We provide a cognitive analysis of how children represent belief using mental files. We explain why children who pass the false belief test are not aware of the intensionality of belief. Fifty-one 3½- to 7-year old children were familiarized with a dual object, e.g., a ball that rattles and is described as a rattle. They observed how a puppet agent witnessed the ball being put into box 1. In the agent’s absence the ball was taken from box 1, the child (...) was reminded of it being a rattle, and emphasising its being a rattle it was put back into box 1. Then the agent returned, the object was hidden in the experimenter’s hands and removed from box 1, described as a ‘‘rattle,” and transferred to box 2. Children who passed false belief had no problem saying where the puppet would look for the ball. However, in a different condition in which the agent was also shown that the ball was a rattle they erroneously said that the agent would look for the ball in box 1, ignoring the agent’s knowledge of the identity of rattle and ball. Their problems cease with their mastery of second-order beliefs. Problems also vanish when the ball is described not as a rattle but as a thing that rattles. We describe how our theory can account for these data as well as all other relevant data in the literature. (shrink)

Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, (...) we criticize Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory as well as Strawson's recent contribution in this journal, and argue that a phenomenological analysis of the nature of self-awareness can provide us with a more sophisticated and accurate model for understanding both phenomenal consciousness and the notion of self. (shrink)

We propose that typical schizophrenic delusions develop on the background of preexisting anomalies of self-experience. We argue that disorders of the Self represent the experiential core clinical phenomena of schizophrenia, as was already suggested by the founders of the concept of schizophrenia and elaborated in the phenomenological psychiatric tradition. The article provides detailed descriptions of the pre-psychotic or schizotypal anomalies of self-experience, often illustrated through clinical vignettes. We argue that delusional transformation in the evolution of schizophrenic psychosis reflects a global (...) reorganization of consciousness and existential reorientation, both of which radiate from a fundamental alteration of the Self. We critically address the contemporary cognitive approaches to delusion formation, often finding them inconsistent with the clinical features of schizophrenia or implausible from a phenomenological point of view. (shrink)

Our objectives in this article are to bring some theoretical order into developmental sequences and simultaneities in children’s ability to appreciate multiple labels for single objects, to reason with identity statements, to reason hypothetically, counterfactually, and with beliefs and desires, and to explain why an ‘implicit’ understanding of belief occurs before an ‘explicit’ understanding. The central idea behind our explanation is the emerging grasp of how objects of thought and desire relate to real objects and to each other. To capture (...) this idea we make use of the notion of discourse referents, as did Perner and Brandl (2005), to explain the developmental link between understanding beliefs and alternative naming. We present confirming evidence of the prediction from this analysis that children should have comparable problems with understanding identity statements. We explain the precociously correct answers in ‘implicit’ false belief tests based on indirect measures in the following way: From infancy children are able to keep track of other people’s experiences, to reason about counterfactual circumstances, and to reason about goal-directed (rational) action depending on given circumstances. Indirect tasks reduce the bias to use actual circumstances for reasoning about goal directed action compared to the traditional task, which leads to more correct answers. An emerging metarepresentational understanding helps overcome these biases and enables not only correct action prediction but also the explanation of erroneous actions. The common metarepresentational element explains why false belief tasks and the alternative naming task are mastered at the same time as children understand identity statements. (shrink)

Abstract:This article addresses the issue of whether and to what extent moral values can be attributed to collective actors. The paper starts from the premise that business ethics as the ethics of an organization is to be distinguished from the virtues of its members. This point is elaborated in both economic- and organization-theoretic terms within the framework of the New Economics of Organization. The result is the development of a concept of governance ethics. The ethics of governance is about the (...) incorporation of moral conditions and requirements in the management, governance, and control structures of a firm. This is the contextual precondition for the long-lasting and beneficial effects of the virtues of individuals within the organizations. (shrink)

We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving (...) with images. In support of this argument we review developmental evidence that children's episodic remembering is independent of and emerges after mastery of the false belief task but emerges together with the use of imagery for solving visual rotation tasks. (shrink)

When do children become consciously aware of events in the world? Five possible strategies are considered for their usefulness in determining the age in question. Three of these strategies ask when children show signs of engaging in activities for which conscious awareness seems necessary in adults , and two of the strategies consider when children have the ability to have the minimal form of higher-order thought necessary for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, respectively. The tentative answer to the guiding question (...) is that children become consciously aware between 12 and 15 months. (shrink)

This paper examines the place of metaphorical interpretation in the current Contextualist-Literalist controversy over the role of context in the determination of truth-conditions in general. Although there has been considerable discussion of 'non-literal' language by both sides of this dispute, the language analyzed involves either so-called implicit indexicality, loose or loosened use, enriched interpretations, or semantic transfer, not metaphor itself. In the first half of the paper, I critically evaluate Recanati's (2004) recent Contextualist account and show that it cannot account (...) for the metaphorical-literal dependence characteristic of metaphor. I then turn to Carston's (2002), and Bezuidenhout's (2001) Contextualist accounts and show that they place no constraints on metaphorical interpretations. In the second half of the paper I sketch a Literalist theory of metaphor elaborated in Stern (2000) and respond to two kinds of Contextualist criticisms of that account by Camp (2005) and Stanley (2005). (shrink)

