In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Gendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and PoliticsJean A. PerkinsGendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and Politics, by Penny A. Weiss; xvii & 189 pp. New York: New York University Press, 1993, $40.00.As Penny Weiss puts it herself: “The main argument of this book is that Rousseau’s defense of sexual differentiation is based on the contribution he perceives it can make to the establishment of community” (p. 7). She accomplishes this by (...) dividing the work into two parts, the first devoted to an analysis of Rousseau’s Emile and Du Contrat social, the second consisting of two feminist essays inspired by her findings.After an introduction Weiss moves directly to an analysis of Emile, showing quite conclusively that the education given to Emile and Sophie does not differ in principle although it does differ in practice since the aim in both cases is to produce sex differences that will make each of them useful members of society. Chapter Three argues that, whereas Rousseau uses much of the rhetoric of innate and natural differences between the sexes, he really does not believe in this thesis. To Rousseau human nature, either male or female, is infinitely malleable. Chapter Four outlines the political benefits that Rousseau saw in the creation of a sex-roled affectionate family. The next chapter attempts to show the consistency of Rousseau’s thought, briefly described as nonliberal, anti-feminist, and communitarian. Up to this point Weiss has remained within the tradition of textual exegesis, but in Chapter Six she moves to a feminist critique of Rousseau’s thought. The argument put forward here is that sex-differentiated roles undermine community since it denies equality to the sexes. The eventual result of such a community would be the rampant spread of domination and the inevitable abuses of power this entails.This reviewer finds many problems with the book. An annoying trait is that the arguments are not given in logical order. For instance, human beings are described as asocial, indolent, and malleable before the author refers to the state of nature where Rousseau develops this idea. At no point does Weiss refer to the so-called Golden Age that intervenes in Rousseau’s scheme between the state of nature and civilization. In many ways this was Rousseau’s real ideal and his construct of an alternative society was only developed because it is impossible to go back to a previous developmental stage. Another, more grievous omission is the total lack of reference to La Nouvelle Héloïse. As William Ray has put it in a recent article, “I consider Julie and Emile as two stages of a single pedagogical project.” Perhaps Weiss, as a political scientist, does not believe that fictional works should be studied in the same way as treatises. Finally, there is an almost complete lack of references to critical works by literary critics (the exception is Jean Starobinski). Had Weiss been aware of Lester Crocker’s important works on Rousseau, she would not have been so surprised at his antifeminism or his recourse to manipulation in both education and society. The tutor or legislator need to arrange things so that individuals can perceive themselves to be free. [End Page 184]Chapters Two, Three, and Four offer the reader a careful look at Rousseau’s aims and methods. Chapter Five gives possible replies that Rousseau might have given in the face of certain criticisms. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight are interesting from a feminist perspective. Despite its limitations Weiss’s book contains much that is useful and thought-provoking.Jean A. PerkinsSwarthmore CollegeCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Along with Husserl's Ideas and Heidegger's Being and Time, Being Given is one of the classic works of phenomenology in the twentieth century. Through readings of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, and twentieth-century French phenomenology (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Henry), it ventures a bold and decisive reappraisal of phenomenology and its possibilities. Its author's most original work to date, the book pushes phenomenology to its limits in an attempt to redefine and recover the phenomenological ideal, which the author argues has never (...) been realized in any of the historical phenomenologies. Against Husserl's reduction to consciousness and Heidegger's reduction to Dasein, the author proposes a third reduction to givenness, wherein phenomena appear unconditionally and show themselves from themselves at their own initiative. Being Given is the clearest, most systematic response to questions that have occupied its author for the better part of two decades. The book articulates a powerful set of concepts that should provoke new research in philosophy, religion, and art, as well as at the intersection of these disciplines. Some of the significant issues it treats include the phenomenological definition of the phenomenon, the redefinition of the gift in terms not of economy but of givenness, the nature of saturated phenomena, and the question “Who comes after the subject?” Throughout his consideration of these issues, the author carefully notes their significance for the increasingly popular fields of religious studies and philosophy of religion. Being Given is therefore indispensable reading for anyone interested in the question of the relation between the phenomenological and the theological in Marion and emergent French phenomenology. (shrink)

The emergence and development of convergent technologies for the purpose of improving human performance, including nanotechnology, biotechnology, information sciences, and cognitive science (NBICs), open up new horizons in the debates and moral arguments that must be engaged by philosophers who hope to take seriously the question of the ethical and social acceptability of these technologies. This article advances an analysis of the factors that contribute to confusion and discord on the topic, in order to help in understanding why arguments that (...) form a part of the debate between transhumanism and humanism result in a philosophical and ethical impasse: 1. The lack of clarity that emerges from the fact that any given argument deployed (arguments based on nature and human nature, dignity, the good life) can serve as the basis for both the positive and the negative evaluation of NBICs. 2. The impossibility of providing these arguments with foundations that will enable others to deem them acceptable. 3. The difficulty of applying these same arguments to a specific situation. 4. The ineffectiveness of moral argument in a democratic society. The present effort at communication about the difficulties of the argumentation process is intended as a necessary first step towards developing an interdisciplinary response to those difficulties. (shrink)

