The poetical remains of Dorotheus, on which I made some comments in the Classical Quarterly vol. ii pp. 47–61, have received from the cod. Vat. Graec. 1056 an increase of ten verses, published by Mr J. Heeg in catal. cod. astrol. Graec. vol. v part iii p. 125 and also in Hermes vol. xlv pp. 316–8.

Intuitionists and classical logicians use in common a large number of the logical axioms, even though they supposedly mean different things by the logical connectives and quantifiers — conquans for short. But Wittgenstein says The meaning of a word is its use in the language. We prove that in a definite sense the intuitionistic axioms do indeed characterize the logical conquans, both for the intuitionist and the classical logician.

Joyce (1998) gives an argument for probabilism: the doctrine that rational credences should conform to the axioms of probability. In doing so, he provides a distinctive take on how the normative force of probabilism relates to the injunction to believe what is true. But Joyce presupposes that the truth values of the propositions over which credences are defined are classical. I generalize the core of Joyce’s argument to remove this presupposition. On the same assumptions as Joyce uses, the credences of (...) a rational agent should always be weighted averages of truth value assignments. In the special case where the truth values are classical, the weighted averages of truth value assignments are exactly the probability functions. But in the more general case, probabilistic axioms formulated in terms of classical logic are violated—but we will show that generalized versions of the axioms formulated in terms of non-classical logics are satisfied. (shrink)

Since Leibniz's time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized for violating the conservation of energy and momentum. Many dualist responses clearly fail. But conservation laws have important neglected features generally undermining the objection. Conservation is _local_, holding first not for the universe, but for everywhere separately. The energy in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries. Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of local conservation laws converges; it probably doesn't in reality. Energy conservation holds (...) if there is symmetry, the sameness of the laws over time. Thus, if there are time-places where symmetries fail due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail there and then, while holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars. Noether's converse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply symmetries. Thus conservation trivially nearly entails the causal closure of the physical. But expecting conservation to hold in the brain simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism. Hence Leibniz's objection begs the question. Empirical neuroscience is another matter. So is Einstein's General Relativity: far from providing a loophole, General Relativity makes mental causation _harder_. (shrink)

In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. I attack the presupposition of this debate: arguing that when properly construed, there is no sense in which supervaluational consequence is revisionary. I provide new considerations supporting the claim that the supervaluational consequence should be characterized in a ‘global’ way. But pace Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000), I argue that supervaluationism does not give rise to counterexamples to familiar inference-patterns (...) such as reductio and conditional proof. (shrink)

The question of the cognitive role of fictionality is this: what is the correct cognitive attitude to take to p, when it is fictional that p? We began by considering one answer to this question, implicit in the work of Kendall Walton, that the correct response to a fictional proposition is to imagine that proposition. However, this approach is silent in cases of fictional incompleteness, where neither p nor its negation are fictional. We argue that that Waltonians should embrace a (...) pluralistic account of the cognitive role of fictional incompleteness: in some cases of fictional incompleteness, we are permitted to resolve the incompleteness during our engagement with the target fiction, and in other cases, we are obliged not to resolve the incompleteness. But though pluralism is accommodated by Walton’s wider account of fictionality, it puts tension on his motivating idea that fictionality stands to the imagination as truth stands to belief. And so we develop a rival conception of the cognitive role of fictionality that is built around a different analogy: on this evidentialist approach, (known) fictionality stands to the imagination as evidence stands to credence. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe seminal work of David Marr, popularized in his classic work Vision, continues to exert a major influence on both cognitive science and philosophy. The interpretation of his work also co...

A plethora of normative conservation concepts have recently emerged, most of which are ill-defined: biological diversity, biological integrity, ecological restoration, ecological services, ecological rehabilitation, ecological sustainability, sustainable development, ecosystem health, ecosystem management, adaptive management, and keystone species are salient among them. These normative concepts can be organized and interpreted by reference to two new schools of conservation philosophy, compositionalism and functionalism. The former comprehends nature primarily by means of evolutionary ecology and considers Homo sapiens separate from nature. The latter comprehends (...) nature primarily by means of ecosystem ecology and considers Homo sapiens a part of nature. Biological diversity, biological integrity, and ecological restoration belong primarily in the compositionalist glossary; the rest belong primarily in the functionalist glossary. The former set are more appropriate norms for reserves, the latter for areas that are humanly inhabited and exploited. In contrast to the older schools of conservation philosophy, preservationism and resourcism, compositionalism and functionalism are complementary, not competitive and mutually exclusive. As the historically divergent ecological sciences—evolutionary ecology and ecosystem ecology—are increasingly synthesized, a more unified philosophy of conservation can be envisioned. (shrink)

