Under the influence of the evangelical movement in the 18th and early 19th centuries education, in one form or another, was brought to a vast number of people in England and Wales. Originally published in 1969, it is this phenomenon that forms the subject of Dr McLeish’s book. The two central figures are Griffith Jones and Hannah More and the movements are seen almost entirely through their work. Dr McLeish examines the nature and aims of the schools which (...) were established; their economics and organisation; their progress and achievement; the social background in which they flourished. In the second part of his book Dr McLeish attempts a bold synthesis. He analyses these data in light of four essentially modern social theories – Marxist dialectics, the functionalist anthropology of Malinowski, Freudian psychoanalysis, and the sociology of Talcott Parsons. The author does not pretend to provide all the answers. What he suggests is a way of looking at history that is open-minded and eclectic and vitalizing in the perspectives which it offers. (shrink)

Few figures of the Middle Ages command the attention of so many modern disciplines as Robert Grosseteste (c. 1170-1253). Theology, Philosophy, History, and Science are all areas which his life and thought continue to have significance and to inspire re-interpretation. Accompanied by a series of original commentaries, this new edition of Grosseteste's work, with English translation, draws together the perspectives of modern scientists and medieval specialists. Volume I of a six volume series, Knowing and Speaking presents two of the earliest (...) of Grosseteste's works, the treatises On the Liberal Arts and On the Generation of Sounds. These are accompanied by a significant Middle English treatise on the Seven Liberal Arts whose anonymous fifteenth-century author translated and excerpted passages from Grosseteste's treatises in a re-imagining of their structure and function.0Each work is treated separately within the volume, which is constructed in three parts. On the Liberal Arts sets Grosseteste's thoughts on the arts subjects and emphasises moral concerns about the purpose of learning. On the Generation of Sounds builds on the theories and statements of On the Liberal Arts in connection to the production of sound, elaborating the earlier position, relating the generation of sounds to human vocal and speech production. (shrink)

Written by a highly respected scholar of Thomas Aquinas's writings, this volume offers a comprehensive presentation of Aquinas's metaphysical thought. It is based on a thorough examination of his texts organized according to the philosophical order as he himself describes it rather than according to the theological order. -/- In the introduction and opening chapter, John F. Wippel examines Aquinas's view on the nature of metaphysics as a philosophical science and the relationship of its subject to divine being. Part (...) One is devoted to his metaphysical analysis of finite being. It considers his views on the problem of the One and the Many in the order of being, and includes his debt to Parmenides in formulating this problem and his application of analogy to finite being. Subsequent chapters are devoted to participation in being, the composition of essence and esse in finite beings, and his appeal to a kind of relative nonbeing in resolving the problem of the One and the Many. Part Two concentrates on Aquinas's views on the essential structure of finite being, and treats substance-accident composition and related issues, including, among others, the relationship between the soul and its powers and unicity of substantial form. It then considers his understanding of matter-form composition of corporeal beings and their individuation. Part Three explores Aquinas's philosophical discussion of divine being, his denial that God's existence is self-evident, and his presentation of arguments for the existence of God, first in earlier writings and then in the "Five Ways" of his Summa theologiae. A separate chapter is devoted to his views on quidditative and analogical knowledge of God. The concluding chapter revisits certain issues concerning finite being under the assumption that God's existence has now been established. -/- John F. Wippel, professor of philosophy at The Catholic University of America, was recently awarded the prestigious Aquinas Medal by the American Catholic Philosophical Association. In addition to numerous articles and papers, Wippel has coauthored or edited several other works, including Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas and The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, both published by CUA Press. (shrink)

Sir John Eccles, a distinguished scientist and Nobel Prize winner who has devoted his scientific life to the study of the mammalian brain, tells the story of how we came to be, not only as animals at the end of the hominid evolutionary line, but also as human persons possessed of reflective consciousness.

John Taurek has argued that, where choices must be made between alternatives that affect different numbers of people, the numbers are not, by themselves, morally relevant. This is because we "must" take "losses-to" the persons into account (and these don't sum), but "must not" consider "losses-of" persons (because we must not treat persons like objects). I argue that the numbers are always ethically relevant, and that they may sometimes be the decisive consideration.