Givenness and Revelation represents both the unity and the deep continuity of Jean-Luc Marions thinking over many decades. This investigation into the origins and evolution of the concept of revelation arises from an initial reappraisal of the tension between natural theology and the revealed knowledge of God or sacra doctrina. Marion draws on the re-definition of the notions of possibility and impossibility, the critique of the reification of the subject, and the unpredictability of the event in its relationship to (...) the gift in order to assess the respective capacities of dogmatic theology, modern metaphysics, contemporary phenomenology, and the biblical texts, especially the New Testament, to conceive the paradoxical phenomenality of a revelation. This work thus brings us to the very heart and soul of Marions theology, concluding with a phenomenological approach to the Trinity that uncovers the logic of gift performed in the scriptural manifestation of Jesus Christ as Son of the Father. Givenness and Revelation enhances not only our understanding of religious experience, but enlarges the horizon of possibility of phenomenology itself. With a Foreword by Ramona Fotiade, Senior Lecturer in French, and David Jasper, Professor of Literature and Theology, both at the University of Glasgow. (shrink)

Violence works at the same time as what we find in the world according to our best description of reality, and as what we fight and reject, hoping for a more peaceful world. It may also be what we recommend, as the only way to change things, or even what we celebrate, as the key resource of true art. Sometimes we even think that adequate theory arises from violence against given paradigms. How can it be so? Do we really understand (...) what we refer to when we speak about violence? (shrink)

This article argues that there is a lack of theorizing about sexuality within social policy in what is referred to as the mainstream and more surprisingly within feminist social policy. This is particularly surprising given the presence of sexuality in recent as well as past social policies as well as in social theory. The purpose of this article is not merely to argue that a relationship between sexuality and social policy should be examined but rather to explore and outline the (...) specific nature of the relationship and its implications for both sexuality and the discipline of social policy. Specifically, how do prevalent sexuality discourses inform and constitute social policy and what are the social relations involved in this process? Correspondingly, what role does social policy play in constituting what we know to be the ‘truths’ of sexuality? What exclusions and inclusions result from these dominant social relations and discourses when ‘played’ through social policy? That sexuality has failed to be analytically incorporated within the discipline of social policy is addressed. First, reasons for the lack of theorizing are explored. Specifically, the historical development of the discipline and the formation of an implicit consensus about what constitute the real concerns of welfare. Second, there is an examination of the ways feminist social policy has or has not engaged with sexuality. The final section posits an emergent framework for integrating sexuality into social policy analyses and critiques. (shrink)

This paper is the text of a lecture given at Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski on 2 November 2023 at the invitation of Professor Irena Kristeva. Its purpose is to retrace the path of my research, from the question of the Animal in the eighteenth century to the theme, at the same time, of the environment associated with the construction of the modern Ego and which gave rise to my latest book published in 2020: Figures of the Self and the (...) Natural Environment in the Eighteenth Century. Throughout, the common thread remains to understand the link between these two processes and the new Anthropology being established at the time, whether in terms of the new definition of Man in general in relation to the Animal, or of the Self in relation to the natural Environment. At the same time, this sensitivity to Nature paved the way for our contemporary ecology, both scientific and political. (shrink)

L'œuf de ver à soie qui se prête à de nombreuses recherches génétiques et physiologiques a été assimilé à un volume géométrique simple afin qu'on puisse calculer aisément l'aire de sa surface totale et son volume. On a d'abord cherché à justifier le modèle géométrique proposé grâce à une étude expérimentale et statistique. On a ensuite établi les formules mathématiques utiles. Enfin on a discuté de l'approximation donnée par ces formules et de leur signification biologique.The egg of the silkworm which (...) permits a lot of genetical and physiological researches has been assimilated to a simple geometric volume, so that the area of its total surface and its volume might be easily calculated. First we have tried to justify the geometrical model which is proposed by means of an experimental and statistical study. We have then demonstrated the useful mathematical formulas. Finally we have discussed the approximation given by these formulas and their biological significance.Das Seidenraupenei, das viele genetische und physiologische Forschungen ermöglicht, hat man mit einem einfachen geometrischen Modell verglichen, um seine ganze Fläche und sein Volumen leicht rechnen zu können. Zuerst hat man versucht, das vorgeschlagene geometrische Modell dank einer experimentalen und statistischen Arbeit zu rechtfertigen. Dann sind die nötigen mathematischen Formeln festgesetzt worden. Zuletzt hat man die durch diese Formeln gegebenen Annäherungen und ihre biologischen Bedeutung erörtert. (shrink)

While examining the reception given by the media to the World Youth Day held in July 2002 in Toronto (Canada) as well as their promotion of the event, the author tries to draw the profile of the youth, and its links with catholic religion. The analysis of press articles published into two important Quebec daily newspapers allows the identification of different visions of the youth put forward by the media. It can be noticed that the emphasis put on youth heterogeneity (...) at the beginning quickly moves to the presentation of a homogeneous youth united around Pope John-Paul II. However, such a relation of youth toward Catholicism goes against research major conclusions on this topic. To this reception of the WYD by Quebec media, several explanations about, among others, mass media status, role, and functioning in our society are proposed. (shrink)

A total of 366 UK children in four different schools, one in Wales, one in Northern Ireland, and two in England, were asked to respond to 20 potentially stressful life experiences. Each event was rated on a scale ranging from 7 to 1 , and the scale value and interquartile range were calculated. In addition, whether or not a given event was actually experienced was noted. Across the groups, there was a very high degree of agreement on all three measures, (...) the median correlations being 0.95 for scale values, 0.70 for interquartile ranges, and 0.92 for incidence. Furthermore, the pooled UK results were found to correlate equally closely with the figures previously obtained in the USA and five other countries. The possibility of a prevalent ‘culture of childhood’, cutting across geo‐political boundaries and ethnic groupings, appears to receive further support. (shrink)

