This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction What is Chemistry about? Is Chemistry Reducible to Physics? Are There Fundamental Limits to Chemical Knowledge? Is Chemical Research Ethically Neutral? Conclusion References.

Experimental philosophy is one of the most recent and controversial developments in philosophy. Its basic idea is rather simple: to test philosophical thought experiments and philosophers’ intuitions about them with scientific methods, mostly taken from psychology and the social sciences. The ensuing experimental results, such as the cultural relativity of certain philosophical intuitions, has engaged – and at times infuriated – many more traditionally minded "armchair" philosophers since then. In this volume, the metaphilosophical reflection on experimental philosophy is brought yet (...) another step forward by engaging some of its most renowned proponents and critics in a lively and controversial debate. In addition to that, the volume also contains original experimental research on personal identity and philosophical temperament, as well as state-of-the-art essays on central metaphilosophical issues, like thought experiments, the nature of intuitions, or the status of philosophical expertise. -/- This book was originally published as a special issue of Philosophical Psychology. (shrink)

The group selection controversy largely focuses on altruism (e.g., Wilson 1983; Lloyd 2001; Shavit 2004; Okasha 2006, 173ff; Borrello 2010; Leigh 2010; Rosas 2010; Hamilton and Dimond in press). Multilevel selection theory is a resolution of this controversy. Whereas kin selection partitions inclusive fitness into direct and indirect components (via influencing the replication of copies of genes in other individuals), multilevel selection considers within-group and between-group components of fitness (Gardner et al. 2011; Lion et al. 2011). Two scenarios of multilevel (...) selection are often distinguished (Damuth and Heisler 1988; Okasha 2006; Pigliucci 2010): (1) group structure only divides individual fitnesses into within- and between-group components (MLS1); and, (2) groups get their own component of fitness and also, in most definitions, a group-level adaptation (MLS2). (shrink)

Healthcare is permeated by phenomena of vulnerability and their ethical significance. Nonetheless, application of this concept in healthcare ethics today is largely confined to clinical research. Approaches that further elaborate the concept in order to make it suitable for healthcare as a whole thus deserve renewed attention. Conceptual analysis. Taking up the task to make the concept of vulnerability suitable for healthcare ethics as a whole involves two challenges. Firstly, starting from the concept as it used in research ethics, a (...) more detailed characterization and systematization of the different realms of human abilities and the various ways in which these realms contain vulnerability is to be established. Secondly, at the same time, the sought-after concept of vulnerability should avoid picturing the relation between healthcare recipient and provider as a relation between a dependent individual in need and another individual capable of providing all the help necessary. An adequate concept of vulnerability should enable one to understand when and in which respects care providers may be vulnerable as well. Philosophical accounts of vulnerability can help to meet both of these challenges. Philosophical accounts of vulnerability can help to make the concept of vulnerability suitable for healthcare ethics as a whole. They come with a price, though. While the ethical role of vulnerability in medical ethics usually is to signify states of affairs that are to be diminished or overcome, philosophical accounts introduce forms of vulnerability that are regarded as valuable. Further analyzing and systematizing forms and degrees of vulnerability thus comprises the task to distinguish between amounts and types of vulnerability that can count as valuable, and amounts and types of vulnerability that are to be alleviated. (shrink)

Philosophical analysis was the central preoccupation of 20th-century analytic philosophy. In the contemporary methodological debate, however, it faces a number of pressing external and internal challenges. While external challenges, like those from experimental philosophy or semantic externalism, have been extensively discussed, internal challenges to philosophical analysis have received much less attention. One especially vexing internal challenge is that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are deeply unclear. According to the standard textbook view, a philosophical analysis aims at a strict biconditional (...) that captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the relevant category. The textbook view arguably identifies a necessary condition on successful philosophical analyses, but understood as a sufficient condition it is untenable, as I will argue in this paper. To this end, I first uncover eight conditions of adequacy on successful philosophical analyses, some of which have rarely been spelled out in detail. As we shall see, even sophisticated alternatives to the textbook view fail to accommodate some of these conditions. I then propose the concept grounding view as a more promising account of philosophical analysis. According to this view, successful philosophical analyses require necessary biconditionals that are constrained by grounding relations among the concepts involved. Apart from providing a satisfactory account of philosophical analysis in its own right, the concept grounding view is also able to meet the challenge that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are problematically unclear. (shrink)

