This article provides a sociological explanation for urban “greening,” the normative practice of using everyday signifiers of nature to fix problems with urbanism. Although greening is commonly understood as a reaction against the pathologies of the industrial metropolis, such explanations cannot account for greening’s recurrence across varied social and historical contexts. Through a study of greening in Germany’s Ruhr region, a polycentric urban region that has repeatedly greened in the absence of a traditional city, I argue that greening is made (...) possible by a social imaginary of nature as an indirect or moral good, which I call urbanized nature, that is an outcome of, and subsequently becomes a variable in, urbanization. I draw on processual accounts of urbanization and the sociology of morality to explain urbanized nature’s emergence in the Ruhr at the beginning of the twentieth century, and its use to fulfill two competing visions of urban democracy in the postwar period. I find that rather than an ideological reaction against cities, greening is an aspirational practice that can be mobilized by a range of actors in a variety of places and times. By showing how a new social imaginary made new forms of moral action possible and how those ideals were then materialized in urban space, this article draws attention to the role of cultural imaginaries in urban change and to the material consequences of moral beliefs. (shrink)

Topology is integral to a shift in socio-cultural theory from a linguistic to a mathematical paradigm. This has enabled in Badiou and Žižek a critique of the symbolic register, understood in terms of pure conceptual abstraction. Drawing on topology, this article understands it instead in terms of the figure. The break with the symbolic and language necessitates a break with form, but topologically still preserves a logic of the figure. This becomes a process of figuration, indeed a process of `deformation'. (...) Badiou/Žižek will then presume a break with the symbolic for `the real'. But topology entails the centrality of not the real but the imaginary. With Castoriadis, this imaginary is understood as productive and social, and with Sloterdijk as spatial. In our times this is a self-organizing socio-technical imaginary. For Niklas Luhmann these socio-technical systems engage in coupling. They structurally couple with other social imaginaries. Their self-organization, going beyond pure functionality, operates through semantic excess: an excess that organizes the system and is their structure. Such structural coupling entails semantic exchange, consisting of not just information but also of images. (shrink)

This study conducted in-depth interviews with 20 students from a university in Wuhan so as to obtain data regarding their collective memory at the early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak and their social imaginaries in the longitudinal dimension of time. Compared with those in other regions, interviewees from Wuhan show more fear and dissatisfaction and think that others find it difficult to empathize with their first-hand experiences. Interviewees from Wuhan are more dependent on the media. However, media use can (...) cause problems related to redundant information and emotional impact. While one is confined to home, he/she is forced to participate in communication with family members and the topic of the body is discussed again from a new angle. Trauma leads to self-reconciliation, as facilitated by the re-examination of and reflection on one’ nomination of and reflection on n family members and the months in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak. However, having received a collectivist education since childhood and having been guided by the discourse system created by the state media, they have since been able to shape their sense of identity and strengthen their sense of national honor. (shrink)

This chapter discusses imaginary technologies that do not exist yet but are expected to be implemented in clinical work in the near future. Adopting a phenomenological view on the politics of organizational time, we illuminate how the rhetoric of futurity and protentional anticipation dominate managerial acts in healthcare organizations. This future-oriented management includes strategies of risk assessment, investments in emerging technologies, and other actions to reduce external uncertainty and move towards an enhanced capacity to cope with potential challenges. (...) However, we suggest that potentially harmful consequences of emerging technologies cannot be established reliably in advance by investigation, experiments, and risk assessments. The phenomenological notion of embodied information infrastructure allows us to consider how visions of complex technologies intertwine with clinical practices in healthcare professionals’ work. We use two examples of imaginary technologies—automated decision-making systems and care robotics—to concretize how the line between imaginary technologies and existing technologies becomes increasingly volatile in healthcare organizations. (shrink)

Young children learn to make sense of the world through mimetic processes. These processes are focused to begin with on their parents, brothers and sisters and people they know well. Young children want to become like these persons. They are driven by the desire to become like them, which will mean that they belong and are part of them and their world. Young children, and indeed humans in general are social beings. They, more than all non-human primates, are social beings (...) who cannot survive without the Other. In mimetic processes the outside world becomes the inner world and the inner world becomes the outside world. The imaginary is developed and the imaginary develops ways of relating to the outside world. In a mimetic loop, this in turn affects the inner world of the imaginary. These processes are sensory and governed by desire. All the senses are involved which means that the imaginary has multiple layers. Since there is an intermingling of images, emotions and language, these processes are rooted in the body and at the same time transcend the body as they become part of the imaginary. Human beings create images of themselves in all cultures and historical periods. They need these images to understand themselves and their relationship to other human beings and to develop social relations and communities. Images of the human being are designs and projections of the human being and his or her relationship to other people and to the world. They are formed to visualize representations of individuals or aspects of them. They arise when we communicate about ourselves. They support us to live with diversities and to develop similarities and feelings of belonging with other people. They are the result of complex anthropological processes, in which social and cultural power structures play an important role. (shrink)

