The stated goal of Donna Haraway's “Cyborg feminism” is to liberate sensuality from violence. In examining her book alongside that of Jesuit Toletus it becomes clear that both argue that sensuality is a place of metaphysical violence. The first two sections of the essay demonstrate this, and, in addition that Toletus' commentary on Aquinas is hardly accurate. This fact will help justify the claim that the Jesuit tradition includes a rather particular theory of sensuality, the origin of which (...) is perhaps Giles of Rome. A third section shows how the Jesuit Gaston Fessard rediscovered Aquinas' own theory of sensuality through a thoroughgoing critique of Hegelian and Marxist dialectic. The essay concludes that Haraway would do well to adopt Aquinas' non‐violent theory of sensuality as her own. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the question of the specific truth granted to the human intellect’s concepts qua concepts (simplex apprehensio), as it is presented and discussed in Sebastião do Couto’s commentary on On Interpretation, included in his general commentary on Aristotle’s Dialectics (1606), the final volume of the famous and influential Cursus Conimbricensis (1592–1606). Such a topic finds it roots in a large medieval debate that runs through many authors and especially Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus, Durandus, and Ockham, reaching in (...) the Jesuit early modern context, with Pedro da Fonseca and Francisco Suárez, a complete and eclectic account that paved the way for the modern understanding of “mind.” . (shrink)

This article provides a basic general introduction to Ramus, and evaluates his role in the history of logic and rhetoric, especially with relation to the study of argumentation. The author agrees with Ong and other historians of logic that Ramus is not to be taken seriously as a logician, and that his undoubted importance in the history of ideas is to be found elsewhere.Ramus advocates a belief in nature, experience and reason, and rejects the reliance on the authority of ancient (...) philosophers, above all Aristotle, though ‘experience’ does not mean scientific experiment and, paradoxically, includes the example of great philosophers and writers. In the end Ramus is seen as responsible for substituting for ancient classical rhetoric an entirely ornamental rhetoric of figures which was to take over education (with the exception of the Jesuit schools) almost until our own day. This curtailing and diminishing of rhetoric is seen as a degeneration. Ancient five-part rhetoric had been concerned with convincing and persuading: Aristotle distinguished the analytic, scientific reasoning of logic, from dialectic which was based on opinion and probability and had close links with rhetoric; by the time of Cicero and Quintilian, who addressed themselves to jurists and politicians, logic has given way to dialectic. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the two become assimilated; the evolution of this is traced here through the thirteenth-century Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain to the fifteenth-century German humanist logician Rudolph Agricola, who influenced Ramus partly through the intermediary of Johann Sturm. Ramus took over their topical theories but restricted them to logic/dialectic, and left rhetoric with little more than tropes and figures. He believed that there was only one method for teaching all the arts, and one dialectic common to them all. The distinction between analytical and dialectical has disappeared, with far-reaching consequences for the study of argumentation. Over the centuries logic has lost its connection with controversy and persuasion. With the development of the post-Cartesian, post-Baconian emphasis on the clarity of scientific discourse, and the mid-nineteenth-century interest in mathematical and formal logic, the process was complete. Argumentation, or the ‘new rhetoric’, aims to fill the gap thus created. (shrink)

Przywara lived in the Jesuit community in Munich until the close of the second world war. He belonged to the group of Southern German Catholic scholars of widely ranging philosophical and theological interests, which included Karl Adam, Martin Grabmann and Guardini among others. Contributing frequently to the magazine of his order, Stimmen der Zeit, he was the leading German Jesuit philosopher of religion in the period between the two world wars. Przywara attracted special attention because he welcomed, more (...) than most of his Catholic colleagues, discussions with all schools of German philosophy, Kantian, Hegelian idealist and modern existentialist, as well as with Protestant dialectical theologians. His own position was always defended with wide historical knowledge and philosophical understanding. There is more frequent reference in most of the periodicals and books of the period to Przywara's argument in some particular discussion or controversy than to his own systematic exposition and philosophy. His philosophical interests were stimulated by his personal friendship with Martin Heidegger which dates from their early association together as pupils at a Jesuit school in Austria. Przywara, probably more than any other Catholic thinker, has not only been attracted to but really shared in the new speculation and positive insights of existential philosophy. (shrink)

