No podemos entender quiénes somos sin entender de dónde venimos. Ocurre con las personas pero también con las políticas locales de participación ciudadana. Por ello, el objetivo de esta breve reflexión será doble. En primer lugar, argumentaremos que las nuevas políticas de participación desarrolladas por los ayuntamientos españoles elegidos en las elecciones municipales de 2015 se han movido por sendas considerablemente diversas. En segundo lugar, sugeriremos que estos caminos diferentes tienen que ver con las coaliciones socio-políticas dominantes en cada uno (...) de los casos y en la interpretación que cada uno de los socios de las mismas realiza sobre cuáles fueron los aciertos y los errores de prácticas participativas previas (Navarro, 2001). (shrink)

Aquest llibre recull els textos de les reflexions que van tenir lloc en l'encont re internacional SCAN (festival de fotografia), a Internet del 29 de febrer al 1 7 d'abril de 2008, i al Teatre Metropol, el dia 17 d'abril de 2008. Tres teòrics de la imatge de reconegut prestigi internacional -Christian Caujolle, Joan Font cuberta i Radu Stern- van debatre virtualment a internet i posteriorment de form a presencial a Tarragona sobre el paper de la imatge al (...) nostre temps. (shrink)

Moral distress has received much attention in the international nursing literature in recent years. In this article, we describe the evolution of the concept of moral distress among nursing theorists from its initial delineation by the philosopher Jameton to its subsequent deployment as an umbrella concept describing the impact of moral constraints on health professionals and the patients for whom they care. The article raises worries about the way in which the concept of moral distress has been portrayed in some (...) nursing research and expresses concern about the fact that research, so far, has been largely confined to determining the prevalence of experiences of moral distress among nurses. We conclude by proposing a reconsideration, possible reconstruction and multidisciplinary approach to understanding the experiences of all health professionals who have to make difficult moral judgements and decisions in complex situations. (shrink)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the following: Professor DW Harding for suggesting inquiry into Binet's work and for allowing use of his own ideas in ...

Scott shows that the gender equality invoked today as a fundamental principle was not originally associated with the term "secularism" when it first entered the nineteenth century. The inequality of the sexes was fundamental to the articulation of the separation of church and state that inaugurated Western modernity. Western nation-states imposed a new order of women's subordination, assigning them to a feminized familial sphere meant to complement the rational masculine realms of politics and economics. It was not until the question (...) of Islam arose in the late twentieth century that gender equality became a primary feature of the discourse of secularism. (shrink)

This study examines how our personal values influence our judgment of the morality of some workplace behaviours. Sixty-nine undergraduates were asked to rank order separately Rokeach''s instrumental and terminal values in terms of their importance as guiding principles in their life. Subjects then read four scenarios, each of which described ethically questionable behaviour of the sort that might be encountered in business. They were then asked to rate whether or not the behaviour of the person described in the scenario was (...) ethical, and whether or not they had any intentions to rectify the situation. People with different value hierarchies perceived the targeted behaviours differently. For example, subjects who valued honesty perceived the behaviour as more immoral than subjects who did not value honesty. While the ranking of the instrumental valuehonesty was the best predictor of people''s judgments about the morality of the behaviour, their ranking of the instrumental valueambition was the best predictor of their behavioural intentions. (shrink)

"Speciesism: 'A failure, in attitude or practice, to accord any nonhuman being equal consideration and respect'"--From the book's cover.

Frege's life and character -- The project -- Frege's new logic -- Defining the numbers -- The reconception of the logic, I-"Function and concept" -- The reconception of the logic, II- "On sense and meaning" and "on concept and object" -- Basic laws, the great contradiction, and its aftermath -- On the foundations of geometry -- Logical investigations -- Frege's influence on recent philosophy.