Human morality may be thought of as a negative feedback cotrol system in which moral rules are reference values, and moral disapproval, blame, and punishment are forms of negative feedback given for violations of the moral rules. In such a system, if moral agents held each other accountable, moral norms would be enforced effectively. However, even a properly functioning social negative feedback system could not explain acts in which individual agents uphold moral rules in the face of contrary social pressure. (...) Dr. Frances Kelsey, who withheld FDA approval for thalidomide against intense social pressure, is an example of the degree of individual moral autonomy possible in a hostile environment. Such extreme moral autonomy is possible only if there is internal, psychological negative feedback, in addition to external, social feedback. Such a cybernetic model of morality and moral autonomy is consistent with certain aspects of classical ethical theories. (shrink)

There is a new Bayesian, or probabilistic, paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, with new psychological accounts of the indicative conditional of natural language. In psychological experiments in this new paradigm, people judge that the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if A then C), is the conditional probability of C given A, P(C | A). In other experiments, participants respond with what has been called the 'de- fective' truth table: they judge that if A then C is true when A (...) holds and C holds, is false when A holds and C does not, and is neither true nor false when A does not hold. We argue that these responses are not 'defective' in any negative sense, as many psychologists have implied. We point out that a number of normative researchers, including de Finetti, have proposed such a table for various coherent interpretations of the third value. We review the relevant general tables in the normative literature, in which there is a third value for A and C and the logically compound forms of the natural language conditional, negation, conjunction, disjunction, and the material conditional. We describe the results of an experiment on which of these tables best describes ordinary people's judgements when the third value is interpreted as indicating uncertainty. (shrink)

SummaryThis essay concerns the concept of reality, considered in the perspective of physics. It tries to reconstruct the process of thought by which this concept is constituted. In this process, reality is transferred from the lived experience of existence, apprehended in the simple consciousness of oneself, to what gives itself, in experience, as an independent source of givenness, and finally to the world, as ultimate condition of the phenomena. In physics, we have to do with an approach of reality which (...) is in terms of representation and no more in terms of lived experience. But in contemporary physics the representation is intimately connected with our praxis. What is really described is not the manifest as such, but the manifestation . The discourse of representation is no more about the phenomena themselves but about the conditions in which the phenomenon constitutes itself as phenomenon. The discourse of physics becomes thus more and more transcendental. But it integrates the transcendental discourse in the representation, giving a concrete appresentation of the non‐representable process of the becoming manifest of reality. (shrink)

This paper shows that Aristotle's De Interpretatione does not separate syntax from semantics. Linguistic sentences are not syntactic entities, and non-linguistic meanings are not semantic propositions expressed by linguistic sentences. In fact, Aristotle resorts to a mental conception of meaning, distinguishing linguistic meanings in a given language from non-linguistic mental contents in relation to actual things: while the former are not the same for all, the latter are shared by everyone. Aristotle is not a modern logician, like Boole, Frege, or (...) Russell, in so far as a mental conception of meaning does not reveal an abstract semantics for a syntactic language. (shrink)

Psychological research on people’s understanding of natural language connectives has traditionally used truth table tasks, in which participants evaluate the truth or falsity of a compound sentence given the truth or falsity of its components in the framework of propositional logic. One perplexing result concerned the indicative conditional if A then C which was often evaluated as true when A and C are true, false when A is true and C is false but irrelevant“ (devoid of value) when A is (...) false (whatever the value of C). This was called the “psychological defective table of the conditional.” Here we show that far from being anomalous the “defective” table pattern reveals a coherent semantics for the basic connectives of natural language in a trivalent framework. This was done by establishing participants’ truth tables for negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional, and biconditional, when they were presented with statements that could be certainly true, certainly false, or neither. We review systems of three-valued tables from logic, linguistics, foundations of quantum mechanics, philosophical logic, and artificial intelligence, to see whether one of these systems adequately describes people’s interpretations of natural language connectives. We find that de Finetti’s (1936/1995) three-valued system is the best approximation to participants’ truth tables. (shrink)

The mechanism of emotions in Stoicism has been presented by Graver a decade ago as relying on a “pathetic syllogism” having as its premises a judgment about the goodness of a certain type of object and a judgment that it is proper to have a certain emotional response to that object. It is true that each emotion is an irrational impulse resulting not only from the opinion that something is good but also from the opinion that it is appropriate to (...) have a certain type of emotional response to that object, as shown by Graver. However, the present paper intends to present an alternative to Graver’s view by reducing the mechanism of emotion to the mechanism of all impulses: each impulse is an assent given to the impression that it is befitting for me to accomplish certain actions, and what Cicero and Stobaeus describe is not the combination of two premises resulting in an emotion as a conclusion, but the idea that it is necessary to give one’s assent to the impulsive impression to produce an emotion. Likewise, in Seneca, it is in such a way that a preliminary form of impulse is transformed into an emotion. A universal judgment about an object being good or a reaction being appropriate is certainly involved in certain emotions, but not in all of them, since many emotions depend on a fresh impression that overwhelms the general rational judgments of someone due to one’s insufficient mental preparation and to the weakness of one’s mind. In those cases, an emotion may involve the impression that a behaviour or a feeling is appropriate without endorsing the idea that it is universally good or appropriate, since the mechanism of the emotion relies on the vividness of one particular impression even against one’s system of beliefs. (shrink)

The question of the given is central to philosophy; phenomenology uses the method of reduction to find the given. This lecture asks whether there is anything that resists reduction, whether there is something irreducible. The author concludes that the phenomenology of givenness addresses the gap between what gives itself and what shows itself, so that the self of the phenomenon emerges only by the exercise of a properly phenomenological hermeneutics.

