Working Memory plays a crucial role in many high-level cognitive processes . The prevalent view holds that active components of WM are predominantly intentional and conscious. This conception is oftentimes expressed explicitly, but it is best reflected in the nature of major WM tasks: All of them are blatantly explicit. We developed two new WM paradigms that allow for an examination of the role of conscious awareness in WM. Results from five studies show that WM can operate unintentionally and outside (...) of conscious awareness, thus suggesting that the current view should be expanded to include implicit WM. (shrink)

This study describes the results of a retrospective review of patients' charts who had an advanced directive (AD) and who were hospitalized in a tertiary, acute care teaching hospital. The purpose of the review was to understand from clinical, sociological, ethical and legal perspectives the nature and utility of ADs. Findings and implications of the review are discussed in terms of: patient demographics; diagnoses; quality of ADs; influence of ADs on clinical decisions; and legal aspects of ADs.

Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on understanding cognition as "enactive." This enactive view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting experimental evidence show that (...) an enactive approach to cognitive science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development; action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics, and psychology. ContributorsMoshe Bar, Lawrence W. Barsalov, Olaf Blanke, Jeannette Bohg, Martin V. Butz, Peter F. Dominey, Andreas K. Engel, Judith M. Ford, Karl J. Friston, Chris D. Frith, Shaun Gallagher, Antonia Hamilton, Tobias Heed, Cecilia Heyes, Elisabeth Hill, Matej Hoffmann, Jakob Hohwy, Bernhard Hommel, Atsushi Iriki, Pierre Jacob, Henrik Jörntell, Jürgen Jost, James Kilner, Günther Knoblich, Peter König, Danica Kragic, Miriam Kyselo, Alexander Maye, Marek McGann, Richard Menary, Thomas Metzinger, Ezequiel Morsella, Saskia Nagel, Kevin J. O'Regan, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Giovanni Pezzulo, Tony J. Prescott, Wolfgang Prinz, Friedemann Pulvermüller, Robert Rupert, Marti Sanchez-Fibla, Andrew Schwartz, Anil K. Seth, Vicky Southgate, Antonella Tramacere, John K. Tsotsos, Paul F. M. J. Verschure, Gabriella Vigliocco, Gottfried Vosgerau. (shrink)

This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind. _Enaction_, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in _The Embodied Mind_, breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied (...) action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. _Enaction_ offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science. Contributors: Renaud Barbaras, Didier Bottineau, Giovanna Colombetti, Diego Cosmelli, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Andreas K. Engel, Olivier Gapenne, Véronique Havelange, Edwin Hutchins, Michel Le Van Quyen, Rafael E. Núñez, Marieke Rohde, Benny Shanon, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Adam Sheya, Linda B. Smith, John Stewart, Evan Thompson. (shrink)

"I do not think I ever reflect in words: I employ visual diagrams [...]" Diese Selbstbeschreibung von Charles S. Peirce bildet den Ausgangspunkt für eine neue Sicht auf das Denken des amerikanischen Naturwissenschaftlers, Philosophen und Begründers des Pragmatismus und der Semiotik. Peirce war ein obsessiver Zeichner. Neben einer graphischen Logik entwickelte er eine zeichnerische Praxis, die untrennbar mit seinem Denken verwoben war, in ihrer philosophischen Relevanz aber bislang übersehen wurde. Der Band versammelt konkrete Fallstudien zu zahlreichen hier erstmals publizierten Zeichnungen (...) von Peirce. Auf der Basis dieses Materials fragt er nach der allgemeinen Bedeutung dessen, was es heißt, in Bildern zu denken. Mit Beiträgen von John Michael Krois, Helmut Pape, Sun-Joo Shin, Frederik Stjernfelt u.a. (shrink)

