Kant’s theory is especially instructive because he was logically more acute than many of his successors; and his awareness of the difficulties of his position was correspondingly higher. This leads him to a rich and complex theory of aesthetic appreciation which, because of the inherent difficulties in stating an internalist position, has its share of the ambiguities. Kant’s overall framework is so clear, however, that we shall go into some of the crucial ambiguities and argue against his theory under the (...) various resulting interpretations since these seem nearly exhaustive of the possible internalist positions. Ever since Kant presented his theory as overcoming the logical and skeptical difficulties of aesthetics, his position has left us with the myth that an internalist account of aesthetic appreciation and evaluation is philosophically defensible. This myth has been believed by too many theorists of art and aesthetics. One could argue, for example, that the expression theory of art is the progeny of, and dependent upon, Kant’s myth. Obviously then, it is important to re-examine the logic of Kant’s position, for a good bit of subsequent theorizing has been built on the same foundation, though without the care displayed by Kant. Hopefully, some of our arguments against Kant will be equally applicable to Kant’s progeny; therefore, we sometimes consider more than one interpretation of what view Kant might be holding. Our aim is not so much to arrive at the "correct" interpretation of Kant himself as it is to explore the logic of the internalist position. (shrink)

In the canonical view of the corporation, management is the agent of the owners of the corporation-the stockholders-and, as such, has a fiduciary duty to manage the corporation in their best interests. Most business ethicists condemn this arrangement as morally indefensible because it fails to respect the right of other corporate constituencies or “stakeholders” to self-deterrnination. By contrast, the modern agency theory of the firm provides a defense of this arrangement on the grounds that it is the result of stakeholders’ (...) right to self-determination. This paper uses the exarnple of managers’ fiduciary duty to stockholders to argue that different normative judgrnents often mask empirical disagreements. (shrink)

Can we achieve greater fairness by reforming the corporation? Some recent progressive critics of the corporation arguethat we can achieve greater social justice both inside and outside the corporation by simply rewriting or reinterpreting corporate rulesto favor non-stockholders over stockholders. But the progressive program for reforming the corporation rests on a critical assumption,which I challenge in this essay, namely that the rules of the corporation matter, so that changing them can effect a lasting redistribution of wealth from stockholders to non-stockholders. (...) This essay uses a critique of the progressive reform program to argue that the rules ofthe corporation are distributively neutral. The corporation isn't rigged against non-stockholders, and changing its rules will not improve the bargaining power of non-stockholders. However, while the rules may be epiphenomenal from the standpoint of distributive justice, they can have substantial impacts on the corporation's efficiency. As a result, the proposed reforms may hurt the corporation's capacity to generate benefits for all the parties concerned. (shrink)

In a commercial society, said Adam Smith, “every man becomes in some measure a merchant.” If Smith is right, what does that mean for the character of the society? This paper addresses the character forming effects of the market—and, specifically its impact on the “virtues.” There is a long tradition of viewing commerce as subversive of the virtues. In this view, the market is held to have legitimated the pursuit of narrow self-interest at the expense of social and civic obligations (...) and moral restraints. But, as Albert Hirschman has shown, many Enlightenment moralists saw commercial society as a moralizing force. Which view is right? This paper examines how many of the character traits that we commonly call virtues are rewarded— and so presumably reinforced and diffused—by the market. In this way, the market (as it were by a hidden hand) strengthens its own foundations and reproduces a moral culture that is functional to its own needs. (shrink)

Moralists tend to have a low opinion of self-interest. It is seen as force that has to be controlled or transcended. This essay tries to get beyond the bifurcation of human motivations into self-interest (which is seen as vicious or non-moral) and concern for others (which is virtuous). It argues that there are some surprising affinities between self-interest and morality. Notably the principal force that checks self-interest is self-interest itself. Consequently, self-interest often coincides with and reinforces the commands of morality (...) and promotes civility and consideration for others. Therefore it provides us with resources for constructing a more humane and civil society. (shrink)

