Jacek Urbaniec: Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics does not necessarily imply that there are links between the temporal physical world and the eternal world of mathematics..

The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...) it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics. (shrink)

We prove that no logic (i.e. consequence operation) determined by any class of orthomodular lattices admits the deduction theorem (Theorem 2.7). We extend those results to some broader class of logics determined by ortholattices (Corollary 2.6).

Let J be any proper ideal of subsets of the real line R which contains all finite subsets of R. We define an ideal J * ∣B as follows: X ∈ J * ∣B if there exists a Borel set $B \subset R \times R$ such that $X \subset B$ and for any x ∈ R we have $\{y \in R: \langle x,y\rangle \in B\} \in \mathscr{J}$ . We show that there exists a family $\mathscr{A} \subset \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ of power ω (...) 1 such that $\bigcup\mathscr{A} \not\in \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ . In the last section we investigate properties of ideals of Lebesgue measure zero sets and meager sets in Cohen extensions of models of set theory. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to discuss current reductive theories of the non-existent objects, specifically - contemporary deflationary theories of the fictional objects. By such theories I mean those denying that fictional objects have any ontological status at all. Theories, which claim that fictional proper names denote some sort of objects but deny that these names denote individual objects, are treated as the reductive theories of non-existent as well. In the discourse I present the following ideas: 1) Russell's theory (...) of description with the further remarks by W. V. O. Quine; 2) A. Plantinga's view that the fictional names have no denotation, which is realized in the framework of possible worlds semantics; 3) Theories by N. Wolterstorf and P. van Inwagen which can be seen as a link between strictly deflationary theories and meinongian theories; Wolterstorff claim that empty names denote general abstract objects and Inwagen identify fictional objects with theoretical objects of literal criticism; 4) Theories based on the speech acts theories; 5) Theories which identify fictional objects with mental objects. The conclusion of the argument is that the aforementioned theories are not adequate for the analysis of fiction (non-existent) and that more suitable for such a purpose are meinongian theories of non-existent objects. (shrink)

The present paper is to be considered as a sequel to [1], [2]. It is known that Johansson's minimal logic is not uniform, i.e. there is no single matrix which determines this logic. Moreover, the logic C J is 2-uniform. It means that there are two uniform logics C 1, C 2 (each of them is determined by a single matrix) such that the infimum of C 1 and C 2 is C J. The aim of this paper is to (...) give a detailed description of the logics C 1 and C 2. It is performed in a lattice-theoretical language. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to present essays centered upon the subjects of Formal Ontology and Logical Philosophy. The idea of investigating philosophical problems by means of logical methods was intensively promoted in Torun by the Department of Logic of Nicolaus Copernicus University during last decade. Another aim of this book is to present to the philosophical and logical audience the activities of the Torunian Department of Logic during this decade. The papers in this volume contain the results concerning (...) Logic and Logical Philosophy, obtained within the confines of the projects initiated by the Department of Logic and other research projects in which the Torunian Department of Logic took part. (shrink)

Jacek Filek criticizes the modern “nonethical” ethics. He points out its break with philosophy, lack of self-criticism, inanity, undue and fruitless formalism, and academism. His article makes a general request for the restitution of ethics as the independent and dignified scholarly discipline closely connected with world and life.

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

Who, whom, why and how? -- The subject between extremes -- Genesis: the Socratic-Platonic deception or the irrepressible need for immortality -- Modern man: the adventures of Robinson Crusoe -- The scientific foundations of modern man -- The evolution of modern man, Nietzsche's moustache, the fittest man and the man without qualities: the four pillars of modern man -- Evolution and zoodicy: the animality of modern man -- Modernity as false consciousness -- Technology and the mind, God-machine, the individual vs. (...) Facebook -- That which returns -- The death of death and late-modern man. (shrink)

. In our paper, presented here in abstract form, we consider the sentential logic with semi-negation. It should be stressed, however, that our main interest is not that logic itself but rather more general matters concerning the theory of matrix semantics for sentential logics. The logic with semi-negation provides a relevant example for elucidating such basic notions of matrix semantics as degree of complexity, degree of uniformity, and self-referentiality. Thus our paper being a contribution to the theory of matrix semantics (...) may be treated as a sequel to [1]. (shrink)