The reader may wish to know something of Antoine Arnauld and his times. His life was full of conflict, with the Jesuits, with the king of France and, though he was a zealous Catholic, with the pope.[ Note ] The son of a wealthy lawyer, he never had to work for his living at anything he did not choose to do. As a priest he never seems to have had any pastoral or teaching responsibilities except those he chose to assume. (...) By choice he was an almost full-time controversialist, whose extant writings fill some forty large volumes. Day by day he went into his study, sharpened his pen and attacked someone---or defended someone, or refuted an answer, or answered a pretended refutation, or wrote a Premier Écrit pour la defense de la seconde lettre. His writings are mostly in the style of some of the less well-known works of Hobbes and Locke, or of certain writings Marx and Engels left to the criticism of the mice. (shrink)

Marx was born in 1818, Engels in 1820, both in Germany. Marx's father was a lawyer, and he went to Bonn and Berlin universities, at first to study law, then philosophy (a flourishing subject in German universities at the time). Engels was not a university man. He went into business. From 1850 to 1870 he managed his family's firm's cotton mill in Manchester. Engels had first-hand knowledge of the English capitalists: he was one. After retiring from the cotton industry he (...) lived on in England. From 1849 Marx lived in England, supported by Engels. His political activities had got him into trouble in Germany and in other parts of Europe, and in the 19th century England received many political refugees. Marx worked in the British Museum studying the English economists and writing Capital. He corresponded constantly with Engels, and after Marx's death Engels edited volumes 2 and 3 of.. (shrink)

The book begins with a critique of Marx. The subtitle of part 1 is 'The Marxian Doctrine'. The most interesting parts of it are chapter 2, 'Marx the Sociologist', and chapter 3 'Marx the Economist'. Schumpeter's criticisms are well-informed and sympathetic. His sociological views are like Weber's, and he is aware of the kinship between those views and the more sophisticated versions of Marxism, such as is found in the letters Engels wrote in the 1890s. 'Nevertheless, the question arises whether (...) the economic interpretation of history is more than a convenient approximation which must be expected to work less satisfactorily in some cases than it does in others.... Social structures, types and attitudes are coins that do not readily melt. Once they are formed they persist, possibly for centuries, and since different structures and types display different degrees of this ability to survive, we almost always find that actual group and national behaviour more or less departs from what we should expect it to be if we tried to infer it from the dominant forms of the productive process... Such facts Marx did not overlook but he hardly realized all their implications.... [Feudalism] influenced conditions of production, wants and technology included But its simplest explanation is to be found in the function of military leadership previously filled by the families and individuals who (retaining that function however) became feudal landlords after the definitive conquest of the new territory. This does not fit the Marxian schema at all well and could easily be so construed as to point in a different direction. Facts of this nature can no doubt also be brought into the fold by means of auxiliary hypotheses but the necessity of inserting such hypotheses is usually the beginning of the end of a theory. Many other difficulties that arise in the course of attempts at historical interpretation by means of the Marxian schema could be met by admitting some measure of interaction between the sphere of production and other spheres of social life.. (shrink)

An anthology of basic statements by the most influential social and political philosophers of Western civilization. Includes Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Mill, Marx and Engels, Hitler, Gandhi, and others.

_The Algebra of Revolution_ is the first book to study Marxist method as it has been developed by the main representatives of the classical Marxist tradition, namely Marx and Engels, Luxembourg, Lenin, Lukacs, Gramsci and Trotsky. This book provides the only single volume study of major Marxist thinkers' views on the crucial question of the dialectic, connecting them with pressing contemporary, political and theoretical questions. John Rees's _The Algebra of Revolution_ is vital reading for anyone interested in gaining a (...) new and fresh perspective on Marxist thought and on the notion of the dialectic. (shrink)