PurposeIn this article, we aim to present and defend a contextual approach to mathematical explanation.MethodTo do this, we introduce an epistemic reading of mathematical explanation.ResultsThe epistemic reading not only clarifies the link between mathematical explanation and mathematical understanding, but also allows us to explicate some contextual factors governing explanation. We then show how several accounts of mathematical explanation can be read in this approach.ConclusionThe contextual approach defended here clears up the notion of explanation and pushes us towards a pluralist vision (...) on mathematical explanation. (shrink)

Welcker was the first to develop the concept "Rechtsstaat" . Kant's concept of freedom, however, provides the background for Welcker's concept of the Rechtsstaat. This article investigates the question of how the concept "respect toward others" is related to the concepts "Rechtsstaat" and "right of freedom". According to Kant, "respect" is not a duty of law but rather a duty of virtue. Still we owe others fulfillment of this duty in a manner that is similar to the way we owe (...) them the fulfillment of a duty of law. Furthermore this duty of virtue corresponds to a moral right of others to respect. Although mutual respect among citizens is not constitutive of a Rechtsstaat, still it is in fact necessary for the survival of a Rechtsstaat. (shrink)

Excusable ignorance not only undermines moral culpability but also agent-responsibility. Therefore, excusable ignorance absolves of liability for costs. Specifically, it defeats liability that is meant to be derived from causal responsibility wherever strict liability cannot be justified. To establish these claims this paper assesses the potential of arguments for liability of excusably ignorant agents and thereby demarcates the proper domain of strict liability and traces the intuition that seemingly supports strict liability accounts to more general principles. The paper concludes that (...) liability cannot be justified in cases of excusable ignorance. Finally, it stresses that although excusable ignorance defeats the link from causal responsibility to liability for costs this does not imply that victims are left to fend for themselves. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that Graham Priest's dialetheic account of semantic paradoxes and the paraconsistent logics employed cannot achieve semantic universality. Dialetheism therefore fails as a solution to semantic paradoxes for the same reason that consistent approaches did. It will be demonstrated that if dialetheism can express its own semantic principles, a strengthened liar paradox will result, which renders dialetheism trivial. In particular, the argument is not invalidated by relational valuations, which were brought into paraconsistent logic (...) in order to avoid strengthened liar paradoxes. (shrink)

Abstract.In this paper we show that the theory of fields together with an integrally closed subring, the theory of formally real fields with a real holomorphy ring and the theory of formally \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $p$\end{document}-adic fields with a \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $p$\end{document}-adic holomorphy ring have no model companions in the language of fields augmented by a unary predicate for the corresponding ring.

This paper is an attempt at presenting a convincing reading of the first sentences of PI § 109, especially of its third sentence. There Wittgenstein mentions what he calls "the pneumatic conception of thought", which by Miss Anscombe is translated as "the conception of thought as a gaseous medium". By comparing the relevant sentences with their sources in Wittgenstein's manuscripts and additional parallels it is found that Anscombe's rendering is liable to be misleading. Wittgenstein's notion of "pneuma" is likely to (...) be inspired by a conception of the kind elucidated by Oswald Spengler, for instance, according to whose account pneuma is to be understood as a sort of body (Seelenkörper). If you take this as your central image, the pneumatic conception alluded to in PI § 109 is one which can be tracked down in Wittgenstein's early as well as in his middle-period work. In this remark (PI § 109), Wittgenstein tries to mention both helpful and misleading features of his earlier ways of thinking, and what he now calls the "pneumatic conception" can be seen to be the foil for both sorts of features. The central idea is that the core of language contains a scaffolding of rules whose ("pneumatic") substance is the same as that of our thought. In accordance with this view the logical structure of thought is held to be identical with that of language and reality—a notion which fits parts of the Tractatus as well as parts of the original "grammatical" conception developed in the early 1930ies. (shrink)