[Editor's introduction: The following are excerpts from three talks given at the conference "Policies and Publics for Science and Technology, " London, April 1990. They introduce a British research initiative in public understanding of science and point to early results. The program was developed and coordinated by the Science Policy Support Group. At the meeting, a new journal for specialists in this area was launched: Public Understanding of Science, to be edited by John Durant, Science Museum, London SW7 2DD, (...) UK. The first issue of the journal is expected to appear in April 1991. Science, Technology, & Human Values reaffirms its long commitment to publishing research on public attitudes toward science and particularly welcomes articles on this topic of general interest to the field of science and technology studies.]. (shrink)

This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes (...) does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley’ (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19–31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge. (shrink)

The danger of human operators devolving responsibility to machines and failing to detect cases where they fail has been recognised for many years by industrial psychologists and engineers studying the human operators of complex machines. We call it “the control problem”, understood as the tendency of the human within a human–machine control loop to become complacent, over-reliant or unduly diffident when faced with the outputs of a reliable autonomous system. While the control problem has been investigated for some time, up (...) to this point its manifestation in machine learning contexts has not received serious attention. This paper aims to fill that gap. We argue that, except in certain special circumstances, algorithmic decision tools should not be used in high-stakes or safety-critical decisions unless the systems concerned are significantly “better than human” in the relevant domain or subdomain of decision-making. More concretely, we recommend three strategies to address the control problem, the most promising of which involves a complementary coupling between highly proficient algorithmic tools and human agents working alongside one another. We also identify six key principles which all such human–machine systems should reflect in their design. These can serve as a framework both for assessing the viability of any such human–machine system as well as guiding the design and implementation of such systems generally. (shrink)

Kant’s philosophy of science takes on sharp contour in terms of his interaction with the practicing life scientists of his day, particularly Johann Blumenbach and the latter’s student, Christoph Girtanner, who in 1796 attempted to synthesize the ideas of Kant and Blumenbach. Indeed, Kant’s engagement with the life sciences played a far more substantial role in his transcendental philosophy than has been recognized hitherto. The theory of epigenesis, especially in light of Kant’s famous analogy in the first Critique, posed crucial (...) questions regarding the ‘looseness of fit’ between the constitutive and the regulative in Kant’s theory of empirical law. A detailed examination of Kant’s struggle with epigenesis between 1784 and 1790 demonstrates his grave reservations about its hylozoist implications, leading to his even stronger insistence on the discrimination of constitutive from regulative uses of reason. The continuing relevance of these issues for Kant’s philosophy of science is clear from the work of Buchdahl and its contemporary reception. (shrink)

What is it reasonable to believe about our most successful scientific theories such as the general theory of relativity or quantum mechanics? That they are true, or at any rate approximately true? Or only that they successfully ‘save the phenomena’, by being ‘empirically adequate’? In earlier work I explored the attractions of a view called Structural Scientific Realism (hereafter: SSR). This holds that it is reasonable to believe that our successful theories are (approximately) structurally correct (and also that this is (...) the strongest epistemic claim about them that it is reasonable to make). In the first part of this paper I shall explain in some detail what this thesis means and outline the reasons why it seems attractive. The second section outlines a number of criticisms that have none the less been brought against SSR in the recent (and as we shall see, in some cases, not so recent) literature; and the third and final section argues that, despite the fact that these criticisms might seem initially deeply troubling (or worse), the position remains viable. (shrink)

(A) I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did (1942, p. 543) or (B) I believe that he has gone out. But he has not (1944, p. 204) would be “absurd” (1942, p. 543; 1944, p. 204). Wittgenstein’s letters to Moore show that he was intensely interested in this discovery of a class of possibly true yet absurd assertions. Wittgenstein thought that the absurdity is important because it is “something similar to a contradiction, thought (...) it isn’t one” (1974, p. 177). What is the explanation of the absurdity of saying or believing something about myself that might be true? Wittgenstein thought that although the explanation will say “something about the logic of assertion” it will also show that “logic isn’t as simple as logicians think it is”. So although the explanation should.. (shrink)

