El designio de este trabajo es mostrar cómo Hans Jonas intenta fundar el deber en el ser y las dificultades que este intento traen consigo.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Spinoza and the Theory of Organism HANS JONAS I CARTESIANDUALISMlanded speculation on the nature of life in an impasse: intelligible as, on principles of mechanics, the correlation of structure and function became within the res extensa, that of structure-plus-function with feeling or experience (modes of the res cogitans) was lost in the bifurcation, and thereby the fact of life itself became unintelligible at the same time that the (...) explanation of its bodily performance seemed to be assured. The impasse became manifest in Occasionalism : its tour de force of an extraneous, divine "synchronization" of the outer and the inner world (the latter denied to animals) not only suffered from its extreme artificiality, the common failing of such ad hoc constructions, but even at so high a cost failed to accomplish its theoretical purpose by its own terms. For the animal machine, like any machine, raises beyond the question of the "how" that of the "what for" of its functioning---of the purpose for which it had thus been constructed by its maker.1 Its performance, however devoid of immanent teleology, must serve an end, and that end must be someone's end. This end may (directly) be itself, as indeed Descartes had implied when declaring self-preservation to be the effect of the functioning of the organic automaton. In that case the existence as such of the machine would be its end--either terminally, or in turn to benefit something else. In the former case, the machine would have to be more than a machine, for a mere machine cannot enioy its existence. But since, by the rigorous conception of the res extensa, it cannot be more than a machine, its function and/or existence must serve something other than itself. Automata in Descartes ' time were mainly for entertainment (rather than work). But the raison d'etre of the living kingdom could not well be seen in God's indulging his mechanical abilities or in the amusement of celestial spectators--especially since mere complexity of arrangement does not create new quality and thus add something to the unrelieved sameness of the simple substratum that might enrich the spectrum of being. For quality, beyond the primitive determinations of the extended per se, is the subjective creature of sensation, the confused representation of quantity in a mind; and thus organisms cannot harbor it because as mere machines they lack mentality, and pure spirits cannot because they lack sensuality, or the privilege of confusion and thereby of illusion with its possible enjoyment. And as to their intellectual enjoyment, even that, deprived of the thrill of discovery by the same token, would pale in the contemplation of what to sufficiently large The concept of "machine," adopted for its strict confinementto efficientcause, is still a finalisticconcept,even thoughthe final cause is no longer internal to the entity, as a mode of its own operation,but external to it as antecedent design. [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY intellects is nothing but the ever-repeated exemplification of the same few, elementary (and ultimately trivial) truths. There remained, then, the time-honored--Stoic as well as Christian--idea that plants and animals are for the benefit of Man. Indeed, since the existence of a living world is the necessary condition for the existence of any of its members, the self-justifying nature of at least one such member (= species) would justify the existence of the whole. In Stoicism, Man provided this end by his possession of reason, which makes him the culmination of a terrestrial scale of being that is also self-justifying throughout all its grades (the end as the best of many that are good in degrees) ; in Christianity, by his possession of an immortal soul, which makes him the sole imago Dei in creation (the end as the sole issue at stake) ; and Cartesian dualism radicalized this latter position by making man even the sole possessor of inwardness or "soul" of any kind, thus the only one of whom "end" can meaningfully be predicated as he alone can entertain ends. All other life then, the product of physical necessity, can be considered his means. However, this traditional idea, in its anthropocentric vanity never a... (shrink)

In this paper I explore alternative ways of addressing the infinite regress problem of inference, as it was depicted in Lewis Carroll’s ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. Roughly put, the problem is that if a claim to the effect that one’s premises give support to one’s conclusion must itself be part of one’s premises, then an infinite regress of reasons ensues. I discuss some recent attempts to solve that problem, but I find all of them to be wanting. Those (...) attempts either require the reasoner to believe that her premises give support to her conclusion, or to take her premises to give support to her conclusion, where taking is not a doxastic attitude. I conclude that, on the face of the failure of those attempts to solve the problem, there is a strong prima facie case for allowing inference to be blind. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for the counter-intuitive conclusion that the same adaptive preference can be both prudentially good and prudentially bad for its holder: that is, it can be prudentially objectionable from one temporal perspective, but prudentially unobjectionable from another. Given the possibility of transformative experiences, there is an important sense in which even worrisome adaptive preferences can be prudentially good for us. That is, if transformative experiences lead us to develop adaptive preferences, then their objects can become prudentially (...) better for our actual selves than the objects of their non-adaptive alternatives would now be. I also argue, however, that the same worrisome adaptive preferences might still be prospectively prudentially objectionable: that is, our pre-transformation selves might be prudentially better off undergoing a non-adaptive alternative transformative experience instead. I argue that both claims hold across the range of the most broadly-defended accounts of well-being in the literature. (shrink)

Compilation of diverse unpublished thesis on literary theory and contemporary Argentine literature.