Since intelligent design (ID) advocates claimed the ubiquitous mouse trap as an example of systems that cannot have evolved, mouse trap history is doubly relevant to studying material culture. On the one hand, debunking ID claims about mouse traps and, by implication, also about other irreducibly complex systems has a high educational value. On the other hand, a case study of mouse trap history may contribute insights to the academic discussion about material culture evolution. Michael Behe argued that mouse traps (...) cannot trap mice with any part missing; therefore, they cannot have a precursor with one part less, therefore, cannot have a continuous history, and therefore, cannot have evolved. The patented and seminal precursor of current flat snap traps, however, had one part less, because spring and striker were formed of one wire. Secondly, historical records that reach back into the Bronze Age suggest that its history continued for a very long time. Thirdly, all prerequisites for evolution (variation, transmission, and selection) abound in mouse trap populations. Hence, Behe’s triple-jump conclusion about mouse traps is false each step. There is no, in principle, impossibility for mouse traps to evolve. An evolutionary account of mouse trap history also has academic merits beyond its educational value. Three important conclusions can be drawn: (1) reticulate phylogenies of artifact systems may be resolvable as overlapping, but branching, phylogenies of parts; (2) homologous ideas may be realized by analogous material, that is, phylogenies of information do not necessarily coincide with those of material parts; (3) recombination of parts between different artifact systems increases the cumulative nature of cultural evolution. (shrink)

In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.

In 1935, A. G. Tansley, who was knighted later, proposed the ecosystem concept. Nevertheless, this concept was not without predecessors. Why did Tansley’s ecosystem prevail and not one of its competitors? The purpose of this article is to pin the distinguishing features of Tansley’s ecosystem down, as far as the published record allows. It is an exercise in finding the difference that made a difference. Besides being a pioneering ecologist, Tansley was an adept of psychoanalysis. His interest even led him (...) to visit Sigmund Freud in Vienna for a while. Psychologists had to regard the mind as an entity in its own right, while knowing that it truly was part of a larger whole (body + mind), because the causal relation between body and mind was unknown. This lead Tansley to conclude that psychologists must not objectify the system under study, have to search for causes within their own field, and must not speculate unless this serves a scientific purpose. In 1925, Tansley defended psychoanalysis in a prolonged controversy against a concerted attack criticizing its speculative content and poor scientific standing. This could have been the reason why Tansley kept his ecosystem free of speculative content and unscientific connotation. The competing ecosystem-like concepts, however, have contained philosophical speculation, non-deterministic properties like vitalism or entelechy, or have been burdened with unscientific connotations. Hence, rigorous restraint distinguished the ecosystem concept and made it ready for use by later researchers. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 24 Heft: 1 Seiten: 341-352.

Medizinethik wie auch Pflegeethik werden allgemein als Disziplinen verstanden, die das Handeln von Menschen auf die Geltung seiner Ziele, Motivationen und Resultate hin untersucht. Ausgangspunkt solcher Formen der Ethik bildet die zum Problem gewordene Situation, in der vermeintlich eindeutige Grundziele, wie zum Beispiel Lebensverlängerung einerseits und Leidensverminderung andererseits, miteinander in Konflikt geraten. Es stellen sich dann Fragen, deren praxisanleitende Beantwortungen von einer Pflegeethik gefordert werden. In der theoretisch fundierten Beantwortung dieser Fragen jedoch entfernen sich Medizin- und Pflegeethik von dem, was (...) Menschen tun und erleiden. Mit Hilfe der seinsgeschichtlichen Hermeneutik Heideggers und des amerikanischen Pragmatismus, vertreten durch John Dewey und Richard Rorty, entwickeln die Autoren eine Methode, die - jenseits sogenannter Grundfragen einer medizinischen Ethik - alltägliche Krisen des heutigen klinischen Miteinanders im Spannungsfeld technischer Medizin und individueller Situation lösungsorientiert neu verstehen lässt. Jene werden - derart als Fragen von Mitgefühl und Selbstbestimmung neu verstanden - zu Chancen einer verantwortungsvollen klinischen Praxis. Die Krankenpflege bildet dabei als neu belebter metaphorischer Fundus den poietischen Horizont dieser Praxis, deren methodischer Vollzug von der Ausbildung bis zum beruflichen Handeln ärztlichen und pflegenden Klinikpersonals reicht. Die kulturellen, sprachlichen, rechtlichen und institutionellen Bedingungen des Handelns in Kliniken werden auf den Prüfstand gestellt und neu bewertet. Schließlich wird die Methode eines Klinischen Pragmatismus, als neue Ethik der Pflege, anhand von einschlägigen Fallbeispielen aus der Praxis beispielhaft angewandt. (shrink)

