A privileged element of contemporary law, confession as a means of proof in criminal proceedings is the object of analysis in this research. Based on a bibliographic review, the study will seek to decompose and reorganize the object on two fronts, constructing a theoretical hypothesis that proposes to observe confession as an inquisitorial practice of an institution, but which also has a traceable genealogical depth in the modulations of subjectivation techniques. The notion of the care of the self that Michel (...) Foucault referred to unfolds in Christian ethics and asceticism, reorganizing the sense of care of the self and slowly, as Christian philosophy developed and the influence of the Catholic Church in the state grew, make the act of confession loaded with an institutional-subjective double, elements that allow Zaffaroni to observe the apparent neutrality of contemporary justice as a facade for an authoritarian state and adept at inquisitorial practices, especially in matters of criminal justice. (shrink)

O autor Darlei Dall’Agnol é formado em Filosofia pela Universidade de Caxias do sul e cursou mestrado em Filosofia na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, com uma dissertação sobre ética e linguagem em Wittgestein; fez Doutorado em Filosofia na Universidade de Bristol, Inglaterra, defendendo tese sobre valor intrínseco na ética de Moore. Publicou vários livros na área de Ética e possui inúmeros artigos e capítulos de livros publicados no Brasil e no exterior. Algumas das obras desse autor são: (...) Ética e Linguagem: uma Introdução ao Tractatus de Wittgenstein, Valor Intrínseco – Metaética, ética normativa e ética prática em G. E. Moore, ambas com publicação em 2005. (shrink)

BackgroundThis study explored the proportion of variance in depressive symptoms explained by processes targeted by BA (activation, behavioral avoidance, anticipatory pleasure, and brooding), and processes targeted by cognitive control training (cognitive control, attentional biases, and brooding).MethodsFive hundred and twenty adults were recruited. They completed a spatial cueing task as a measure of attentional biases and a cognitive task as a measure of cognitive control and completed self-report measures of activation, behavioral avoidance, anticipatory pleasure, brooding, and depressive symptoms. With path analysis (...) models, we explored the relationships between these predictors and depressive symptoms.ResultsBA processes were significant predictors of depressive symptoms, and activation partially predicted anticipatory pleasure, which in turn predicted depressive symptoms. However, cognitive control and attentional biases predicted neither brooding nor depressive symptoms. A comprehensive model including all processes fit the data but did not explain more of the variance in brooding or depressive symptoms than a model including only BA processes.LimitationsThe spatial cueing task was associated with low reliability and the use of a non-clinical sample limited the generalizability of the conclusions.ConclusionActivation, behavioral avoidance, brooding, and anticipatory pleasure are relevant processes to target in order to reduce depressive symptoms, while cognitive control and attentional biases are not. (shrink)

Este artigo é sobre a folksonomia como uma ferramenta que contribui para as atividades colaborativas de grupos de usuários na rede social acadêmica Passei Direto, com o objetivo de analisar a folksonomia como ferramenta de apoio em grupos colaborativos nessa rede social, por meio de estudo de caso holístico e exploratório, sendo realizada observação direta intensiva. A justificativa baseou-se na necessidade de compreender a potencialidade das atividades cooperativas e a solução das necessidades informacionais. Concluiu-se que a folksonomia é uma ferramenta (...) de apoio em grupos colaborativos no Passei Direto, onde os usuários, no uso de tags em práticas de indexação, visam a enriquecer e ampliar as possibilidades de acesso às informações. No entanto, apesar de representar uma ferramenta de forte cunho colaborativo, a folksonomia também deixa lacunas no tocante à recuperação da informação, dada a falta de padronização e controle dessa ferramenta, embora essas características façam parte da sua essência. (shrink)

Developing informed and participatory citizens is one of the aims of the National Council for the Social Studies’ (NCSS) vision of civic education. However, when aspiring to meet the call for meaningful civic education, teachers may find themselves at odds with other goals of accountability-driven school environments, creating contexts in which ambitious teaching becomes the answer to instilling democratic citizenship in students. The purpose of this study is to document the experience of such an ambitious teacher, chronicling a fifth-grade teacher's (...) quest for ensuring her students’ access to civic education in an urban, highly-structured, and accountability-based school environment. Through describing her teaching philosophy, instructional strategies, and experience with administration hampering her ability to promote civic education, a pattern of ambitious social studies teaching commensurate with existing literature is supported and questioned. (shrink)