This paper examines recent communitarian writing about the market. Much of this work explains the loss of community in our times as a result of the expansion of the market and market values. As the market has invaded other domains, such as family andneighborhood, relationships there have become infected by the instability and transience that characterize market relations. Centralto this critique of the market is the view that the market is unable to sustain lasting commitments. This paper tests this hypothesis (...) byexamining the fate of the family—the paradigmatic case of commitment—in three separate historical periods when market orcommercial values were especially dominant. It then extends the analysis to two other component institutions of community—voluntaryand charitable activities. Finally, it examines institutions where so-called market values should presumably hold unchallenged sway,namely in the work place and the marketplace. The paper finds that communitarian values appear to thrive in market society. Instead ofbeing a juggernaut the market may be an endangered species. (shrink)

Our fast-paced society does not approve of solitude; being alone is antisocial and some even find it sinister. Why is this so when autonomy, personal freedom and individualism are more highly prized than ever before? Sara Maitland answers this question by exploring changing attitudes throughout history. Offering experiments and strategies for overturning our fear of solitude, she to helps us to practice it without anxiety and encourages us to see the benefits of spending time by ourselves. By indulging in (...) the experience of being alone, we can be inspired to find our own rewards and ultimately lead more enriched, fuller live. - The School of Life is dedicated to exploring life's big questions: How can we fulfill our potential? Can work be inspiring? Why does community matter? Can relationships last a lifetime? We don't have all the answers, but we will direct you toward a variety of useful ideas--from philosophy to literature, from psychology to the visual arts--that are guaranteed to stimulate, provoke, nourish, and console. (shrink)

The view of business ethics that Christopher McMahon calls the “implicit morality of the market” and Joseph Heath calls the “market failures approach” has received a significant amount of recent attention. The idea of this view is that we can derive an ethics for market participants by thinking about the “point” of market activity, and asking what the world would have to be like for this point to be realized. While this view has been much-discussed, it is still not well-understood. (...) This paper seeks to remedy this problem. I begin by showing, against some recent commentators, that McMahon’s view and Heath’s view are fundamentally the same. Second, I clarify the sense of “efficiency” at work in the market failures approach. Finally, I argue that, in its current form, this view has little relevance to the real world of business. I conclude by sketching two ways of modifying it to fit our world. (shrink)

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity poses a serious philosophical problem. On the one hand, it seems to imply that there is exactly one divine being; on the other hand, it seems to imply that there are three. There is another well-known philosophical problem that presents us with a similar sort of tension: the problem of material constitution. We argue in this paper that a relatively neglected solution to the problem of material constitution can be developed into a novel solution (...) to the problem of the Trinity. (shrink)

It has been proposed that inferring personal authorship for an event gives rise to intentional binding, a perceptual illusion in which one’s action and inferred effect seem closer in time than they otherwise would . Using a novel, naturalistic paradigm, we conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis and examine the relationship between binding and self-reported authorship. In both experiments, an important authorship indicator – consistency between one’s action and a subsequent event – was manipulated, and its effects on binding (...) and self-reported authorship were measured. Results showed that action-event consistency enhanced both binding and self-reported authorship, supporting the hypothesis that binding arises from an inference of authorship. At the same time, evidence for a dissociation emerged, with consistency having a more robust effect on self-reports than on binding. Taken together, these results suggest that binding and self-reports reveal different aspects of the sense of authorship. (shrink)

The sea god Poseidon is taken for granted as such in Classical Greek literature and iconography. Yet one does not have to look far in the literary or iconographical sources to find material that conveys a somewhat different impression. This has been noticed, and in the past there have been some interesting attempts to surmise Poseidon's origins and significance from the evidence at hand. This paper is not an attempt to reconstruct a putative Mycenaean deity, but will examine certain episodes (...) of the Homeric Iliad to suggest possible reasons for the inconsistencies and anomalies that appear. (shrink)

Originally published in 1920 as part of a series of handbooks for teachers, this book of advice to history teachers is still full of practical information on the use of historical sources and possible classroom exercises designed to engage children with the study of the past. This book will be useful to anyone with an interest in the history of education, historical education in particular.