Through careful analysis of phenomenological texts by Husserl and Heidegger, Marion argues for the necessity of a third phenomenological reduction that concerns what is fully implied but left largely unthought by the phenomenologies of both ...

A great deal of thought has been given to the effects of information technology on reading, books and printed material. Its impact on writing, the production of texts, which is, however, the counterpart of reading, has not aroused the same interest. It is true that witnesses to the act of creation are less familiar objects than books or newspapers: in spite of the passion of the media and the educated public for writers’ manuscripts, these remain predominantly the prerogative of researchers (...) and are still rarely taken out of libraries and archive collections. In extremely literate Western societies, reading is an activity practised by large sectors of the population. The same cannot be said about writing as an active producer of texts, for this encompasses a much more limited group of professionals, and is thought, more or less, to require a special gift in its literary form. Written production is rather the hidden face of McLuhan's Gutenberg galaxy, and the commercial businesses which manufacture and distribute writing in its printed form are better known to the public than the mysterious secrets of creation. (shrink)

Academic popularizers of the new field of evolutionary psychology make notable appeals to William James to bolster their doctrine. In particular, they cite James’ remark that humans have all the “impulses” animals do and many more besides to shore up their claim that people’s “instincts” account for their flexibility. This essay argues that these scholars misinterpret James on the instincts. Consciousness (which they find inscrutable) explains cognitive flexibility for James. The evolutionary psychologists’ appeal to James is, therefore, unwarranted and, given (...) the conditions relevant to the public and professional audiences they address, also ineffective as a rhetorical tool for enlisting new recruits. (shrink)

This volume of twelve essays focuses on two interrelated issues. First it addresses the historical and cultural determinants that have given rise to what frequently has been described as 'the French exception': the unusually conflictual French political process inherited from the revolutionary past in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and its accompanying avant-gardism in artistic, literary and philosophical practice, both of which distinguish France from other European countries. Second, the contributors assess the exhaustion of this tradition in recent years - (...) noted prominently on the occasion of the celebration of the bicentennial of the Revolution in 1989 - in a progressive 'normalization' of French society that has been the final outcome of the liquidation of the colonial empire, the collapse of Marxism as a social force. (shrink)

In order to introduce the question of tbe « given » and of its elaboration with respect to the motifs of reduction, construction and destruction, we take as a point of departure the first courses of Heidegger at the University of Freiburg in the years 1919-1920. Framed by a sustained debate with the different figures of Neokantianism that occupied the forefront of the philosophical scene in Germany, Heidegger’s aim is to take up and to radicalize Husserl’s phenomenological enterprise indexed to (...) intuition of an ultimate givenness, through the question : « Was heißt “gegeben”, “Gegebenheit” — dieses Zauberwort der Phänomenologie und der “Stein des Anstoßes” bei den anderen ? » This project of taking Husserl’s phenomenlogy will lead Heidegger to reopen the ongoing debate between Husserl and Natorp about the method of reconstruction vs. reduction. So we could venture the hypothesis, according to which the Heideggerian theme of Destruktion “destruction” or “deconstruction,” if it does inherit a sense from the Husserlian Abbau , from the de-sedimentation of accumulated strata that have come to obstruct the grasp of insight , this theme could all the same be understood as the taking up again — in a practical reversal — Rekonstruktion, Natorpian reconstruction. (shrink)

It was a tenacious dream: the first language spoken by man was music, poetry and science, all at the same time. In the beginning the same word, given by God or dictated by Nature, stood for things, feelings and laws. And in the cherished image of this dawning faculty not only had the distinction between word and song, the difference between expressive power and objective designational power (or “referential function,” as the linguists say) not yet appeared, but the sacred and (...) profane uses of speech had not yet established their separate kingdoms: in the great festival of the earliest days each word was a celebrant and contained the substance of reality. The word, invested with an integral meaning, hit the mark and rejoiced at the contact. Everything to which man gave a name was a god to him or the delegate of a god, so that by virtue of a benevolent revelation or of an exact inspiration the earliest vocal expression combined the fullness of knowing with the musical fullness of its expressive power. But this language of Paradise, witness to an age when man was not separated from man or removed from Nature or from God, has long been forgotten, dismembered, dispersed. Multiple and incompatible idioms have taken its place. The clear light of meaning has become clouded. (shrink)

The question of Nietzsche's place in hermeneutics raises many questions: can Nietzsche's thought itself be characterized as "hermeneutical" and to what extent, given that hermeneutics was only developed as such after him? Can and should hermeneutics, which until recently did not take his thought much into account, incorporate Nietzsche's thought as a whole? Whereas a mutual fecundation will always be fruitful, this paper argues that one should resist a simple integration of Nietzsche into hermeneutics in light of their different understandings (...) of truth, interpretation and nihilism. It thus becomes possible to also resist the postmodern and nihilistic understanding of hermeneutics. Aware of their differences, hermeneutics and Nietzsche will perhaps have more to say to one another. (shrink)

This text is based on the lecture held by Jean-Luc Marion at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, on December 4., 2015. By thematizing the?limits of phenomenality?, Marion analyzes what exceeds the horizon of objectivity and the framework of subjectivity. By relying on some of the most important philosophers of the history of metaphysics, Marion offers an alternative way, namely, a phenomenology of givenness that focuses on saturated phenomena. nema.

Algebraic theories for extensive measurement are traditionally framed in terms of a binary relation $\lesssim $ and a concatenation (x,y)→ xy. For situations in which the data is "noisy," it is proposed here to consider each expression $y\lesssim x$ as symbolizing an event in a probability space. Denoting P(x,y) the probability of such an event, two theories are discussed corresponding to the two representing relations: p(x,y)=F[m(x)-m(y)], p(x,y)=F[m(x)/m(y)] with m(xy)=m(x)+m(y). Axiomatic analyses are given, and representation theorems are proven in detail.