Lógica, formação escolar e filosofia entre os jesuítas Resumo: O interesse mais direto deste artigo é a relação entre a Lógica e a formação filosófica na educação jesuíta. Para compor uma imagem da importância e da concreção da Lógica na formação proposta pelos inacianos, nós nos concentraremos na Ratio Studiorum e na obra do jesuíta português Pedro da Fonseca (1526-1599). A razão do recorte proposto é que as reflexões de Fonseca sobre o tema parecem, por um lado, orientar outros jesuítas, (...) como é o caso de Sebastião do Couto, que é o autor da dialética do Curso Conimbricense; por outro, elas são mais completas, sobretudo pela atenção dada por Fonseca ao método e às disputationes. De posse do conceito de Lógica de Fonseca, concluímos com a indicação de caminhos contemporâneos de revisitação de lógicas do passado. Palavras-chave: lógica; método; educação; jesuítas. Logic, school education and philosophy among the Jesuits Abstract: The most direct interest of this article is the relationship between Logic and philosophical formation in Jesuit education. In order to produce an image of the importance and concretion of Logic in the formation proposed by the Ignatians, we will focus on the Ratio Studiorum and on the work of the Portuguese Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca (1526-1599). The reason for the proposed approach is that Fonseca's reflections on the subject seem, on the one hand, to guide other Jesuits, such as Sebastião do Couto, who is the author of the dialectic of Curso Conimbricense; on the other hand, Fonseca’s conception of logic is more complete regarding the other Jesuits, especially due to the attention given by our author to the method and the disputationes. In possession of Fonseca's Logic concept, we conclude with an indication of contemporary paths for revisiting the logics of the past. Key-words: logic; method; education; Jesuits. Logica, educazione scolastica e filosofia tra i gesuiti Abstract: L’interesse più diretto di questo articolo è il rapporto tra Logica e la formazione filosofica nell’educazione dei gesuiti. Per produrre un’immagine dell’importanza e della concretezza della Logica nella formazione proposta dagli inaziani, ci concentreremo nella Ratio Studiorum e nell’opera del gesuita portoghese Pedro da Fonseca (1526-1599). Il motivo di questa scelta è che le riflessioni di Fonseca sull’argomento sembrano, da un lato, guidare gli altri gesuiti, come Sebastião do Couto, cioè, l’autore della dialettica del Curso Conimbricense; da l’altro, la concezione di logica di Fonseca è più completa riguardo ad’altri gesuiti, soprattutto per l’attenzione data dall’autore al metodo e alle disputationes. Possedendo il concetto di logica di Fonseca, concludiamo con l’indicazione di modi contemporanei di rivisitare le logiche del passato. Parole chiave: logica ; metodo ; educazione ; gesuiti. Data de registro: 16/09/2021 Data de aceite: 01/12/2021. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula:From Studied Ambiguity to Saving MysteryBrian E. Daley, S.J.One of the central questions Christian theologians continue to ask themselves, as they confront the mystery of the person of Christ, is, what is the significance for us today of the Council of Chalcedon? For generations of modern scholars, especially those in the West, the dense and rather technical phrases forged at that fifth-century gathering of Christian bishops (...) and appended to a restatement of what we know as the “Nicene creed” represented a major milestone in the Churches’ ongoing clarification of how disciples are to understand the person of Jesus the Savior.In J. N. D. Kelly’s widely used survey, Early Christian Doctrines,1 for instance, Chalcedon’s “settlement” of the twenty-four-year dispute between Nestorius and his Antiochene supporters and Cyril of Alexandria and the Church of Alexandria was the culmination of “the decisive period for Christology”2 in the early Church, an attempt to define an understanding of Christ that could be accepted by all Christians throughout the Empire, but which nevertheless—surprisingly, perhaps—“failed to bring permanent peace.”3 Aloys Grillmeier, in his foundational study of the growth of early Christian understandings of Jesus, speaks of the years up to Chalcedon as [End Page 165] temporally defining “the development of belief in Christ from its beginning to its first climax in a council of the Church.”4 In an influential study of the theology of the seventh-century monk and theologian Maximus the Confessor, Hans Urs von Balthasar emphasizes the centrality of Chalcedon’s formulaic, classically dialectical picture of the person of Christ as central to Maximus’s whole approach to God, the world, and the human spirit. The reason, Balthasar argues, lies in Chalcedon’s ability to affirm both unity and abiding difference in Christ as the dominant pattern of God’s relationship to creation:From the moment that Chalcedon, in its sober and holy wisdom, elevated the adverbs ‘indivisibly’ (ἀδαιρέτως) and ‘unconfusedly’ (ἀσυγχύτως) to a dogmatic formula, the image of a reciprocal indwelling of two distinct poles of being replaced the image of mixture. This mutual ontological presence (περιχώρησις) not only preserves the being particular to each element, to the divine and the human natures, but also brings each of them to its perfection in their very difference, even enhancing that difference. Love, which is the highest level of union, only takes root in the growing independence of the lovers; the union between God and the world reveals, in the very nearness it creates between these two poles of being, the ever-greater difference between created being and the essentially incomparable God.5With a little help from German Romantic philosophy, and perhaps from his Jesuit confrère Erich Przywara, Balthasar here sees in the Chalcedonian picture of Christ not only Maximus’s central inspiration, but the early Church’s final paradigm for conceiving how the transcendent God can be present and crucially active in the world.One might multiply examples. But does this understanding of Chalcedon’s portrait of Christ really represent its intent or its lasting meaning? What led to its articulation? What was, one may ask, the real achievement of this gathering of over 500 Eastern bishops, mainly from the Greek-speaking East, called by the new emperor Marcian and his long-influential spouse, the [End Page 166] Empress Pulcheria, in a port suburb across the Bosporus from Constantinople, in October of 451? On the level of Church politics, at least, it was a step towards restoring a balance, however briefly, between major centers of influence in the Church of the mid-fifth century, and the theological traditions with which they had become associated: a balance precariously achieved in 433, after the bitter controversy over Nestorius’s views on how to conceive the person of Christ, by what is often called the “Formula of Reunion,” which sketched the outlines of traditional faith in the Savior—a formula apparently drafted at that time by Theodoret of Cyrus and proposed by the Church of Antioch, but which was also warmly embraced by Theodoret’s principal rival, Cyril of Alexandria. After heated debates between the bishop of Constantinople, the... (shrink)

