This essay argues that the reigning medical and scientific understanding of the endocrine system, which insists on its fundamental biological plasticity, was historically constructed through a dual child–animal metaphor. The work accomplished by such organic metaphors, as Donna Haraway terms them, returns us to the endocrine laboratories and clinics in which they were built in Europe and the United States in the first half of the twentieth century. The child and animal metaphors implanted the concept of plasticity into the human (...) body to the effect of bringing sexed and gendered life under the jurisdiction of science and medicine, where it could not only be normalized in a sense long appreciated by transgender studies but also cultivated towards the ostensible “improvement” and “perfection” of the human. This is also, then, a history of the eugenic heritage of modern endocrinology, which has been largely ignored in recent discussions of plasticity and the body’s materiality. To interrogate the role of foundational organic metaphors in endocrinology is to open up plasticity not only to its historical context but also to radical contestation, making the contemporary assumptions of transgender medicine untimely, particularly the medicalization of the transgender child. (shrink)

Despite its imperative to include all gendered positions under one umbrella, ‘trans’ is continually riven by intramural confrontation over the differences between its masculine and feminine iterations. Whether in political organizing, on social media or in the pages of academic trans theory, it sometimes seems like ‘trans’ is subject to an interminable and gendered custody battle. Dissatisfied with the terms of masc–femme antagonism, this essay uses the gendered interfaces of critique and autotheory to enmesh the work of Jules Gill- (...) class='Hi'>Peterson and Paul B. Preciado. Reading into the interdependence of Gill-Peterson’s and Preciado’s texts yields a different theory: trans as an auto-antonym, a word that produces opposite meanings depending on context. Treating trans as auto-antonymic conjures a relational and even erotic escape from the naturalization of gendered antagonism in trans theory, affirming the unexpected bridges, reversals or ‘sex changes’ of specifically trans writing. (shrink)

The psychedelic psilocybin has shown promise both as treatment for psychiatric conditions and as a means of improving well-being in healthy individuals. In some jurisdictions (e.g., Oregon, USA), psilocybin use for both purposes is or will soon be allowed and yet, public attitudes toward this shift are understudied. We asked a nationally representative sample of 795 US Americans to evaluate the moral status of psilocybin use in an appropriately licensed setting for either treatment of a psychiatric condition or well-being enhancement. (...) Showing strong bipartisan support, participants rated the individual’s decision as morally positive in both contexts. These results can inform effective policy-making decisions around supervised psilocybin use, given robust public attitudes as elicited in the context of an innovative regulatory model. We did not explore attitudes to psilocybin use in unsupervised or non-licensed community or social settings. (shrink)

Este artículo hace foco en el problema de la pérdida de la creencia del mundo, que Gilles Deleuze plantea en sus estudios sobre cine, a partir de uno de los temas ontológicos más perdurables en toda su obra: el par conceptual actual-virtual. Para ello, ponemos en relación la forma en la cual estos conceptos son expuestos y problematizados en Diferencia y repetición y cómo reaparecen en La imagen-movimiento (señalada por Deleuze como de carácter actual) y La imagen-tiempo (marcada por su (...) virtualidad). A partir de este prisma, presentamos una perspectiva en el debate de los estudios deleuzianos sobre la relación actual-virtual, que cuestiona tanto la prioridad virtual como la relación de mediación entre los planos (sea en su versión clásica o sofisticada), para volcarnos a un vínculo de coalescencia para cuya conceptualización aunamos los recursos teóricos del cristal del tiempo con los del envolvimiento de la Idea y la intensidad. En esa coalescencia es posible comprender de qué manera el plano virtual, lejos de emplazarnos fuera del mundo, nos permite según Deleuze volver a creer en él. (shrink)

En este artículo se analizan las perspectivas políticas que surgen de las diferentes interpretaciones existentes sobre la ontología que Gilles Deleuze construye en Diferencia y repetición. En primer lugar, se contemplan las implicancias de una visión restringida a su teoría de la Idea, donde el debate consiste en establecer si Deleuze se inclina por una prioridad virtual o una actual; en términos políticos, éstas lo acercan, respectivamente, a una genealogía soberana o una liberal. En un segundo momento mostramos cómo esta (...) interpretación acotada se enriquece si se toma en cuenta el otro concepto fundamental del libro de 1968: la intensidad. De allí surgen versiones sofisticadas de ambas posturas: la prioridad actual ya no se identifica con un atomismo social, sino con la corporalidad intensiva del pueblo y las minorías que lo componen; el Estado como Idea social que emerge de la prioridad virtual, por su parte, ya no está “fuera del mundo”, sino que está constituido por una materialidad intensiva. Finalmente, se mostrará que el elemento intensivo no alcanza para resolver las limitaciones de ambas perspectivas -tanto en lo especulativo como en lo político-, y la necesidad de superarlas hacia una reciprocidad absoluta, donde la inmanencia entre Idea e intensidad sólo encuentra distinción en los movimientos de plegado de un mismo espacio topológico, cuya traducción política es un Estado intensivo indisociable del pueblo que lo expresa y explica. (shrink)