In some situations, a decision is best represented by an incompletely analyzed act: conditionally on a given event A, the consequences of the decision on sub-events are perfectly known and uncertainty becomes probabilizable, whereas the plausibility of this event itself remains vague and the decision outcome on the complementary event ${\bar{A}}$ is imprecisely known. In this framework, we study an axiomatic decision model and prove a representation theorem. Resulting decision criteria aggregate partial evaluations consisting of (i) the conditional expected utility (...) associated with the analyzed part of the decision, and (ii) the best and worst consequences of its non-analyzed part. The representation theorem is consistent with a wide variety of decision criteria, which allows for expressing various degrees of knowledge on ( ${A, \bar{A}}$ ) and various types of attitude toward ambiguity and uncertainty. This diversity is taken into account by specific models already existing in the literature. We exploit this fact and propose some particular forms of our model incorporating these models as sub-models and moreover expressing various types of beliefs concerning the relative plausibility of the analyzed and the non-analyzed events ranging from probabilities to complete ignorance that include capacities. (shrink)

rights is a normative concept. This gives rise to three desiderata for conceptualising rights: first, given the wide variety of contexts in which rights are invoked, an account of rights must be su...

El problema del presente es abordado en su dimensión de realidad dada al hombre. En primer lugar, este articulo ahonda en el carácter impersonal del tiempo y en su condición contradictoria de lugar de entrega de lo dado: al presentarse el presente no hay ni donador ni beneficiario. En segundo lugar, declinando el sentido de la palabra francesa "maintenant", se evidencia el "ahora" como nulidad entre pasado y futuro; como intersticio dual en el que se alcanza y se pierde toda (...) cosa. Apoyándose en la concepción kantiana del tiempo y en la noción de donación de Derrida, el autor indica que el "ahora" es receptividad inmediata, intuitiva y no conceptual: en el presente el hombre se da y se recibe a si mismo. El presente, a la vez que constituye el espacio de la identidad, es también vector de diferencia: al hacerse signo a si mismo de sí mismo, el presente aparece como su propia alteridad. La duración del presente, por expresar la relación del hombre consigo mismo, es signo de alternancia entre llegada y partida; entre muerte y reparación. En fin, se analizan las mutaciones del sentido que se le ha dado a la noción de promesa en la historia de Occidente, entendida como la experiencia de la proyección del ahora hacia el porvenir. The problem of present is analyzed as a reality given to man. First, the impersonal character of time is studied in its contradictory condition of opening place of giving: when present appears, there is not a giver, nor a receiver. In the second place, by considering the etymological sense of the French word "maintenant", it is showed that the "now" is a nullity between past and future, a dual interstice in which everything is reached or lost. Following the Kantian conception of time and the Derridian notion of "donation", the author highlights that the "now" is immediate receptivity, intuitive and not conceptual: in the present, man gives himself to himself and receives himself from himself. The present, at the same time that it constitutes the space of identity, it is also the vector of difference: when it becomes a sign to himself of himself, the present appears as his own alterity. The present duration, as it traduces the relation of man with himself, is a sign of alternation between coming and leaving; between dead and reparation. Finally, the mutations in the meaning of the notion of "promise" in Western history are investigated and understood as the experience of the now projected towards the future. (shrink)

A solution of the zeno paradoxes in terms of a discrete space is usually rejected on the basis of an argument formulated by hermann weyl, The so-Called tile argument. This note shows that, Given a set of reasonable assumptions for a discrete geometry, The weyl argument does not apply. The crucial step is to stress the importance of the nonzero width of a line. The pythagorean theorem is shown to hold for arbitrary right triangles.

This edited collection explores the philosophy of Clarence Irving Lewis through two major concepts that are integral to his conceptual pragmatism: the a priori and the given. The relation between these two elements of knowledge form the core of Lewis’s masterpiece _Mind and the World-Order_. While Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism is directed against any conception of the _a priori_ as constraining the mind and experience, it also emphasizes the inalterability and the unavoidability of the given that remains the same through any (...) interpretation of it by the mind. The essays in this volume probe Lewis’s new account of the relation between the a priori and the given in dialogue with other notable figures in 20 th -century philosophy, including Carnap, Friedman, Goodman, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Sellars, and Sheffer. _C.I. Lewis’s Conceptual Pragmatism_ __represents a focused treatment of a long-neglected figure in 20 th -century American philosophy. (shrink)

These lectures on logic, more specifically proof theory, are basically intended for postgraduate students and researchers in logic. The question at stake is the nature of mathematical knowledge and the difference between a question and an answer, i.e., the implicit and the explicit. The problem is delicate mathematically and philosophically as well: the relation between a question and its answer is a sort of equality where one side is ``more equal than the other'': one thus discovers essentialist blind spots. Starting (...) with Godel's paradox --so to speak, the incompleteness of answers with respect to questions--the book proceeds with paradigms inherited from Gentzen's cut-elimination. Various settings are studied: sequent calculus, natural deduction, lambda calculi, category-theoretic composition, up to geometry of interaction, all devoted to explicitation, which eventually amounts to inverting an operator in a von Neumann algebra. Mathematical language is usually described as referring to a preexisting reality. Logical operations can be given an alternative procedural meaning: typically, the operators involved in GoI are invertible, not because they are constructed according to the book, but because logical rules are those ensuring invertibility. Similarly, the durability of truth should not be taken for granted: one should distinguish between imperfect and perfect modes. The procedural explanation of the infinite thus identifies it with the unfinished, i.e., the perennial. But is perenniality perennial? This questioning yields a possible logical explanation for algorithmic complexity. This highly original course on logic by one of the world's leading proof theorists challenges mathematicians, computer scientists, physicists, and philosophers to rethink their views and concepts on the nature of mathematical knowledge in an exceptionally profound way. (shrink)