The world of work is undergoing major surgery. Future economic historians may yet describe the cumulative impact of globalisation, technological change and new work patterns that are currently shaking the OECD countries as an economic revolution similar in magnitude and significance to the industrial revolution of the 19th century. There is certainly plenty of pain around, but scattered in so many countries and cultures that this late 20th century revolution will probably prove to have been beyond the capacity of any (...) Charles Dickens, or of a Marx and Engels, to chronicle.From the perspective of the European Union, the pain is clearly visible in two areas: a growing insecurity and stress attending many who are at work in the Union, particularly in occupations and employments where earnings have risen a lot; and the level and persistence of long-term unemployment together with the growing number of discouraged workers, primarily men, who are opting out of the labour force altogether. Not visible within the EU, but no less real of course, is the impact on workers in other countries when the Union adopts protectionist or aggressive trading policies.[...]CONCLUSION :The dislocation that is evident throughout the world of work today, and the insecurity and pain it is causing, is influencing political life in the European Union. What Americans would call the ‘feel bad’ factor tempts some to support protectionist measures, abrupt limits to immigration, cuts in taxation and social services, workfare or — if they are outsiders — abuse of the social welfare system and black market activity. It is important to appreciate that very few people are escaping; the upheavals in the world of work are affecting insiders and outsiders. Making common cause requires forging a fresh consensus on fundamental values of which two key ones are the nature of a business enterprise and the place of a job in a person’s life. These are the key areas where social innovation must match the apparently ceasless innovations on the part of technology. They may, hopefully, prove capable of redirecting the process of technological change itself. (shrink)

This paper considers proposals for developing ‘co-productive’ medical partnerships, within the UK National Health Service (NHS), concentrating in particular on the potential problem involved in combining professional and lay conceptions of health. Much of the literature that advocates the introduction of co-productive healthcare partnerships assumes that medical professionals and patients share, or can easily come to share, a common set of beliefs about what is valuable with regard to health interventions and outcomes. However, a substantial literature documents the contestability of (...) the concept of health, particular across professional and lay divides. We suggest that this potential disagreement ought to be taken seriously, and suggest that the prospect of a co-productive NHS in which patients and professionals act in partnership is threatened by the existence of unresolved epistemic differences. We suggest that part of the solution may lie in re-framing this potential disagreement in the terms provided by Engel’s bio-psycho-social account of health, and demonstrate how support for this account can be grounded upon a critical realist foundation. What we call a ‘stratified conception of health’ reveals the potential complementarity between health beliefs which may have at first seemed to be essentially contradictory. We consider some of the practical implications this idea has for conceiving and creating co-productive medical partnerships. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:846 BOOK REVIEWS Marx's Socwl Critique of Culture. By Loms DUPRE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 299. $30.00 (cloth) and $9.95 (paper). Modernity has produced in equal measure material abundance and critical disdain. Its critics may he roughly divided into two groups. Negative critics deny all value to modernity and long for a glorious past or a perfect future; the romanticism of an Othmar Spann (...) or the utopian anarchism of a Mikhail Bakunin provide excellent examples of this type. Of more interest to political theory, however, are the dialectical critics who both affirm and deny the modern project; Rousseau and Marx are the greatest thinkers in this category. Louis Dupre is certainly a critic of modernity. The nature of his complaint remains to he determined. I should begin by saying that Dupre's hook neither condemns nor worships Marx. From the start he sets for himself the unfashionable task of understanding his author before passing judgment on his ideas. Hence, Dupre explicitly distinguishes interpretation from critique and devotes most of this hook to elucidating Marx's ideas. Some readers would perhaps agree with Hahermas that interpretation is always critique, hut I find that Dupre generally maintains this distinction in these pages. I turn first to his reading of Marx. This is not a hook about what might he called high culture, a civilization 's achievements in expressing the human spirit. Dupre relies little on Marx and Engel's scattered reflections on art and society, and he spends relatively few pages on the Frankfurt School and their critique of contemporary popular culture. Dupre is rather a philosopher using Marx to think about culture in a fundamental way. His subject is modernity itself and particularly Marx's criticism of the essentially modern separation of culture and activity. The first part of the hook focuses on Marx's conception of alienation. For almost half a century questions about the unity of Marx's early and late writings have accompanied explications of Entfremdung. Dupre sides with those who see a unity of purpose in the works of the young and the old Marx. Although the idea of alienation appears rarely in Das Kapital, Dupre argues that Marx continually attacked bourgeois society for separating subject and object. Culture thus becomes in capitalist societies an object of exchange value that stands in opposition to its producers, a commodity like all others. The second chapter pursues Marx's belief that alienation must he understood socially and historically. Here Dupre provides a subtle interpretation of Marx's conceptions of base and superstructure. He concludes that Marx rejected the logical extremes of determinism and voluntarism BOOK REVIEWS 847 in history. Instead, the rational will of the proletariat was viewed as the culmination of social development. Yet, as Dupre notes, Marx's belief in the general principle that history is progressive turns on his specific analysis of the spread of capitalism; the generalization about history depends in the end on unproven assumptions about the development of capitalism. Dupre devotes his third chapter to a broad and learned discussion of the role of the dialectic in Marx and Marxist political theory. Marx himself did not provide a complete and clear account of dialectical contradiction; any tension that might lead to the destruction of capitalism fell within Marx's understanding of contradiction. Dupre's conclusion that Marx ultimately founded his dialectical method on an undefended teleology will, I think, ring true to most students of the subject. His discussion of the realist interpretation of the dialectic will occasion controversy largely because Dupre believes Engel's methodological ideas in Anti-Dukring can he legitimately associated with Marx's views. This is an important and damning link, for, of course, the scientism enunciated in Anti-Dukring took Marxism a long way toward both the relatively benign orthodoxy of the German Social Democrats and the horrible monism of Stalin. For Marx, however, the dialectic was more than anything else a way of positing the loss of social and culture unity and of foreseeing their reintegration. His exposition of Marx's atempt to unify economic and social activity contains a thoughtful reconstruction of the concept of value in classical economics... (shrink)