In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010). Basic conditional reasoning takes background assumptions represented as conditionals about how the world works. If an antecedent of one of these conditionals is provided by the (...) task, then a likely conclusion can be inferred based only on background assumptions. A critical feature of counterfactual reasoning is that the selection of these additional assumptions is constrained by actual events to which the counterfactual is taken to be counterfactual. In contrast, in basic conditional reasoning one enriches the given antecedent with any plausible assumptions, unconstrained by actual events. In our tasks basic conditional reasoning leads to different answers from counterfactual reasoning. For instance, a doctor, sitting in the park with the intention of reading a paper, is called to an emergency at the swimming pool. The question, “If there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?” should counterfactually be answered “in the park”. But by ignoring the doctor's intentions, and just reasoning from premises about the default location of a hospital doctor who has not been called out to an emergency, one might answer: “in the hospital”. Only by 6 years of age did children mostly give correct answers. (shrink)

This book examines new concept of evolutionary ontology based on the idea of radically different "ontic orders" - natural and cultural being. It explains how culture evolved out of nature and how it became "anti-natural". The remedy is seen in the global biophilous reconstruction of culture. The value of the "live planet" Earth and the "subject" capable of creative activity and evolution are given fundamental philosophical interpretation.

A new axiomatic treatment of equilibrium thermodynamics—thermostatics—is presented. The equilibrium states of a thermal system are assumed to be represented by a differentiable manifold of dimensionn + 1 (n finite). The empirical temperature is defined by the notion of thermal equilibrium. Empirical entropy is shown to exist for all systems with the property that the total work delivered along closed adiabats is zero. Absolute entropy and temperature follow from the additivity of heat and energy for two separate systems in thermal (...) equilibrium considered as a whole. The absolute temperature is defined up to a multiplicative constant. The exterior differentiable calculus of Cartan is introduced and in a subsequent paper its use for the derivation of standard results in thermostatics will be explained. (shrink)

We develop a new theory of the cognitive changes around 4 years of age by trying to explain why understanding of false belief and of alternative naming emerge at this age. We make use of the notion of discourse referents as it is used in File Change Semantics, one of the early forms of the more widely known Discourse Representation Theory. The assumed cognitive change exists in how children can link DRs in their mind to external referents. The younger children (...) check whether the conditions for a DR match the conditions of an external entity. The older children, in addition, have an explicit understanding of reference in virtue of making explicit identity assertions. This involves the metarepresentational ability of representing that different DRs represent the same external referent, which — we argue — is required for alternative naming and for the false belief task. (shrink)

The approach of structuralism came to philosophy from social science. It was also in social science where, in 1950–1970s, in the form of the French structuralism, the approach gained its widest recognition. Since then, however, the approach fell out of favour in social science. Recently, structuralism is gaining currency in the philosophy of mathematics. After ascertaining that the two structuralisms indeed share a common core, the question stands whether general structuralism could not find its way back into social science. The (...) nature of the major objections raised against French structuralism – concerning its alleged ahistoricism, methodological holism and universalism – are reconsidered. While admittedly grounded as far as French structuralism is concerned, these objections do not affect general structuralism as such. The fate of French structuralism thus does not seem to preclude the return of general structuralism into social science, rather, it provides some hints where the difficulties may lie. (shrink)

Alois Riehl’s View of Friedrich Nietzsche and His Relationship with Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Alois Riehl and Friedrich Nietzsche were contemporaries – both were born in the same year, 1844. But the philosophical paths they followed could hardly be more different. Nevertheless, Riehl recognized Nietzsche as one of the most important thinkers of his time. He was one of the first academic philosophers to devote a detailed analysis to Nietzsche’s writings. And Riehl saw in Nietzsche’s work a complementary counterpart to the scientific (...) philosophy that he developed in his Philosophical Criticism. At the heart of the present paper is a speech given by Riehl on October 15, 1903, on the occasion of the reopening of the Villa Silberblick and the unveiling of Max Klinger’s bust of Nietzsche. The argument is divided into three parts. First, it reconstructs the background to these events historically in light of the friendly relationship between Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Riehl, as well as Riehl’s hesitation to give a speech. Second, Riehl’s ambivalent attitude in his reception of Nietzsche is analyzed through a close reading of his text. Third, the paper concludes with a final look at the specific event of October 15, 1903, based on historical material. (shrink)

From the perspective of Catholic moral theology, one of the most important topics in view of the tense relationship between law, ethics and religion is natural law. The first part of the present text tries to defend this type of theory, which goes back to antiquity, against the most important objections and to determine the contours of a contemporary form of natural law thinking. In the second part of the text, their practical importance is indicated using the example of the (...) current debate about the moral evaluation of suicide and suicide assistance as well as dealing with the phenomenon of so-called transgenderness. (shrink)

