The intersection of language, stigma, and neuropsychiatry is an integral area of concern for limited english proficiency (LEP) communities, demanding a greater focus in U.S. healthcare systems. Lan...

Neuropsychiatric disorders such as drug addiction, depression and schizophrenia are often centrally implicated in public health challenges. These conditions impact the individuals affected and have widespread implications, contributing to related crises such as opioid epidemic, rising suicide rates and homelessness. Despite their influence, public health interventions frequently emphasise individual responsibility, overlooking the complex interplay of neurobiological and systemic factors that underpin these disorders. Current public health frameworks, such as the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ intervention ladder, prioritise efforts that encourage individual (...) behaviour change. Paetkau critiques this emphasis on individual responsibility, emphasising the need to consider more systemic factors, such as social determinants of health, as targets of necessary intervention.1 We aim to reinforce Paetkau’s critique of the intervention ladder by introducing three neuropsychiatric case studies, each highlighting the limitations of an individual-based framework in addressing psychopathology-involved public health issues. We argue that conditions like addiction, depression and serious mental illness undermine the emphasis on individual responsibility in public health and policy interventions. To this end, neuroscience demonstrates that effective public health interventions necessitate a shift from the long-standing emphasis on individual responsibility towards more comprehensive, systems-level interventions. Opioid overdose deaths in the USA have sextupled since 1999, with over 100,000 deaths in 2023 alone.2 The opioid crisis has since remained one of the most pressing public …. (shrink)

Neuropsychiatric disorders introduce distinct challenges to clinical decision-making. Affected patients often experience impairments or absences in rationality, lucidity and cogni-emotional capacities, rendering it difficult for them to engage in the decision-making process. In turn, dynamics of the patient-physician relationship become strained, including when physicians employ bioethical principlism or moral case deliberation to arrive at ethically justified courses of action–both of which require sufficient communication and rationality that may be impaired or altogether absent in the presence of psychopathology. The complexity of (...) neuropsychiatric conditions therefore compels interrogation towards how ethics consultations are currently constructed and conducted when full communication or rational decision-making cannot be assumed. Delany et al, for example, present a robust, methodical framework for ethical deliberation.1 Such methodologies for facilitating ethical decision-making, although valuable in predominant contexts, assume full participant engagement and decision-making capacities (eg, independent moral agency). Neuropsychiatric disorders complicate this assumption, making it difficult for patients with limited decision-making capacity to engage meaningfully in proposed ethics consultations.2 This paper will explore how neuropsychiatric disorders complicate the assumptions of full participant engagement underlying ethical frameworks. It will argue that, by adapting ethics consultations to function as a ‘mental prosthesis’, clinicians can better navigate the ethical challenges posed by neuropsychiatric disorders, helping to ensure that patient autonomy is upheld even in cases of impaired cognitive …. (shrink)

Abstract:Representations of the space of the village, the wilderness, and the overlapping edge of the forest between them often play a critical role in intercultural collisions between the “developing” world's spaces and pressures from the ‘developed’ world's activities within them. These collisions include land grabs and resource extraction, conversion of forest or wilderness to mechanized agriculture, uneven legal disputes over what constitutes ownership and use, and conservation efforts to reduce climate change or restore genetic biodiversity in forests. This study illuminates (...) how the physical and perceptual spaces of village, wilderness, and forest change, resist change, and are forced to change in three key domains: health (traditional medicine), food security (hunting, farming, and resource extraction in general), and use-ownership (as indigenous knowledge, occupancy, and access to land-use generally). Findings from the study disclose a need to include time (as the pace of change) whenever changed perceptions of space are proposed or occur. Recommendations include applying the criterion to strive always for the least disruptive (short-term) procedures for addressing a problem such that those outcomes achieve the most sustainable impacts over the long-term. (shrink)