This text was Lukacs' response to the Soviets' crushing of the Dubeck reform movement in August 1968. As Norman Lavine notes, it was written in great haste between September and December 1968, and Lukacs was not satisfied with the result. It seemed "too much of a summary to be a true scientific work and too scientific for a good summary". Lukacs intended to revise the text as part of a projected work on ethics. I would suggest that The Process of (...) Democratization's literary form is "manifesto." Like its famous predecessor, the book brings a lifetime devoted to a dialectical reading of social experience to bear on a specific revolutionary situation. Unlike the text of Marx and Engels, however, the task of this dialectical inquiry is to explain the emergence of alienating repression within a praxis supposedly guided by Marxist-Leninist principles, and to point toward an overcoming of the alienation that remains within Marxism. (shrink)

The relationship between Marxism and ecology has been sullied by Martinez-Alier's influential interpretation of Engels's reaction to the agricultural energetics of Sergei Podolinsky. This introduction to the first English translation of Podolinsky's 1883 Die Neue Zeit piece evaluates Martinez-Alier's interpretation in light of the four distinct but closely related articles Podolinsky published over the years 1880–3. This evaluation also emphasises the important but previously underrated role of energy analysis in Marx's Capital. Engels's criticisms of Podolinsky are found to be quite (...) justified from both political-economy and ecological perspectives. From the standpoint of Marx and Engels's metabolic and class-relational approach to production, Podolinsky's attempt to reduce use-value to energy is fraught with problems. Podolinsky's energy reductionism does not even come close to representing an alternative value analysis – let alone a groundbreaking perspective on ecological history – as was suggested by Martinez-Alier. Far from Marx and Engels's vision of communism as an ecologically sustainable and coevolutionary human development, Podolinsky's conception of human labor as an energy accumulation machine seems to uncritically mimic the standpoint of the capitalist interested in using nature only to extract as much energy throughput as possible from the labour-power of the worker. (shrink)

Replies to commentaries on the book Mental Reality by Noam Chomsky, Michael Smith, Paul Snowdon, Pascal Engel.

The resurrection of the classical Marxian ecological critique in the context of the current planetary emergency has led to the return of the concept of the dialectics of nature, associated with the work of Frederick Engels in particular. In the century following the deaths of Charles Darwin and Karl Marx, the dialectics-of-nature conception played a formative role in the development of the modern ecological critique within science, notably in Britain, and helped inspire the contemporary environmentalist movement. Nevertheless, all of this (...) occurred outside the dominant streams of Marxian thought and practice, where a great chasm had arisen in this area. Whereas official Marxism in the Soviet Union reduced the dialectics of nature to a fixed dogma, Western Marxism rejected it altogether. In the current Anthropocene Epoch in the geological time scale – and in what is referred to here as the Capitalinian Age of the Anthropocene – a new historical-materialist synthesis constructed on classical foundations, reintegrating the dialectics of nature, so as to address the immense ecological challenges confronting humanity, is seen as objectively (and subjectively) necessary. (shrink)