The focus of this paper will be the critical material in the particular Life of Thucydides which is attributed to ‘Marcellinus’.1 After some preliminary remarks about the extant Lives, I shall identify the critical material to be discussed, and proceed to examine its composition and possible origin. I shall suggest that, like the biographical material, the critical passages are a compilation of material from different sources and show a variety of approaches. In discussing these approaches, I shall show that the (...) critical passages contain different emphases, analytical skills and priorities, and vocabulary. (shrink)

Unless one is a pacifist there is little difficulty in theory in ethically justifying a country’s entitlement to produce or to purchase, or even to market, weapons for the preservation of internal order or external peace. In practice, however, the international arms industry gives considerable cause for ethical misgivings, which are here explored. “It is difficult to escape from the notion that the primary factor behind the international sale of arms is the generation of profits. If companies are left unchecked, (...) there is considerable evidence that companies will exploit commercial opportunities to the detriment of ethical considerations.”. (shrink)

Few notions are more central to Aquinas’s thought than those of matter and form. Although he invokes these notions in a number of different contexts, and puts them to a number of different uses, he always assumes that in their primary or basic sense they are correlative both with each other and with the notion of a “hylomorphic compound”—that is, a compound of matter (hyle) and form (morphe). Thus, matter is an entity that can have form, form is an entity (...) that can be had by matter, and a hylomorphic compound is an entity that exists when the potentiality of some matter to have form is actualized.1 What is more, Aquinas assumes that the matter of a hylomorphic compound explains certain of its general characteristics, whereas its form explains certain of its more specific characteristics. Thus, the matter of a bronze statue explains the fact that it is bronze, whereas its form explains the fact that it is a statue. Again, the matter of a human being explains the fact that it is a material object, whereas its form explains the specific type of material object it is (namely, human). My aim in this chapter is to provide a systematic introduction to Aquinas’s primary or basic notions of matter and form. To accomplish this aim, I focus on the two main theoretical contexts in which he deploys them—namely, his theory of change and his theory of individuation. In both contexts, as we shall see, Aquinas appeals to matter and form to account for relations of sameness and difference holding between distinct individuals. (shrink)

The purpose of this entry is to provide a systematic introduction to medieval views about the nature and ontological status of relations. Given the current state of our knowledge of medieval philosophy, especially with regard to relations, it is not possible to discuss all the nuances of even the best known medieval philosophers' views. In what follows, therefore, we shall restrict our aim to identifying and describing (a) the main types of position that were developed during the Middle Ages, and (...) (b) the most important considerations that shaped their development. We shall have occasion along the way, however, to examine in detail certain aspects of the views of important representatives of all the main medieval positions, including Peter Abelard (1079 1142), Gilbert of Poitiers (1085 1154), Albert the Great, (1200 1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225 1274), John Duns Scotus (1265 1308), Henry Harclay (1270 1317), Peter Auriol (1280 1322), and William Ockham (1285 1347). (shrink)

The Tree of Life hypothesis frames the evolutionary process as a series of events whereby lineages diverge from one another, thus creating the diversity of life as descendent lineages modify properties from their ancestors. This hypothesis is under scrutiny due to the strong evidence for lateral gene transfer between distantly related bacterial taxa, thereby providing extant taxa with more than one parent. As a result, one argues, the Tree of Life becomes confounded as the original branching structure is gradually superseded (...) by reticulation, ultimately losing its ability to serve as a model for bacterial evolution. Here we address a more fundamental issue: is there a Tree of Life that results from bacterial evolution without considering such lateral gene transfers? Unlike eukaryotic speciation events, lineage separation in bacteria is a gradual process that occurs over tens of millions of years, whereby genetic isolation is established on a gene-by-gene basis. As a result, groups of closely related bacteria, while showing robust genetic isolation as extant lineages, were not created by an unambiguous series of lineage-splitting events. Rather, a temporal fragmentation of the speciation process results in cognate genes showing different genetic relationships. We argue that lineage divergence in bacteria does not produce a tree-like framework, and inferences drawn from such a framework have the potential to be incorrect and misleading. Therefore, the Tree of Life is an inappropriate paradigm for bacterial evolution regardless of the extent of gene transfer between distantly related taxa. (shrink)

Belief in free will is widespread. The present research considered one reason why people may believe that actions are freely chosen rather than determined: they attribute randomness in behavior to free will. Experiment 1 found that participants who were prompted to perform a random sequence of actions experienced their behavior as more freely chosen than those who were prompted to perform a deterministic sequence. Likewise, Experiment 2 found that, all else equal, the behavior of animated agents was perceived to be (...) more freely chosen if it consisted of a random sequence of actions than if it consisted of a deterministic sequence; this was true even when the degree of randomness in agents’ behavior was largely a product of their environments. Together, these findings suggest that randomness in behavior—one’s own or another’s—can be mistaken for free will. (shrink)