Imagining is something we use everyday in our lives and in a wide variety of ways. In spite of the amount of works devoted to its study from both psychology and philosophy, there are only a few formal systems capable of modelling it; besides, almost all of those systems are static, in the sense that their models are initially predefined, and they fail to capture the dynamic process behind the creation of new imaginary scenarios. In this work, we review (...) some influential theories of imagination and use their insights to distil an algorithm describing such process. Then, we use this algorithm to define a dynamic logical system built upon on a single-agent epistemic logic that provides the necessary tools to capture how the agent voluntarily creates new imaginary worlds; in other words, our system allows the model to be expanded dynamically at any time as a result of the agent performing an act of imagination. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatization and prove that the system is sound and complete. (shrink)

In recent years, Richard Kearney has emerged as a leading figure in the field of continental philosophy, widely recognized for his work in the areas of philosophical and religious hermeneutics, theory and practice of the imagination, and political thought. This much-anticipated--and long overdue--study is the first to reflect the full range and impact of Kearney's extensive contributions to contemporary philosophy. The book opens with Kearney's own "prelude" in which he traces his intellectual itinerary as it traverses the three imaginaries explored (...) in the volume: the dialogical, the political, and the narrative. The interviews that follow the first section allow readers to listen in on conversations between Kearney and some of the most interesting and respected thinkers of our time--Noam Chomsky, Charles Taylor, Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricouer, and Martha Nussbaum--as they reveal new and unexpected aspects of their thought on stories and mourning, ethics and narrative, terror and religion, intellectuals and ideology. The next section, on the political imaginary, looks at Kearney's distinctive contribution to the political situation in Ireland and in Europe more generally; and in the last, on narrative, writers including David Wood, Terry Eagleton, and Mark Dooley focus on Kearney's novels as instances of narrative theory put into literary practice. Concluding with Kearney's postscript, an essay on "Traversals and Epiphanies in Joyce and Proust," the volume comes full circle, encompassing the full extent of Richard Kearney's engagement and offerings as a philosopher. (shrink)

Introduction 11 PART I: THE HALLE YEARS Chapter One: The Rehabilitation of the Imagination in Husserl’s Early Thought. 17 §1. Brentano’s Rehabilitation of Intentionality and the Problem of Imagination. §2. Husserl and the Breakthrough of Phenomenology. §2.1 The Meaning-Bestowing Act as ‘the Peg from which Everything hangs.’ §2.2 Consciousness is not a Container. §2.3 ‘A Difference that cannot be Phenomenologically Reduced.’ §3. Imagination as an Authentic, Intuitive Intentionality. PART II: THE GÖTTINGEN YEARS Chapter Two: Irreconcilable Differences: Imagination and Image Consciousness. (...) 71 §1. Separations, Convergences, and Goodbyes §2. A nothing in the midst of things that sees me. §3. Wrestling with the angel of Imagination. §4. Images of Productive Phantasy. Chapter Three: The Garden of the Forking Paths: On Time Consciousness. 107 §1. Picking up an Ancient Cross. §2. Continuum of Continua. §3. In Search of Time Lost. Chapter Four: Absence and the Absolute: The Revisions of Phantasy and Time-Consciousness. 143 Recapitulation: Cutting loose the baggage of the ‘Content for an Apprehension and Apprehension’ Schema. §1. The Concept of an Absolute Consciousness and the Embedment of Contents. §2. Transcendental Phenomenology and the Opening Up of a Closed Field. §3. The Breakthrough on the Contents of Consciousness. §3.1. ‘Consciousness through and through’ §3.2. Ambiguities of Immanence. §4. Primary and Secondary Memory revisited. §5. The New Account of Internal Time Consciousness. Chapter Five: The Breakthrough of the Life of Phantasy: Recollection and Pure Phantasy. 187 §1. Introducing the Pure Ego. §2. The Pending Problem of Belief in Presentifications. §3. Recollection and Internal Time Consciousness. §3.1. The Characterization of Recollection as Consciousness ‘Once Again’ following the Revision of the Schema. §3.2. Recollection as a Modified Appearance and a Directedness toward the Past Object. §3.3. Recollection as the Reproductive Modification of the Internal Consciousness of a Past Act. §4. The Differentiation of Recollection and Pure Phantasy on the basis of Internal Time-Consciousness. PART III: THE FREIBURG YEARS AND BEYOND Chapter Six: The Subject in Image: Husserl’s Revisiting of Image-Consciousness. 239 §1. Introducing the Concept of Perceptual Phantasy. §2. The Subject in Image. §3. Is There Temporality in Image?. §4. Revisiting the Theory of Image-consciousness as Depiction. §5. Pictoriality and Phantasy Temporality. Chapter Seven: ‘Myth that is Truest Memory:’ Phantasy and the Literary Work of Art. 303 §1. Theater and Drama. §2. Is the Literary Work of Art Itself Imaginary? §3. The Literary Work as an Idea with a Temporality. §4. Phantasy and the Consciousness of Possibility. Parting Words on Poetry and Philosophy. Bibliography: 361. (shrink)

