Im vorliegenden Buch stellt Klaus Oehler die Lehre vom noetischen und dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles dar und begründet damit erstmals die These, dass das für die neuzeitliche Philosophie zentrale Problem der Reflexion und des Selbstbewusstseins schon, wenn auch nicht in gleicher Weise, in der antiken Philosophie eine Rolle gespielt hat.

Im vorliegenden Buch stellt Klaus Oehler die Lehre vom noetischen und dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles dar und begründet damit erstmals die These, dass das für die neuzeitliche Philosophie zentrale Problem der Reflexion und des Selbstbewusstseins schon, wenn auch nicht in gleicher Weise, in der antiken Philosophie eine Rolle gespielt hat.

Die moderne Poesie, als deren Begrunder Baudelaire gilt, enthalt eine geschichtliche Substanz, von der man bis zu Walter Benjamin kaum etwas ahnte. AN ihrem Anfang steht die nicht mehr bloSS asthetische Auseinandersetzung mit der Prosa der Bourgeoiswelt. DIe zu Beginn der Julimonarchie von Heine, Daumier u. A. Begrundete, von Baudelaire 1846 dann programmatisch formulierte postromantische Asthetik nimmt jene Prosa in ihrer widerspruchlichen Bewegung in sich auf, um sie in revolutionarem Sinne zu transformieren. DIe Verfahrensweisen dieser antibourgeoisen Asthetik, ihre historischen und (...) asthetischen Voraussetzungen, ihre Strategien und Aporien werden deutlich nur in der konkreten Konfrontation der Werke mit dem historisch-ideologischen "Text", auf den sie sich beziehen. OEhlers Buch will den Blick offnen fur den Traditionszusammenhang von "realistischer" und "esoterischer" Avantgarde. (shrink)

Der Versuch des Aristoteles, die Gesamtheit der Erscheinungen begrifflich zu fassen, geht von einem genial einfachen Ansatz aus: Indem er die möglichen Typen von Aussagen über die Erscheinungen voneinander unterscheidet, erhält er zugleich eine Typologie der Erscheinungen selbst. Er findet sie in Substanz und Quantität, Qualität und Relation, Ort und Zeit, Lage und Zustand, aktivem Handeln und passivem Erleiden. Daneben behandelt Aristoteles alle Arten von Gegensätzen, die sechs Erscheinungsformen der Bewegung und die Möglichkeit qualitativer Veränderung.

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

In the present research, we examine the relation between leader mindfulness and employee performance through the lenses of organizational justice and leader-member relations. We hypothesize that employees of more mindful leaders view their relations as being of higher leader-member exchange quality. We further hypothesize two mediating mechanisms of this relation: increased interpersonal justice and reduced employee stress. In other words, we posit that employees of more mindful leaders feel treated with greater respect and experience less stress. Finally, we predict that (...) LMX quality serves as a mediator linking leader mindfulness to employee performance—defined in terms of both in-role and extra-role performance. Across two field studies of triadic leader-employee-peer data and dyadic leader–employee data, we find support for this sequential mediation model. We discuss implications for theorizing on leadership, organizational justice, business ethics, LMX, and mindfulness, as well as practical implications. (shrink)

Sentences containing predicates of personal taste (for example, ‘tasty’, ‘funny’) and aesthetic predicates (for example, ‘beautiful’) give rise to an acquaintance inference: They convey the information that speakers have first-hand experience with the object of predication and they can only be uttered appropriately if that is the case. This is surprisingly hard to explain. I will concentrate on aesthetic predicates, and firstly criticize previous attempts to explain the acquaintance phenomena. Second, I will suggest an explanation that rests on a speech (...) act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, according to which, in uttering ‘X is beautiful’ speakers perform two illocutionary acts simultaneously: an expressive and an assertive one. I will spell out this suggestion in detail and defend it against objections. Considering puzzles related to the acquaintance inference will lead to a new argument for a promising version of hybrid expressivism in meta-aesthetics. (shrink)

This paper aims to delineate the class of aesthetic judgments linguistically. The main idea is that aesthetic judgments can be specified by a certain set of assertibility conditions, i.e., by norms that govern appropriate speech-acts. This idea is spelled out in detail and defended against various objections. The suggestion leads to an interesting account of aesthetic judgments that is theoretically fruitful: It provides the basis for a non-circular and satisfying characterization of the whole domain of aesthetic research and it marks (...) an important linguistic difference between aesthetic judgments and judgments of personal taste. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 1 Seiten: 55-88.