In Brazil, the CNPq provides grants, funds and fellowships to productive scientists to support their investigations. They are ranked and categorized into four hierarchical levels ranging from PQ 1A to PQ 1D. Few studies, however, report and analyse scientific productivity in different sub-fields of Biomedical Sciences, e.g., Biochemistry, Pharmacology, Biophysics and Physiology. In fact, systematic comparisons of productivity among the PQ 1 categories within the above sub-fields are lacking in the literature. Here, the scientific productivity of 323 investigators receiving PQ (...) 1 fellowships in these sub-fields of BS was investigated. The Scopus database was used to compile the total number of articles, citations, h-index values and authorship positions in the most cited papers by researchers granted CNPq fellowships. We found that researchers from Pharmacology had the best performance for all of the parameters analysed, followed by those in Biochemistry. There was great variability in scientific productivity within the PQ 1A level in all of the sub-fields of BS, but not within the other levels. Analysis of the most cited papers of PQ 1 researchers in Pharmacology revealed that the citations of researchers in the 1C and 1D levels were associated with publications with their senior supervisors, whereas those in the 1B level were less connected with their supervisors in comparison to those in 1A. Taken together, these findings suggest that the scientific performance of PQ 1A researchers in BS is not homogenous. In our opinion, parameters such as the most cited papers without the involvement of Ph.D. and/or post-doctoral supervisors should be used to make decisions regarding any given researcher’s fellowship award level. (shrink)

A part les contraintes imposées aux décisions publiques par 1a mobilité, l’analyse reçue des choix publics postule que le processus politique fonctionne essentiellement de la même façon en régime fédéral qu’en régime unitaire. Il s’avère cependant qu’il existe une dimension du processus politique en régime fédéral qui se prête spécifiquement à l’analyse économique, nommément le fait que, là où les fonctions se recoupent dans un même territoire, il se trouve deux niveaux de gouvernement qui se concurrencent dans l’offre des mêmes (...) services à un même groupe de votants. Si alors on définit les votes comme des inputs dans la production d’outputs politiques, on se trouve en situation de concurrence par deux offreurs ou plus visà- vis d’une même ressource placée en propriété commune. On peut supposer que l’analyse conventionnelle de l’allocation des ressources en régime de propriété commune puisse jeter un éclairage sur l’aboutissement du processus politique fédéral. Dans ces conditions, il y va de l’intérêt de chacun des deux offreurs de chercher à s’attirer les votes et donc d’être le premier à offrir l’output politique en question. En l’absence de droits exclusifs sur le bassin de votes, le chevauchement amène les deux joueurs à vouloir réaliser le profit politique, de crainte de le perdre à l’avantage de l’autre partie. Et pourtant, le profit s’en trouvera ultimement dissipé ex post pour les deux parties après l’avènement du deuxième joueur. On découvre ainsi que les forces mises en branle dans un régime fédéral type sont de deux ordres : une force restrictionniste d’abord, fondée sur la mobilité des ressources entre les entités décentralisées, et une force expansionniste liée à la dynamique politique étudiée dans ces lignes. Ce résultat peut expliquer pourquoi le dossier empirique reste ambigu sur la contribution du fédéralisme au freinage de la croissance du secteur public. Les conséquences de ce processus sont dégagées et les avenues possibles de solution explorées.Except for the mobility constraints imposed on political decisions of lowerlevel governments, public choice analysts assume that the working of the political process under federalism remains the same at all levels of government as under unitary state. This paper argues that one dimension of the political process in a federalist framework lends itself to specific economic analysis, namely the fact that, once constitutional limits break down and functions overlap, two or more levels of government compete for the same voters in the supply of services in a given territory.Viewing votes as inputs in the production of political outputs, the conventional analysis of allocation under cnmmon-property rule should shed light on the outcome of this process. The analysis shows that it is in the interest of both suppliers to seek to gain the votes in being first to implement programs.There are thus two forces operating in a typical federalist system, an expansionist one rooted in the political dynamics analyzed here, and a restrictionist one based on the mobility of resources among decentralized entities. This may explain why the empirical record is rather mixed on the contribution of federalism to containing government growth. The consequences of this process are derived and possible avenues for improvement are explored. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Edmund Husserl’s Influence on Karl Jaspers’s Phenomenology”Jean Naudin (bio) and Jean-Michel Azorin (bio)Keywordsphenomenology, intentionality, intuition, empathy, ambiguitySchwartz and Wiggins’s paper clearly shows that Jaspers’s comprehensive psychiatry draws mainly from Husserl’s phenomenology. This thesis enters a current debate opened by Chris Walker and German Berrios about the influence of Husserlian philosophy on Jaspers’s work. This debate, which emerged at the end of the so-called decade of (...) the brain, could be considered perfectly obsolete. But its topicality relies on taking up the challenge of the scientific bases of comprehension in psychiatric experience. Wiggins and Schwartz perfectly achieve this aim by opposing a theory of seeing and a theory of thinking. Works such as Walker’s are grounded on thinking; they are works about theory. They are not works about experience, but rather epistemological or historical works. In contrast, Wiggins and Schwartz suggest to see, as Jaspers did, and not to think, following Husserl by grounding their psychopathology on intuition and presuppositionlessness. They emphasize Jaspers’s method of “making present” by doing a perfect analysis of the issues of translation of vergegenwärtigung as a co-experiencing of mental processes as if they were directly given. These main principles of direct-givenness, presuppositionlessness, and making present pull the Jaspersian concepts to the Husserlian phenomenological reduction and seem like the foremost principle in Husserlian phenomenology: the intuition of the thing in itself. Whereas Jaspers refuted the principle of eidetic reduction, Wiggins and Schwartz clearly show how much he grounded on the basis of the concept of intentionality, discovered and enlightened during Husserl’s life within the horizon of phenomenological reduction. Actually, it seems that the authors take the side of Jaspers to better support their own vision of psychiatric experience, which they more explicitly argued in Husserlian terms of the later period in some other papers (Schwartz and Wiggins 1985; Wiggins and Schwartz 1988, 1991; Wiggins, Schwartz, and Northoff 1990). However, they take care here to struggle exclusively with the epistemological field of their opponents, considering only Jaspers’s own writings and the Husserlian texts that were accessible to Jaspers when he wrote his psychopathology. There is no room for Kant in Jaspers’s main [End Page 37] principles, and this assumption must lead us to consider the horizon opened by Jaspers, that is, the horizon of a science of meaning essentially built on the lived experiences and the bracketing of any kind of a priori. In contrast to the slight influence of Kant, one idea that emerges is that of the straight impact of Dilthey on both Jaspers and Husserl. We perfectly agree with Wiggins and Schwartz that Jaspers, grounding both on Husserl and Dilthey, arrives at a methodological principle that is all his own, by considering both the connections of the life-stories and the objectivity of symptoms. In other words, we can find the originality and maybe the astonishing modernity of Jaspers in his perfect description of the balance between comprehension and observation, between empathy and its limits, that are obviously found in psychotic processes.We thus focused our comments on the following critiques to Jaspers, although they were already well argued in the brief conclusion of Wiggins and Schwartz: (a) the issue of empathy, (b) the limits of Jaspersian phenomenology, and (c) the merits of its genuine ambiguity.The Issue of Empathy. Indeed we have no reliable scientific mean to guarantee the correctness of our intuitions of the other’s mental life, and this problem might lead one to globally reject the method. The discussion of this problem, classical in the Continental literature since the twenties, led the Continental psychiatrists to unfortunately abandon their own traditions. And it is surprising for a Continental psychiatrist to see this debate coming back into the English-speaking literature. When we address the issue of empathy, we have no easy means to abandon folk psychology. Using philosophical slang weakens the attempt to enlighten its foundations instead of describing its values. The suspicion regarding empathy is partially legitimated by the prejudices of Jaspers himself. As psychiatrists, we have to carry on the Jaspersian research by progressively abandoning it and coming back... (shrink)