The paper examines the structure and dynamics of the political imaginary of the two countries of post-Soviet Central Asia - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As the authors show, Russia has a special place in this structure. For a long time, many ordinary citizens of these states did not perceive Russia as a foreign state on an equal footing with others. This perception was due to a number of factors, the most important of which was Soviet institutional and psychological inertia. (...) At the institutional level, Soviet inertia was expressed primarily in the transparency of the borders between Russia and the Central Asian countries. On a psychological level, it manifested itself in nostalgia for the Soviet past. It was the overlapping of soviet nostalgia with the understanding of the importance of migration to Russia for the material well-being of households that gave rise to a high level of loyalty to Moscow. Recently, however, the Russian Federation has started to gradually become a foreign state among others in the eyes of ordinary residents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the minds of people, Russia still has a specific status, but this specificity is increasingly seen in a global context; in this context, other actors along with Moscow matter (Beijing and Washington, as well as Istanbul and Tehran). The process of turning Russia into an ordinary “abroad” was going on before, but it accelerated sharply after February 24, 2022. The authors identify signs of distancing from Russia both at the level of the ruling elites and at the level of civil society. Among these signs are, in particular, the desire of governments to demonstrate a multi-vector foreign policy, a change in the public rhetoric of top officials, as well as manifestations of anti-Russian sentiment in the public sphere of Kyrgyzstan. (shrink)

This paper explores the deep historical contexts for imagining natural disasters. By focusing on a foundational event in the Western disaster imaginary – the eruption of Vesuvius in AD 79 – and its remediation across centuries, the paper suggests that the real-time aesthetic of the mediation of extreme nature events that now abounds in contemporary culture is profoundly embedded in processes of historical intermediality. The term remediation is used to denote a genuinely historical mechanism by which past and (...) present (process and event) are simultaneously made visible. Empirically, the paper investigates the superimposition of temporal dimensions in recreations of the ancient disaster from the late 18th century to the present. Using the insights gained from this spectacular case study, the paper ends by arguing that a re-temporalization of historical analysis itself is needed for history to contribute to contemporary concerns with the present as a conjuncture of multiple and conflicting time scales. (shrink)

Time arises in the theory of gravity through the semiclassical approximation of the gravitational part of the solution of the Wheeler-De Witt equation in the manner shown by Banks (SCAG). We generalize Banks' procedure by grafting a Born-Oppenheimer type approximation onto SCAG. This allows for the feedback of matter onto gravity, wherein the latter is driven by the (quantum) mean energy-momentum tensor of matter. The wave function is nonvanishing in classically forbidden configurations of gravity. In SCAG this is described (...) by the evolution of matter in imaginary time. This is interpreted as an inverse temperature, and the norm of the matter wave function, no longer conserved for these gravitational configurations, is a partition function. A simple cosmological model is worked out to illustrate these ideas. In this model it is shown that the temperature of the matter which emerges into the classically permitted region is the inverse bounce time of the bounce executed by the system in the forbidden region (behind the horizon).Time present and time past are both perhaps present in time future. And time future contained in time past. If all time is eternally present All time is unredeemable.—T. S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton,”Four Quartets, 1943. (shrink)

Olympe de Gouges is known primarily for La Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne (1791), which is her response to the Declaration of the Rights of Man, adopted in 1789 by the National Assembly. Carol Sherman's book, Reading Olympe de Gouges, turns our attention away from normative principles of La Déclaration and directs it toward the ways that de Gouges's other texts challenge the normativity of the dominant social imaginaries of the time. Sherman’s book is (...) required reading for anyone wanting to participate in the debates about whether de Gouges deserves a place the Panthéon, but also in broader discussions about the history of feminism and the French Revolution. (shrink)

