Name der Zeitschrift: Rhizomata Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 2 Seiten: 148-176.

Qui sont « les Anciens »? Dans cet article nous allons examiner la signification de l’expression « les Anciens » dans le papyrus médical appelé Anonyme de Londres, en essayant de lui donner une juste attribution. L’examen contextuel des deux occurrences de ce terme révèle que le rapprochement avec les Aristotéliciens, proposé par la plupart des interprétations, est plutôt plausible. Cette conclusion est basée sur deux éléments : d’abord d’étroites analogies avec quelques textes d’Aristote, puis l’usage qui a été fait (...) de cette même expression dans les traités médicaux contemporains de la rédaction du papyrus. La recherche semble démontrer que, dans le premier cas, par l’expression « les Anciens » l’auteur du papyrus ferait allusion à Aristote et non aux Platoniciens, et dans le second, qu’il pourrait s’agir d’une allusion aux philosophes présocratiques, soit Héraclite soit Empédocle. (shrink)

This study adopts moral reasoning strategies to investigate why consumers support companies involved in ethical transgressions. Drawing on several cases of real multinationals publicly involved in tax avoidance practices, it aims to demonstrate that moral rationalization and moral decoupling depend not only on how consumers perceive the magnitude of the transgression, but also on their individual differences, such as political ideology and brand identification. A quantitative study with a sample of 3989 consumers of five different focal brands was employed to (...) test a set of hypotheses. Findings reveal that moral decoupling directly explains purchase intentions. However, rationalization only explains behavioral intentions if it leads to a reduction in the perceived immorality of the action. Furthermore, the study reveals significant differences across personal values. Left-leaning individuals tend to rationalize less and decouple more when they perceive that the magnitude of the transgression as egregious. Interestingly, consumers who are highly identified with the brand are less affected by the transgression and tend to be more supportive toward the brand by engaging in rationalization mechanisms. (shrink)

An economic crisis is an unexpected phenomenon with strong consequences for nations, institutions and people's wealth, habits, and behaviors. It departs from the ‘normal’ evolution of the affairs foreseen by economic theory. It makes the claim for new theoretical explanations. It surprises the economic agents that try to ascertain what kind of phenomenon they are facing in order to decide the appropriate actions to undertake. It calls for revisions of theory, plans and expectations. Overall, a crisis calls for an explanation (...) which clarifies its causes. (shrink)

Many sentences can be interpreted both as a metaphor and as a literal claim, depending on the context. The aim of this paper is to show that there are discourse-based systematic constraints on the identification of an utterance as metaphorical, literal, or both (as in the case of twice-apt metaphors), from a normative point of view. We claim that the key is contextual coherence. In order to substantiate this claim, we introduce a novel notion of context as a rich and (...) heterogeneous body of information, including previous discourse, elements coming from the surroundings of the utterance, background information, and Questions Under Discussion (QUD) issued from these three sources. We then define contextual coherence as a relation between what we call the minimal paraphrase of the metaphor and the context, and argue that for an interpretation to be coherent two conditions must be met. First, the minimal paraphrase must address some question in the QUD stack. Second, it must be externally consistent, i.e. consistent with the available contextual information. Finally, we argue that an approach based on contextual coherence is better suited to deal with twice-true and twice-apt metaphors than traditional approaches based on semantic deviance or pragmatic lack of fit. (shrink)

This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that beliefs formed (...) on the basis of our memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification and justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity other than memory. The aim of the book is to explain these features of memory. It proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past and suggests that memories have a particular content as well; they represent themselves as having a certain causal origin. The book then accounts for the feelings associated with our memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories represent; things such as our own past experiences, or the fact the memories originate in those experiences. It also accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of memory. (shrink)

During the second half of the twentieth century, economics exported its logic - utility maximization - to the analysis of several human activities or realities: a tendency that has been called "economic imperialism". This book explores the concept termed by John Davis as "reverse imperialism", whereby economics has been seen in recent years to have taken in elements from other disciplines. Economics and Other Disciplines sheds light on the current state and possible future development of economics by focusing on it (...) from a philosophical perspective, broadening the concept of rationality in economic theory. The beliefs that prevail in the world today make up a physicalist worldview. This book argues that this pervasive view is harmful for economics as a social science. Do new economic currents like behavioral economics, evolutionary economics, neuroeconomics, institutional economics, happiness economics, the capability approach and civil economy, escape this widespread mentality? What would be an adequate underlying economic ethos? Do these approaches fit into this ethos? Ricardo F. Crespo appraises the contributions from a classical philosophy angle, emphasizing their implications regarding practical reason. This volume is of great importance to those who are interested in political economy, economic theory and philosophy, as well as philosophy of social science. (shrink)

Husserl va haciéndose consciente de que el ideal “racionalista” de la razón no hace justicia por sí solo a la riqueza de la vida moral. La vida lograda no consistiría solamente en conducir ésta de acuerdo con el ideal de la razón, sino en dejarse mover por el amor. Éste presenta dos características: revela la individualidad de la persona que ama y de la persona amada y funda una “comunidad del tender” con la(s) persona(s) amada(s).