Women, particularly those in public positions (e.g. journalists, politicians, celebrities, activists) are subject to disproportionate amounts of abuse on social media platforms like Twitter. This abuse occurs in a landscape that those platforms designed, and maintain. Focusing in particular on Twitter, as typical of the kind of platform we’re interested in, we argue that it is the platform not (usually) the individuals who use it, that bears collective responsibility as a corporate agent for misogyny. Social media platforms, however, should not (...) overstep the prevention of misogyny into interference in open political debates. (shrink)

A distinction has been drawn between basic conversation analysis and applied CA. Applied CA has become especially beneficial for informing areas of practice such as health, social care and education, and is an accepted form of research evidence in the scientific rhetoric. There are different ways of undertaking applied CA, with different foci and goals. In this article, we articulate one way of conducting applied CA, that is especially pertinent for practitioners working in different fields. We conceptualise this as Reflective (...) Interventionist CA. We argue that this approach to applied CA is important because of its emphasis on the reflective stance that is valuable to an understanding of research data, its commitment to collaboration with practitioners, and its inductive style. In this paper, we outline the core premises and benefits of this approach and offer empirical examples to support our argument. To conclude, we consider the implications for evidence-based practice. (shrink)

ResumenEl artículo se propuso indagar el término compuesto de naturaleza sagrada partiendo del supuesto que la naciente conciencia ecológica posee voces que abogan por ella. Sin embargo, la composición del término trae la paradoja de unir dos órdenes de realidad que occidente ha escindido. De esta manera, se expone una reflexión epistemológica y ética. La reflexión epistemológica se enriqueció con la pesquisa sobre lo sagrado. En ella se descubre a la naturaleza como una hierofanía donde convergen lo divino, lo humano (...) y lo cósmico, por lo que se trasciende la dicotomía entre naturaleza y lo sagrado. En la reflexión ética se revisaron tres ideas interconectadas: la percepción de la sacralidad de la naturaleza se basa en una visión unitaria y orgánica de la realidad, esta percepción conlleva una actitud reverencial hacia la naturaleza que va acompañada de la responsabilidad cósmica del ser humano de mantener los equilibrios del universo. Se concluye que una nueva cosmología y antropología está emergiendo, pero están en el orden del mito, sus logos están todavía en la penumbra, de ahí que la indagación a la naturaleza sagrada puede abrir una experiencia y un discurso que permita hacer del mundo un hogar de cuidado reverencial. Palabra clave: naturaleza sagrada; epistemología; ética; cosmología organicista; reverencia. (shrink)

Since antiquity, philosophers and engineers have tried to take life’s measure by reproducing it. Aiming to reenact Creation, at least in part, these experimenters have hoped to understand the links between body and spirit, matter and mind, mechanism and consciousness. Genesis Redux examines moments from this centuries-long experimental tradition: efforts to simulate life in machinery, to synthesize life out of material parts, and to understand living beings by comparison with inanimate mechanisms. Jessica Riskin collects seventeen essays from distinguished scholars (...) in several fields. These studies offer an unexpected and far-reaching result: attempts to create artificial life have rarely been driven by an impulse to reduce life and mind to machinery. On the contrary, designers of synthetic creatures have generally assumed a role for something nonmechanical. The history of artificial life is thus also a history of theories of soul and intellect. Taking a historical approach to a modern quandary, Genesis Redux is essential reading for historians and philosophers of science and technology, scientists and engineers working in artificial life and intelligence, and anyone engaged in evaluating these world-changing projects. (shrink)

Jessica Flanigan defends patients' rights of self-medication on the grounds that same moral reasons against medical paternalism in clinical contexts are also reasons against paternalistic pharmaceutical policies, including prohibitive approval processes and prescription requirements.