This collection of essays is unlike others in the field of African studies, for it is based on three very precisely delineated focal points: a particular geographical region, the sub-Sahara; specific modes of cultural production, literature and cinema; and a focus on works of French expression. This three-fold approach to exploring the relationships between power and culture in a non-Western environment greatly contributes to making this book unique from a variety of perspectives: African, Francophone and postcolonial studies, as well as (...) cross-disciplinary, cultural, transnational and diasporic studies. Moreover, the book offers deft and innovative analyses that move beyond the rhetoric of crises on the African continent we so very often hear of, so as to present a critical reflection on the subject at hand that is specific to the sub-Sahara and at the same time intimately linked to global culture, economy and politics. The authors' three-fold approach also presupposes that disciplinary compartmentalization increases power conflicts in academia. If only in part, compartmentalization is the result of antagonistic and competitive relations between specialization and multidisciplinary education. This book is thus a modest attempt at presenting an alternative to excessively fixed and homogeneous academic frontiers while considering that disciplinary expertise remains a must. Keeping in mind that an increasing number of scholars in Anglophone Postcolonial studies and Francophone African studies have been attempting for quite some time now to open interstices and build crossroads that can better connect them to each other, keeping in mind that these scholars work at revealing mechanisms by which any antagonistic discourses can mix, influence, act upon or react to one another, this book seeks to take a constructive step in establishing enduring grounds for multidisciplinary, cross-disciplinary and transnational academic research and collaboration. (shrink)

We address Dubourg and Baumard's claim that imaginary worlds are most appealing early in the lifespan when the exploratory drive is highest. Preschool-age children prefer fictions set in the real world, and fantastical information can be difficult for children to represent in real time. We speculate that a drive to explore imaginary worlds may emerge after children acquire substantial real-world skills and knowledge. An account of age effects on fictional preferences should encompass developmental change.

In this dissertation, I address the role of the social imaginary in the age of democracy. I first show that we live in the "age of democracy" by looking at the works of modern thinkers such as Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau and de Tocqueville. They see democracy as an overcoming of what I called "epistemocracy." Then I turn my attention to the debate that occurred in the early and the mid-twentieth century on "the End of Ideology." This debate that still (...) influences us today shaped the way we think of democracy; we oppose it to all that is ideological and utopian. But this position is paradoxical because on the one hand it rejects the "atemporality" of ideology and utopia, but on the other it places itself outside of time in order to make its claim. This is referred to as "Mannheim's paradox." Thanks to the work of Paul Ricoeur, I show that narratives are unsurpassable and that we ought to see them as constitutive of reality. I show that this is dominant theme throughout Ricoeur's life and work where he insists that the modern and autonomous subject of modernity must be rejected and a new form of subjectivity, one that understands finitude and one that is linguistically mediated, must be retrieved. I then apply this general philosophy to Ricoeur's reading of ideology and utopia, whereby each plays a necessary role of sedimentation---in the case of ideology---and of innovation---in the case of utopia. Once the social imaginary is retrieved, I move to the work of radical democrats---Claude Lefort, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe---to show that radical democracy is the most compatible form of democracy with Ricoeur's thought. Lefort will show that Ricoeur is right in believing that power is symbolically mediated and that is ultimately groundless. Laclau and Mouffe will also complement Ricoeur's philosophy by showing that dissent is also linguistically and symbolically mediated. (shrink)

The nature of farming is – still – an essentially biological, and thus volatile, system, which poses substantial challenges to its integration into financialized capitalism. Financial investors often seek stability and predictability of returns that are hardly compatible with agriculture – but which are increasingly seen as achievable through data and digital farming technologies. This paper investigates how farmland investment brokers engage with, perceive, and produce farming data for their investors within a co-constructive process. Tackling land’s ‘stubborn materiality’ for investment, (...) I argue, has material and immaterial components: it includes the re-imagination of farming as a financial asset that delivers reliable income streams for investors; and the re-engineering of farmland’s concrete materialities with digital farming technologies. Farmland investment brokers develop investor-suitable farmland imaginaries, underpinned by storytelling as well as the calculative ‘evidence’ of (digital) data. At the same time, digital technologies have become a key tool for transforming farms into ‘investment grade assets’ endowed with the rich data on farm performance and financial returns requested by investors. I conclude that the assetization and digitization of farmland need to be seen as closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing processes and identify key areas for future research on this intersection. (shrink)