Punktem wyjścia rozważań są cztery hipotezy: dwie leksykalne, gramatyczna i historyczna: 1. Wyrażenie „rozumieć" jest polisemem i to podwójnie: a) wieloznacznością właściwą wielu predykatom mentalnym (tj. może mieć w szczególności sens aktualny, habitualny, sekwencyjny lub procesualny); b) wieloznacznością swoistą (tj. może w szczególności mieć sens intuicyjny, identyfikacyjny, indulgencyjny lub inskrypcyjny). 2. Wyrażenie „rozumieć” w sensie identyfikacyjnym występuje w kontekstach eliptycznych (może mieć wówczas sens esencjalny, strukturalny, funkcjonalny, kauzalny, kategorialny lub konceptualny). 3. Wszelkie (niemetaforyczne) konteksty i derywaty wyrażenia „rozumieć" dadzą się (...) sparafrazować za pomocą wprowadzonych rozróżnień. 4. Różnice zdań w sprawie rozumienia albo biorą się z pomieszania znaczeń, albo są empirycznie testowalne. Przedstawione hipotezy pozwalają usunąć nieporozumienia, dotyczące kolejno: argumentów relacji rozumienia, kategorii semantycznej „rozumienia", relacji między poszczególnymi pojęciami „rozumienia" oraz. między rozumieniem a innymi funkcjami mentalnymi, warunkami poprawności definicji „rozumienia konceptualnego", na koniec kryteriów kompetencji językowej. (shrink)

Niniejszy artykuł stanowi polemikę z esejem Saula Smilansky’ego pt. O wątpliwej warości moralnej pewnych rozpowszechnionych form modlitwy. Według Smilansky’ego niektóre modlitwy prośby, a zwłaszcza modlitwy o czyjeś dobra kosztem kogoś innego, są niemoralne. Zgadzam się, że nie każda modlitwa jest moralnie akceptowalna, lecz jednocześnie argumentuję, że jego uzasadnienie tej tezy zakłada lub zawiera fałszywe przesłanki. W szczególności formułuję cztery zastrzeżenia (lub zarzuty) wobec jego argumentu: (i) punktem wyjścia filozofii modlitwy powinny być nie prywatne przekonania filozofa, lecz (w przypadku braku empirycznej (...) wiedzy o modlących się ludziach) ortodoksja lub ortopraksja określonej religii (zastrzeżenie metodologiczne); (ii) modląca się osoba (zwłaszcza w trudnej sytuacji życiowej) nie rozważa konsekwencji wysłuchania swej modlitwy (zastrzeżenie psychologiczne); (iii) zgodnie z modelem biblijnym każda modlitwa prośby zawiera warunek ‘jeśli Bóg chce’ (zastrzeżenie teologiczne); (iv) pomimo (reprezentowanej przez Smilansky’ego) powszechnej opinii, modlitwa prośby nie jest działaniem w zwykłym znaczeniu tego słowa (zastrzeżenie ontologiczne). Tej ostatniej tezy bronię, posługując się rozróżnieniem Charlesa Taliaferro na Świat Omodlony i Świat Nieomo- dlony. Poza tym próbuję podać własne kryterium moralności modlitwy prośby: modlitwa taka jest moralnie dobra, jeśli buduje pozytywną relację z Bogiem lub innymi ludźmi oraz jest wypowiadana wraz z uzupełnieniem ‘Boże, bądź wola Twoja!’. (shrink)

t. 1. Etyka ogólna -- t. 2, cz. 1-2 Etyka szczegółowa.

The quest for effective medicines is very old. In modern times two important tools have been developed to evaluate efficacy of drugs: superiority and non-inferiority types of clinical trials. The former tests the null hypothesis of μ (the difference between a tested drug and comparator) ≤ 0 against μ > 0; the latter tests the null hypothesis of μ ≤ - Δ against, μ > - Δ, where Δ is the clinical difference from the comparator. In a superiority trial, a (...) new drug is tested against a placebo; in a non-inferiority trial, a new drug is tested against active treatment. In this paper, arguments are presented to show that a superiority trial against a placebo is scientifically sound but ethically unacceptable, whereas a non-inferiority trial against active treatment is ethically sound but scientifically not reliable. Switching from a superiority type of trial with placebo to a non-inferiority trial with an active-control — following the latest revision of Declaration of Helsinki — is in practice switching from the violation of the uncertainty principle to uncertainty of results. Given human and financial resources, it appears an academic question as to which is more unethical: to violate patients’ rights or to produce results without scientific value. All presented considerations lead to the conclusion that the use of a superiority trial of design with an active control instead of placebo will satisfy scientific needs, expectation of patients, and the ancient quest for effective medicines. In the era of Good (Clinical, Laboratory, Manufacture) Practice, the attention of those performing clinical trials is focused on the procedure, not always on its essence. However even the excellent performance of a trial which is not worth doing is fruitless. (shrink)