Hypocrites invite moral opprobrium, and charges of hypocrisy are a significant and widespread feature of our moral lives. Yet it remains unclear what hypocrites have in common, or what is distinctively bad about them. We propose that hypocrites are persons who have undermined their claim to moral authority. Since this self-undermining can occur in a number of ways, our account construes hypocrisy as multiply realizable. As we explain, a person’s moral authority refers to a kind of standing that they occupy (...) within a particular moral community. This status is both socially important and normatively precarious. Hence, moral agents are right to be vigilant when it comes to hypocrisy, and are often justified in their outrage when they detect it. We further argue that our view can preserve what is attractive in rival accounts, while avoiding their associated problems. (shrink)

This book shows how environmental decline relates to human health and to health care practices in the U.S. and other industrialized countries. It outlines the environmental trends that will strongly affect health, and challenges us to see the connections between ways of practicing medicine and the very environmental problems that damage ecosystems and make people sick. In addition to philosophical analysis of the converging values of bioethics and envrionmental ethics, the book offers case studies as well as a number of (...) practical suggestions for moving health care toward sustainability. (shrink)

Scientists have long counseled against interpreting animal behavior in terms of human emotions, warning that such anthropomorphizing limits our ability to understand animals as they really are. Yet what are we to make of a female gorilla in a German zoo who spent days mourning the death of her baby? Or a wild female elephant who cared for a younger one after she was injured by a rambunctious teenage male? Or a rat who refused to push a lever for food (...) when he saw that doing so caused another rat to be shocked? Aren’t these clear signs that animals have recognizable emotions and moral intelligence? With _Wild Justice_ Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce unequivocally answer yes. Marrying years of behavioral and cognitive research with compelling and moving anecdotes, Bekoff and Pierce reveal that animals exhibit a broad repertoire of moral behaviors, including fairness, empathy, trust, and reciprocity. Underlying these behaviors is a complex and nuanced range of emotions, backed by a high degree of intelligence and surprising behavioral flexibility. Animals, in short, are incredibly adept social beings, relying on rules of conduct to navigate intricate social networks that are essential to their survival. Ultimately, Bekoff and Pierce draw the astonishing conclusion that there is no moral gap between humans and other species: morality is an evolved trait that we unquestionably share with other social mammals. Sure to be controversial, _Wild Justice_ offers not just cutting-edge science, but a provocative call to rethink our relationship with—and our responsibilities toward—our fellow animals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.3 (2000) 286-290 [Access article in PDF] Letter to Lester Olson Jessica Benjamin Dear Lester Olson,I regret not having responded sooner to your communication. This is a matter of considerable importance to me, but you might imagine that it is difficult to read an analysis of events in which I was so involved that takes so little account of my/our point of view. Let me (...) add, after reading your response, that I do recognize that this is through no fault of your own, and as you indicated to me later, you assiduously strove to get more information. I believe it was Alfred Kazin who (I've heard) said that the movements of today make the dissertations of tomorrow. Since that is always a difficulty, I am sure that my experience is not singular. Unfortunately, in my view, the decontextualization of Audre Lorde's speech at that conference can serve to perpetuate the misunderstanding that underlay the destructive polarization that occurred at that time. To accept her view that the event was organized with no effort to include women of color by oblivious, racist white women is surely not what happened. In fact, the estrangement between white and black women at the time of the "Second Sex Conference" had much deeper causes (the enduring structures of racism in our country) for which I believe no individual could be held responsible.First, let me clarify an important fact. While we organizers of the conference invited numerous black and third world women to participate, we were consistently declined. For instance, Mary Helen Washington said she did not want to speak to an audience of only white women, and it was her experience that only white women came to feminist conferences. Indeed, at the time Michele Wallace, who probably would have been interested had she been available, was vociferously complaining about the lack of interest, indeed the rejection of feminism, among black women. Audre Lorde herself, one of our consultants, had been apprised of the participants for months and never named anyone who could participate. Similarly, Robin [End Page 286] Morgan had been consulted and had offered no suggestions of black participants. Yet ten days before the conference her young black protégé at Ms., Susan McHenry, appeared with a series of demands, including a list of black women she wished to see invited to the conference. Although I had met with Robin Morgan months before, she had never told me of Susan McHenry or proposed her as a participant, rather her interest had been focused on what would become the anti-pornography movement, similar to the interests of Kathy Barry who wrote about female sexual slaves. At the conference, Susan McHenry did speak; she expressed her indignation and outrage, and suggested that the entire conference was a racist gathering that should change direction and consider only the issue of racial exclusion.It is certainly true that the organizers were distressed by the same issue prior to the conference. After nearly a year of organizing, soliciting, and publishing open calls for participation, we were absolutely desperate to find participants who would reflect racial and ethnic groups other than white middle class. But in 1979 the institution of women's studies looked very different than it does now--feminism was a political movement not an academic institution, and only a few women in any university had become interested in it. And that does not even begin to address how few women, let alone black women, were in the universities in 1979!A second important point is that Audre Lorde was not speaking to an audience who disagreed with her; she was speaking to an audience who were already inflamed because they felt that certain identities had been left out of the conference. Despite the fact that it was an open conference, based on an open invitation--we had drawn scores of women to give workshops and papers whom we had never heard of--and despite the fact that we had organized the conference to address differences among women, the audience consisted of many women ready to protest... (shrink)