Digital media transform social options of access with regard to producers, recipients, and literary works of art themselves. New labels for new roles such as »prosumers « and »wreaders« attest to this. The »blogger« provides another interesting new social figure of literary authorship. Here, some old desiderata of Dadaism appear to find a belated realization. On the one hand, many web 2.0 formats of authorship amplify and widen the freedom of literary productivity while at the same time subjecting such production (...) to a periodic schedule. In comparison to the received practices of authors and recipients many digital-cultural forms of narrating engender innovative metalepses (and also their sublation). Writing in the net for internet-publics enables the deliberate dissolution of the received autobiographical pact with the reader according to which the author’s genuine name authenticates the author’s writing. On the other hand, the digital-cultural potential of dissolving the autobiographical pact stimulates scandals of debunking and unmasking and makes questions of author-identity an issue of permanent contestation. Digital-cultural conditions of communication amplify both: the hideand- seek of authorship as well as the thwarting of this game by recipients who delight in playing detective. In effect, pace Foucault’s and Barthes’ postulates of the death of the author, the personality and biography of the author once again tend to become objects of high intrinsic value. (shrink)

The research aims to investigate the characteristics and risks associated with the handling of sensitive data in the implementation of public policies within the digital government model. To achieve this, a hypothetical-deductive method and bibliographic and documentary procedures are employed, proposing an interdisciplinary discussion on technological advancement, data protection, transparency, and public policies. The justification revolves around the importance of a comprehensive, cohesive system that genuinely protects sensitive personal data, considering the need to keep pace with technological developments and (...) maintain a minimum level of security in the digital age at both national and international levels. There is no doubt that the judicious and strategic use of data has the potential to drive substantial improvements in policy evaluation, decision-making, and the relationship between government and citizens. However, dealing with personal data also means addressing risks with responsibility, transparency, and respect for individual rights. (shrink)

In collective harm cases, bad consequences follow if enough people act in a certain way even though no such individual act makes a difference for the worse. Global warming, overfishing and Derek Parfit’s famous case of the harmless torturers are some examples of such harm. Shelly Kagan argues that there is a threshold such that one single act might trigger harm in all collective harm cases. Julia Nefsky points to serious shortcomings in Kagan’s argument, but does not show that (...) his conclusion is incorrect. I argue that our best theories of vagueness (the epistemic view of vagueness, three-valued logic, and supervaluationism) entail that there is a threshold in all collective harm cases. However, my analysis points to another problem with Kagan’s argument: the thresholds are not necessarily perceptible. Given the assumption that only perceptible differences matter morally, passing such a threshold does not necessarily trigger morally relevant harm, pace Kagan. Last, I consider two variants of Kagan’s argument and find both problematic. One controversially assumes that observational relations like ‘cannot perceive the difference between’ are transitive. The other problematically assumes that so called triangulation always is possible. (shrink)

This paper investigates the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead that they are much more similar to the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, it suggests that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge, justified belief, or mere belief; it's a practical attitude, most plausibly (...) the attitude of rational acceptance. This view has important ramifications well beyond debates in philosophy of language and linguistics. It affects not only our view of which speech act sequences are fine and which are off; it bears on whether presuppositions can function as testimony, whether they can be lies, and whether they are ontologically committal, thus addressing central topics in epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. (shrink)

"Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind" is an elegant survey of Stoic and Epicurean ideas about the soul an introduction to two ancient schools whose belief in the soul's physicality offer compelling parallels to modern approaches in the ...

Objective Some researchers claim that the quality of informed consent of clinical research participants in developing countries is worse than in developed countries. To evaluate this assumption, we reviewed the available data on the quality of consent in both settings. Methods We conducted a comprehensive PubMed search, examined bibliographies and literature reviews, and consulted with international experts on informed consent in order to identify studies published from 1966 to 2010 that used quantitative methods, surveyed participants or parents of paediatric participants (...) in actual trials, assessed comprehension and/or voluntariness, and did not involve testing particular consent interventions. Forty-seven studies met these criteria. We compared data about participant comprehension and voluntariness. The paucity of data and variation in study methodology limit comparison and preclude statistical aggregation of the data. Results and Discussion This review shows that the assertion that informed consent is worse in developing countries than in developed countries is a simplification of a complex picture. Despite the limitations of comparison, the data suggest that: (1) comprehension of study information varies among participants in both developed and developing countries, and comprehension of randomisation and placebo controlled designs is poorer than comprehension of other aspects of trials in both settings; and (2) participants in developing countries appear to be less likely than those in developed countries to say they can refuse participation in or withdraw from a trial, and are more likely to worry about the consequences of refusal or withdrawal. (shrink)