Erich Przywara admits to have developed his idea of a “metaphysics of creature” in confrontation with M. Heidegger’s thinking. We will show how the Jesuit reading of the latter is based on the roots of Heideggerian thought in the discussions of the 1920s around the nature of Kantism. Przywara tries to account for these debates from the tensions existing in the very approach of the philosopher of Königsberg. These will give rise to two ways of interpretation, that Przywara schematises (...) under the traits of a “metaphysics of finitude,” as represented by M. Heidegger, and a “metaphysics of infinity,” in particular with E. Herrigel. According to Przywara, it is from the dialectic between these two paths that the perspective of the analogia entis as metaphysics of creature must arise. (shrink)

When in October 2016 I started working on my book Jorge Mario Bergoglio. An intellectual biography I did not have the slightest idea of ​​the importance played by the figure and work of Gaston Fessard in the formation of Bergoglio’s thought. There was nothing to suggest that Gaston Fessard could be a relevant author for the intellectual formation of the future Pope. I was struck by the polar and dialectical model of thought that animated him, the possibility of harmonizing opposites, (...) of inviting concepts to a common table that apparently could not be approached, because it places them in a higher plane in which they find their synthesis. This paradigm, of the Church and of the Society of Jesus as complexio oppositorum, finds its verification, according to Bergoglio, in the way in which the Jesuits have achieved the inculturation of the faith in the indigenous peoples of Latin America. Bergoglio rereads Ignatius in the light of a dialectical model. As he will say in one of the interviews he gave me on the occasion of the writing of my book: “In Ignatian spirituality there is always this bipolar tension”. It is certainly an original, uncommon reading of Ignatius’s thought. It is the ideal factor that allows us to explain why Bergoglio, when in 1986 he went to Frankfurt to write his doctoral thesis, chose the Guardinian essay dedicated to the polar opposition. When I concluded my volume on the intellectual biography of the future Pontiff in February 2017, one element, however, remained obscure. Where, from which author had Bergoglio drawn his polar model? Where did your antinomic reading of Ignatian spirituality come from? Not by Guardini discovered philosophically in 1986. Francis indicated the starting point of his intellectual formation. The reading of Fessard’s La dialectique des Exercices spirituels de saint Ignace de Loyola, published in 1956, is the work that “ had a great influence “ on him. It is the work that clarifies Bergoglio’s antinomian thought, his subsequent ideal encounter with Guardini’s philosophy. (shrink)

A good deal of attention has been given in recent philosophy of religion to the question of whether we can sensibly attribute to God a form of knowledge which the 16th-century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina termed "middle knowledge". Interest in the doctrine has been spurred by a recognition of its intimate connection to certain conceptions of providence, prophecy, and response to petitionary prayer. According to defenders of the doctrine, which I will call "Molinism", the objects of middle knowledge (...) are all the true counterfactuals of the form, 'If C were to occur, then S would freely do A', where C specifies a particular set of circumstances. (Such propositions are usually referred to as "counterfactuals of freedom" - hereafter "CFs".)' I will try to assess the current status of two distinct questions: (1) Are there true CFs? and (2) Could God know true CFs if there are any? Obviously, Molinism must answer both questions affirmatively. Most of the discussion has focused on the first question. I hope to show that this approach has been a dialectical mistake on the part of critics of Molinism, for the difficulties of giving an affirmative answer to question (2) are, I believe, far easier to state clearly and convincingly. (shrink)