Stanley and Williamson have defended the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a subspecies of knowing-that by appeal to the syntax and semantics of ascriptions of knowing-how. Critics have objected that this way of defending intellectualism places undue weight on linguistic considerations and fails to give sufficient attention to empirical considerations from the scientific study of the mind. In this paper, I examine and reject Stanley's recent attempt to answer the critics.

I argue that an adequate account of non-reductive realization must guarantee satisfaction of a certain condition on the token causal powers associated with (instances of) realized and realizing entities---namely, what I call the 'Subset Condition on Causal Powers' (first introduced in Wilson 1999). In terms of states, the condition requires that the token powers had by a realized state on a given occasion be a proper subset of the token powers had by the state that realizes it on that occasion. (...) Accounts of non-reductive realization conforming to this condition are implementing what I call 'the powers-based subset strategy'. I focus on the crucial case involving mental and brain states; the results may be generalized, as appropriate. I first situate and motivate the strategy by attention to the problem of mental causation; I make the case, in schematic terms, that implementation of the strategy makes room (contra Kim 1989, 1993, 1998, and elsewhere) for mental states to be ontologically and causally autonomous from their realizing physical states, without inducing problematic causal overdetermination, and compatible with both Physicalism and Non-reduction; and I show that several contemporary accounts of non-reductive realization (in terms of functional realization, parthood, and the determinable/determinate relation) are plausibly seen as implementing the strategy. As I also show, implementation of the powers-based strategy does not require endorsement of any particular accounts of either properties or causation---indeed, a categoricalist contingentist Humean can implement the strategy. The schematic location of the strategy in the space of available responses to the problem of mental (more generally, higher-level) causation, as well as the fact that the schema may be metaphysically instantiated, strongly suggests that the strategy is, appropriately generalized and instantiated, sufficient and moreover necessary for non-reductive realization. I go on to defend the sufficiency and necessity claims against a variety of objections, considering, along the way, how the powers-based subset strategy fares against competing accounts of purportedly non-reductive realization in terms of supervenience, token identity, and constitution. (shrink)

Motivated by the seeming structure of the sciences, metaphysical emergence combines broadly synchronic dependence coupled with some degree of ontological and causal autonomy. Reflecting the diverse, frequently incompatible interpretations of the notions of dependence and autonomy, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering variety. Here I argue that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I first argue, by attention to the problem of higher-level causation, that two and only two strategies for addressing this problem accommodate the genuine emergence (...) of special science entities. These strategies in turn suggest two distinct schema for metaphysical emergence---'Weak' and 'Strong' emergence, respectively. Each schema imposes a condition on the powers of entities taken to be emergent: Strong emergence requires that higher-level features have more token powers than their dependence base features, whereas Weak emergence requires that higher-level features have a proper subset of the token powers of their dependence base features. Importantly, the notion of “power” at issue here is metaphysically neutral, primarily reflecting commitment just to the plausible thesis that what causes an entity may bring about are associated with how the entity is---that is, with its features. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers commonly suppose that any fundamental entities there may be are maximally determinate. More generally, they commonly suppose that, whether or not there are fundamental entities, any determinable entities there may be are grounded in, hence less fundamental than, more determinate entities. So, for example, Armstrong takes the physical objects constituting the presumed fundamental base to be “determinate in all respects” (1961, 59), and Lewis takes the properties characterizing things “completely and without redundancy” to be “highly specific” (1986, 60). (...) Here I look at the usually cited reasons for these suppositions as directed against the case of determinable properties, in particular, and argue that none is compelling (Sections 1 to 3). The discussion in Section 3 moreover identifies positive reason for taking some determinable properties to be part of a fundamental (or relatively fundamental) base. I close (Section 4) by noting certain questions arising from the possibility of fundamental determinables, as directions for future research. (shrink)