Marjolaine Deschênes | : C’est surtout de Joan C. Tronto que les ambassadrices du care se réclament en France, davantage que de Carol Gilligan. Je montre ici qu’une certaine tendance du discours français sur le care peut être diagnostiquée comme le symptôme d’une culture désenchantée, dépouillant le monde non de ses dieux, mais de ses dimensions esthétique, artistique et imaginative. Le renversement que ce discours tend à opérer, de la figure morale de l’autonomie à celle de la vulnérabilité, illustrerait (...) ce « symptôme ». C’est plus précisément l’idée du care comme « maintien du monde » chez Tronto que je critique, puisque l’auteure exclut de ces activités les domaines esthétique, artistique et intellectuel. Je discute trois auteures ayant déjà critiqué cette notion de care, qui chacune font progresser mon propos vers ce que je considère être un oubli du monde « existentiellement » habitable chez la philosophe. Enfin je contribue à combler ce qui manque dans la théorie de Tronto, soit un horizon esthétique et une réflexion sur le langage qui s’encastre dans une herméneutique du soi. Je me penche alors sur un care qui consiste à veiller sur la « fragilité du langage politique » chez Paul Ricoeur. Je conclus que s’agissant de faire du care une valeur publique à la fois féministe et soucieuse non seulement de la vie, mais aussi du monde, les activités artistiques, intellectuelles et éducationnelles sont de loin les plus efficaces, contrairement à ce que Tronto semble penser. | : In France, the ambassadresses of care ethics mainly align themselves with Joan C. Tronto’s theory—rather more than with Carol Gilligan’s. Here I want to state that a certain tendency of French discourse of “care” might be diagnosed as a symptom of a disenchanted culture, since it strips the world of its aesthetic, artistic, and imaginative dimensions. I contend that we can find the best illustration of this symptom when that discourse tends to shift from the moral figure of autonomy to the moral figure of vulnerability. More precisely, I aim to challenge Tronto’s idea of “care” as a “maintaining of the world”, since she excludes from it the areas of aesthetics, the arts, and intellectual activities. I shall discuss three authors who have already criticized Tronto’s notion of “care”. Each of them presents an opportunity for me to refine my reflection on what I consider to be Tronto’s disregard for an existentially liveable world. Finally, I help to fill in what is lacking from Tronto’s theory —that is to say, an aesthetic horizon and a real reflection on language, a reflection framed by a hermeneutics of the self. To this end, I focus on a “care” consisting in keeping watch over the “political language’s fragility” in Paul Ricoeur. I conclude by stating that if we really want to make “care” a public value, this feminist value should be concerned not only with life, but also with world. Artistic, intellectual, and educational activities are by far the most efficient at making such a value public. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynecology. By Laurence B. McCullough and Frank A. Chervenak.

Frege begins Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, the work that introduces the project which was to occupy him for most of his professional career, with the question, 'What is the number one?' It is a question to which even mathematicians, he says, have no satisfactory answer. And given this scandalous situation, he adds, there is small hope that we shall be able to say what number is. Frege intends to rectify the situation by providing definitions of the number one and the (...) concept of number. But what, exactly, is required of a definition? Surely it will not do to stipulate that the number one is Julius Caesar - that would change the subject. It seems reasonable to suppose that an acceptable definition must be a true statement containing a description that picks out the object to which the numeral '1' already refers. And, similarly, that an acceptable definition of the concept of number must contain a description that picks out precisely those objects that are numbers - those objects to which our numerals refer. Yet, while Frege writes a great deal about what criteria his definitions must satisfy, the above criteria are not among those he mentions. Nor does he attempt to convince us that his definitions of '1' and the other numerals are correct by arguing that these definitions pick out objects to which these numerals have always referred. Yet, while Frege writes a great deal about what criteria his definitions must satisfy, the above criteria are not among those he mentions. Nor does he attempt to convince us that his definitions of ‘1’ and the other numerals are correct by arguing that these definitions pick out objects to which these numerals have always referred. There is, as we shall see shortly, a great deal of evidence that Frege’s definitions are not intended to pick out objects to which our numerals already refer. But if this is so, how can these definitions teach us anything about our science of arithmetic? And what criteria must these definitions satisfy? To answer these questions, we need to understand what it is that Frege thinks we need to learn about the science of arithmetic. (shrink)

To learn whether criticism and regulation of research practices have been followed by a reduction of deception or use of more acceptable approaches to deception, the contents of all 1969, 1978, 1986, and 1992 issues of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology were examined. Deception research was coded according to type of (non)informing (e.g., false informing, consent to deception, no informing), possible harmfulness of deception employed (e.g., powerfulness of induction, morality of the behavior induced, privacy of behavior), method of (...) deception (e.g., bogus device or role, false purpose of study, false feedback), and debriefing employed. Use of confederates has been partly replaced by uses of computers. "Consent" with false informing declined after 1969, then rose in 1992. Changes in the topics studied (e.g., attribution, socialization, personality) largely accounted for the decline in deception in 1978 and 1986. More attention needs to be given to ways of respecting subjects' autonomy, to appropriate debriefing and desensitizing, and to selecting the most valid and least objectionable deception methods. (shrink)

Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments and our thoughts; that there is a third realm containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. Until recently, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for most philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explication unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of several revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings (...) — interpretations on which these claims receive a very different reading. In Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge attempts to undermine this trend. Burge argues that Frege is the very Platonist most have thought him — that revisionist interpretations of Frege's Platonism, mine among them, run afoul of the words on Frege's pages. This paper is a response to Burge's criticisms. I argue that my interpretation is more faithful than Burge's to Frege's texts. (shrink)

Ethics is normative; ethics indicates, in broad terms, what researchers should do. For example, researchers should respect human participants. Empirical study tells us what actually happens. Empirical research is often needed to fine-tune the best ways to achieve normative objectives, for example, to discover how best to achieve the dual aims of gaining important knowledge and respecting participants. Ethical decision making by scientists and institutional review boards should not be based on hunches and anecdotes (e.g., about such matters as what (...) information potential research participants would want to know and what they understand, or what they consider to be acceptable risks). These questions should be answered through empirical research. Some of the preceding articles in this special issue illustrate uses of empirical research on research ethics. This article places empirical research on research ethics into broader perspective and challenges investigators to use the tools of their disciplines to proactively solve ethical problems for which there currently exist no empirically proven solutions. (shrink)

RESUMEN:Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar la articulación entre la afirmación del carácter racional de la fe, esto es, su dimensión latitudinaria, el escepticismo epistemológico, y su derivación práctica en un concepto de tolerancia restringido al interior del protestantismo. Se subrayará, en este sentido, el carácter estratégico de la articulación entre racionalidad de la fe y escepticismo, en cuanto permite apelar a la ignorancia con vistas a la tolerancia, sin por ello dejar de sostener la interpretación protestante del cristianismo, en (...) detrimento de la interpretación católica.PALABRAS CLAVE:LOCKE - LATITUDINARISMO - ESCEPTICISMO - TOLERANCIA - PROTESTANTISMOABSTRACT:This paper aims to analyze the articulation between faith rationality assertion, i.e. its latitudinarian aspect, its epistemological skepticism, and its practical implication in a restricted concept of tolerance within Protestantism. In this regard, we will emphasize the strategic feature of the link between faith rationality and skepticism, as it allows appealing to ignorance towards tolerance, without dropping the Protestant interpretation of Christianity, to the detriment of Catholic interpretation.KEYWORDS:LOCKE - LATITUDINARIANISM - SKEPTICISM - TOLERATION - PROTESTANTISM. (shrink)

Does Frege have a metatheory for his logic? There is an obvious and uncontroversial sense in which he does. Frege introduces and discusses his new logic in natural language; he argues, in response to criticisms of Begriffsschrift, that his logic is superior to Boole's by discussing formal features of both systems. In so far as the enterprise of using natural language to introduce, discuss, and argue about features of a formal system is metatheoretic, there can be no doubt: Frege has (...) a metatheory. There is also an obvious and uncontroversial sense in which Frege does not have a metatheory for his logic. The model theoretic semantics with which we are familiar today are a post-Fregean development. The question I address in this paper is, does Frege have a metatheory in the following sense: do his justifications of his basic laws and rules of inference employ, or even require, ineliminable use of a truth predicate and metalinguistic variables? My answer is ‘no’ on both counts. I argue that Frege neither uses, nor has any need to use, a truth predicate or metalinguistic variables in his justifications of his basic laws and rules of inference. Quine's famous explanation of the need for semantic ascent simply does not apply to Frege's logic. The purpose of the discussions that are typically understood as constituting Frege's metatheory is, rather, elucidatory. And once we see what the aim of these particular elucidations is, we can explain Frege's otherwise puzzling eschewal of the truth predicate in his discussions of the justification of the laws and rules of inference. (shrink)