Charts the history of the Jesuits in France, their organization, teaching methods and aims, with particular reference to La Flèche and the relationship between Christianity and Classical philosophy in the philosophical curriculum followed there by Descartes. This was the Jesuit version of the liberal arts, based mainly on works by Aristotle, including dialectic, natural philosophy, mathematics, metaphysics, and ethics. Speculation as to Descartes's activities in the period 1614–1618, in between finishing his studies at La Flèche, his law studies, and (...) joining Prince Maurice of Nassau's army. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Original Dwelling Place: Zen EssaysRobert E. GossOriginal Dwelling Place: Zen Essays. By Robert Aitken. Upland, California: Counterpoint, 1996. 241 pp.Robert Aitken narrates his over forty-year journey into Zen, elucidating not only his spiritual journey but also reflecting the Americanization of Zen Buddhism. He was introduced to Zen Buddhism during World War II as an internee in a camp for enemy civilians in Kobe, Japan. Original Dwelling Place is Aitken’s (...) ninth book to explore a series of topics that accent his personal journey into Zen. He has gathered a series of essays about the texts and lineage teachers with whom he studied over the years. In the opening section, entitled “Ancestors,” he pays homage to the masters [End Page 212] who influenced his own Zen practice. He writes, “All of my guides have passed away, but they are alive in my mind and body” (p. 5). The book reflects his continuing bond with those deceased teachers who exercised a vital presence and environmental influence within his life. He shares some stories, personal insights, and legacies of some of his guides, such as Nyogen Senzaki, Soen Roshi, Blyth Sensei, and D. T. Suzuki. I found his essay on the legacy of Dwight Goddard filling in many personal details of a pioneer Western Buddhist who significantly contributed to the Americanization of Buddhism. In many ways, Aitken’s own spiritual development and Original Dwelling Place recapitulate the Americanization of Zen Buddhism, providing some important insights into that process of Buddhist acculturation.Yet Aitken does not limit his guides to twentieth-century ones. He brings alive the classical discourses and relates them to contemporary life. Throughout his essays, I was struck by how alive and dynamic Aitken’s Mahayana contemplative vision and practice are. There is a spirit of “contemplative action” that collapses the duality of meditative practice and living that discovers the truth dynamically within a matrix of open living. As a Christian practitioner of Ignatian spirituality, I found many parallels to the Jesuit ideal of being “contemplative in action.” Aitken’s essays elucidate an ongoing dynamic dialectic that fluctuates between meditative reflection and the world of experience—reminding me at times of the contemplative Trappist monk, Thomas Merton, and at other times of the Jesuit poet-activist, Daniel Berrigan.The reader garners an aesthetic sense that classical Zen texts have been an integral part of his journey and have provided him with a platform to reflect on topics such as marriage, death, the use of money, sexuality, and Zen practice. Some of his essays have a meditative quality, drawing the reader into an web of intertextuality and experience where Zen teachers and Western poets engage in a contemplative path of pleasure expressed in awareness of the everyday dewdrop world. There were moments that I envisioned reading a particular essay on retreat, for they had a meditative quality that reminded me of some the writings of Thomas Merton. Like Merton, Robert Aitken does not merely probe meditative experience but attempts to interrogate the everyday experiences of Western Buddhists from meditative awareness. Most Japanese Buddhists, he notes, are married within Shinto ceremonies, and Western Buddhists have resurrected old Buddhist marriage ceremonies seldom used by Japanese practitioners. Western Buddhist marriage ceremonies, Aitken notes, are a relatively new tradition that often blends ceremonies from The Book of Common Prayer with Buddhist rituals. He ends his short essay on marriage with final reflections on how marriage and family form a little sangha.In “Death: A Zen Buddhist Perspective,” Aitken breaks new ground by noting how Buddhists face the fact of death and find solace in impermanence. He quotes the Japanese haiku poet, Isa Kobayashi (1763–1827), grieving at the loss of his baby daughter:The dewdrop world is the dewdrop world, and yet—and yet(p. 124). [End Page 213]Isa looks desperately for something to give him hope but only finds comfort in his grief. Aitken points out that within grief is emancipation and that bereavement can be a good teacher. He develops some reflections on a highly underdeveloped topic within Buddhism: grieving and the transformation of grief into solace.Aitken writes on political revolution and the matters of ethics. He addresses... (shrink)