Theology is the preeminent academic discipline during the Middle Ages and, as a result, most of great thinkers of this period are highly trained theologians. Although this is common knowledge, it is sometimes overlooked that the systematic nature of medieval theology led its practitioners to develop full treatments of virtually every area within philosophy. Indeed, theological reflection not only provides the main context in which the medievals theorize about what we would now recognize as distinctively philosophical issues, but it is (...) responsible for some of their most significant philosophical contributions. To give just a few examples: it is problems with the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation that prompt medievals to develop the notions of ‘substance’ and ‘person’ in striking and original ways; it is problems with the doctrine of the Eucharist that lead them to consider the possibility of ‘accidents that do not inhere’; and it is problems of.. (shrink)

Feminist legal scholarship has questioned the usefulness of non-consent as a criterion for rape. Under conditions of generalized sexual oppression, consent may not be an adequate for absence of coercion. I defend this argument and propose that rape law reform can be usefully informed by state protection of workers in the capitalist labor market, where it is assumed that the parties occupy an unequal bargaining position.

The doctrine of the Trinity poses a deep and difficult problem. On the one hand, it says that there are three distinct Persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—and that each of these Persons “is God”. On the other hand, it says that there is one and only one God. So it appears to involve a contradiction. It seems to say that there is exactly one divine being, and also that there is more than one. How are we to make sense of (...) this? (shrink)

Peter Abelard is one of the greatest philosophers of the medieval period. Although best known for his views about universals and his dramatic love affair with Heloise, he made a number of important contributions in metaphysics, logic, philosophy of language, mind and cognition, philosophical theology, ethics, and literature. The essays in this volume survey the entire range of Abelard's thought, and examine his overall achievement in its intellectual and historical context. They also trace Abelard's influence on later thought and his (...) relevance to philosophical debates today. (shrink)

Constitutional interpretation is problematic because it can be difficult to distinguish legitimate interpretation from illegitimate change. The distinction depends largely on what a constitution is. A constitution, like any other law, necessarily has a meaning, which pre-exists judicial interpretation: it is not a set of meaningless marks on paper. Any plausible constitutional theory must offer an account of the nature of that meaning. In doing so, it must address two main questions. The first is whether the meaning of the constitution (...) is given solely by its words, or also by additional evidence of underlying intentions, purposes or values. The second question is whether, in either case, its meaning is determined by the original meanings, intentions, purposes or values of the founding generation, or by contemporary meanings, intentions, purposes or values. This question divides so-called 'originalists' from 'non-originalists'. This article discusses all these alternatives, and the main arguments for and against them. It is subtitled 'Originalism' because it defends a moderate version of that position; however, it is argued that this is equivalent to a moderate version of non-originalism. (shrink)

This article defends what I call the atmospheric claim about trust: at least one form of trust manifests itself in human life in a manner that is like an atmosphere (generalized, ambient, and diffuse). I also provide a provisional defense of the claim that trust is a necessary condition for the thriving of something that matters to us. I offer a phenomenological sketch of existential trust. Existential trust is a primordial and atmospheric (generalized, ambient, and diffuse) manifestation of trust that (...) constitutes a fundamental way of being in relationship with the world as a whole such that one feels supportively upheld, vulnerably open, orientationally attuned, and demanded in relation to this world, with the overall effect of feeling at home in it. (shrink)

Aquinas is quite clear about the definition of moral virtue and its effects, but he devotes little space to its function: How does it accomplish what it accomplishes?Aquinas’s treatment of the acquired moral virtues in our non-rational appetites reveals that they have at least two functions: they make the soul’s powersgood instruments of reason, and they also calm the appetites so that one can make moral judgments with an unclouded mind. Virtue in the will has a different, “strong directive” function: (...) it directs our will to certain goods prior to reason’s forming its judgment. Aquinas must also hold that the virtues of the non-rational appetites exercise strong direction as well, but we cannot see why unless we examine his account of the infused moral virtues. (shrink)

The lattice of r.e. equivalence relations has not been carefully examined even though r.e. equivalence relations have proved useful in logic. A maximal r.e. equivalence relation has the expected lattice theoretic definition. It is proved that, in every pair of r.e. nonrecursive Turing degrees, there exist maximal r.e. equivalence relations which intersect trivially. This is, so far, unique among r.e. submodel lattices.