René Girard’s anthropological theory is founded on the assumption that mimesis in primates may have been a threat to the emergence of new species, particularly for what humans would become. Mimesis necessarily led to rivalry around nonshareable objects, which may have led the members of the earliest anthropoid communities to autodestruction. As known to all who are familiar with the ideas of Girard, mankind has been selected by the repetition of a mechanism according to which a bunch of individuals killed (...) one member of their community. It is the hypothesis of the scapegoat victim that helps to explain the emergence of all cultural forms; in fact, it is the scapegoat victim that makes human thought possible... (shrink)

In Every Thing Must Go James Ladyman and Don Ross argue for a radical version of naturalistic metaphysics and propose that contemporary analytic metaphysics is detached from science and should be discontinued. The present article addresses the issues of whether science and metaphysics are separable, intuitions and understanding should be excluded from scientific theory, and Ontic Structural Realism satisfies the criteria of the radical version of naturalism advanced by Ladyman and Ross. The point underlying those topics is that successful scientific (...) research presupposes metaphysics, and that basic epistemic virtues common to metaphysics and science may allow us—as opposed to what Ladyman and Ross suggest—to increase our understanding of the world and to put constraints on allowable metaphysical theories. (shrink)

This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the (...) queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory. (shrink)

In this article, an attempt is made to analyse important implications of the hermeneutic approach in qualitative studies. The article discusses the hermeneutic circle with regard to reasoning contexts, on which the researcher's interpretation is based. Problems in connection with achievement of ‘proper’ understanding in an interpretative process are discussed in light of Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy. Some features of qualitative studies are addressed. This is concerned with arguments in the presentation of findings in qualitative studies using the hermeneutic approach. The (...) essence of the article is there are grounds for reasonable understanding, even though it cannot be absolute in the hermeneutic. (shrink)

I propose that we can explain the contribution of mental time travel to agency through understanding it as a specific instance of our more general capacity for narrative understanding. Narrative understanding involves the experience of a pre-reflective and embodied sense of self, which co-emerges with our emotional involvement with a sequence of events. Narrative understanding of a sequence of events also requires a ‘recombinable system’, that is, the ability to combine parts to make myriad sequences. Mental time travel shares these (...) two characteristics: it involves an embodied sense of self and the ability to create novel scenarios. What is unique about mental time travel is that it is a story explicitly about our selves, and it involves metarepresentation. Agency is enabled by narrative understanding when we are able to put our current situation into a larger narrative context, whereby some possible actions, but not others, make sense. However, new features of agency are enabled when we understand stories that are explicitly about our selves: we gain the ability to plan and act on plans. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss some questions proposed by Prof. Newton da Costa on the foundations of quasi-set theory. His main doubts concern the possibility of a reasonable semantical understanding of the theory, mainly due to the fact that identity and difference do not apply to some entities of the theory’s intended domain of discourse. According to him, the quantifiers employed in the theory, when understood in the usual way, rely on the assumption that identity applies to all entities in (...) the domain of discourse. Inspired by his provocation, we suggest that, using some ideas presented by da Costa himself in his seminars at UFSC and by one of us in some papers, these difficulties can be overcome both on a formal level and on an informal level, showing how quantification over items for which identity does not make sense can be understood without presupposing a semantics based on a ‘classical’ set theory. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, Jonathan Barker argues against the claim that grounded entities are ontologically innocent. In this paper I defend the ontological innocence of grounded entities against Barker's argument. I tease out an assumption that is crucial for the success of Barker's argument and I show that the defender of ontological innocence can deny this assumption in a motivated way.

The article deals with the entrenchment of the institute of criminal liability of a legal person in the Lithuanian criminal law. Upon approval of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter also referred to as the CC) on 26 September 2000, the criminal liability of a legal person was provided almost in every fifth (at present—in every second) article of the Special Part of the CC. Although criminal liability has been increasingly applied to legal persons (e.g., in 2011, (...) if compared to 2005, almost three times as much punishments were imposed), however, almost 90 percent of the articles of the CC providing also for criminal liability of a legal person are “dead”. One doubt arises with regard to social legitimacy of such lawmaking and the quality thereof in the sense of juridical technique. (shrink)

We consider the claim by Dorato and Morganti 591–610) that primitive individuality should be attributed to the entities dealt with by non-relativistic quantum mechanics. There are two central ingredients in the proposal: in the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, individuality should be taken as a primitive notion and primitive individuality is naturalistically acceptable. We argue that, strictly understood, naturalism faces difficulties in helping to provide a theory with a unique principle of individuation. We also hold that even when taken in (...) a loose sense, naturalism does not provide any sense in which one could hold that quantum mechanics endorses primitive individuality over non-individuality. Rather, we argue that non-individuality should be preferred based on the grounds that such a view fits better the claims of the theory. (shrink)

This introduction characterizes and positions value theory, or axiology, as a philosophical discipline. It identifies its central issues and explains how value theory overlaps partly with other areas of moral philosophy, such as metaethics and normative etics, and how it relates other areas of philosophy. The introduction also explains how value theory branches out to disciplines outside of philosophy, especially to economic theory. The Handbook is divided into three main parts, and section I.1 closes with a brief explanation and motivation (...) of this thematic division. Sections I.2–I.4 summarize the individual chapters, give brief backgrounds to their subject matters, and explain how they are interrelated. (shrink)