It is good to spot young German philosophers working unapologetically in the tradition of Hegel, when it is done as well as this; such spottings are rarer on this side of the Atlantic. In this monograph, based on his dissertation written under Béla Weissmahr at the Jesuit Hochschule für Philosophie in München, Burkhardt examines Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, focussing on the three themes of traditional metaphysica specialis: the world, the self, and God; or, in Kant’s critique, the (...) antinomies, the paralogisms, and the transcendental ideal. But the book is not just a treatment of specific passages in Hegel, nor even a summary of Hegel’s critique as a whole; it is an attempt to rethink the fundamental moves of the Transcendental Dialectic in light of the sorts of concerns that Hegel has raised, to speculate first with Kant and then beyond him. If one accepts, as I do, that the Kantian critique of reason remains the most fundamental opponent to speculative philosophy, then the urgency of assessing the strength of Hegel’s answer to Kant is clear. (shrink)

This pioneering monograph, published by the Jesuit Faculties of Philosophy and Theology at Montréal, disclaims being ‘un essai original de philosophie spéculative’. Nevertheless Père Desjardins’ critico-historical study of the metaphysical grounding in some Absolute Reality of the absolute character experienced in moral obligation leads him beyond criticism of the notable diversity of its evaluation by neo-Scholastics to a deeper exploration of moral obligation in human action and its dialectic of physical liberty and moral necessity. The deontological argument to God (...) was first formulated by Bańez, when the sixteenth century discoverers of the New World met pagans ignorant of God’s revealed sanction for morality. Today’s growing appreciation of Bańez’s creative insight into Thomist metaphysic is tested, perhaps, by this succinct argument in his commentary upon the Summa theologiae 2a-2ae, 10, 1. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS At the Origins of Modern Atheism. By MICHAEL J. BucKLEY, S.J. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987. Pp. viii+ 445. Writing ostensibly a history of the philosophical origins of 18th century atheism in 17th century theism, Michael Buckley, S.J., has contributed a learned, subtle, and provocative hook whose length is significantly increased and whose focus is considerably enlarged by a running commentary about the metatheory (...) (Richard McKeon's philosophical semantics) that structures his reading of the chosen theists and atheists. Buckley provides the best summary of his own historical conclusion: "... theology generated apologetic philosophy and philosophy generated Universal Mechanics, and these in turn co-opted theology to become the foundations of theistic assertions... [But] when the contradictions between Cartesian and Newtonian mechanics were further negated... god became a deus otiosus" [pp. 358-359]. This conclusion rests on a philosophical principle whose elements are taken from Plato's Seventh Epistle: " The name, the definition, and the instance for the atheistic negations are all set by the current theism " [p. 15]. In turn, this principle is justified by a cluster of meta-theses that are not easily summarized, although one stands above the rest: " Much more may he involved in such a process of ideas [from 17th century theism to 18th century atheism] than their· own internal necessity, hut internal necessity remains and governs inherently " [p. 334]. The latter meta-thesis asserts that there is a dialectic of ideas and it is from this point of view that Buckley reads the conceptual history of modern atheism. Dialectical necessity is a bugbear for many contemporary philosophers, hut Buckley argues, convincingly I think, that some kind of conceptual necessity links theism and atheism. Atheism is, essentially, the negation of a particular form of theism. In Hegelian terms, atheism is a determinate negation which draws all of its conceptual content from what it negates. Buckley, however, puts an even greater Hegelian spin on the same point. If the theism carries within itself a contradiction, it negates itself and, thereby, dialectically generates its contradiction-atheism [cf. p. 17]. " Modern atheism took not only its meaning hut its existence from the self-alienation of religion " [p. 359]. A theism that believes in the existence of an intelligent, personal God, Who creates and orders the universe, but that attempts a rational 144 BOOK REVIEWS 145 justification of this belief apart from the religious experience that alone can embody such a faith contains exactly the kind of inner contradiction that generates the negation of itself. Buckley focuses on the poignant contradiction of a Christian theology abandoning " the religious figure of Jesus as the principal evidence for the reality of God" [p. 41] in favor of some philosophy (whether that of Descartes, Malebranche, or Newton) which provides a different and allegedly more certain kind of evidence for God's existence. This theology, or more precisely the theistic philosophies it spawned, are the sources of modern atheism because, if Descartes and Newton are consistently combined, philosophy can do quite well without God. Laplace's famous reply to Napoleon, although it was not originally an atheistic slogan, captures what Diderot and d'Holbach thought: God is an unnecessary hypothesis in a truly universal mechanics which needs to presuppose only matter and motion. The historical story, of course, is more complicated