This article briefly outlines some of the key problems with the way in which the moral realm has traditionally been understood and analysed. I propose two alternative views of what is morally interesting and applicable to nursing practice and I indicate that instability has its upsides. I begin with a moral tale – a 'Good Samaritan' story – which raises fairly usual questions about the nature of morality but also the more philosophically fundamental question about the relationship between subjectivity and (...) moral agency. I then consider this relationship from the perspectives of two twentieth century philosophers: Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Foucault. Levinas' basic point is that the experience of ethical subjectivity is made possible through others: the demand to respond to the existence of others is the basic social structure that precedes individual freedom. If Levinas posits intersubjectivity as a fundamental or primitive feature of the moral realm, Foucault poses an even more basic question: how have moral subjects and relations of obligation been constituted? The aim of ethical inquiry, for Foucault, is to describe the network of discourses, institutions, relations, and practices through which certain kinds of subjects are constituted and constitute themselves, e.g. as a kind of person who can act morally. Finally, I consider some recent research in philosophy of nursing which illustrates how Levinasian and/or Foucauldian perspectives can deepen understanding of nurses' moral practices, specifically, the work of Norwegian public health nurses, Canadian pediatric nurses, and Irish midwives. I suggest that in spite of the instability of morality in general and the particular ethical challenges that face nurses, there are grounds for hope and possible strategies for living in unstable times. (shrink)

This study considers the potential for influencing business students to become ethical managers by directing their undergraduate learning environment. In particular, the relationship between business students’ academic cheating, as a predictor of workplace ethical behavior, and their approaches to learning is explored. The three approaches to learning identified from the students’ approaches to learning literature are deep approach, represented by an intrinsic interest in and a desire to understand the subject, surface approach, characterized by rote learning and memorization without understanding, (...) and strategic approach, associated with competitive students whose motivation is the achievement of good grades by adopting either a surface or deep approach. Consistent with the hypothesized theoretical model, structural equation modeling revealed that the surface approach is associated with higher levels of cheating, while the deep approach is related to lower levels. The strategic approach was also associated with less cheating and had a statistically stronger influence than the deep approach. Further, a significantly positive relationship reported between deep and strategic approaches suggests that cheating is reduced when deep and strategic approaches are paired. These findings suggest that future managers and business executives can be influenced to behave more ethically in the workplace by directing their learning approaches. It is hoped that the evidence presented may encourage those involved in the design of business programs to implement educational strategies which optimize students’ approaches to learning towards deep and strategic characteristics, thereby equipping tomorrow’s managers and business executives with skills to recognize and respond appropriately to workplace ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

Aim: The aim of this review is to examine the ways in which the concept of moral distress has been delineated and deployed in the argument-based nursing ethics literature. It adds to what we already know about moral distress from reviews of the qualitative and quantitative research. Data sources: CINAHL, PubMed, Web of Knowledge, EMBASE, Academic Search Complete, PsycInfo, Philosophers’ Index and Socindex. Review methods: A total of 20 argument-based articles published between January 1984 and December 2013 were analysed. Results: (...) We found that like the empirical literature, most authors in this review draw on Jameton’s original definition and describe moral distress in psychological–emotional–physiological terms. They also agree that moral distress is linked to the presence of some kind of constraint on nurses’ moral agency, and that it is best understood as a two-staged process that can intensify over time. There is also consensus that moral distress has an important normative meaning, although different views concerning the normative meaning of moral distress are expressed. Finally, the authors generally agree that moral distress arises from a number of different sources and that it (mostly) affects negatively on nurses’ personal and professional lives and, ultimately, harms patients. However, despite this consensus, many authors take issue with the way in which moral distress is conceptualized and operationalized. Moreover, while some worry that identifying nurses as a group of health professionals whose voices are ignored or marginalized might disempower nurses and encourage them to avoid their moral responsibilities, others take situations involving moral distress as indicative of more fundamental, structural inequities at the heart of contemporary healthcare provision. Conclusion: We conclude that research on moral distress in nursing is timely and important because it highlights the specifically moral labour of nurses. However, we suggest that significant concerns about the conceptual fuzziness and operationalization of moral distress also flag the need to proceed with caution. (shrink)

At least since the seventeenth century, the strange combination of epistemological certainty and ontological power that characterizes mathematics has made it a major focus of philosophical, social, and cultural negotiation. In the eighteenth century, all of these factors were at play as mathematical thinkers struggled to assimilate and extend the analysis they had inherited from the seventeenth century. A combination of educational convictions and historical assumptions supported a humanistic mathematics essentially defined by its flexibility and breadth. This mathematics was an (...) expression of l’esprit humain, which was unfolding in a progressive historical narrative. The French Revolution dramatically altered the historical and educational landscapes that had supported this eighteenth‐century approach, and within thirty years Augustin Louis Cauchy had radically reconceptualized and restructured mathematics to be rigorous rather than narrative. (shrink)