When examining the role of Stoic ethics within Stoic philosophy as a whole, it is useful for us to look at the Stoic view of the way in which philosophy is made up of parts. The aim is a synoptic and integrated understanding of the "theoremata" of all the parts, something which can be achieved in a variety of ways, either by subsequent integration of separate study of the three parts or by proceeding through 'mixed' presentations, which can be made (...) at varying levels of understanding. In two presentations of Stoic ethics we find initially baffling claims about the life of virtue being 'the same as' or 'equivalent to' the life according to nature. These indicate approaches in which understanding of ethical concepts was enlarged and enriched by study of physics. Interpretation which makes physics in these passages into ethical foundations answers poorly to the ancient texts and raises severe difficulties as an interpretation of Stoicism. Two texts which have been taken to commit Stoics to a foundationalist view of the relation of ethics and physics do not in fact do so; rather, they fit well into the holistic view of philosophy and its parts. (shrink)

In recent years, theories of social understanding have moved away from arguing that just one epistemic strategy, such as theory-based inference or simulation constitutes our ability of social understanding. Empirical observations speak against any monistic view and have given rise to pluralistic accounts arguing that humans rely on a large variety of epistemic strategies in social understanding. We agree with this promising pluralist approach, but highlight two open questions: what is the residual role of mindreading, i.e. the indirect attribution of (...) mental states to others within this framework, and how do different strategies of social understanding relate to each other? In a first step, we aim to clarify the arguments that might be considered in evaluating the role that epistemic strategies play in a pluralistic framework. On this basis, we argue that mindreading constitutes a core epiststrategy in human social life that opens new central spheres of social understanding. In a second step, we provide an account of the relation between different epistemic strategies which integrates and demarks the important role of mindreading for social understanding. (shrink)

This paper examines the ancient appeal to nature in ethics to support the account of the final end in life offered by the various schools from aristotle onwards. various modern objections against the appeal to nature are examined and found not to hold. as a result certain features of the ancient position emerge: the appeal to human nature is not an attempt to end ethical argument by appeal to undisputed fact; nor does it depend on a metaphysics which we can (...) no longer accept; nor is it meant to map out a specific way of life or set of ethical rules. it amounts to something like an appeal to moral psychology to set guidelines for a realistic ethical theory. a proper understanding of the ancient appeal to nature reveals the limits to some modern metaethical assumptions, and also the extent to which there may be more continuity between ancient ethics and some modern ethical thinking than is often assumed. (shrink)

This study investigated the relationship between dream emotion and dream character identification. Thirty-five subjects provided 320 dream reports and answers to questions on characters that appeared in their dreams. We found that emotions are almost always evoked by our dream characters and that they are often used as a basis for identifying them. We found that affection and joy were commonly associated with known characters and were used to identify them even when these emotional attributes were inconsistent with those of (...) the waking state. These findings are consistent with the finding that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, associated with short-term memory, is less active in the dreaming compared to the wake brain, while the paleocortical and subcortical limbic areas are more active. The findings are also consistent with the suggestion that these limbic areas have minimal input from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the dreaming brain. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that there are two kinds of indicative conditionals that do not contain conditional 'then.' There are hypothetical conditionals such as 'If Mary has done the groceries, there is beer in the fridge' and there are biscuit conditionals such as 'If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.' There is also broad consensus that we cannot find an analogous distinction between hypothetical and biscuit conditionals within indicative conditionals that do feature 'then.' Conditionals containing 'then,' it (...) is assumed, are uniformly read as hypothetical conditionals. In this article, I shall argue that there are biscuit conditionals featuring 'then.' This result, I take it, is not only interesting on its own. It also puts pressure on the popular view that conditional 'then' triggers the presupposition that in some situations in which the conditional's antecedent is not true, its consequent is not true either. (shrink)