Pierre Trémaux’s 1865 ideas on speciation have been unjustly derided following his acceptance by Marx and rejection by Engels, and almost nobody has read his ideas in a charitable light. Here we offer an interpretation based on translating the term sol as “habitat”, in order to show that Trémaux proposed a theory of allopatric speciation before Wagner and a punctuated equilibrium theory before Gould and Eldredge, and translate the relevant discussion from the French. We believe he may have influenced Darwin’s (...) revision to the third edition of the Origin on rates of evolution, and suggest that Gould’s dismissal of Trémaux is motivated by concern that others might think punctuated equilibrium theory was tainted by a connection with Trémaux. (shrink)

Despite the general acceptance of Hegel's importance for Marx, virtually no one has paid sufficient attention to Marx's youthful critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Even Alfred Schmidt, whose work refers to the Naturphilosophie most frequently, underestimates its importance in the formulation of Marx's own materialist philosophy of nature and comes close to replicating the very Hegelian views that Marx is attacking. Yet the critique of the Naturphilosophie in Marx's Dissertation and the 1844 Manuscripts foreshadows Marx's later stated intention in (...) Capital to turn Hegel right-side up. It affirms not only a theory of the ontological reality of the material world, but a dialectics of nature whose importance for Marx extends from the Paris Manuscripts to Capital. Marx' s Naturphilosophie criticizes Hegel's replacement of natural history with a Philosophy of Nature derived from logical categories. It affirms Engels' later view that natural history should be restored by discovering dialectics in nature rather than imposing dialectics on it. (shrink)

In a recent article, ?Marxism and Radical Democracy?,1 Femia argues that Marxism is incompatible with radical democracy. In so doing he specifically reiterates2 a now common claim that the notion of scientific socialism defended by Marx and Engels and prevalent in the Second International is anti?democratic. This claim has not only been made by critics of Marxism.3 It has been a major criticism of classical Marxism within the Western Marxist tradition, in particular? in the work of the Frankfurt School.4 It (...) is one of the main reasons why the classical Marxism of Engels and the Second International has been rejected as positivist and vulgar: no modern sophisticated Marxist admits to either positivism or vulgarity. In this paper I examine and reject Femia's arguments for the claim that the notion of scientific socialism is undemocratic. I argue that the orthodox view of Marxism as a scientific theory is compatible with democracy, and indeed encourages a democratic understanding of socialism. A thoroughly vulgar Marxism is thoroughly democratic. (shrink)

Spanning a critical period--from the turbulent era of the American and French Revolutions through to the calmer waters of the nineteenth centuries, this book will help all students of political ideas to gain a fuller appreciation of the great works which form the foundation of the subject. Seven classic texts have been chosen for analysis: Hamilton's The Federalist, Sieyes' What is the Third Estate?, Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, Hegel's The Philosophy of Right, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, (...) Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto, and Mill's On Liberty. Together they illustrate and express the main themes of the period. The most prominent of these is the growing distinction between the state and society and the problems that this brings in its train. Other themes embrace the interplay of revolution and reaction, the growth of representative government, and the challenge posed by democracy. The clear analysis and explanation contained in each essay will enable the reader to return to the original texts with a new understanding and insight. (shrink)

Engels is the author of three articles devoted to the origins of Christianity. In 1882 the magazine Per Sozialdemokrat carried his "Bruno Bauer and Early Christianity," conceived of as an evaluation of Bauer's contribution to the treatment of this complex problem. The following year, in the English journal Progress, Engels published an article titled "The Book of Revelation," a characterization of Christianity as it appears according to the Apocalypse of St. John. Finally, in 1894-1895, shortly before his death, Engels (...) published in Die Neue Zeit a studied titled "A Contribution to the History of Early Christianity.". (shrink)