Moritz Geiger was one of the most significant members of the early phase of the phenomenological movement. His work on the consciousness of feelings constitutes an example of careful phenomenological analysis. The central question Geiger raised is this: how are feelings given to consciousness when they are “fully lived”? As I seek to prove, the principal result of his analysis is to point out a way of being oriented towards feelings without objectifying them. Geiger’s analysis of the consciousness of feelings (...) is a masterpiece of phenomenological precision. It is reasonable to think that it influenced the way Husserl conceived of something so decisive as emotive intentionality. (shrink)

Student performance and its evaluation remain a serious challenge for education systems. Frequently, the recording and processing of students’ scores in a specific curriculum have several flaws for various reasons. In this context, the absence of data from some of the student scores undermines the efficiency of any future analysis carried out in order to reach conclusions. When this is the case, missing data imputation algorithms are needed. These algorithms are capable of substituting, with a high level of accuracy, the (...) missing data for predicted values. This research presents the hybridization of an algorithm previously proposed by the authors called adaptive assignation algorithm, with a well-known technique called multivariate imputation by chained equations. The results show how the suggested methodology outperforms both algorithms. (shrink)

: El análisis de las disposiciones de ánimo (Gesinnungen) ofrecido por Alexander Pfänder constituye un primer capítulo de lo que se podría denominar “fenomenología de la conciencia emotiva” o “crítica de la razón afectiva”. Este fenomenólogo de la primera hora ofrece un detallado examen fenomenológico de este tipo especial de vivencias intentando, al mismo tiempo, mostrar su relevancia moral. Este trabajo pretende enmarcar y reconstruir dicho análisis en el marco de un intento más general de insistencia en la importancia que (...) el mundo de los afectos puede tener para la ética. (shrink)

Badain Jaran is a desert, more than 19,000 square miles of endless openness, with innumerable sand dunes up to 1,600 feet tall and mysterious salt-water lakes. It is part of the Alashan desert, south-west to the Gobi in the Inner Mogolia province of China. A place that has been discovered by American scientists on satellite images in the 1980s only that miraculously has been kept hidden to most people since. In 2009-12 Carlos Crespo realised a vast photo essay on (...) the unique, spectacular, and very remote landscape of Badain Jaran. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In (...) sections 2 and 3, I will discuss the two main existing conceptions of the conditions that a mental state must satisfy to count as an episode of remembering. The first of these approaches is backward-looking. It puts forward conditions that strictly concern the aetiology of the mental state. I will argue that the conditions offered by the backward-looking approach are both too strong and too weak: They rule out mental states which, intuitively, count as memories while including mental states which, intuitively, do not qualify as memories. The second approach is forward-looking. It puts forward conditions that only concern the use that the subject makes of the mental state while forming beliefs about their own life. I will argue that the conditions proposed by the forward-looking approach are both too weak and too strong as well. However, the discussion of the two approaches will allow us to extract some helpful lessons on the constraints that any proposal about the nature of remembering should respect. An alternative approach aimed at incorporating those lessons will be offered in section 4 by drawing on the literature on functionalism. In section 5, I will argue that this approach can, on the one hand, accommodate as memories those mental states which indicate that the backward-looking approach and the forward-looking approach are too strict while, on the other hand, excluding those mental states which suggest that the two alternative approaches are too permissive. Accordingly, I will conclude that construing memory along functionalist lines is a satisfactory approach to the nature of remembering. (shrink)

La reconstrucción sistemática y el análisis crítico de la teoría husserliana acerca de la felicidad y de su búsqueda no es tarea fácil. Ello se debe tanto a dificultades terminológicas como a la dispersión en las distintas obras del fundador del método fenomenológico. Este trabajo pretende presentar los elementos fundamentales de una teoría tal en el contexto de la teleología de la vida moral. La felicidad entendida como vida dichosa en su totalidad (seliges Gesamtleben) en la cual todas las intenciones (...) –tanto las teóricas como las éticas– son cumplidas, satisfechas, constituye un ideal, inalcanzable de hecho, que guía la vida moral. Sin embargo, según Husserl, es posible acercarse, aunque sea asintóticamente, a dicha felicidad, una felicidad que también tiene una dimensión intersubjetiva que reside en el cumplimiento de los fines de una comunidad ética. (shrink)