It is well-known that in recent years, alongside the familiar forms of modern ethical theory, such as consequentialism, deontology, and rights theory, there has been a resurgence of interest in what goes by the name of “virtue ethics” — forms of ethical theory which give a prominent status to the virtues, and to the idea that an agent has a “final end” which the virtues enable her to achieve. With this has come an increase of theoretical interest in ancient ethical (...) theories, particularly Aristotle's, an interest which has made a marked difference in the way ethics is pursued in the Anglo-Saxon and European intellectual worlds. In this essay, I shall not be discussing modern virtue ethics, which is notably protean in form and difficult to pin down. I shall be focusing on ancient eudaimonistic ethical theories, for in their case we can achieve a clearer discussion of the problem I wish to discuss. (shrink)

Rationality (or something similar) is usually given as the relevant difference between all humans and animals; the reason humans do but animals do not deserve moral consideration. But according to the Argument from Marginal Cases not all humans are rational, yet if such (marginal) humans are morally considerable despite lacking rationality it would be arbitrary to deny animals with similar capacities a similar level of moral consideration. The slippery slope objection has it that although marginal humans are not strictly speaking (...) morally considerable, we should give them moral consideration because if we do not we will slide down a slippery slope where we end up by not giving normal humans due consideration. I argue that this objection fails to show that marginal humans have the kind of direct moral status proponents of the slippery slope argument have in mind. (shrink)

Inductive reasoning is fundamental to human cognition, yet it remains unclear how we develop this ability and what might influence our inductive choices. We created novel categories in which crucial factors such as domain and category structure were manipulated orthogonally. We trained 403 4–9-year-old children to categorise well-matched natural kind and artefact stimuli with either featural or relational category structure, followed by induction tasks. This wide age range allowed for the first full exploration of the developmental trajectory of inductive reasoning (...) in both domains. We found a gradual transition from perceptual to categorical induction with age. This pattern was stable across domains, but interestingly, children showed a category bias one year later for relational categories. We hypothesise that the ability to use category information in inductive reasoning develops gradually, but is delayed when children need to process and apply more complex category structures. (shrink)

This book traces the long-term genesis of the sixth-century Roman legal penalty of forced monastic penance. The late antique evidence on this penal institution runs counter to a scholarly consensus that Roman legal principle did not acknowledge the use of corrective punitive confinement. Dr Hillner argues that forced monastic penance was a product of a late Roman penal landscape that was more complex than previous models of Roman punishment have allowed. She focuses on invigoration of classical normative discourses around punishment (...) as education through Christian concepts of penance, on social uses of corrective confinement that can be found in a vast range of public and private scenarios and spaces, as well as on a literary Christian tradition that gave the experience of punitive imprisonment a new meaning. The book makes an important contribution to recent debates about the interplay between penal strategies and penal practices in the late Roman world. (shrink)

There are a class of moral virtues that have an intimate relationship with agential evaluation, following Gary Watson we can call these ‘second-order virtues,’ e.g., modesty, blind charity, being judgmental, etc. Julia Driver has argued that these virtues are distinguished by being virtues which require ignorance. Richard Y. Chappell and Helen Yetter-Chappell have argued that these virtues are distinguished by being virtues of salience. Aside from the disagreement about the distinguishing features of these virtues, there is an intrinsic interest (...) in the second-order virtues and vices. For these virtues and vices play an integral role in moral education and character formation. This paper seeks to deepen that discussion by examining a second-order vice, namely, the vice of being judgmental. I argue that being judgmental requires a salience structure which exhibits undue attention to the negative features of others (pace Jessie Munton). Modeling being judgmental as a vice of attention helps to unify the various characteristics of judgmental persons, namely, a tendency to excessive standing, excessive epitomization, and relational qualification. As an upshot, we receive another reason to adopt an attention model of the second-order virtues and vices. (shrink)

Early Polemical Writings covers the young Kierkegaard's works from 1834 through 1838. His authorship begins, as it was destined to end, with polemic. Kierkegaard's first published article touches on the theme of women's emancipation, and the other articles from his student years deal with freedom of the press. Modern readers can see the seeds of Kierkegaard's future career these early pieces. In "From the Papers of One Still Living," his review of Hans Christian Andersen's novel Only a Fiddler, Kierkegaard rejects (...) the notion that environment is decisive in determining the fate of genius. He also puts forward his belief that each person needs a life-view or life for which and by which to live, a thought he explores further in the comic play The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars. (shrink)