Shadow of the Other is a discussion of how the individual has two sorts of relationships with an "other"--other individuals. The first regards the other as a s work apart is her brilliant utilization of a systematic dialectical approach to her subject, always maintaining the delicate balance between opposing tensions: masculinity and femininity, subjectivity and objectivity, passivity and activity, love and aggression, fantasy and reality, modernism and postmodernism, the intrapsychic and the intersubjective. Benjamin s work apart is her brilliant utilization (...) of a systematic dialectical approach to her subject, always maintaining the delicate balance between opposing other as a mental repository fo unwanted characteristics cast from the self. Jessica benjamin shows the implications of this dual relationship for male/female hierarchy and offers a possibility for balancing the two. This book continues the author's well-known explorations of the themes of intersubjectivity and gender, taking up issues at the forefront of contemporary debates in feminist theory and psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Contextualism is motivated by cases in which the intuitive correctness of a range of phenomena, including knowledge attributions, assertions and reasoning, depends on the attributor's context. Contextualists offer a charitable understanding of these intuitions, interpreting them as reflecting the truth value of the knowledge attributions and the appropriateness of the relevant assertions and reasoning. Here, I investigate a range of different invariantist accounts and examine the extent to which they too can offer a charitable account of the contextualist data.

Arguably no concept is more fundamental to science than that of causality, for investigations into cases of existence, persistence, and change in the natural world are largely investigations into the causes of these phenomena. Yet the metaphysics and epistemology of causality remain unclear. For example, the ontological categories of the causal relata have been taken to be objects (Hume 1739), events (Davidson 1967), properties (Armstrong 1978), processes (Salmon 1984), variables (Hitchcock 1993), and facts (Mellor 1995). (For convenience, causes and effects (...) will usually be understood as events in what follows.) Complicating matters, causal relations may be singular (Socrates’s drinking hemlock caused Socrates’s death) or general (Drinking hemlock causes death); hence the relata might be tokens (e.g., instances of properties) or types (e.g., types of events) of the category in question. Other questions up for grabs are: Are singular causes metaphysically and/or epistemologically prior to general causes or vice versa (or neither)? What grounds the intuitive asymmetry of the causal relation? Are macro-causal relations reducible to micro-causal relations? And perhaps most importantly: Are causal facts (e.g., the holding of causal relations) reducible to non-causal facts (e.g., the holding of certain spatiotemporal relations)? (shrink)

Fallibilists claim that one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Jessica Brown offers a compelling defence of this view against infallibilists, who claim that it is contradictory to claim to know and yet to admit the possibility of error.

Many contemporary philosophers accept a strong generalization of Hume's denial of necessary causal connections, in the form of Hume's dictum (HD), according to which there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct, intrinsically typed entities. Hume's version of his dictum occurs during his investigation into the source of the idea of causal connection. The most powerful role that HD plays in Lewis's system concerns its providing a basis for, as Lewis puts it, a "principle of plentitude" that will guarantee "that (...) the worlds are abundant, and logical space is somehow complete". Lewis's combinatorialism promises to provide a principled, extensionally adequate, and reductive generator of metaphysical modal space. Beyond combinatorialism, there are many other accounts of metaphysical modality that need to be considered, not just with an eye to extensional adequacy but also to the clear desideratum to provide an account of the space of metaphysical modality that is principled. (shrink)

