Ion Soteropoulos reconciles the contradiction between the finite and infinite and transforms this reconciliation into the founding principle of motion. This book will appeal to readers interested in the logical mechanics of the physical universe, the hidden powers of our finite brain, and the utility of robots in the future.

Descartes is considered to be the founder of modern rationalism. This is a clear statement which, however, does not show the manner in which rationalism as such appeared in the history of science, taking into account the turmoil of the Renaissance centuries, the significance of the Reform and the birth of modern science. As a founder of a new metaphysics, Descartes, through his work, remains par excellence the case in which the scholastic and Renaissance aftermaths as well as the Reform (...) mutations are mixed in a new synthesis that will be called modernity. This study focuses on reinterpreting Cartesianism from this perspective in the vast context of modernity’s metaphysical significance – it is a hypothesis that will need to be developed not only by means of hermeneutical instruments but, especially, by means of those instruments belonging to the history of culture and anthropology. (shrink)

My paper tackles the generic relationship between philosophy and law, the necessity of applying philosophy to law, the legitimacy and range of such an approach, the configuration of the way in which philosophy has left its mark in the juridical sphere. It surveys, in a chronological order, as well as in terms of their co-existence, the various stages of the relationship between philosophy and law. 1. Although both have been “within the walls”, law secludes itself, relatively speaking, in “the world (...) taken as a whole”, to shape its own identity, to survive as a self-sufficient, distinct technique (F. Geny), or it does it in a doctrinary way (positivism). 2. The representatives of philosophy in the juridical sphere are doing their best to uphold law’s struggle for knowledge, to have it gain recognition as a “science”, renounce its one-sidedness and harmonize with the others. 3. Juridical norms are not untouchable in relation with philosophy. Philosophy may work within juridical norms if it has an affinity with the content of juridical normativeness and respects its specificity. 4. The conclusion I reach is that we must try to cultivate a joint area bringing together philosophy and law, an area wherein the specific features of the two distinct fields reach a consensus for the sake of the human condition – hic et nunc. Philosophy bestows coherence and casts light on “law for man’s sake”, while the philosophically founded law appears to be the “normative project of the human”, a human practice inextricably connected with other types of practice, with man as a whole. The practical way to fulfil this goal, like the goal itself, will always be liable to criticism and improvement, open to debates and various options in a concrete socio-historical context. (shrink)

Back in the Good Old Days of Logical Positivism, theories of meaning were part of a normative project that sought not merely to describe the features of language and its use, but so to speak to separate the wheat from the chaff. In this paper, I side with Herman Cappelen (2013) in thinking that we need to rethink and reintroduce the important distinction between sense and nonsense that was ditched along with other normative aspirations during Logical Positivism’s spectacular demise. Despite (...) this, my delineation of the bounds of sense is different from Cappelen’s. One of my goals in the present paper is to argue that category mistakes are paradigmatic examples of nonsensical sentences. To this end I describe one candidate for what it might be that makes category mistakes nonsensical. (shrink)

his study attempts to reveal how ideology can be a determinative exponent for a negative interpretation of religion. Ideology and its processes are such powerful inducements that even a spirit like Eliade’s (or Heidegger’s, Sartre’s, Cioran’s, and Noica’s, in the 20th century) couldn’t resist them. This text also reveals, in its connotation, that an impersonal interpretation is preferred for one who is defined by political or, generally speaking, ideological motives.

Nature Exposed to our Method of Questioning explores how we create our cultural assumptions about personhood, culture and nature.

Nous montrons ici que le rejet de l�identité par Wittgenstein s�appuie sur la contestation du principe de causalité, doublé d�une conception pragmatique de la personne. Dans son rejet de la causalité la position de Wittgenstein ressemble fortement à celle de David Hume. Pour parvenir à une conception pragmatique de la personne on analysera l�usage linguistique et grammatical qui régit l�identité personnelle. Chez Wittgenstein le concept de personne se définit par rapport au contexte actionnel.

Cases of poor care have been documented across the world. Contrary to professional requirements, evidence indicates that these sometimes go unaddressed. For patients, the outcomes of this inaction are invariably negative. Previous work has either focused on why poor care occurs and what might be done to prevent it, or on the reasons why those who are witness to it find it difficult to raise their concerns. Here, we build on this work but specifically foreground the responsibilities of registrants and (...) students who witness poor care. Acknowledging the challenges associated with raising concerns, we make the case that failure to address poor care is a breach of moral expectation, professional requirement and, sometimes, legal frameworks. We argue that reporting will be more likely to take place if those who wish to enter the profession have a realistic view of the challenges they may encounter. When nurses are provided with robust and applied education on ethics, when “real‐world” cases and exemplars are used in practice and when steps are taken to develop and encourage individual moral courage, we may begin to see positive change. Ultimately however, significant change is only likely to take place where practice cultures invite and welcome feedback, promote critical reflection, and where strong, clear leadership support is shown by those in positions of influence across organisations. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to analyse the fundamentals of Eliade’s view of the History of Religions, with a focus on the origins of this view, in the context of the criticism against the field of study corresponding to religious studies as they have developed over the last two centuries. The first part of the study briefly evaluates religious studies as to where it falls on a spectrum ranging from scientific objectivity to ideology, while the second part aims at (...) developing the hypothesis according to which the principles of the study of religions are found in the notion of “experience,” under the determinative influence of Nae Ionescu’s lectures. (shrink)

The religious consciousness functions symbolically. As the orientation towards the sacred belongs to consciousness, human existence is constituently symbolic. For Eliade, symbolism is an immediate given of consciousness, an essential object of intelligence that belongs to human beings and can be found in any existential situation of man in cosmos. If, according to Eliade, the religious history of humanity begins with the existence of the sacred, with those infinite hierophanies which organize the world and fill it with significances, then we (...) are entitled to state the anthropological importance invested by Eliade into the religious symbolism. (shrink)

ArgumentThis text is a reflection on the fate of a special kind of scientific object - anatomy collections - and their place in contemporary times. Though the phenomenon of keeping and displaying such collections is generally dying out, those specimens which survive continue to puzzle and fascinate us. To understand the current status of such collections, and the nostalgia evoked by the specimens within them, I argue, we should approach them as modern ruins. This allows us to think of them (...) as places of absence, pointing to unfinished lives and unfinished scientific projects. The paper begins with the story of a preserved human face from the Francis I. Rainer anatomical-anthropological collection (Bucharest), and continues by discussing the fate of that collection, and of anatomy collections more widely. Ultimately, the paper asks, what is it that we want to preserve: specimens, practices, or research philosophies? (shrink)