John Stuart Mill claims that free institutions are next to impossible in a multinational state. According to Will Kymlicka, this leads him to embrace policies kindred to those of Friedrich Engels, aimed at promoting mononational states in Europe through coercive assimilation. Given Mill’s harm principle, such coercive assimilation would have to be justified either paternalistically, in terms of its civilizing effects upon the would-be assimilated, or non-paternalistically, with reference to the danger that their non-assimilation would pose to others. However, (...) neither possible interpretation is plausible; Mill takes Europe’s civilized status to shield Europeans from paternalistic coercion, and he opposes coercive assimilation where it could conceivably be justified in the name of defense. Although this much suggests that Kymlicka misinterprets Mill by ignoring his definition of nationality, it leaves scope for Kymlicka to argue that Mill favors policies that promote mononationality through neglecting the languages and cultures of national minorities. (shrink)

This text views the hungry forties in early-Victorian England through the writings of the conservative Thomas Carlyle, the liberal John Stuart Mill, and the socialist Friedrich Engels. The growth of industrial cities, the emergence of working-class organizations and rising middle-class power, as well as revolutions abroad in 1848 made this a tumultuous time. These writers provide reflections on the tensions produced in this key period of transition to an industrial, democratic society.

Karl Marx has often been described as anti‐ecological, concerned about the exploitation of humanity, not of nature. But, conducting a careful review of Marx's writings and a survey of the intellectual context in which Marx lived and worked, John Bellamy Foster argues that, in fact, Marx had a deeply and systematically ecological view of the world.To make this argument, Foster traces the development of Marx's ideas. He finds in the materialist, antiteleological philosophy of Epicurus the partial origins of an (...) ecological perspective. Other elements of Marx's ecology emerged from his critique of Thomas Malthus's view that population would inevitably outstrip agricultural production—a conclusion that could justify social inequality. From this subject, Marx turned to a study of the agricultural chemist Justus von Liebig, drawing from him to formulate the notion of a “metabolic rift” in the human relation with nature. Armed with such ideas, Marx contributed to debates over soil “exhaustion,” the problems of agriculture, and the division between town and country. Ultimately, under Liebig's influence, Marx arrived at an ecological critique of capitalist agriculture and what he saw as its inevitable depletion of the natural fertility of the soil. Both he and Friedrich Engels would argue that ecological problems could be addressed only if human beings regarded nature rationally, through an understanding of nature's laws, and then organized production accordingly.Thus, engaged in nineteenth‐century discussions about science and nature, including those relating to Darwinism, Marx linked social transformation with the transformation of the human relation with nature: the alienation of human labor paralleled the alienation of human beings from nature. In other words, the domination of nature resulting from unequal ownership of land paralleled the domination of humans through economic power. Foster traces these ideas across each stage in the development of Marx's thought: in relation to agriculture, Darwinism, and, in his last years, ethnology, geology, and paleontology. Foster follows the course of Marx's ecological views even after Marx's death. For a time, Marx and Engel's ecological critiques influenced Marxist thought in the Soviet Union. Nikolai Bukharin, August Bebel, and other Marxist scholars built on the original foundation, and by the 1920s Soviet ecology was highly advanced—only to be crushed, in the 1930s, by Stalin.Seeking to place Marx within his context, Foster ranges widely, from Epicurus to the influence of Epicureanism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Baron d'Holbach, Denis Diderot, and Darwin, and on to Hegel, political economy, and French socialism. He covers thinkers who influenced Marx as well as those whom Marx reacted against, including William Paley and, especially, Malthus, who represented for Marx the intrusion of natural theology into political economy. In attempting to reconstruct Marx's world, Foster largely follows the methods of traditional intellectual history, often interpreting ideas apart from their contexts. In his analysis of Darwin's ideas, for example, he considers Marx's debts to other scholars but not Marx's own research and observations of nature. Foster, however, does review in some detail society and politics in Marx's day, remarking on the social discontent and the perception of materialism as a threat to the established order, associated with both atheism and revolutionary France.Foster's ambition goes beyond illuminating Marx's thought to situating ecology within materialism and science. Foster thus takes issue, persuasively, with the idea, often encountered in Green thought, that modern science justifies exploitative attitudes toward nature. This view, according to Foster, is a misinterpretation of modern science and reflects a reduction of ecological questions to questions of values, obscuring the material interrelations between humans and nature. In fact, he finds no necessary contradiction between sustainability and the mastery of nature, noting that in the seventeenth century John Evelyn, among others, remained an advocate of modern science even as he defended trees and criticized London's air pollution. And he notes that in the nineteenth century ecological thought, in the work of Darwin and others, was grounded in materialist conceptions of nature.Foster's analysis is valuable both as a critique of the conventional wisdom about Marx's views of nature and as a thorough effort to place Marx within the context of his time. Scholars and readers interested in nineteenth‐century intellectual history will find Foster's acccount of an ecological revolutionary worth the study. (shrink)