Aquinas argues that an agent’s act may be voluntary, involuntary, or even nonvoluntary. An agent performs a non-voluntary act on these conditions: (a) the agent does not know the act falls under a certain description D, (b) the act under D is not contrary to the agent’s will, and (c) if the agent had known that the act fell under D, the agent would still have performed it. Aquinas’s full account of non-voluntary acts is terse and ambiguous and seems to (...) contradict his fuller, more articulate, and philosophically rich views on voluntary and involuntary acts. The appearance of inconsistency, however, is illusory. Once understood, his account of non-voluntary acts clarifies various aspects of his theory of responsibility that are hard to glean from other discussions and reveals just how strongly Aquinas is inclined to Augustinian internalism. (shrink)

Debates in Medieval Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses aims to de-mystify medieval works by offering an illuminating, engaging introduction to the problems that medieval philosophers from Augustine through Ockham wrestled with. Each of the volume’s 11 units presents a debate that will enable students to return to the primary texts prepared to think critically and imaginatively about them. Debates include: Does Anselm have a hierarchical or a flat conception of free will? Is Abelard’s ethics conceptually impoverished? Does Avicenna teach (...) that we acquire concepts through abstraction or emanation? What is Aquinas’s purpose in writing the Summa contra gentiles? How sound are Ockham’s criticisms of Scotus’s theory of universals and individuation? The 10 essays newly commissioned for this volume will advance scholarship in medieval metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, logic, and philosophical theology, and in particular they will showcase what is philosophically distinctive and original in medieval philosophy. Students without experience in the history of philosophy will benefit from each unit’s clear, sharply written introductions that supply the necessary background to approach the debates intelligently. In addition, the volume’s general introduction elucidates the value of studying the history of philosophy through debate, in particular the history of medieval philosophy. Students will find in these debates models that will train them to formulate their own critical evaluations of a wide range of philosophical texts by thinkers with diverse philosophical commitments. (shrink)

Au cours des dernières décennies, l’intérêt pour le phénomène de la mémoire, concernant la sphère immédiate de la vie personnelle ou étendu à l’expérience collective, a pris une importance croissante. Dans ce second cas, l’effervescence autour de la question n’en a que peu éclairé les véritables enjeux. On se contente trop souvent d’affirmer que la mémoire collective de..

Paul Ricœur prononça cette allocution en Allemagne en janvier 1990, à l’occasion de la remise du prix Karl-Jaspers que l’Université de Heidelberg lui avait décerné pour l’année 19891.Ce prix a été créé à l’initiative de cette Université en 1983 pour commémorer le centenaire de la naissance du philosophe Karl Jaspers, qui y enseigna dès avant la Première...

ABSTRACTThis essay explores the different interpretations proposed by Ernst Cassirer and Hans Blumenberg of the relation between Platonic philosophy and myth as a means of bringing to light a fundamental divergence in their respective conceptions of what precisely myth is. It attempts to show that their conceptions of myth are closely related to their respective assumptions concerning the historical significance of myth and regarding the sense of history more generally. Their divergent conceptions of myth and of history, I argue, are (...) at the same time not simply matters of abstract speculation, but spring from fundamental presuppositions concerning myth's political significance. The present elucidation aims not only to set in relief one or another of the ways in which Cassirer or Blumenberg understood myth, nor even to present Blumenberg's critical reception of Cassirer's theories, but above all to contribute to the interpretation of the political implications of myth and of its historical potency in our contemporary epoch. (shrink)

Discussions about resource allocation commonly invoke concerns of unfair and variable decisions when physicians ration at the bedside. This concern is no less germane in disaster medicine, in which physicians make triage and allocation decisions under duress, and patients and their families may be challenged to self-advocate. Unfortunately, a real-time mechanism to support a process for ethical decision making may not be available to medical relief workers. Yet, resources for ethics decision support can be important for the moral well-being of (...) the clinician, the ethical integrity of the relief effort, and to bolster the trust and confidence of the population receiving medical services. The need for clinical ethical support should be anticipated in disaster preparedness planning. (shrink)