Mazzino Montinari nannte Die Geburt der Tragödie "Nietzsches schwierigstes Werk". Es greift auf antike Traditionen zurück und orientiert sich weltanschaulich an Schopenhauer und Wagner, dessen,Musikdrama' Nietzsche als "Wiedergeburt der Tragödie"darstellt. Bei Nietzsche selbst und in der Kulturkritik wirkte vor allem das Konzept des Dionysischen nach. Gegen die Décadence gerichtet, wurde es zum Ideogramm eines rauschhaften Lebenskults.

Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by recourse to final aims. Hedonistic versions of ETHICAL consequentialism spell out what is MORALLY right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. Veritistic versions of EPISTEMIC consequentialism spell out what is EPISTEMICALLY right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false ones. Even though these theories are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also interesting disanalogies. For (...) example, popular versions of epistemic consequentialism implicitly endorse the truth-indication principle (which claims that a belief is epistemically justified only if there are factors indicating that the belief itself is true), whereas popular versions of ethical consequentialism do not subscribe to an analogous pleasure-indicating principle (which claims that an act is morally justified only if there are factors indicating that performing the act itself is pleasurable). In a first step I will argue that this difference rests on the fact that plausible versions of epistemic consequentialism have to meet certain constraints, which versions of ethical consequentialism do not have to satisfy. As these constraints can be easily met by incorporating the truth-indication principle, epistemic consequentialists tend to subscribe to it. In a second step I will investigate whether the identified constraints can also be met independent from the truth-indication principle. Are there plausible versions of veritistic epistemic consequentialism that reject the principle, thereby allowing that some beliefs can be epistemically justified even though no factors speak in favor of their truth? Building on ideas put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Crispin Wright, and others, I will answer this question affirmatively. (shrink)

With this special issue, we would like to promote research on changes in the funding of the sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Since funding secures the livelihood of researchers and the means to do research, it is an indispensable condition for almost all research; as funding arrangements are undergoing dramatic changes, we think it timely to renew the science studies community’s efforts to understand the funding of research. Changes in the governance of science have garnered considerable attention from science studies (...) and higher education research; however, the impact of these changes on the conduct and content of research has not received sufficient attention, and theoretical insights into the connections between funding practices and research practices are few and far between. The aim of this special issue is to contribute to our theoretical understanding of the changing nature of research funding and its impact on the production of scientific knowledge. More specifically, we are interested in the interplay between funding and research practices: What is the impact of institutionalised funding arrangements on the production of scientific knowledge? (shrink)

Anthony Brueckner argues for a strong connection between the closure and the underdetermination argument for scepticism. Moreover, he claims that both arguments rest on infallibilism: In order to motivate the premises of the arguments, the sceptic has to refer to an infallibility principle. If this were true, fallibilists would be right in not taking the problems posed by these sceptical arguments seriously. As many epistemologists are sympathetic to fallibilism, this would be a very interesting result. However, in this paper I (...) will argue that Brueckner’s claims are wrong: The closure and the underdetermination argument are not as closely related as he assumes and neither rests on infallibilism. Thus even a fallibilist should take these arguments to raise serious problems that must be dealt with somehow. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, Kant's claim that moral wrongness has its ground in a contradiction underlying every immoral action is a “bluff” rooted in “dogmatic moralism”. Ever since Benjamin Constant's exchange with Kant, counterexamples have played a crucial role in showing why Kant's “universalization procedure” fails to determine the moral validity of our judgments. Despite recent attempts to bring Kant's ethics closer to Aristotle's, these counterexamples have prevailed. Most recently, Jesse Prinz has launched another attack along the same lines. (...) Prinz insists that Kant's universalization procedure fundamentally begs the question and fails to generate plausible results. Even authors who are very sympathetic to Kant, such as Allen Wood, have tried to downplay universalization, focusing instead on other formulations of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I respond directly to four of the most prominent counterexamples. In each case, I aim to show how we can uphold Kant's fundamental claim that the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative articulates the form of our particular moral judgments. (shrink)

Is art epistemically valuable? Catherine Z. Elgin answers this question in the affirmative. She argues for the epistemic value of art on the basis of her innovative epistemological theory, in which the focus is shifted from knowledge and truth to a non-factive account of understanding. After an exposition and critique of her view, as she develops it in her most recent book “True Enough” (MIT-Press, 2017), I will build on some of her ideas in order to strengthen her account.