than this skeleton dialectic can suggest. Buckley richly details the story but I shall rehearse only its opening chapter. Buckley begins with the Jesuit theologian, Leonard Lays (1554-1623), usually known under his Latin name, Lessius, whose De providentia numinis et anima immortalitate (1613) set the pattern for subsequent Catholic theology. Lessius, who was convinced that atheism by eliminating the eternal judge destroys morals and sound politics, revived Stoic arguments, numerous variations on a theme, which show that the universe is everywhere imprinted with a divine design. Lessius's intent, although he referred only to ancient philosophers, was not to replay the classical battle between the Stoics and the Epicureans but to combat the atheism, silent and disguised in contemporary Europe, that Lessius thought to be the inevitable outcome of the wars of religion and theological fights. Lessius, however, paid scant attention to his own insight... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion by Selusi AmbrogioCatherine König-Pralong (bio)Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion. By Selusi Ambrogio. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. How Modern Historians of Philosophy Drew Their World MapsIn his latest book, Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception (...) and the Exclusion, Selusi Ambrogio presents an extensive survey of how Indian and Chinese traditions were conceived of and staged in modern European historiography. This study, which surpasses in detail and scope other works devoted to the same topic,1 reconstructs 150 years of philosophical historiography. Otto van Heurn's Barbaricae philosophiae antiquitatum libri duo (published in 1600) included for the first time contemporary and ancient Indian thinkers in the philosophical doxography; at the other end of the time span considered, Jacob Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae (1744) sanctioned the exclusion of Chinese and Indian thinkers by means of a detailed criticism of their pseudo-philosophies. Moreover, Ambrogio makes the choice to focus on the history of philosophy, unlike Étiemble, for example,2 who was interested in philosophy in a broad sense—academic and non-academic—as well as in travel accounts, the writings of the Jesuits, and those of their opponents, among other sources. According to Ambrogio, the histories of philosophy were more representative of "the common European understanding of these civilizations," since they "were not openly written for controversialist aims" (p. 2). Even though one may wonder whether defining philosophy ("what philosophy is and its role"—ibid.) and legitimizing its scholarly practice is a less political or less polemical undertaking than pamphlets, letters, and philosophical essays,3 it is probably true that philosophical historiography produced an effect of objectification or an appearance of neutrality.The author's main thesis is that the exclusion of all non-Greeks or non-Europeans from the history of philosophy does not date from the nineteenth century and Hegel, as is generally thought, but precisely from the moment when Indian and Chinese "civilizations" were considered by historians of philosophy and included in the philosophical historiography: from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards (p. 3). Applying a segregationist model, modern historians of philosophy developed a dialectic of [End Page 203] identification—the author speaks of "reception"—and exclusion. They defined the European philosophical mind by demarcating it from other ways of thinking, which they situated in place and time on a civilizational world map. Encompassing the world from Europe produced in return processes of definition and situation. Philosophy was established in a territory and identified with a "culture" or "mind" that began to think itself in relation to the rest of the world under the name of Europe.4I will discuss Ambrogio's remarkable work in three moments. First, I will develop some particularly interesting conclusions drawn from the study; namely, they address periodization, the production of cultural categories, and the valorization of theory. I will then discuss the main thesis as well as some problematic issues, before concluding on the subject of a world absent from Ambrogio's book, the Near and Middle East.I. Logic of Time and Cultural TerritorializationAmbrogio's book is composed of three parts that address three successive historiographical models. First, the "perennialist universalism" (p. 57)—represented by, among others, Otto van Heurn, Thomas Burnet, Isaac Vossius, François Bernier, Georg Horn, and François de la Mothe le Vayer—included ancient India and then China in the "prisca theologia"; on the other hand, it described contemporary Indian and Chinese thinkers as "barbarian" philosophers. In this constellation, Buddhism began to function as the negative part of Oriental thought. According to the Jesuits, it had polluted and corrupted the original Chinese wisdom, often identified with Confucianism.The second model constructed an "Atheistic Asia," which was used either as a positive anthropological image (for example in Pierre Bayle), or as a negative foil for Lutheran philosophy and theology (for example in Johann Franz Buddeus). In the pages he dedicates to these endeavors, Ambrogio often moves away from philosophical doxography, represented by André-Fran... (shrink)

Chapter The Need for a Theory of Argument Structure. THE STANDARD APPROACH The approach to argument diagramming which we call standard was originated, ...