I discuss certain representative accounts of metaphysical emergence falling into three broad categories, assessing their prospects for satisfying certain criteria; the ensuing dialectic has a bit of the Goldilocks fable about it. At one end of the spectrum are what I call ‘scientistic’ accounts, which characterize metaphysical emergence by appeal to one or another specific feature commonly registered in scientific descriptions of seeming cases of emergence; such accounts, I argue, typically fail to provide a clear basis for ensuring incompatibility with (...) ontological reduction, and thus fail to guarantee satisfaction of the criterion of appropriate contrast (§2). At the other end of the spectrum are what I call ‘abstractionist’ accounts, which characterize emergence in terms floating free of scientific notions; such accounts, I’ll argue, typically fail to guarantee satisfaction of the criterion of illuminating contrast (§3). I’ll then look at several accounts of metaphysical emergence that are what I call ‘substantive’, in appealing to familiar relations or posits which are properly metaphysical, while being intelligibly connected to scientific relations and posits. As we’ll see, the resources of such accounts are up to the tasks of blocking ontological reduction and of enabling investigations into metaphysical emergence to proceed in an illuminating way (§4). I close with some methodological morals (§5). (shrink)

Contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary contextually, in particular that the strength of epistemic position required for one to be truly ascribed knowledge depends on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists support their view by appeal to our intuitions about when it's correct (or incorrect) to ascribe knowledge. Someone might argue that some of these intuitions merely reflect when it is conversationally appropriate to ascribe knowledge, not when knowledge is truly ascribed, (...) and so try to accommodate these intuitions even on an invariantist view. DeRose (Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, 1998; Philosophical Review, 2002) argues that any such 'warranted assertibility manoeuvre', or 'WAM', against contextualism is unlikely to succeed. Here, I argue that his objections to a WAM against contextualism are not persuasive and offer a pragmatic account of the data about ascriptions of knowledge. (shrink)

This article introduces the special issue on questions, questioning, and institutional practices. We begin by considering how questioning as a discursive practice is a central vehicle for constructing social worlds and reflecting existing ones. Then we describe the different ways questions and question have been defined, typologized, and critiqued, in general and within seven institutions including policing, the courts, medicine, therapy, research interviews, education, and mediated political exchanges. The introduction concludes with a preview of the articles in the special issue.

The capability approach aims to ensure all individuals are able to form and pursue their own conception of the good, whilst the state remains neutral between them, and has done much to include oppressed and marginalised groups. Liberal neutrality and social inclusivity are worthy goals, yet I argue that Martha Nussbaum’s influential formulation of the capability approach, at least, cannot meet them. Conceptualising capabilities as opportunities to perform specific, valuable functionings fails to accommodate those who do not value, or cannot (...) perform, these functionings. I therefore propose that the capability approach be modified, such that capabilities are conceptualised, instead, as opportunities to exercise control in certain central domains of our life. (shrink)

To what degree has biology influenced and shaped the development of moral systems? One way to determine the extent to which human moral systems might be the product of natural selection is to explore behaviour in other species that is analogous and perhaps homologous to our own. Many non-human primates, for example, have similar methods to humans for resolving, managing, and preventing conflicts of interests within their groups. Such methods, which include reciprocity and food sharing, reconciliation, consolation, conflict intervention, and (...) mediation, are the very building blocks of moral systems in that they are based on and facilitate cohesion among individuals and reflect a concerted effort by community members to find shared solutions to social conflict. Furthermore, these methods of resource distribution and conflict resolution often require or make use of capacities for empathy, sympathy, and sometimes even community concern. Non-human primates in societies in which such mechanisms are present may not be exactly moral beings, but they do show signs of a sense of social regularity that -- just like the norms and rules underlying human moral conduct -- promotes a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi. (shrink)

The physicalist thesis that all entities are nothing over and above physical entities is often interpreted as appealing to a supervenience-based account of "nothing over and aboveness”, where, schematically, the A-entities are nothing over and above the B-entities if the A-entities supervene on the B-entities. The main approaches to filling in this schema correspond to different ways of characterizing the modal strength, the supervenience base, or the supervenience connection at issue. I consider each approach in turn, and argue that the (...) resulting formulation of physicalism is compatible with physicalism’s best traditional rival: a naturalist emergentism. Others have argued that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism fail. My aim here, besides addressing the full spectrum of supervenience-based approaches, is to show how certain philosophical and scientific theses concerning naturalism, properties, and laws give us new reasons to think that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism are untenable. (shrink)