Chance comes into plays at many levels of the explanation of the evolutionary process; but the unity of sense of this category is problematic. The purpose of this talk is to clarify the meaning of chance at various levels in evolutionary theory: mutations, genetic drift, genetic revolutions, ecosystems, macroevolution. Three main concepts of chance are found at these various levels: luck (popular concept), randomness (probabilistic concept), and contingency relative to a given theoretical system (epistemological concept). After identifying which concept(s) of (...) chance fit(s) with these levels, the question is raised whether these concepts can be reduced to a smaller number, and whether chance in evolutionary theory has a subjective or an objective sense. (shrink)

Husserlian reduction is a rigorous method for describing the foundations of psychiatric experience. With Jaspers we consider three main principles inspired by phenomenological reduction: direct givenness, absence of presuppositions, re-presentation. But with Binswanger alone we refer to eidetic and transcendental reduction: to establish a critical epistemology; to directly investigate the constitutive processes of mental phenomena and their disturbances, freed from their nosological background; to question the constitution of our own experience when facing a person with mental illness. Regarding the last (...) item, we suggest a specific kind of reduction, typically intersubjective from the start, which we call the ‘looking-glass reduction'. The schizophrenic experience -- understood as a ‘loss of taken-for-grantedness’ implying the constitutions of the body, of the other, and of internal time -- is a real ‘epochal provocation’ for the psychiatrist. As the horizon it opens seems to be both corporeal and narrative, this ‘provoking’ of an epoche in the attitude of the psychiatrist himself and the resistances it implies raise important issues regarding the general constitution of human experience. (shrink)

This essays deals with Heidegger’s concept of “Thing”, as sketched in the 1950 lecture Das Ding.In Being and Time, Heidegger had worked out a concept of “tool”, Zeug, which vanished in later works. The Heideggerian “thing” is undeniably more than a “tool”. The author argues than beings viz. phenomena are actually given to us which oppose the logic of “thinghood” while transcending the logic of “toolhood”: Flemish painting is used as an example of phenomena which overcome the affective reality of (...) being-in-the-world without respecting the mode of appearing proper to things. Another witness is summoned, sacramental experience: a phenomenological description of what is given to see and feel during the Eucharistic liturgy aims at showing that being-in-the-world and “being in the Fourfold” can be put into brackets in such an event, and that it must be the case for such an event to be understood. (shrink)

It is unquestionable that the European Parliament has contributed to the creation of a community policy in environmental matters and has given all its support to the first initiatives of the Community in thisrespect. Furthermore, it has adopted a series of specific resolutions. The European Parliament has not had a decisive infiuence, however, in the implementation of the Action Programme of the Community by the adoption of directives. Although the Commission generally approved suggestions made by parliamentarians, the Council hardly ever (...) followed them through. Through the procedure of parliamentary questions, possibly followed by the adoption of a resolution, the Parliament has nevertheless contributed to making a number of problems known. In future, strengthening of the moral «authority» of the European Parliament by the very fact of its being directly elected seems to be of crucial importance. On the other hand it is conceivable that a great number of procedural changes in the Community can and must further the development of the European Parliament's role in environmentalpolicies. (shrink)