This paper comments on five problems concerning the transformation of the Polish economy with special emphasis on employee participation and trust. 1) There can be no ethical evaluation or justification of employee participation independent of the goals of the transformation. 2) In Poland this participation is affected by deep distrust towards the whole process of transformation. 3) Privatisation is the topic most often mentioned in this connection. 4) The definition of trust becomes even more crucial when the phenomenon of distrust (...) has to be explained. 5) Institutions can become the substitute of trust. (shrink)

One of the most vigorously debated issues in attention labs concerns the nature of the coupling between the sensory-motor system and covert spatial attention. Proponents of the Premotor Theory of Attention (PToA) claim that attention should be accounted for in terms of motor preparation for goal-directed actions such as eye or hand movements. For others, it is a supramodal psychological entity that is independent of our sensorimotor machinery. Both parties also seek to articulate this controversy in terms of cognitive science (...) as a question of whether attention is embodied or disembodied cognition. The PToA is thought to advocate the embodiment of attention. We, however, are inclined to think that a more nuanced view of this conceptual framework is needed to yield some insights into how radical it actually is in terms of embodied cognition (EC). We argue that PToA still seems to bear some features of weak embodiment. Yet we suggest that it has the potential to build a stronger concept of attention as EC, but somewhat paradoxically this would require giving attention deflationary treatment and reconstructing it in other terms. We propose that the notion of pre-reflective intentionality might serve as an inspiration to this end. (shrink)

Since the very dawn of its history, modern philosophical anthropology has been addressing the issue of the human body. As a result of those efforts, Descartes, de Biran, Husserl, Sartre, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty and others have brought forward a variety of conceptions concerning various aspects of human corporeality. Anthropological explorations concerning the question of the human body, appear in a particularly interesting way, when they are considered in the context of those points of view which, in an essential way, refer to (...) the subjective character of the human being. It is a matter of reconstructing and analyzing how the subject's corporeality is given to the subject, originarily, according to the phenomenological rule zu den Sachen selbst. The aim of this paper is thus to put into some order the concerns of a variety of anthropologists with regard to the question of the human body, as it is given to, or experienced by, the subject. A metatheoretical analysis of this field proves it is possible to do so with the use of a tool, which is called here, a dimension of corporeality. (shrink)

In contemporary literary Hindi there is an abundance of Perso-Arabic loanwords which often function similarly to words of Sanskrit origin. Despite their semantic proximity, each of them can have different connotational meanings and cultural associations. Furthermore, depending on the context, one of them will be preferred to the other. This situation can become an issue when translating from Hindi into Polish. In this paper, I will investigate whether these loanwords should be considered as a third language in translation. If this (...) is the case, they make the text a multicultural one, and, thus, raise the question of how to translate them into Polish, being at the same time focused on a monolingual recipient and their cognitive comfort while not impoverishing and distorting the process of translation. Moreover, I will propose an approach which can be of assistance in achieving this goal, relying on French and Latin loanwords used in the Polish language. (shrink)

W artykule tym przedstawiam skróconą historię „intelektualnych kontaktów” Józefa Innocentego Marii Bocheńskiego i Leszka Kołakowskiego. Koncentruję się na zdecydowanej polemice, która pozwala dostrzec różnice filozoficznych stanowisk i „stylów filozofowania”. Zaczyna się ona sporem o znaczenie Erazma z Rotterdamu na konferencji w Rapperswillu w roku 1986; jej kontynuacją była krytyczna ocena książki Bocheńskiego Sto zabobonów. Jerzy Giedroyc w liście do Kołakowskiego zauważył: „Rzeczywiście trudno z większą elegancją zniszczyć autora. Wyobrażam sobie jaka będzie reakcja Bocheńskiego”. Zaiste reakcja Bocheńskiego była gwałtowna, opublikował w (...) roku następnym dwa artykuły, które były – przeważnie „nie wprost” – zdecydowaną polemiką z Kołakowskim i próbą precyzyjnego przedstawienia własnego stanowiska. Spór ten można potraktować jako ilustrację słynnego rozróżnienia Kołakowskiego na dwa typy aktywności w kulturze: kapłana i błazna. (shrink)

The article attempts to show that the Italian philosophy of “dialogue” (Guido Calogero, Aldo Testa) from the 1950s and the 1960s is not a “philosophy of dialogue”, understood as “New Thinking”, as a radical abandonment of the Cartesian egological perspective. The reception of that “New Thinking” of the 1920s (mainly: Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig) in Italy is significantly belated and essentially consists of simplifications and overlooks that we are dealing with a radically new thinking paradigm. Italian philosophers, as they (...) themselves define it, went “their own way”. It means, however, that they have not at all opened themselves to the authentic philosophy of dialogue. (shrink)