This interdisciplinary book examines the work of several female artists since 1960 in the areas of dance, music, installation, photography, architecture, poetry, literature, theater, film, and performance art. Each chapter is primarily devoted to an important work by a single artist, seen within its historical context, and with particular attention to how each artist incorporated gender issues or feminist thought into her respective art form. Laurie Anderson, Gwendolyn Brooks, Jane Campion, Judy Chicago, Zaha Hadid, Pauline Oliveros, Yvonne Rainer, Cindy Sherman, (...) Amy Tan, and Paula Vogel have each made groundbreaking contributions to their fields. As a group, they represent a tremendous diversity of approaches to art making: from accessible to opaque, from overtly feminist to apolitical, from emotive to cool, from controversial to mainstream. (shrink)

In Portraits of American Philosophy, eight of America's most prominent philosophers offer autobiographical narratives that remind us that the life of a scholar is both a tale of personal struggle and an adventure in ideas.

This book is a unique modern analysis of the genealogy of morals. Accessible and full of details about ethical trends and the catalysts which shape them, it encompasses an amazing breadth of information, taking examples from virtually every culture and through every historical era. The provocative theme is that morality is as subject to fashion and the whims of the rich and powerful in society as any other aspect of human life. The common thread is the existence at certain times (...) of moral codes which allow, perhaps even encourage such actions and beliefs. This compelling study offers an insight into the complex relationship between what a society believes and how it behaves. Driven by envy, idolatry, greed, racism, megalomania or lust, there is no end to the creativity of sinners and no greater challenge than to understand what we mean by 'sin'. (shrink)

Gilbert et al. argue that the neuroethics literature discussing the putative effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on personality largely ignores the scientific evidence and presents distorted claims that personality change is induced by the DBS stimulation. This study contributes to the first-hand primary research on the topic exploring DBS clinicians’ views on post-DBS personality change among their patients and its underlying cause. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with sixteen clinicians from various disciplines working in Australian DBS practice for movement disorders and/or (...) psychiatric conditions. Thematic analysis of the interviews revealed five primary themes: 1) types, frequency and duration of personality change, 2) causes of personality change, 3) impact on patient and family, 4) communication, comprehension and awareness, and 5) management. Clinicians described a variety of personality changes in Parkinson’s disease following DBS including irritability, impulsivity and impaired decision-making. The frequency of personality change seen in patients varied amongst clinicians, but changes were overwhelmingly transient. Clinicians considered both DBS stimulation and additional factors as inducing personality change. For DBS patients with major depressive disorder, a restoration of pre-morbid personality was associated with alleviation of illness. Considerations for future research of personality change following DBS include selecting suitable tools for quantitative examination and developing a common language between the scientific and ethics communities. Clinical implications including recommendations for the informed consent process for patients and families and clinicians’ management of personality change are discussed. (shrink)

The 30th anniversary of the first DBS surgery of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) for Parkinson’s disease was celebrated in Grenoble this June. Since this initial surgery, the application of DBS has e...

Three-legged animals do not exist today and such an animal is not found in the fossil record. Which constraints operate to result in the lack of a triped phenotype? Consideration of animal locomotion and robotic studies suggests that physical constraints would not prevent a triped from being functional or advantageous. As is reviewed here, the strongest constraint on the evolution of a triped is phylogenetic: namely, the early genetic adoption of a bilaterally symmetrical body plan occurring before the advent of (...) limbs. Presumably, this would greatly constrain any three-legged animal from ever evolving. Tripedalism is employed only by a few animals, but many use a tripod stance while engaged in a variety of activities. Because terms are often used interchangeably in the literature, a standardization of locomotion terminology is proposed. Understanding the constraints behind “forbidden” phenotypes forces us to confront gaps in our evolutionary understanding of which we may be unaware. (shrink)

Associative learning is an essential feature of human cognition, accounting for the influence of priming and interference effects on memory recall. Here, we extend our account of associative learning that learns asymmetric item-to-item associations over time via experience by including link maturation to balance associations between longer-term stability while still accounting for short-term variability. This account, combined with an existing account of activation strengthening and decay, predicts both human response times and error rates for the fan effect for both target (...) and foil stimuli. (shrink)