The present paper elaborates a deductivist account of natural language argu-ment in the context of pragma-dialectics. It reviews earlier debates, criticizes some standard misconceptions in the literature, and argues that the identification and analysis of deductive argument schemes can be the basis of a compelling theory of argumentative discourse.

This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological (...) enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.Keywords: Dialectics, Enactivism, Language, Epistemology, Ontology. (shrink)

E.V. Ilyenkov is widely considered to be the most important Soviet philosopher in the post-Stalin period. He is known largely for his original conception of the ideal, which he deployed against both idealist and crude materialist forms of reductionism, including official Soviet Diamat. This conception was articulated in its most developed form in ‘Dialectics of the Ideal’, which was written in the mid-1970s but prevented from publication in its complete form until thirty years after the author’s death. The translation (...) before you provides for the first time the complete, unabridged and unedited text of ‘Dialectics of the Ideal’ in English translation, including the author’s own subsequent comments on the text. (shrink)

The Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU has set the course to guide the present development of our society and determine its short- and long-term prospects. The Congress took place at a watershed in the development of the country and the contemporary world as a whole. It generalized the accumulated domestic and international experience in socialist construction, formulated a strategy to achieve the triumph of the ideals of communism, peace, and progress, made a creative contribution to the development of Marxist-Leninist theory, (...) and formulated a complex of problems to be resolved by social scientists and philosophers.Prior to the Congress, the journal published a series of articles analyzing advances made by Soviet scholars over the previous five years in the main avenues of phibsophy-dialectical and historical materialism, socio-philosophical problems in the development of socialism, philosophical problems in the natural sciences, the problems of scientijk-technological and social progress, culture and the cultural heritage, the development of the individual and communist education, ethics and esthetics, the history of philosophy, and the ideological struggle in the modern world.Today, the guidepost defining the primary content of the work ofphilosophers must be those programmatic theses of the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress that point to the need for a broader orientation of the social sciences toward the concrete needs ofpractical life, for quick reactions to the shifts currently occurring in our life, for the careful analysis of new phenomena, and, by virtue of this, for the attainment of impressive theoretical andpractical results. The basis for this is a creative application of materialist dialectics, particularly in striving for a deeper analysis of the problems of socialism, social progress, and the maintenance of peace. This gives rise to the need for ficndamental advances in philosophical theory. Of primary importance is the acceleration of the countrys socioeconomic development, which requires investigation into the economic, social, political, cultural, and other aspects of the acceleration of social progress and the elevation in it of the role of the masses and the human factor.The new CPSU Program concentrates the attention of social scientists on the study and comprehensive analysis of global development, the creation of a new society in the USSR and in other socialist countries, the dialectics of the productive forces and production relations, the material and intellectual spheres under socialism, patterns in the establishment of the communist formation, and the paths and means toward the gradual approach to its highest phase. The scientijic analysis of the objective contradictions in socialist society, the elaboration of well-founded recommendations on their resolution, of reliable economic and social prognoses, is an urgent task of the social sciences at the contemporary stage of development.In initiating a new rubric, we by tradition would like to share with readers our plans in this area. In this issue we enumerate the basic problems for the discussion and preparation of articles in light of the materials of the Twenty-seventh Congress. The journal plans to conduct a discussion of these problems and, with the help of its wide range of authors, to publish a series of articles.The editors will embark under this new rubric with an article from the vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician P. N. Fedoseev, entitled "Dialectics in the Contemporary World.". (shrink)

Scoring rules measure the deviation between a credence assignment and reality. Probabilism holds that only those credence assignments that satisfy the axioms of probability are rationally admissible. Accuracy-based arguments for probabilism observe that given certain conditions on a scoring rule, the score of any non-probability is dominated by the score of a probability. The conditions in the arguments we will consider include propriety: the claim that the expected accuracy of _p_ is not beaten by the expected accuracy of any other (...) credence _c_ by the lights of _p_ if _p_ is a probability. I argue that if we think through how a non-probabilist can respond to pragmatic arguments for probabilism, we will expect the non-probabilist to accept a condition _stronger_ than propriety for the same reasons that the probabilist gives for propriety, but this stronger condition is incompatible with the other conditions that the probabilist needs to run the accuracy argument. This makes it unlikely for the probabilist’s argument to be compelling. (shrink)

An English reconstruction and analysis of Benjamin's Passagen-Werk.