Compatibilist libertarianism claims that alternate possibilities for action at the agential level are consistent with determinism at the physical level. Unlike traditional compatibilism about alternate possibilities, involving conditional or dispositional accounts of the ability to act, compatibilist libertarianism offers us unqualified modalities at the agential level, consistent with physical determinism, a potentially big advance. However, I argue that the account runs up against two problems. Firstly, the way in which the agential modalities are generated talks past the worries of the (...) incompatibilist in the traditional free will problem. As such, it fails to dispel the worries that determinism generates for the incompatibilist. Secondly, in spite of the ingenious use of the supervenience thesis and multiple realizability, the position still allows us to generate the old worry that determinism at the physical level would mean no alternate possibilities at the level of agency. In particular, I develop a new example, the ‘atomic slit case’ that demonstrates how physical level information is salient to what is possible at the agential level, motivating incompatibilism. (shrink)

This work is reprinted in John Dewey, The Middle Works, 1899-1924, Vol. 3.

Linnebo and Pettigrew have recently developed a version of non-eliminative mathematical structuralism based on Fregean abstraction principles. They recognize that this version of structuralism is vulnerable to the well-known problem of non-rigid structures. This paper offers a solution to the problem for this version of structuralism. The solution involves expanding the languages used to describe mathematical structures. We then argue that this solution is philosophically acceptable to those who endorse mathematical structuralism based on Fregean abstraction principles.

The article covers electronic informed consent from different dimensions so that practitioners might understand the history, regulation, and current status of eIC. It covers the transition of informed consent to electronic screens and the implications of that transition in terms of design, costs, and data analysis. The article explores the limits of regulation mandating eIC for mobile application research, and addresses some of the broader social context around eIC.

John Wilson; Emotion, Religion and Education: A reply to Richard Allen, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 195–203, https.

This paper is the third of a multi-part examination of the Babylonian mathematical lunar theories known as Systems A and B. Part I (Britton, AHES 61:83–145, 2007) addressed the development of the empirical elements needed to separate the effects of lunar and solar anomaly on the intervals between syzygies, accomplished in the construction of the System A lunar theory early in the fourth century B.C. Part II (Britton, AHES 63:357–431, 2009) examines the accomplishment of this separation by the construction of (...) a successful theory depicting the variations due to lunar anomaly in System A and its subsequent adaptation in System B. The present paper examines the introduction of the uniform zodiac, necessary for any theory depicting variations depending on the position of syzygy. It addresses three questions: (1) In light of all available evidence, what is the magnitude of the constant term in the expression Δλ* = C − 1.3828°Y, describing the difference between the Babylonian sidereal longitudes and modern tropical longitudes? (2) What considerations governed the placement of the Babylonian sidereal zodiac relative to the fixed stars? (3) When was the uniform zodiac introduced? To the first question it finds C = 3.20° ± 0.1°, scarcely different from Huber’s (Centaurus 5:192–208, 1958) estimate of 3.08°, essentially confirming Huber’s result obtained from much less data. For the second it shows that accommodating the three asterisms comprising Taurus limited the placement of the zodiac to within 3°, while the prominence of half sign multiples among the measured intervals between prominent Normal Stars led irresistibly to the choice adopted. Finally, it finds that the zodiac was introduced between −408 and −397 and probably within a very few years of −400. (shrink)

I respond to the following objection: It is sometimes said that any virtue judgement (that X is a virtue or that P is a virtuous person) always presupposes some moral principle (e.g., concerning the goodness or rightness of acts typically performed by people with the character trait X) which cannot be articulated as part of an ethics of virtue. Accordingly, the objection continues, virtue ethics is always derivative from principle ethics. I focus on an underlying assumption of the objection: that (...) a principle is the only thing which can count as a good reason supporting a moral claim. I examine the assumptions Kant makes about the role of principles in morality and O'Neill's recent claims that Kant gives us primarily an ethic of virtue rather than rules. Finally, I suggest a possible justification for virtue claims that do not rely on principles. (shrink)

This paper considers criticisms of the author's Science and Scepticism advanced by Fred D' Agostino, Graham Oddie, Elie Zahar, Alan Musgrave, and John Worrall. The criticisms concern the following topics: the aim of science, unified theoryhood, the empirical basis, corroboration by already known evidence, the idea that scientific theories need be no more than possibly true, and the pragmatic problem of induction. Various clarifications and improvements result, and on the last topic the author significantly modifies his position.