Feministische Sprachphilosophie wird im deutschen Sprachraum kaum betrieben. Der Artikel versucht zu zeigen, weshalb feministische Sprachphilosophie sowohl für den Feminismus als auch für die Philosophie wichtig ist. Exemplarisch wird feministische Kritik an der Sprach- philosophie diskutiert, und das Verhältnis von Feminismus und Sprache wird anhand von Arbeiten aus der feministischen Linguistik untersucht. Es werden verschiedene allgemeine Formen der sprachlichen Benachteiligung unterschieden, und es wird gezeigt, dass das Benachteiligen durch Sprache ein illokutionärer Akt sein kann. Feminist philosophy of language is barely (...) existent in the german speaking world. The article tries to show why feminist philosophy of language is of concern both to feminism and to philosophy. It discusses a feminist critique of the philosophy of language and examines the relation between feminism and language through work of feminist linguists. Different forms of linguistic discrimination are distinguished, and it is shown that discrimination by using language can be an illocutionary act. (shrink)

In societies of high legal culture, criminal law is regarded as a protective and repressive measure of the state, as an imperative of crime and inevitable punishment (as a strict rule). Therefore, the article attempts to show the fact that the entirety of the provisions and norms of criminal law, consolidated in a modern democratic state under the rule of law (or, at least, a state that is attempting to become such a state), allows for the assertion that the purpose (...) of criminal law is coordination or, at least, the balance of the interests of conflicting subjects—the victim and the culprit, the culprit and the state. Thus, by means of criminal law, one can try to attain legal concord in seemingly irreconcilable situations. The reality of such striving is confirmed by court practice and statistics in criminal justice. The article analyses the origin of the reconciliation function, essentially a new aspect of criminal law. A position is formed that the fundamentals of such a function of criminal law are “laid” by the provisions of the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania that the striving of the Nation is an open, just and harmonious civil society and a state under the rule of law. For the implementation of these provisions, one makes use of the possibilities of penal law-making and respectively corrects the penal policy. (shrink)

The paper firstly reconstructs Mario Calderoni’s criticism of the Jamesian version of pragmatism, which corresponds to his philosophical choice in favor of the ethical value assigned by Peirce to the scientific-experimental method. In this light, I propose a reading of some Calderoni’s arguments concerning the link between the construction of beliefs, practical norms and moral or legal responsibility, trying to reassess his criticisms of James and then his conception of philosophy as a practical and therapeutic activity. The latter will be (...) discussed considering Wittgenstein’s analysis of intentional verbs and Calderoni’s approach to the issues of freedom, of the definition of voluntary acts as well as of individual responsibility, both moral and legal. In particular, I will focus on the paradigm shift suggested by Wittgenstein with regard to the problem of human will, which seems useful for enhancing Calderoni’s pragmatist insights. (shrink)

En me fondant sur le témoignage de Photius sur l’Anthologion de Jean Stobée (Bibl., cod. 167) et en considérant d’abord l’architecture de l’ouvrage et les aspects techniques de la composition, je me propose d’évaluer la possibilité d’une nouvelle lecture, selon laquelle le florilège de Stobée n’aurait pas été destiné à une instruction scolaire générale ni adressé à un destinataire unique, son propre fils Septimius, mais, tout en relevant indéniablement de la littérature didactique, aurait eu en quelque sorte un caractère propédeutique, (...) en présentant à l’utilisateur l’inventaire général du monde ordonnée logiquement, et en utilisant une tradition gnomologico-doxographique antérieure avec un dessein culturel nouveau. (shrink)

To date, little understanding exists of how first-year students in professionally oriented higher-education programs experience their academic transition process. In the present study, we first argued how the constructs of academic adjustment and academic integration can provide complementary perspectives on the academic transition of first-year students in HE. Next, we examined what first-year students in professional HE contexts perceive to be the most important experiences associated with their academic transition process in the first semester of their first year of higher (...) education. To this end, we adopted the fundamentals of the critical incident technique and asked 104 students in a Flemish university college to complete “reflective logs” with open questions at the start of the second semester of their FYHE, wherein they reflected on three critical academic experiences during their first semester. An inductive, cross-case content analysis of the collected narratives showed that students reported on nine themes of academic experiences, which relate to five adjustment themes and four integration themes. Further analyses showed that although some of the nine themes of academic experiences appear to be more important at different times in the first semester, they all seem to be meaningful throughout the whole semester. (shrink)

This paper examines the competing construals of the phrase recovering alcoholic, which, as a Membership Categorization Device, serves to fulfill a commitment to an identity category and at the same time evokes other category-bound activities, often with unintended consequences. Former problem drinkers are routinely referred to by themselves and others as recovering alcoholics, yet they are not ‘recovering’ in the canonical sense of the word, and they participate in a behavior – not drinking – which is a negation of the (...) behavior that originally qualified them as alcoholics. This use of the relatively new identity marker recovering alcoholic may discourage a problem drinker from attempting sobriety, as it implies an unbounded, never-ending period of recovery, unlike recovery from other diseases. (shrink)