One of the most important philosophical principles in contemporary natural science is the principle of the universality of evolutionary development , which was argued with much force and depth in F. Engels's The Dialectics of Nature. For the more than a century that has passed since Engels's sweeping synthesis of knowledge in the natural sciences, his revelation of the unity of the processes of evolution in inanimate and animate nature, including the inevitably and law-governed appearance of its "highest flower, (...) the thinking mind," where appropriate conditions for that appearance arise, this principle of development has assisted in the achievement of many impressive advances. The general outlines of the evolutionary process of nature, in its infinite diversity, are now emerging in ever sharper relief, although our knowledge of that process still contains many rather serious lacunae. It is significant to note that the progress of natural science leads not only to modifications but often even to radical revisions of many notions about the evolution of nature, including those that seemed unchallengeable. (shrink)

Biology above the level of the individual organism ? population ecology and genetics, community ecology, biogeography and evolution ? requires the study of intrinsically complex systems. But the dominant philosophies of western science have proven to be inadequate for the study of complexity:(1)The reductionist myth of simplicity leads its advocates to isolate parts as completely as possible and study these parts. It underestimates the importance of interactions in theory, and its recommendations for practice (in agricultural programs or conservation and environmental (...) protection) are typically thwarted by the power of indirect and unanticipated causes rather than by error in the detailed description of their own objects of study.(2)Reductionism ignores properties of complex wholes; the effects of these properties are therefore seen only as noise; this randomness is elevated into an ontological principle which leads to the blocking of investigation and the reification of statistics, so that data reduction and statistical prediction often pass for explanation.(3)The faith in the atomistic nature of the world makes the allocation of relative weights to separate causes the main object of science, and makes it more difficult to study the nature of interconnectedness. (shrink)

The article explores the question of Gilbert Simondon’s (1924–1989) attitude to dialectics and the influence of G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy on his theory of individuation. Simon­don’s philosophy is seen as a coherent system with its own method and original concep­tual apparatus, developed also in the course of a critical revision of Hegelian dialectics. It is noted that in a number of cases the French philosopher describes processes, connec­tions, relations as dialectical, in others as non-dialectical. The use of common terms (...) (e.g. “abstract” and “concrete”) is analyzed in order to discover the influence of Hegel’s ideas on Simondon’s philosophy. In addition to his dissertations, which are widely recog­nized internationally, lesser-known recent publications from the philosopher’s archive are also drawn upon. On the basis of these texts, it is shown that in his philosophy of techno­logy, in an attempt to disassociate himself from certain dialectical categories, including such essential ones as “negation”, “sublation”, and the triad “thesis – antithesis – synthe­sis”, he developed an approach to which he gave the name of analectic. Simondon’s con­cept of transduction is described, in which one can see the main difference between his understanding of the processes of change and development and that proposed by Hegel. At the same time, it is noted that although the three levels of technique (element, indi­vidual and ensemble) and the three “phases of being” (pre-individual, individual, trans­individual) are seen by Simondon as a transductive unity, in some aspects a dialectical relationship is maintained between them. It is concluded that at a superficial glance Si­mondon’s philosophy has little in common with Hegelian dialectics, but on closer exami­nation of the underlying foundations of Simondon’s approach it becomes apparent that it is implicit in it. (shrink)

Traces the conceptual impasse that opposes free will and determinism to the dichotomy between subject and object, and to the limitations imposed by the thinking that underlies this division. Thinking rooted in the dialectics of subject and object transcends the impasse of the traditional debate and provides a more complete account of the experiential given of self and of free will. H. Bergson and M. Merleau-Ponty are used as examples of applying this dialectical thinking to the problem of freedom (...) and determinism. This approach is then applied to the common analysis of the act of will , and with the help of a clinical vignette, the self and free agency emerge naturally from the dialectical nature of the data. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

That form shall correspond to the content of a work is a law of realist art. Marxist-Leninist esthetics, on the basis of discovery of this law, does not prescribe an invented norm for the artist, but generalizes from the experience of art itself. Methodologically, it takes as its point of departure the dialectics of content and form. In so doing, Marxist-Leninist esthetics does not dissolve in philosophical concepts the distinctive features of content in art and the nature of form. (...) It examines the unity of content and form, and their development, in the context in which they manifest themselves specifically in art. In other words, it investigates the esthetic features of the relationship between content and form in art. (shrink)

Answering the call made by Frederic L. Holmes to introduce the concept of the longue durée in the history of science and medicine, this essay sets out to weigh the pros and cons of the concept for the field. It argues that four genres (or traditions) can be distinguished in medical historiography, each with their own ambitions, methods, perspectives and audiences. It concludes by calling for articulated and lively debate between the protagonists of the different genres as the royal way (...) to historical understanding. (shrink)