The world has seen several financial and economic crises in the past few years. Psychological, ethical and philosophical levels of causal analysis have been discussed, and in this context, an interest in classical thinkers has emerged. The work of Aristotle has influenced writers from Marx and Menger to Amartya Sen. This book introduces us to Aristotle's thought on 'the economic' and on its influences on economists. First, it focuses on Aristotle´s ideas, situating Aristotle in his historical context, describing his positions (...) on the economic and analysing what kind of reality the economic is, its relation with ethics and with politics. Then, it determines what kind of science is concerned with the economic. Later, it analyses related topics and shows the influence of Aristotle's ideas on contemporary economists. It concludes by highlighting the Aristotelian contributions to today's economy. This scholarly volume offers important new insights into the Aristotelian approach to the economy itself, as well as to the idea of economics as a science, bringing Aristotle's views to bear on the modern economy. (shrink)

This book develops a philosophical analysis of economic reality and economic science from an Aristotelian point of view. It is the result of many years of thinking and philosophical study about these topics. It differs from other philosophy of economics books as it also deals with economic reality (not only the science) and approaches its subject from an Aristotelian perspective. It differs from other Aristotelian studies about economics as it covers the whole of philosophy of the economy. This book argues (...) why Aristotle's thinking guarantees an appropriate interdisciplinary synthesis. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose an account of metaphor identification on the basis of contextual coherence. In doing so, we build on previous work by Nicholas Asher and Alex Lascarides that appeals to rhetorical relations in order to explain discourse structure and the constraints on the interpretation of metaphor that follow from it. Applying this general idea to our problem, we will show that rhetorical relations are sometimes insufficient and sometimes inadequate for deciding whether a given utterance is a case (...) of metaphor. They are insufficient, since rhetorical relations fall short at times of providing a basis for disambiguating between literal and metaphorical interpretations. In such cases, contextual information other than previous discourse needs to enter the picture. To this effect, we bring the idea of external consistency into play. Beyond that, though, we will argue that rhetorical relations are sometimes inadequate to account for coherence, if conceived as relations among sentences only. The reason is that extra-linguistic elements of the situation in which the sentence is uttered may be crucial for getting at the preferred interpretation. To account for these cases, we allow rhetorical relations to connect both with previous discourse and with extra-linguistic situations. In our final refinement of the notion of contextual coherence, we forfeit any appeal to rhetorical relations in favour of Questions Under Discussion (QUD). We defend the view that this account does not only explain the same sort of cases. What is more, it solves the issue of metaphor identification in impoverished contexts. (shrink)

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...) entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section. (shrink)

este trabajo aborda tres aspectos fundamentales del método filosófico de Edith Stein. En primer lugar, se alude a las cosas mismas como el punto de partida del filosofar de esta autora. En segundo lugar, se considera el aspecto que constituye uno de los aportes fundamentales del método fenomenológico y que es claramente reconocible en nuestra autora, a saber, el haber puesto de manifiesto la imposibilidad de hacer filosofía primera sin tomar en cuenta la vida consciente ante la que todas las (...) cosas se abren. En tercer lugar, se remite a la individualidad de la persona como un aspecto de la antropología de Stein especialmente relevante. Al final del análisis de cada uno de estos tres aspectos metodológicos se intenta mostrar en qué sentido éstos pueden ser de relevancia para emprender el camino hacia la pregunta por la mujer. (shrink)

The ‘value-free ideal’ has been called into question for several reasons. It does not include “epistemic values”—viewed as characteristic of ‘good science’—and rejects the so-called ‘contextual’, ‘non-cognitive’ or ‘non-epistemic’ values—all of them personal, moral, or political values. This paper analyzes a possible complementary argument about the dubitable validity of the value-free ideal, specifically focusing on social sciences, with a two-fold strategy. First, it will consider that values are natural facts in a broad or ‘liberal naturalist’ sense and, thus, a legitimate (...) part of those sciences. Second, the paper will not reject the value-free ideal; rather, it will construe this ideal in a special way, not casting values aside in sciences, but bringing them to the table and rationally discussing them. Today’s predominant naturalistic view has tended to ‘naturalize’ values by looking for physicalist explanations for them—a move resisted by defenders of normativism in social sciences. At the same time, a contending ‘liberal naturalist’ stream has emerged, claiming that not all natural entities can be explained by the methods and concepts of physical sciences, and favors a non-materialist naturalism which includes mind, consciousness, meaning and value as fundamental parts of nature that cannot be reduced to matter. Hence, it may be posited that non-epistemic values could be ‘naturally’ included in the field of human sciences. (shrink)

Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments (...) are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious (...) faculty of introspection or "inner perception" mechanism. (shrink)

Moderation and liberalism are different and in some cases antagonistic concepts. In recent years, the view that Sieyès’s idea of constituent power is a moderate and liberal rendering of sovereignty has gained acceptance in intellectual history and constitutional theory literature. This claim is based on the premise that radical and illiberal readers of Rousseau’s idea of sovereignty, such as Robespierre and the Jacobins, were opposed to representing the general will (volonté générale). Thus, constituent power as the exercise of power by (...) extraordinary representatives to draft a constitution would be a liberal attempt at political moderation in the French revolution. In contrast to this liberal reading, my analysis shows that Sieyès’s idea of constituent power is an illiberal attempt at political moderation. Against moderate liberal theories, constituent power demands that the extraordinary representatives of the constituent assembly must will, deliberate, and act as if they were the people themselves. These representatives have absolute powers and the mandate to create a constitution but also the imperative to perceive and mirror the sovereign will. From a political theory approach, I conclude that constituent power is not a liberal idea but a key notion of moderate illiberalism that prevailed during the French Revolution. (shrink)

This article raises a very relevant question today: “Does AI think?” To come up with an answer, it explores several conceptions of knowledge, from classical Aristotelian notions to modern philosophers’ takes on it. For Aristotle, knowledge starts with the senses, and, through epagoge and nous, it grows into an understanding of the nature of the thing known, which is something that does not happen with AI. Modern schools of thoughts are either rationalist or empiricist. For rationalists, knowledge is innate, while (...) empiricists believe all knowledge comes from the senses. As Kant views it, knowledge is “built” on sensorial data with the use of theoretical reason categories. Based on these approaches, it is harder to claim that AI does not think by itself. The article also reviews current philosophers’ views on AI and AI thinking. Summing up, the answer to the initial question depends on the concept of knowledge adopted. As this article shares the classical notion of thinking, it concludes that AI does not think. (shrink)

R. Otto (1869-1937) is known for his work in the field of philosophy of religion. The article addresses his main contributions, with special attention to the Aufsätze zur Ethik and its connection to The Idea of the Holy. Against the idea that Otto is unable to develop an ethics without giving up some fundamental positions of The Idea of the Holy, the article argues in favor of their agreement with his ethical writings, on the basis of the thesis that not (...) everything we know is a form of knowledge (wissen), in the sense of intellectual representation. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, (...) and I shall aim at a specification of the content of memories that is in accordance with those aspects of them. (shrink)

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are ‘token-reflexives’, in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able (...) to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. (shrink)

This essay offers a discussion and contextualisation of a series of letters exchanged between Jordi Cat and Paul Feyerabend from 1989 to 1994. These letters provide insights into Feyerabend’s later thought on a variety of themes including quantum holism, the disunity of science, the development of logical empiricism, and science activism. In doing so, we provide some original analysis and exegesis of Feyerabend’s evolving views on scientific methodology and quantum mechanics by focusing on Feyerabend’s changing attitudes towards Bohm, Bohr, (...) and his eventual colleague Hans Primas and his later sympathies with the algebraic approach. We also highlight Feyerabend’s role in the growth of the Disunity of Science movement and how he connected disunity to practical considerations in the philosophy of action. (shrink)

This paper tries to introduce the main elements of Alexander Pfänder´s thought. Pfänder was one of the most prominent phenomenologists. He wrote many books on different philosophical topics such as Logic, Ethics, Epistemology, etc. Here one pays special attention to his way of considering Logic and his special comprehension of phenomenological method.

El artículo aborda la cuestión de la contribución de los sentimientos a la “conformación” y a la “revelación” de la identidad personal desde la perspectiva de la fenomenología husserliana. Para ello se parte de una breve descripción de qué entiende Edmund Husserl por “sentimientos” señalando el error de considerar esta esfera como una esfera homogénea. La distinción fundamental que cruza la misma es la existente entre sensaciones afectivas y actos afectivos. Manuscritos inéditos de Husserl a los que el autor ha (...) tenido acceso amplían esta distinción y profundizan en los diversos tipos de intencionalidad afectiva. Una vez ofrecida una visión de conjunto sobre la concepción husserliana de los sentimientos, se analiza la contribución de éstos – entendidos en uno u otro sentido – a la conformación de los distintos, por así decir, “niveles” de identidad personal. De este modo, se reconstruye una suerte de “arqueología” de la identidad personal que va desde lo que Husserl denomina “fluyente presente viviente” hasta lo que en este trabajo se llama “identidad personal en sentido eminente”. (shrink)