In this paper the authors argue that ethical considerations are relevant for evaluating animal production systems and that in consequence agrologists should seriously consider the arguments of animal welfare supporters. Furthermore, the authors point out the ethical basis for some (though not all) of the conclusions proposed by supporters of animal welfare. In consequence it is necessary to determine the nature of animal welfare and methods of evaluating the welfare of animals and to recognize when production systems fail to satisfy (...) the needs of animals. (shrink)

Part intellectual autobiography and part exposition of complex yet contemporary economic ideas, this lively conversation with renowned scholar and public intellectual Kenneth J. Arrow focuses on economics and politics in light of history, current events, and philosophy as well. Reminding readers that economics is about redistribution and thus about how we treat each other, Arrow shows that the intersection of economics and ethics is of concern not just to economists but for the public more broadly. With a foreword by Amartya (...) Sen, this book highlights the belief that government can be a powerful force for good, and is particularly relevant in the current political climate and to the lay reader as well as the economist. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

Head transplantation fits within the broader conceptual space occupied by transhumanists and others who seek to extend the lives of human beings indefinitely. It is reasonable to reflect on whether, under what circumstances, and in what ways human immortality would be good. In this paper, I disambiguate the ways in which immortality might be considered a human good and then argue that immortality is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for objective meaning in life. I also argue that mortality is not (...) a necessary condition for objective meaning in life. (shrink)

Measurement realism, the view that measurement targets quantitative attributes and that not all attributes are quantitative, has come under attack both from metrologists and philosophers. In this paper, I take a close look at two influential arguments against measurement realism: the argument from obsolescence and the argument from coordination. I concede that these arguments do challenge the epistemological position traditionally taken by measurement realists, but argue that the metaphysical core of measurement realism survives the challenge posed by these arguments. This (...) metaphysical core is vital to maintaining a clear and ambitious standard for successful measurement. (shrink)

This paper will develop the concept of semiogenesis – a process of novel sign generation – and how instances of this process, such as agency, relate to their built environment and beyond. Section two will build on Hoffmeyer’s discussion of swarms, specifically the idea of overlapping swarms and its manifestation in the creation of termite mounds, in order to introduce three types of structure. Building upon this real-world example explored in section two, the third section will present a heuristic for (...) semiogenesis: a neuromorphic dynamic system model grounded in information and thermodynamic theory. Through the lens of this heuristic model, the penultimate section will more rigorously characterize the similarities and differences between termite and human agency in their respective built milieus. (shrink)

Gaston Fessard employs Hegel’s dialectical logic to clarify how St. Ignatius’s _Spiritual Exercises_ envisage and prepare the decisions and choices between contrasting options or major turning points in spiritual life, in moments of what Ignatius would call _Election_.

Categories may be viewed as deductive systems or as algebraic theories. We are primarily interested in the interplay between these two views and trace it through a number of structured categories and their internal languages, bearing in mind their relevance to the foundations of mathematics. We see this as a common thread running through the six contributions to this issue of Studia Logica.

First published in 1952, British Empirical Philosophers is a comprehensive picture of one of the most important movements in the history of philosophic thought. In his introduction, Professor A. J. Ayer distinguishes the main problems of empiricism and gives a critical account of the ways in which the philosophers whose writings are included in this volume attempted to solve them. Editors Ayer and Raymond Winch bring together an authoritative abridgement of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding ; Bishop George Berkeley’s (...) Principles of Human Knowledge ; almost the entire first book of David Hume’s Treatise Concerning Human Nature ; and extracts from Thomas Reid’s Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man and John Stuart Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. (shrink)

This article argues that Hegel read Lacan. Put less paradoxically, it claims that situating Hegel within a Lacanian paradigm results in an understanding of the future as still open and of history as not ended. Absolute knowing, on this model, is the recognition of the way in which history has developed, not a claim that it can advance no further. The article aims to persuade those who might otherwise dismiss Hegel – for example, persons au courant with poststructuralism – that (...) he still can make a decisive contribution to current debates. (shrink)