Simmel never finished his book on Hegel. Simmel rarely mentions Hegel throughout his collected works. But when he does, it is often with praise. However, Simmel explicitly distances himself from Hegel in those places where, as readers, we find Hegelian traits. What should we make of this complex relationship? With the aim of contributing to understanding Simmel’s systematic thought, I assess the extent to which Simmel was and was not influenced by Hegel. I refer to two lesser-known writings, in which (...) Simmel addresses Hegel’s philosophy at length, along with some of the more incidental mentions of Hegel that Simmel makes throughout his oeuvre. I show that Simmel adopts Hegel’s conception of philosophy while rejecting its system building. I then argue that what most scholars consider to be Hegelian in Simmel’s philosophy, namely dialectics, in fact represents his weakest, or most general, form of Hegelianism. Moreover, I show that given Simmel’s aesthetic focus, he may have been more influenced by Schiller than by Hegel in this regard. Finally, among other Hegelian features that are often overlooked, I consider Simmel’s conceptual relationality of individual–society as well as his critique of Kantian ethics. (shrink)

Starting from a political controversy and a wide-ranging media-discussion, the article examines the evolution of German national holidays from the "Kaiserreich" to the reunited Federal Republic. The author lists the dates and attributes of the national festivities and asks to what extent national days can contribute to a collective identification with the given state and its political system. In the process of change one identifies a long run from emotional festivity towards a rather rational attitude in celebrating the National Day. (...) The future of the current German national holiday in the frame of a 'democratic culture' is far away from being settled. (shrink)

Grammar can be formulated as a kind of substructural propositional logic. In support of this claim, we survey bare Gentzen style deductive systems and two kinds of non-commutative linear logic: intuitionistic and compact bilinear logic. We also glance at their categorical refinements.

Mit einer Dissertation über griechische Philosophie wurde der 23-jährige Karl Heinrich Marx aus Trier 1841 an der Universität Jena mit dem Prädikat "vorzüglich würdig" promoviert.0In der vorliegenden Edition werden die örtlichen Hintergründe im Umfeld der "Hohen Schule" der Ernestiner, die Begleitumstände des amtlichen akademischen Verfahrens und die aufsehenerregende Wirkungsgeschichte im Umgang mit der Qualifikationsschrift behandelt.0Zugleich hatte sich die Alma mater Jenensis ein bleibendes Denkmal für die Förderung eines aufstrebenden und später berühmt gewordenen Nachwuchsgelehrten durch die Jenaer Bildungsstätte gesetzt. Für die (...) politische sowie Ideen- und Symbolgeschichte und die ideologischen Räderwerke des 19. Jahrhunderts bildet die deutsch-sowjetische Editionsgeschichte der Marx-Dokumente ein eindrucksvolles Exempel.0Der 200. Geburtstag 2018 des grossen und nach wie vor heftig umstrittenen Philosophen, Publizisten, Politikers und Ökonomen bot den äusseren Anlass für diese Publikation. Mit einer Zusammenfassung in Chinesisch, Englisch und Spanisch. (shrink)

The paper presents an analysis of the influence of welfare state regimes on national models of corporate social responsibility. The paper takes its point of departure in Esping-Andersen’s three models of welfare state regimes. These models are extended to provide hypotheses on the role of corporate social responsibility in the provision of welfare goods. The paper exemplifies its points by providing an analysis of the Danish model of CSR, and drawing comparisons to other European models and the American model.