This article explains how and why the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm (IPP), a 450-year-old approach to education, can serve as a framework for a modern principles-based ethics course in accounting. The IPP takes a holistic view of the world, combining five elements: context, experience, reflection, action, and evaluation. We describe the components of the IPP and discuss how they align with suggestions from prior research for providing principles-based ethics instruction in accounting. We conclude by describing how we used the IPP as (...) a framework to create a graduate-level accounting ethics course. (shrink)

I argued that Frege does not have a metatheory in the following sense: the justifications he offers for his basic laws and rules of inference neither employ nor require a truth-predicate or metalinguistic variables. In ‘Does Frege Use a Truth-predicate in his "Justification" of the Laws of Logic?’, Dirk Greimann disputes this. As Greimann interprets Frege, (i) Frege's remarks commit him to giving a metatheoretic justification of the basic laws and rules of his logic, and (ii) Frege actually gives such (...) a justification in the early sections of Grundgesetze—although the truth-predicate that Frege employs is a non-standard one: it is neither a predicate that holds of all and only true sentences nor a predicate that holds of all and only true thoughts. I argue that Greimann's interpretation is not, in the end, true to the text, and that his non-standard view of what is required of a Tarskian truth-predicate is ultimately not viable. (shrink)

This note explores the common core of constructive, intuitionistic, recursive and classical analysis from an axiomatic standpoint. In addition to clarifying the relation between Kleene’s and Troelstra’s minimal formal theories of numbers and number-theoretic sequences, we propose some modified choice principles and other function existence axioms which may be of use in reverse constructive analysis. Specifically, we consider the function comprehension principles assumed by the two minimal theories EL and M, introduce an axiom schema CFd asserting that every decidable property (...) of numbers has a characteristic function, and use it to describe a precise relationship between the minimal theories. We show that the axiom schema AC00 of countable choice can be decomposed into a monotone choice schema AC00m (which guarantees that every Cauchy sequence has a modulus) and a bounded choice schema BC00. We relate various (classically correct) axiom schemas of continuous choice to versions of the bar and fan theorems, suggest a constructive choice schema AC1/2,0 (which incidentally guarantees that every continuous function has a modulus of continuity), and observe a constructive equivalence between restricted versions of the fan theorem and correspondingly restricted bounding axioms \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${AB_{1/2,0}^{2^{\mathbb{n}}}}$$\end{document}. We also introduce a version WKL!! of Weak König’s Lemma with uniqueness which is intermediate in strength between WKL and the decidable fan theorem FTd. (shrink)

Mandatory reporting laws, which vary slightly from state to state, require reporting by helping professionals when there is reasonable cause to suspect child abuse. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) require researchers to warn subjects of this duty to report, which may have a chilling effect on subject rapport and candor. Certificates of confidentiality, in conjunction with other precautions, may reduce some barriers to valid research. Attempts to resolve problems created by reporting laws must produce the most valid research, while minimizing harm (...) and distress to research participants, their families, and the researcher and meeting local and federal legal requirements. (shrink)

Mediante el comentario de los últimos párrafos de la respuesta de Montaigne a la primera objeción que se le hace a Ramón Sibiuda (Ensayos, II, 12), se pretende lo siguiente: a) Precisar la naturaleza de la defensa de Montaigne, basada en la utilidad más que en la verdad de los argumentos de Sibiuda; b) Precisar la relación entre fideísmo y escepticismo en Montaigne, relación que pasa por una ambigüedad de posiciones (del fideista, del libre pensador, y del buen católico), pero (...) en la que parece dominar finalmente el juicio; c) Y precisar la concepción de Dios que aparece en la respuesta a esa objeción, y el papel que parece jugar en el proyecto de los Ensayos, esto es, un Dios oculto el acceso al cual no depende de nosotros, por lo que no podemos construir nuestra vida ejerciendo nuestro juicio a partir de Él. (shrink)

According to care theory the good parent confronting a helpless child has an unmediated impulse to relieve his distress; that impulse grows into a prescriptive ethic of relatedness, often contrasted to the more individualistic ethic of justice. If, however, a child's nature is understood as assertive and competent as well as fragile and dependent; if, in addition, he acquires needs through socialisation and is the beneficiary of inferred needs determined by others, then an ethic of need-gratification is insufficient. Caring theory, (...) with its emphasis on empathy, compassion, and attentiveness to the child's present state undervalues the role of adult restraint and imposition in a rounded caring philosophy. Parents (and teachers) must continuously balance gratification with suppression, support with restraint, engrossment with detachment. From this process emerges a revised relational ethic in which the care/justice distinctions are collapsed. (shrink)