In Chapter 12 of the General Theory, on “The State of Long-Term Expectation,” Keynes writes: “It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain”. In a footnote to this sentence, Keynes points out that by “very uncertain” he does not mean the same as “very improbable” and refers to the chapter on “The Weight of Arguments” in his earlier Treatise on Probability. The purpose of this article, in the first place, is (...) to provide an account of, and to sort out the relations between, Keynes's views on probability, uncertainty, and the weight of arguments. (shrink)

Aesthetic statements of the form ‘X is beautiful’ are evaluative; they indicate the speaker’s positive affective attitude regarding X. Why is this so? Is the evaluative content part of the truth conditions, or is it a pragmatic phenomenon (i.e. presupposition, implicature)? First, I argue that semantic approaches as well as these pragmatic ones cannot satisfactorily explain the evaluativity of aesthetic statements. Second, I offer a positive proposal based on a speech-act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, which states that, with the (...) literal utterance of ‘X is beautiful’, we perform two illocutionary acts simultaneously, an assertive and an expressive one. I will specify this theory in detail and argue that it can satisfactorily account for the evaluative content of aesthetic statements. I will also discuss the advantages of the theory over other variants of expressivism in meta-aesthetics. (shrink)

This essay presents a phenomenological analysis of the functioning of symbols as elements of the life-world with the purpose of demonstrating the interrelationship of individual and society. On the basis of Alfred Schutz''s theory of the life-world, signs and symbols are viewed as mechanisms by means of which the individual can overcome the transcendences posed by time, space, the world of the Other, and multiple realities which confront him or her. Accordingly, the individual''s life-world divides itself into the dimensions of (...) time, space, the social world and various reality spheres which form the boundaries or transcendences that the I has to understand and integrate. Signs and symbols are described as appresentational modes which stand for experiences originating in the different spheres of the life-world within the world of everyday life, within which they can be communicated, thereby establishing intersubjectivity. Schutz''s theory of the symbol explains how social entities – such as nations, states or religious groups – are symbolically integrated to become components of the individual''s life-world. The following paper reconstructs Schutz''s concept of the symbol as a crucial component of his theory of the life-world, which is seen as an outstanding phenomenological contribution to the theory of the sign and the symbol in general. (shrink)

Socially assistive devices such as care robots or companions have been advocated as a promising tool in elderly care in Western healthcare systems. Ethical debates indicate various challenges. An important part of the ethical evaluation is to understand how users interact with these devices and how interaction influences users’ perceptions and their ability to express themselves. In this review, we report and critically appraise findings of non-comparative empirical studies with regard to these effects from an ethical perspective.Electronic databases and other (...) sources were queried using a comprehensive search strategy generating 9851 records. Studies were screened independently by two authors. Methodological quality of studies was assessed. For 22 reports on 21 datasets using a non-comparative design a narrative synthesis was performed.Data shows positive findings in regard to attitudes and emotional reactions of users. Varying perception of a social relation and social presence are the most commonly observed traits of interaction. Users struggle with understanding technical complexities while functionality of the devices is limited. This leads to a behavioral alignment of users towards the requirements of the devices to be able to make use of them.This evidence adds to three important ethical debates on the use of socially assistive devices in healthcare in regard to (1) reliability of existing empirical evidence to inform normative judgements, (2) ethical significance of the social presence of devices and (3) user autonomy in regard to behavioral alignment. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions—a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a (...) problem can be seen by reconsidering and modifying a well-known argument to the conclusion that beliefs cannot be justified by perceptions but only by other beliefs. Nevertheless, the aim of the paper is not to conclude that perceptions are actually incapable of justifying our beliefs but rather to highlight an overlooked problem that needs to be solved in order to properly understand the justificatory relationship between perceptions and beliefs. (shrink)