Paul B. Thompson’s From the Field to Fork: Food Ethics for Everyone explains the growing number of ways that food connects to ethical questions concerning our consumption, production, storage, and distribution of food. Although this book serves as an introduction to food ethics for non-experts, professionals in agricultural science and food production, food activists, and philosophers will have a lot to learn from Thompson’s insight, careful argumentation, and mastery of the economic, scientific, and political issues that ground our current debates (...) about food. In my comments, I will first briefly provide an overview of Thompson’s thoughtful book. I will explain the methodology employed in this book and how his methodology applies to specific philosophical questions within food ethics. I will focus my commentary on how Thompson frames the ethics of diet and obesity. I will then raise a few questions concerning food choice and paternalism that were omitted from this book, but that I think raise substantial ethical concerns in affluent countries. I will close with a very brief comment on Thompson’s methodology. (shrink)

Over the past 25 years, no religious institution in America has done more to explore the link between the environment and spirituality than the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. Now, for the first time, a selection of the finest of the Cathedral's ecological sermons appears in a single volume.

In this study, Daniel Westberg offers readers an account of Aquinas’s ethics and the action theory that underlies it. Both friends and enemies of Aquinas have covered this subject matter before, but early commentators misunderstood central parts of Aquinas’s ethical theory, and they handed down their misinterpretations in traditions that continue into the present. Against the traditional view that Aquinas’s medieval Christian inheritance, with its focus on the will, and on grace and love, required an action theory fundamentally different from (...) Aristotle’s, Westberg shows that the core of Aquinas’s action theory is authentically Aristotelian. Aquinas is neither a natural law theorist nor a voluntarist, as he is commonly thought to be. Instead, he holds a complex yet plausible account of human action that gives a greater role to practical reason and prudence than commentators generally recognize. This central contention is important, for it counters centuries of misinterpretation, and Westberg argues effectively for it. For this reason, anyone with a serious interest in medieval ethics should read Westberg’s study. (shrink)

I had the privilege of chairing the Institute of Medicine Committee on the Necessity of Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 2011, an effort that has lessons not only about the questions presented to it, but also about the policy and practice of the use of chimpanzees in research and about animal research policy in general. In this essay I will assess the impact and implications of the committee's work and at the same time clarify what I see as (...) its limits. All in all, I believe it is fair to say that the committee's recommendations and the process of its work represent a success for bioethics‐related consensus committees. The combination of topic, timing, and public stakeholder sentiment may have aligned in unique ways that contributed to that success. But even if it turns out to be a special case of sorts, there are lessons to be learned for the future. (shrink)