In this critical introduction to contemporary philosophical issues in the theory of truth Pascal Engel provides clear and authoritative exposition of recent and current ideas while providing original perspectives that advances discussion of the key issues. This book begins with a presentation of the classical conceptions of truth - the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and verificationist and pragmatist accounts - before examining so-called minimalist and deflationist conceptions that deny truth can be anything more than a thin concept holding (...) no metaphysical weight. The debates between those who favour substantive conceptions of the classical kind and those who advocate minimalist and deflationist conceptions are explored. Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking as some upholders of radical deflationist views have claimed. Questions about truth and realism are examined and the author shows how the realism/anti-realism debate remains a genuine, meaningful issue for a theory of truth and has not been undermined by deflationist views. Even if a metaphysical substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, Engel concludes, truth can keep a central role within our thinking, as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices, in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics. (shrink)

This paper tries to say in what sense truth is a norm, a thesis that Donald Davidson, whose view are examined, denies. After skteching his conception of rationality, it is argued that truth is a norm in only the sense that we ought to believe what we believe is true, not that we all to believe everything which is true. This minimal norm of truth is isolated and defended.

L’une des raisons pour lesquelles la vérité et la démocratie ne semblent pas faire bon ménage est qu’on a tendance à confondre, d’une part, la liberté d’opinion et de parole avec l’égale vérité des opinions, ce qui revient à adopter une forme de relativisme, et, d’autre part, la règle de majorité avec une règle de vérité, ce qui revient à adopter une forme de théorie de la vérité comme consensus. Parce que la démocratie libérale repose sur le principe de la (...) pluralité des valeurs et sur la neutralité axiologique, on a tendance à penser qu’elle exige de traiter toutes les opinions comme également respectables et, moyennant une confusion de plus, comme également vraies. Parce que la démocratie suppose la règle selon laquelle, en matière de décisions, la majorité doit l’emporter, on suppose que les opinions majoritaires ont le plus de chances d’être vraies, et qu’elles sont vraies parce qu’elles sont celles de la majorité. (shrink)

La philosophie de l'esprit et des phénomènes mentaux a connu, depuis une trentaine d'années, un renouveau important, notamment en raison de l'intérêt suscité chez les philosophes par les progrès des neurosciences et des sciences cognitives. Au sein de la tradition analytique anglo-américaine en particulier, un véritable tournant mentaliste et naturaliste tend désormais à supplanter l'approche " linguistique " jusque-là dominante. Ce livre propose une introduction aux thèmes riches et complexes que développent des auteurs comme Davidson, Fodor, Dennett et Dretske : (...) les relations de l'esprit et du corps, le problème de la causalité mentale, celui de l'explication en sciences cognitives, les débats sur le statut de la " psychologie populaire ", la nature des croyances chez les adultes, les enfants et les animaux, des images mentales, de l'identité personnelle et de la conscience. Et il présente de façon synthétique et rigoureuse les principales théories de l'esprit actuelles : l'identité esprit-cerveau, le fonctionnalisme, l'éliminativisme, et les divers programmes de " naturalisation " de l'intentionnalité. L'auteur montre que la philosophie de l'esprit contemporaine est un domaine très ouvert, étroitement lié aux problématiques philosophiques traditionnelles comme à celles des sciences cognitives. Il s'efforce de défendre une forme de matérialisme non réductionniste, sensible à la fois au caractère naturel et causal des phénomènes mentaux et à leur dimension spécifique et autonome. (shrink)