What is morality? How many moral values are there? And what are they? According to the theory of morality-as-cooperation, morality is a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. This theory predicts that there will be as many different types of morality as there are different types of cooperation. Previous research, drawing on evolutionary game theory, has identified at least seven different types of cooperation, and used them to explain seven different (...) types of morality: family values, group loyalty, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness and property rights. Here we explore the conjecture that these simple moral ‘elements’ combine to form a much larger number of more complex moral ‘molecules’, and that as such morality is a combinatorial system. For each combination of two elements, we hypothesise a candidate moral molecule, and successfully locate an example of it in the professional and popular literature. These molecules include: fraternity, blood revenge, family pride, filial piety, gavelkind, primogeniture, friendship, patriotism, tribute, diplomacy, common ownership, honour, confession, turn taking, restitution, modesty, mercy, munificence, arbitration, mendicancy, and queuing. These findings indicate that morality – like many other physical, biological, psychological and cultural systems – is indeed a combinatorial system. Thus morality-as-cooperation provides a principled and powerful theory, that explains why there are many moral values, and successfully predicts what they will be; and it generates a systematic framework that has the potential to explain all moral ideas, possible and actual. Pursuing the many implications of this theory will help to place the study of morality on a more secure scientific footing. (shrink)

Evoluvation is one of the badly over worked words, like “ force,” “ instinct,” and “ value.” It means a process of Becoming. but it is applied to various orders of facts which have very little in common, either as regards the material evolving or in the way in which the evolution comes about. We hear of the evolution of a solar system, the evolution of matter, the evolution of religion, the evolution of the chemical elements, the evolution of man, (...) the evolution of language, the evolution of scenery, the evolution of the horse, the evolution of mind, the evolution of plants, the evolution of sex, the evolution of society, the evolution of species, the evolution of evolution theories, and so on. When processes that are different are called by the same name, there is bound to be confusion; and it is more than verbal. We venture to make some simple suggestions which, if accepted, would lessen the confusion. (shrink)

In my contribution to this volume, I (BHS) comment on on the stultifying rhetoric of contemporary analytic moral theory as illustrated in Judith Jarvis Thomson's Tanner Lectures, with particular reference to Thomson's anxieties about the moral relativism exhibited by college freshman and to her efforts--quite strained, in my view, and inevitably unsuccessful--to demonstrate the existence of objective judgments in matters of morality and taste .

In this article I examine how Deleuzian-inspired assemblage theory allows us to offer a new challenge to the enlightenment categories of thought that have dominated archaeological thinking. The history of archaeological thought, whilst superficially a series of paradigm shifts, can be retold as arguments constructed within distinctions between ideas and materials, present and past, and culture and nature. At the heart of all of these has been the critical issue of representation, of how the gap between people and the world (...) can be bridged. In the last decade or so, however, archaeologists have begun to make a more significant challenge to these ideas, and have attempted to offer a critique of our enlightenment heritage that is ontologically, rather than epistemologically, inspired. Drawing on the manner in which assemblages allow for the vibrancy of matter, are non-anthropocentric, multiscalar and more-than-representational, this article argues that Deleuzian thought offers the best chance to rework our understanding of the past in this manner. This is explored through a case study of three scales of analysis of Neolithic Britain. (shrink)

Under an ‘antitheodicy’, I understand any attempt to show the principal impossibility of a morally respectable and rationally convincing theoretical answer to the theoretical problem of evil which is understood as a problem of consistency and rational coherence between propositions. In this paper, I will analyse the concept of rationality which is presupposed at least in some strands of antitheodicy. A. Gleeson’s ‘A frightening love. Recasting the Problem of Evil’ presupposes a dichotomy between an engaged-existential and a detached-impersonal kind of (...) philosophical thinking which are respectively characterized by a stress on authenticity and the acknowledgement of particularity and contingency in the first case and by precision, logic, provability and an instrumental understanding of rationality in the second case. The second kind of reasoning which underlies all theodicies is inapt for dealing adequately with the real problem of evil. I try to show that the dichotomy of impersonal objective and existentially subjective kinds of philosophy is not a contradictory one but leaves out a broad field in-between which can be characterized as ‘informal reasoning’ and which allows a morally sensitive answer to the theoretical problem of evil which is not isolated from the ‘real’ problem of evil. (shrink)