This paper presents a challenge to enactivist approaches to cognition (e.g. Ward, D., Silverman, D. & Villalobos, M. 2017) that is based on the theoretical commitments behind forms of looking time studies that have been extensively used to probe into the cognitive abilities of infants and nonhuman animals. I briefly summarize the Violation of Expectation (VoE) paradigm (Ginnobili & Olmos 2021) to illustrate why such methods might pose a problem for enactivists and their conception of cognition as a largely representation-free (...) dynamic coupling between organism and environment. I argue that despite the lack of clarity regarding how the notion of expectation should be applied to the minds of neonates and nonhuman animals, there is an inherently representational aspect to expectation, given that it embodies satisfaction conditions. The challenge is, then: given that many forms of enactivism seem to reject the notion of representationas it is used in the VoE literature, how can enactivists make sense of data and results obtained using such research methods? (shrink)

This article starts, on the one hand, with a consideration of the paradoxical way in which, namely when he wanted to evoke those intellectual figures that have decidedly contributed to the revelation of the "true Pascal", i. e., of the Pascal that had known the good usage of reason, Fortunat Strowski comes to the idea of putting side by side Pierre Duhem and Leon Brunschvicg. On the other, a reference is made to the fact that Duhem only published two articles (...) and a preface on Pascal while Brunschvicg is the author of a major work on the great figure of the XVIIth -Century. Hence, the question raised is about the consideration that shall be given to a paradoxical affirmation that seems to place on equal terms the few pages that Duhem has written on Pascal with the imposing contributions of Brunschvicg. For the author of the article, it would not be very consequent to take such affirmations as if they were unreflected ones, since it is clear that Strowski knew exactly what he was writing as we can see from the very good knowledge he had of the writings of both Blaise Pascal and Pierre Duhem. Indeed, and more than anyone else, Strowski was in a very good position to enlighten us about these two thinkers and to write about them in the terms he effectively did. The goal of the article, therefore, is to justify that assertion, which on its face is quite paradoxical, by showing in concrete terms the extent to which Pierre Duhem was truly influenced by Blaise Pascal. ––– O presente artigo começa por realçar o modo paradoxal como, uma vez que ele se dá ao trabalho de evocar aqueles autores que contribuíram para a revelação do verdadeiro Pascal, ou seja, daquele que conheceu o bom uso da razão, Fortunat Strowski não hesita em colocar o nome de Pierre Duhem lado a lado com o de Léon Brunschvicg. O facto, porém, é que Pierre Duhem não fez mais do que publicar dois artigos e um prefácio sobre Blaise Pascal, ao passo que Brunschvicg lhe dedicou uma obra que haveria de ficar famosa. O problema, portanto, consiste em saber qual o valor que se deve atribuir a uma tal afirmação desconcertante, a qual parece simplesmente equalizar as poucas páginas de Duhem sobre Pascal com as imponentes contribuições de Brunschvicg. Nesse sentido, a estratégia do autor do artigo consiste em não tomar de forma ligeira uma tal afirmação, como se Strowski não tivesse considerado bem as consequências e o alcance daquilo que escrevia, pois a verdade é que ele conhecia não só a obra de Pascal mas também a de Duhem. Ou seja, mais do que ninguém, ele estava perfeitamente à altura de nos comunicar algo de substancial acerca de cada um destes pensadores e de escrever a seu propósito aquilo que ele efectivamente escreveu. Em suma, o presente artigo não tem outra pretensão que não a de justificar essa afirmação aparentemente paradoxal segundo a qual Pierre Duhem foi um verdadeiro pascaliano. (shrink)

In this paper we address some central problems of combination of logics through the study of a very simple but highly informative case, the combination of the logics of disjunction and conjunction. At first it seems that it would be very easy to combine such logics, but the following problem arises: if we combine these logics in a straightforward way, distributivity holds. On the other hand, distributivity does not arise if we use the usual notion of extension between consequence relations. (...) A detailed discussion about this phenomenon, as well as some possible solutions for it, are given. (shrink)

This edited collection explores the philosophy of Clarence Irving Lewis through two major concepts that are integral to his conceptual pragmatism: the a priori and the given. The relation between these two elements of knowledge form the core of Lewis's masterpiece Mind and the World-Order. While Lewis's conceptual pragmatism is directed against any conception of the a priori as constraining the mind and experience, it also emphasizes the inalterability and the unavoidability of the given that remains the same through any (...) interpretation of it by the mind. The essays in this volume probe Lewis's new account of the relation between the a priori and the given in dialogue with other notable figures in 20th-century philosophy, including Carnap, Friedman, Goodman, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Sellars, and Sheffer. C.I. Lewis: The A Priori and the Given represents a focused treatment of a long-neglected figure in 20th-century American philosophy. (shrink)

The phenomenological origins of the concept of givenness -- Remarks on the origins of Gegebenheit in Heidegger's thought -- Substitution and solicitude: how Levinas re-reads Heidegger -- Sketch of a phenomenological concept of sacrifice.

A translation of the lecture given by Jean-Luc Nancy at the conference ‘Left Theory for the twenty-first century’, organized by Costas Douzinas and Michalis Bartsidis at the Nicos Poulantzas Institute in Athens on 14 January 2021. Initial translation by Ioanna Bartsidi.