Cet article questionne la situation de la littérature au temps de la mondialisation. Le désir du sinologue François Jullien de découvrir s’il y a encore la possibilité d’établir un dialogue entre les cultures — pas en termes d’identité, mais d’écart et de fécondité culturelle — a suscité ma curiosité. Comment la littérature et l’imaginaire des lecteurs sont-ils en train de se modifier? Notre terrain d’observation privilégié sera celui de ce que nous appellerons l’écriture migrante, lorsque les écrivains immigrés utilisent la (...) langue du pays d’accueil pour écrire leurs histoires. Ce sujet, à son tour, conduit aux questions du canon littéraire, de l’intertextualité et de l’interprétation comme base lexicale pour la réécriture d’un nouveau réseau de mots-clés de la littérature, à l’époque de la postmodernité. The main aspect of this article concerns the situation of literature in the time of globalization. We have organized this work on the base of François Jullien’s theory about the possibility to establish a cultural dialogue, not in terms of identity, but in terms of difference and cultural fecundity. How literature and the reader’s imaginary are changing? In order to extend this research we have also considered the problem of the migrant writing: a kind of writing realized by migrant writers, who use the language of the host country in their stories. An issue that puts in evidence other problems, such as the discussion about literary canon, the subjects of interpretation and intertextuality in terms of innovative keywords to reflect on the postmodern literature. (shrink)

The practice of early modern natural history depended on the collective collecting activities of a great variety of people. Among them, artisans played a major role in acquiring and distributing knowledge about the natural world and they contributed significantly to the scholarly labour in natural history. This distributed labour was both acknowledged by contemporaries as well as hidden from sight, reflecting the period′s dominant norms for class and gender. By combining an interpretation of the visual representation of labour in European (...) insect studies with an examination of written sources about natural history practices from about 1680 to 1810, this article decodes the often‐codified frontispieces and other more symbolic illustrations to offer new insights into the labour of natural history. Those who identified as scholars and artisans (or both) conceptualised their own intellectual and practical engagement with natural history within the semantic field of work. Some seemed to have even envisioned a new social role for academics as well as artisans. This article analyses the diversity of the “productive forces” in insect studies as they changed over time and it reconstructs what I will call the social imaginaries of participation. (shrink)

Suárez's discussion of time in the Metaphysical Disputations is one of the earliest long treatises on time (extending over sixty pages), and includes detailed arguments supporting the view that physical actions take place within an absolute temporal reference frame. Whereas some previous thinkers, such as John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureole, had made tantalising suggestions that time exists independently of physical changes, their ideas were primarily negative theses in response to perceived problems with the dominant view that (...) time was caused by the celestial motion. Suárez, in contrast, provides a positive thesis based on his revision of traditional, Scholastic metaphysics. He argues that the ordering of earlier and later events can only be understood by conceiving events as existing within the embrace of a ?flowing and successive space? which he refers to as ?entirely necessary and immutable in its own flux? (omnino necessarium et immutabile in suo fluxu) - something at least very like an absolute temporal reference frame. Yet it would be simplistic to describe Suárez's work on time only in terms of its nascent absolutism, since for him there is a second kind of time, a more properly ?real? time, which is an accident of material being. This kind of time is ontologically tied to the most intimate existence of objects, creating a plurality of individual continua of time - one for each distinct being. He calls this kind of time ?intrinsic time? (tempus intrinsecum). Suárez's dualistic account of time, in which he proposes an ?intrinsic time?, linked to being, which exists within a second order absolute temporal reference frame, or ?imaginary succession?, forms a bridge between scholasticism and early modern philosophy providing a foundation for the work of later absolutists like Gassendi and Newton. (shrink)

The first part of the article analyses the imaginary of the characteristics and form of society as developed in early modern liberal political philosophy, especially by John Locke and Thomas Paine. It uses different contemporary receptions of the key authors of this tradition, namely the liberal reception of John Keane, which emphasizes the theoretical distinction between civil society and the state, the materialist reception of Ellen Meiksins Wood, which contextualizes political ideas in the political struggles and class interests of (...) the time, and the reception of Foucault, which focuses on the development of biopolitical governmentality. The article finds that the liberal tradition imagined society as a given and self-regulating sphere that does not require interference from the state. A socio-historical presupposition of this imaginary was the economic sovereignty of individuals, and it overlooked the relations of domination and exploitation. In its second part, the article presents Hannah Arendt’s critical concept of society. She did not conceptualize society as a given totality and in a spatial way, but used it as a qualifier of a specific, impoverished mode of being, in particular to analyse the situation and perspective of minorities. (shrink)