The problem of the origin of life understandably counts as one of the most exciting questions in the natural sciences, but in spite of almost endless speculation on this subject, it is still far from its final solution. The complexity of the functional correlation between recent nucleic acids and proteins can e.g. give rise to the assumption that the genetic code (and life) could not originate on the Earth. It was Portelli (1975) who published the hypothesis that the genetic code (...) could not originate during the history of the Earth. In his opinion the recent genetic code represents the informational message transmitted by living systems of the previous cycle of the Universe. Here however, we defend the existence of a certain strategy in the syntheses of the genetic code during the history of the Earth. The strategy of correlation between amino acid and nucleotide polymers made an increasing velocity of the chemical evolution possible, that is, it increased the velocity of formation of the genetic code. Thus, life with the recent genetic code could originate on the Earth within the present cycle of the Universe. (shrink)

We translate Socrates’ famous saying I know that I know nothing into the arithmetical sentence I prove that I prove nothing. Then it is easy to show that this translated saying is formally undecidable in formal arithmetic, using Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. We investigate some variations of this Socrates-Gödel sentence. In an appendix we sketch a ramified epistemic logic with propositional quantifiers in order to analyze the Socrates-Gödel sentence in a more logical way, separated from the arithmetical context.

Whilst the role of Maturation or M‐phase Promoting Factor (MPF) as a universal M‐phase regulator is well documented, much less attention has been paid to its role in nuclear transplantation experiments and especially to its influence upon remodelling of transplanted nuclei. There is currently wide acceptance that successful nuclear transplantation using differentiated nuclei is possible only in a cytoplasmic environment that is capable of inducing rapid nuclear de‐differentiation to a pronuclear‐like form. In this review our purpose is firstly, to outline (...) the conditions under which such remodelling can be induced, and secondly, to extend the debate to include a consideration of whether complete nuclear remodelling is an absolute necessity for clonal development. (shrink)

Animals are hand-raised in a variety of contexts, including experimental research. This has been criticized frequently as producing animals with species-untypical behaviour. Here we compare life histories of 330 hand-raised and 631 gooseraised Greylag geese from a free-flying flock to determine whether hand-raising affected life history, reproductive variables and behaviour. We found little differences in life histories or reproductive variables of hand-raised and goose-raised geese. However, hand-raised females had lower life expectancies than goose-raised ones, mainly due to predation during breeding. (...) Hand-raised geese were stressed significantly less during social, handling and predator stress, were attacked less by conspecifics and were less vigilant than goose-raised geese. We conclude that hand-raising resulted in geese with species-typical life histories but reduced stress responses. This makes hand-raised geese cooperative partners for research, but also more vulnerable when exposed to predators. Keywords: hand-raising; greylag goose; Anser anser; life-history; reproductive success; stress. (shrink)

Ethics and legal design currently seem to be involved in a “vortex of temporality” (Jürgen Habermas), which, according to the understanding of many, integrates them into a modern way of life. Examples are the protection of life (Embryo Protection Act and abortion, reinterpretation of Article 1 of the Basic Law in the Maunz/Dürig commentary by Herdegen), the promotion of plural family forms and sexual relationship worlds (“marriage for all“, life stage partnership), assisted dying (judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on (...) assisted suicide). Apparently, it is always about the dismantling of traditional taboos and the establishment of legal regulations that are intended to correspond to a new ethical consciousness and plural ideological worlds. The discussion in ethics theory and legal theory in this situation has agreed on a model of the gravitational fields of liberal self-execution, in which cultural development in ethics and law should find its moral support and at the same time its legal ethical dynamics. According to this understanding, a basic consensus is maintained in the execution of liberal debates (also on moral and legal questions). It is articulated in human rights principles, which themselves must be discussed again in open conversation in their meaning, but which at the same time bring themselves to the fore as irrefutable exactly in this social process. Theological ethics maintains a certain distance from this interpretation. The understanding of freedom must then be structured for the lifestyle of society in such a way that the one-sidedness of individualism and abstract overemphasis, even exaggeration, is avoided. The aim is to integrate social integration, reference to natural framework conditions and realistic border awareness in ethics and law. Moral theology can be based in this on the further development of social science. (shrink)

We introduce a particular way of drawing the distinction between the use of theory and simulation in the prediction of people's decisions and describe an empirical method to test whether theory or simulation is used in a particular case. We demonstrate this method with two effects of decision making involving the choice between a safe option (take amount X) and a risky option (take double the amount X with probability 1/2). People's predictions of choice frequencies for trivial (€ 0.75) as (...) opposed to substantial (€ 18) amounts in Experiment 1 are quite accurate when they are presented with both conditions juxtaposed but are less accurate when only given one of the conditions. This result is interpreted to speak for the use of theory in prediction. In contrast people's predictions of the framing effect for substantial amounts (more risk seeking for positively than negatively framed problems) are accurate only for independent predictions but not for juxtaposed predictions, which speaks for the use of simulation. (shrink)