The Internet and other interactive networks are diffusing across the globe at rates that vary from country to country. Typically, economic and market structure variables are used to explain these differences. The addition of culture to these variables will provide a more robust understanding of the differences in Internet and interactive network diffusion. Existing analyses that identify culture as a predictor of diffusion do not adequately specify the dimensions of culture and their impacts.This paper presents a set of propositions to (...) be used in analyses of the impact of culture on the diffusion of interactive networks. The propositions were developed using cultural constructs presented by Hofstede (1991), Herbig (1994) and Hall and Hall (1987). Diffusion of innovations theory and critical mass theory provide the theoretical base. The development of the propositions resulted from a close examination of the theories for relationships mediated by culture. The resulting propositions use cultural variables in relationships established by the theories. It is hoped that the propositions will serve as a starting point for future research in the area of cultural influences on the diffusion of interactive networks. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge Companion to OckhamJeffrey E. BrowerPaul Vincent Spade, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xii + 400. Cloth, $54.95.Contemporary analytic philosophers have always been among the most enthusiastic audiences for the volumes in the Cambridge Companion series. And of all the great philosophers of the Middle Ages, perhaps none has appealed more to their sensibilities than William Ockham. It is fitting, (...) therefore, that after the publication of the Companion to Aquinas—the first volume in the series devoted to a medieval philosopher—there should appear a Companion to Ockham.The fifteen chapters comprising this volume survey the entire range of Ockham's thought and may conveniently be divided into four main parts. The first part (chaps. 2-7) deals with Ockham's most enduring legacy: his contribution to issues falling within the domain of logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. The second part (chaps. 8-9) is devoted to issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind/cognition. The third part (chaps. 10-13) focuses on Ockham's views in ethics, action theory, and political philosophy. And the fourth part (chaps. 14-15) considers aspects of his philosophical theology. In addition, there is also an historical chapter (chap. 1), placing Ockham's life and works in their late-medieval intellectual context, and a brief editor's introduction, including a very useful list of all Ockham's writings, together with the best (sometimes, the only) Latin editions and English translations available.The volume is well organized and beautifully conceived. Some chapters are quite difficult, and in places contain material that is likely to be unfamiliar even to specialists in medieval philosophy. But the way in which they have been organized maximizes their usefulness and accessibility to specialists and non-specialists alike. The earlier parts of the volume lay the foundation for later ones, and the individual chapters within each part are arranged so as to build on and complement one another. This is perhaps most evident in the five chapters comprising the first part. Calvin Normore's presentation ofOckham's logic (in chap. 2) nicely prepares the reader for Claude Panaccio's discussion (in chap. 3) of Ockham's theory of mental language. Panaccio's chapter, in turn, provides the framework for David Chalmer's analysis (in chap. 4) of the debate over whether [End Page 588] Ockham's mental language permits synonymous expressions. Again, these three chapters taken together provide important background for Paul Spade's treatment (in chap. 5) of Ockham's views in metaphysics, which are closely related to his logic and philosophy of language. Finally, Gyula Klima's discussion (in chap. 6) ofhow Ockham's views in semantics and ontology differ from those of his predecessors, and André Goddu's discussion (in chap. 7) of Ockham's philosophy of nature, can be fully appreciated only against the background of the preceding chapters.What is perhaps most impressive about the volume, however, is the extent to which it succeeds at providing a systematic introduction to Ockham's philosophical achievement. All the chapters are, to some extent, concerned with matters of textual analysis and interpretation. But most of them involve much more than a mere survey of Ockham's texts. For example, in each of the four main parts, there is at least one chapter that attempts to locate Ockham's views in relation to those of his predecessors or contemporaries (such as Aquinas and Scotus), with the result that we get a sense of Ockham's place in the major medieval debates to which he contributed. At the same time, the volume introduces us to some of the most lively current debates in Ockham scholarship. It does this, not merely by summarizing them, but by actually carrying them out over the course of its chapters. For example, Eleonore Stump provides a sophisticated defense (in chap. 8) of what has become a standard interpretation of Ockham's theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition. In the following chapter, however, Elizabeth Karger rejects the standard interpretation on the basis of a re-reading of certain key texts. Again, in the first part of the volume there is a running debate... (shrink)

Aspiration-based evolutionary dynamics have recently been used to model the evolution of fair play in the ultimatum game showing that incredible threats to reject low offers persist in equilibrium. We focus on two extensions of this analysis: we experimentally test whether assumptions about agent motivations (aspiration levels) and the structure of the game (binary strategy space) reflect actual play, and we examine the problematic assumption embedded in the standard replicator dynamic that unhappy agents who switch strategies may return to a (...) rejected strategy without exploring other options. We find that the resulting “no switchback” dynamic predicts the evolution of play better than the standard dynamic and that aspirations are a significant motivator for our participants. In the process, we also construct and analyze a variant of the ultimatum game in which players can adopt conditional (on their induced aspirations) strategies. (shrink)

The interview reconstructs Jeffrey Schnapp's brilliant career from his origins as a scholar of Dante and the Middle Ages to his current multiple interdisciplinary interests. Among other things, Schnapp deals with knowledge design, media history and theory, history of the book, the future of archives, museums, and libraries. The main themes of the interview concern the relationships between technology and pedagogy, the future of reading, and artificial intelligence.

Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the (...) proposition that Glenn loves Tracy has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that Glenn loves Tracy is distinct from the proposition that Tracy loves Glenn yet both have the same constituents, what is about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? In The Nature and Structure of Content, Jeffrey C. King formulates a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, King deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: he shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on his approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The Nature and Structure of Content also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis. Scholars and students working in the philosophy of mind and language will find this book rewarding reading. (shrink)

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"[This book] proposes new foundations for the Bayesian principle of rational action, and goes on to develop a new logic of desirability and probabtility."—Frederic Schick, _Journal of Philosophy_.