In 1988, David Hull presented an evolutionary account of science. This was a direct analogy to evolutionary accounts of biological adaptation, and part of a generalized view of Darwinian selection accounts that he based upon the Universal Darwinism of Richard Dawkins. Criticisms of this view were made by, among others, Kim Sterelny, which led to it gaining only limited acceptance. Some of these criticisms are, I will argue, no longer valid in the light of developments in the formal modeling of (...) evolution, in particular that of Sergey Gavrilets’ work on adaptive landscapes. If we can usefully recast the Hullian view of science as being driven by selection in terms of Gavrilets’ and Kaufmann’s view of there being “giant components” of high-fitness networks through any realistic adaptive landscape, we may now find it useful to ask what the adaptive pressures on science are, and to extend the metaphor into a full analogy. This is in effect to reconcile the Fisherianism of the Dawkins–Hull approach to selection and replicators, with a Wrightean drift account of social constructionist views of science, preserving, it is to be hoped, the valuable aspects of both. (shrink)

In _The Political Economy of the Spectacle and Postmodern Caste_, John Asimakopoulos analyzes the political economy of the spectacle conceptualized by philosophers like Guy Debord through a broad interdisciplinary-nonsectarian approach concluding every society is a caste system legitimized by ideology.

The Intelligent Nation proposes a systemic and radical transformation of the organisation, management, ownership and performance of the services of the state by capitalising on the potential offered by contemporary information capability and fulfilling the rights and obligations both to and of citizens. In this book, John Beckford shows how, by adopting the principles of an intelligent organisation, the state can thrive and meet the needs of its citizens. He proposes a complete rethink of the state as the enabler (...) or provider of public services. In particular, he points to the failure of the public sector to significantly emulate the massive gains in productivity and customer focus experienced in both manufacturing and services (e.g. finance, retailing, insurance). Governance and all public services must be redesigned to align to the contemporary needs of the citizen and exploit the power of information to enable a transformation of their effectiveness, redefine efficiency, and support human-based services in crucial areas. Each chapter provides the key learning points, a discussion of the problem in theory and practice, integrated case studies, and discussion points. Written in an accessible style, the book provides thought-provoking supplemental reading for masters and undergraduate students reading organization theory, organization development, political science, public administration, healthcare, information systems, and business and management science. (shrink)

William Harvey's theoretical commitment to the primacy of the blood developed from his study of the chick in the hen's egg. Harvey's original contribution, that the blood was the first material embodiment of the soul, is shown to be a crucial departure that enabled him to conceive of the general circulation of the blood.

John Ashton, the editor who brought us In Six Days and On the Seventh Day, has done it again with this compelling new book that is a must-read for all ...

Among various kinds of disclosures typically required in research as well as in clinical scenarios, risk information figures prominently. A key question is, what kinds of risk information would the reasonable person want to know? I will argue, however, that the reasonable person construct is and always has been incapable of settling this very question. After parsing the nebulous if not “contentless” character of the reasonable person, I will explain how Western courts have actually adjudicated cases of “negligent nondisclosure,” that (...) is, cases in which patient‐plaintiffs allege that their informed consent rights were violated by the failure of their health providers to inform them of reasonably foreseeable risks that subsequently materialized. To support my argument, I will scrutinize the landmark decision by the United Kingdom's Supreme Court in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board and, in particular, Justice Brenda Hale's concurrence. (shrink)