I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will (...) point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the notion and role of metaphors and illustrations in Maxwell's works in exact science as a pathway into a broader and richer philosophical conception of a scientist and scientific practice. While some of these notions and methods are still at work in current scientific research-from economics and biology to quantum computation and quantum field theory-, here I have chosen to attest to their entrenchment and complexity in actual science by attempting to make some conceptual sense (...) of Maxwell's own usage; this endeavour includes situating Maxwell's conceptions and applications in his own culture of Victorian science and philosophy. I trace Maxwell's notions to the formulation of the problem of understanding, or interpreting, abstract representations such as potential functions and Lagrangian equations. I articulate the solution in terms of abstract-concrete relations, where the concrete, in tune with Victorian British psychology and engineering, includes the muscular as well as the pictorial. This sets the basis for a conception of understanding in terms of unification and concrete modelling, or representation. I examine the relation of illustration to analogies and metaphors on which this account rests. Lastly, I stress and explain the importance of context-dependence, its consequences for realism-instrumentalism debates, and Maxwell's own emphasis on method. (shrink)

Cet article défend l’idée que l’on peut distinguer quatre niveaux d’analyse au sein des sciences sociales (y compris l’économie) – à savoir, a) un niveau descriptif statistique, b) un niveau explicatif causal, c) un niveau explicatif téléologique, et d) un niveau téléologique prescriptif. Généralement, les sciences sociales ne considèrent que les niveaux a) et b). L’exclusion du niveau c) peut conduire à considérer comme des « anomalies » certains comportements qui ne sont pas compatibles avec des théories comme celle du (...) choix rationnel ou celle de l’utilité espérée – à savoir, des théories qui adoptent une attitude dite de « rationalité instrumentale ». Inclure le niveau c) dans la réflexion implique de considérer la « rationalité pratique » et cela rend ces anomalies « raisonnables ». L’article prend pour cadre théorique la notion de causalité et la téléologie d’Aristote. La première section introduit ces notions, tandis que la deuxième section explore les points de vue contemporains sur la causalité et la téléologie. La troisième section introduit des arguments pour établir la légitimité de l’usage des valeurs en sciences sociales. Cette étape est nécessaire, car les causes finales des explications téléologiques dans le domaine des choses humaines sont bien, en définitive, des valeurs. Ces discussions ouvrent la voie à l’introduction, dans la quatrième et dernière section, des quatre niveaux analytiques susmentionnés. Plus précisément, dans le cas de l’économie, cette discussion se fonde sur la classification des disciplines économiques chez Carl Menger. (shrink)

Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can (...) shed some light on the experience of mental time travel. This is the view that, when a subject remembers some fact episodically, their memory represents itself as coming from a perception of that fact. I propose that the experience of mental time travel in memory is the experience of representing one of the elements in this complex content, namely, the past perceptual experience of the remembered fact. In defence of this proposal, I offer two considerations. Firstly, the proposal is consistent with the idea that memories enjoy a temporal phenomenology (specifically, a feeling of pastness). Secondly, the proposal is consistent with the possibility that some of our other cognitive capacities might yield an experience of mental time travel which can be oriented towards the future. I argue that the received conception of mental time travel is in tension with those two ideas. (shrink)

El estudio de la motivación de la utilización de los sistemas de control avanzado de música ambiental y el hecho de crear un buen ambiente, una buena experiencia de cara al cliente que entra en un local a realizar una compra debido al atractivo generado por la música es el objetivo de esta investigación. El estudio de las emociones que se derivan de la utilización de la música en locales comerciales y la repercusión que tiene en el comportamiento de compra (...) del consumidor serán analizados con el estudio de varios casos de éxito sobre esta cuestión. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to show, in general terms, the Husserlian sources of the way in which von Hildebrand understands emotive consciousness, while still recognizing important differences beween the two authors. To carry out this task I will develop four points of contact between the two thinkers: (1) the idea of the existence of a priori laws in the emotional sphere, (2) the defense of spiritual (geistige) forms of affectivity, (3) the idea that affective responses to value can (...) be correct or incorrect, that is, adequate or not according to the value to which they respond, and (4) the existence of a kind of emotive evidence (Gemütsevidenz) that parallels evidence in the realm of judgment. (shrink)

Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, (...) memory can produce justification for belief through the process of remembering. This is why a subject may be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of memory even if, in the past, she was not justified in believing it through any other source. The resulting picture of memory is a picture wherein the epistemically generative role of memory turns out to be grounded on its intentionally generative role. (shrink)