Nach einer kurzen Übersicht überDescartes' mechanistiche Theorie der somatischen Funktionen und der Reproduktion, wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit die Entwicklung dieser Theorie bis zur neuesten Zeit beschrieben. Sodann wird eine Übersicht gegeben über die vitalistische Theorie, welche unter wissenschaftlichen Forschern bis zur Mitte des vorigen Jahrhunderts vorherrschte. Dann werden die Gründe dafür angegeben, dass diese Theorie des Vitalismus ungefähr um diese Zeit verlassen wurde, um durch die mechanistische Theorie ersetzt zu werden. Diese ihrerseits ist jedoch auf einer unbegründeten metaphysischen Auffassung (...) vom Wesen der Wirklichkeit aufgebaut. Nehmen wir sie an, so können wir die synthetischen Einheit, die Gesamterscheinungsreihe, die wir unter dem Namen Reproduktion und Körperfunktion zusammenfassen, nicht richtig beschreiben. Der Begriff „Leben” ist eine Synthese aller Beziehungen, die zwischen dem Organismus und seiner Umwelt bestehen. Diese Auffassung des Lebens ist die Grundlage der Biologie, daher ist denn auch Biologie eine selbständige, unabhängige Wissenschaft.Zuletzt wird der Reflexbegriff behandelt. Die mechanistische Auffassung des Reflexbegriffes ist unrichtig, da alle Reflexfunktion synthetischen, oder integrativen Charakter hat. Wäre dem nicht so, dann würde das Nervensystem lediglich Chaos hervorzubringen imstande sein. Biologie, ohne die Gegebenheit des Lebens vorauszusetzen, ist unmöglich und wissenschaftliches Voraussagen auf dem Gebiete der Biologie ist überall nur auf Grund dieser Voraussetzung möglich.Après avoir donné un bref aperçu de la théorie mécanique cartésienne de l'activité corporelle et de la reproduction, l'article contenu dans cette revue trace le développment de cette théorie jusqu'à notre temps. Un bref aperçu est donné ensuite de la théorie vitaliste qui prévalait parmi les observateurs scientifiques jusqu'au milieu du siècle dernier. Après cela sont exposées les raisons pour lesquelles la théorie du vitalisme fut abandonnée de nos jours et il est démontré, qu'il est généralement admis que l'abandon de cette théorie implique l'adoption de la conception mécanique. Cette conception, cependant, est basée sur une conception métaphysique mal fondée se rapportant à la nature de la réalité et, en l'acceptant, nous ne pouvons exprimer ou décrire l'intégration qui apparait dans les phénomènes de reproduction et d'activité corporelle de toutes sortes. La vie c'est l'intégration soutenue s'étendant sur toutes les relations entre l'organisme et son entourage; et la conception de la vie, c'est la base de la biologie, de sorte que la biologie est une science indépendant.l'Article termine par une discussion de l'action-réflexe et démontre qu'une interprétation mécanique de l'action-réflexe est inadéquate, puisque l'intégration est incluse dans toute action-réflexe; car si tel n'était pas le cas, le système nerveux ne serait autre chose qu'un mécanisme à produire du chaos. La biologie ne peut pas se passer de la vie, comme sa conception fondamentale, et les prédicitions en matière de biologie sont toujours basées sur cette conception. (shrink)

Forcing with [κ] κ over a model of set theory with a strong partition cardinal, M. Spector produced a generic ultrafilter G on κ such that κ κ /G is not well-founded. Theorem. Let G be Spector-generic over a model M of $ZF + DC + \kappa \rightarrow (\kappa)^\kappa_\alpha, \kappa > \omega$ , for all $\alpha . 1) Every cardinal (well-ordered or not) of M is a cardinal of M[ G]. 2) If A ∈ M[ G] is a well-ordered subset (...) of M, then A ∈ M. Let Φ = κ κ /G. 3) There is an ultrafilter U on Φ such that every member of U has a subset of type Φ, and the intersection of any well-ordered subset of U is in U. 4) Φ satisfies Φ → (Φ) α β for all $\alpha and all ordinals β. 5) There is a linear order Φ' with property 3) above which is not "weakly compact", i.e., $\Phi' \nrightarrow (\Phi')^2$. (shrink)

Although several theoretical approaches consider general methods for dealing with shape, recent observations and experimental data show that embryos exhibit marked changes in the properties of the biological material involved in shape development and shape regulation capacity. In vivo experiments have shown that the amphibian embryo gradually develops from a situation in which it is not able to maintain its shape to one in which it can not only maintain its shape but also possesses a maximal tolerance towards deformation together (...) with a maximal shape regulation capacity. So far two especially clear conclusions have emerged: (i) the form of the embryo appears to be determined by cell activities intrinsic to each stage, and (ii) the morphogenetic programme can be executed normally within wide limits notwithstanding dramatic deformations of the embryo during quite a long period. Thus the hypothesis may be advanced that shape and morphogenesis to some extent become independent phenomena during embryonic development. (shrink)

Two putative functions of emotion experience — its roles in intentional action and in social understanding — were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, they (...) were not less likely than other groups to provide negative emotional explanations of another person’s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using emotion, implying that “simulation” is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety experience. (shrink)