Después del proceso de secularización propio de la modernidad, podemos sospechar que, quizás, estemos asistiendo a una época de post-secularización debido al creciente interés por la espiritualidad y por la mística. En este contexto, el presente estudio sobre lo místico y su vinculación con la ética tiene por objetivo fundamental conocer qué aportaciones al ámbito de la acción moral pueden surgir del estudio de la experiencia mística. Para ello, profundizaremos en el conocimiento del propio ser humano desde una perspectiva que (...) contemple su dimensión trascendente y espiritual, a fin de valorar la contribución que puede suponer el estudio de la mística al ámbito de la educación en valores, en pos de un nuevo paradigma antropológico, social y cultural que responda a las eternas inquietudes del ser humano. (shrink)

Until the discovery of catalytic RNA, the notion that all enzymes are proteins had seemed incontrovertible. Now the existence of RNA enzymes has been confirmed in a variety of contexts. What is known about the chemistry of RNA‐catalyzed reactions is reviewed below, with particular attention to the self‐splicing rRNA intron of Tetrahymena thermophila and the processing of pre‐tRNA molecules by RNase P.

This essay tries to show how Michel Henry’s Phenomenology of Life can be understood as a valuable criticism of hermeneutical philosophy and especially of hermeneutical phenomenology in the manner Martin Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur had conceptualized it. Using Michel Henry’s concept of phenomenological distance, it will be shown here that on the basis of every hermeneutics there lies the classical topos of the auctorial intention that was once gained by the interpretation of texts and is simply ontologized by hermeneutical philosophers. (...) What follows from such a perspective is that human life seems to be ontologically separated form itself, against which Michel Henry tries to show that each life can only be humane, both in relation to itself as well as to others, if it affects itself without any distance. (shrink)

¿Qué queda de la escuela? La experiencia de la escuela primaria deja huellas que se memoran y narran tiempo después, dando cuenta de lo que ha afectado y atravesado las vidas en el tiempo de la infancia. A partir de la investigación narrativa y mediante entrevistas abiertas nos propusimos recuperar y analizar lo que los adultos memoran de ese tiempo. Sintetizamos los resultados del trabajo de campo, que ubican al disciplinamiento, al miedo y al respeto como los tópicos de mayor (...) recurrencia e intensidad, como asimismo a los sentidos otorgados a estos recuerdos. Esbozamos finalmente lo que se olvida o se silencia. La reflexión a la que invita el artículo enfatiza en los efectos que la escuela y los adultos producen de manera imperceptible o poco tematizada, en la vida de quienes las habitan. (shrink)

Este estudio de la idea de Dios en la fenomenología de Husserl, intenta, a modo de propedéutica, ordenar, según cuatro enfoques, textos husserlianos en que se hace referencia a Dios. En primer lugar, se trata de Dios considerado como un objeto de cuya constitución hay que dar razón. En segundo lugar, se reúnen las referencias a Dios "usado" para destacar la universalidad de los rasgos de las operaciones constitutivas. A continuación se estudian textos referidos a la experiencia religiosa, el lugar (...) que da Husserl a la experiencia mística, a la creencia y la plegaria. Para terminar, se considera la idea de Dios en relación con las preguntas y hechos "últimos", las notas de la divinidad y el método que autoriza al filósofo a referirse a ella. (shrink)

En el presente escrito indagamos en representaciones de docentes en torno a la experiencia de llevar adelante propuestas de filosofía con niños. Para ello, proponemos, primero, precisar las implicancias de lo que denominamos escenas filosóficas, definimos a la enseñanza de la filosofía como un problema filosófico y caracterizamos, luego, la práctica a partir de una polémica sobre su denominación de filosofía para niños o filosofía con niños. Para relevar estas representaciones, realizamos seis entrevistas en profundidad a docentes que tienen amplia (...) experiencia en esta práctica, y, a partir de un análisis de las entrevistas, ponemos el énfasis en la potencia de la reflexión sobre la experiencia. Recuperamos, en las narraciones, la revisión de la propia formación, de la idea de planificación y del modo en el que irrumpen las infancias. Por último, subrayamos el reconocimiento del carácter transformador del hacer filosofía con niños que relatan los docentes. (shrink)