The nature of intelligence and how it can be measured has occupied psychologists, educationalists, biologists and philosophers for hundreds of years. However, there has been little investigation into the rise of the traditional dominant educational ideology that intelligence and IQ have innate limits and are unchanging and unchangeable. This book traces the roots of this mind set back to early puritan communities on both sides of the Atlantic, drawing parallels between puritan dogma and the development of the traditional curricula and (...) selection processes that are still firmly embedded in school practice today. Drawing on the work of Galton, Pearson, Burt, Goddard, Terman and others in his search for the truth about intelligence testing, John White looks at the personal histories and socialised religious backgrounds of these key psychologists and casts an entirely new light on schooling in Britain and the USA in modern times. This work also shows how we can transcend this heritage and base our educational system on values and practices more in tune with the twenty-first century. (shrink)

John Skorupski; I *—The Presidential Address: The Legacy of Modernism**, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 1–20, h.

In _Knowledge, Art, and Power_ John Ryder develops a pragmatic naturalist theory of experience that posits the cognitive (knowledge), the aesthetic (art), and the political (power) as the most general and pervasive dimensions of all human experience.

This chapter uses separability of lives to apply the same-number addition theorem, which derives originally from John Harsanyi, to arrive at a broadly utilitarian conclusion about aggregation across people when the population is constant. It outlines the assumptions required by the theorem.

Frente a la objetivación excesiva de la culpabilidad que ha implicado la juridización de los procesos penales (marco legal, imputación, tribunal, juicio público y condena), este artículo se propone reivindicar la importancia de la experiencia vivida y subjetiva de la culpa como sentimiento fundante para una reorientación de la acción. Con ello se busca enfatizar el carácter imprescindible de la convicción subjetiva para los procesos de justicia y reparación. Esto se mostrará usando una metodología fenomenológico-hermenéutica (Ricoeur) que permita analizar la (...) configuración de la conciencia moral como fruto de la tensión entre imputación-culpa y responsabilidad; para, finalmente, concluir la necesidad de pasar de la culpabilidad como remordimiento a la responsabilidad frente al otro y al futuro, la delimitación de lo que está en las propias manos y el carácter subjetivo de la responsabilidad so pena de una simulación moral.AbstractIn regards to the excessive objectification of guilt that has resulted from the juridization of criminal proceedings (legal framework, indictment, court, public trial and sentencing), this paper aims to assert the importance of the subjective experience of guilt as the basis for reorienting action. The goal is to emphasize the essential nature of subjective conviction for the processes of justice and redress. To show this, a hermeneutic phenomenological methodology(Ricoeur) is used. This approach makes it possible to analyze the configuration of moral conscience as the result of the tension between indictment-guilt and responsibility. Finally, the authors conclude that it is necessary to move from experiencing guilt as remorse to experiencing it as responsibility toward others and toward the future. Individuals should be aware of what is in their own hands and the subjective character of responsibility in order to avoid moral simulation. (shrink)

A Critical Introduction to Philosophy of Language is a historically oriented introduction to the central themes in philosophy of language. Its narrative arc covers Locke's 'idea' theory, Mill's empiricist account of math and logic, Frege and Russell's development of modern logic and its subsequent deployment in their pioneering program of 'logical analysis', Ayer and Carnap's logical positivism, Quine's critique of logical positivism and elaboration of a naturalist-behaviorist approach to meaning, and later-Wittgenstein's 'ordinary language philosophy'-inspired rejection of the project of logical (...) analysis. Thus, it historically situates the two central programs in early twentieth-century English-speaking philosophy -- logical analysis and logical positivism -- and discusses the central critiques they face later in the century in the works of Quine and the later-Wittgenstein. Unlike other secondary studies in philosophy of language, A Critical Introduction to Philosophy of Language is not just a 'greatest hits album', i.e., a discontinuous compilation in which classics in the field are presented together with their standard criticisms one after the other. Instead, Fennell develops a particular, historical-thematic narrative in which the figures and ideas he treats are introduced in highly intentional ways. And by cross-referencing them throughout his discussions, he highlights the contributions they make to the narrative they comprise. (shrink)

Ugaritische Grammatik. Zweite, stark überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. By Josef Tropper. Alter Orient und Altes Testament, vol. 273. Münster: ugarit-Verlag, 2012. Pp. xxii + 1068. €100.