This paper addresses an action that, from a Deleuzian perspective, is capable of modifying the despairing current social situation in which we are immersed, through the creation of political Ideas. Even though Deleuze conceives social Ideas as vast civilizing structures, we propose to bring into the political domain the logic of other acts of creation, such as the artistic or the philosophical, where the monumental coexists with minor figures that are nonetheless capable of introducing novelty into the world. The politician (...) is the figure of those who are capable of having an Idea that allows to break the habits that perpetuate the current situation, and gives consistency to the intensive forms of life that continually create and dissolve themselves in the flow of becoming. Thus, macro- and micro-politics do not oppose each other, but offer in their immanence an alternative to social nihilism. (shrink)

A través de la puesta en serie de _Diferencia y repetición_ (1968) y _La imagen-movimiento_ (1983), trazaremos cuatro senderos en la ontología divergente de Gilles Deleuze, mostrando cómo cada una de las escuelas de montaje del cine clásico implica una _inversión_ determinada respecto a cuatro facetas de la tradición filosófica, representadas por Hume, Spinoza, Hegel y Descartes. La taxonomía de los estudios sobre cine abrirá caminos _claros_ en la oscura ontología de Deleuze, mientras que el libro del ‘68 revelará la (...) carga filosófica implícita en los desarrollos cinematográficos, al mismo tiempo que mostrará las divergencias e incomposibilidades que gruñen debajo de la aparente pulcritud de la clasificación de las imágenes cinematográficas. (shrink)

Proponemos confrontar el pensamiento de Gilles Deleuze y Leo Strauss a partir de las disímiles interpretaciones que estos dos influyentes filósofos del siglo XX han hecho de la ontología política de Spinoza. Ambos comparten una problemática común: cómo se relacionan la sustancia y los modos existentes. Pero donde Strauss realiza un llamado a la Revelación y el mandato de amar al prójimo para colmar la brecha y evitar que la sabiduría sea sinónimo de indiferencia ante el sufrimiento de la multitud, (...) Deleuze recurre a una propuesta de lectura de la teoría del modo finito que permite distinguir el punto de vista de la Eternidad de aquel de la Duración, sin por eso dejar a los modos finitos librados al azar de los encuentros, es decir, permitiéndoles encontrar su conatus en la potencia divina. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone realizar un abordaje crítico de la ontología afirmativa de Gilles Deleuze a partir de las objeciones realizadas por Georg Hegel a Spinoza en su Ciencia de la lógica. La hipótesis de trabajo es que, dada la herencia spinozista del pensamiento de Deleuze, estas críticas pueden resultar pertinentes para reflexionar sobre algunos puntos fundamentales. De esta manera, se intenta contrariar la habitual tendencia de los estudios deleuzianos de trabajar en una clave anti-hegeliana, es decir, a partir de (...) una separación teórica total con la problemática de Hegel. Se descarta la posibilidad de centrar las críticas de Hegel en torno a la sentencia "omni determinatio est negatio" o la imposibilidad de progresar desde la afirmación absoluta (por lo que el verdadero comienzo en Spinoza -y por tanto en Deleuze- sería la mera realidad empírica donde los elementos se vinculan de manera extrínseca, es decir, sin concepto). El punto de inconmensurabilidad es que Hegel afirma que es necesario que exista un movimiento de retorno (zurürckkehren) para que la afirmación no se degrade al punto de la disolución, mientras que Deleuze prefiere el movimiento de eterno retorno (ewige wiederkunft) como apertura insistente en el porvenir. Este artigo se propõe a realizar uma abordagem crítica da ontologia afirmativa de Gilles Deleuze a partir das objeções realizadas por Georg Hegel a Spinoza em sua Ciência da Lógica. A hipótese de trabalho é que, visto que o pensamento de Deleuze tem uma herança spinozista, essas críticas podem resultar pertinentes para refletir sobre alguns pontos fundamentais. Desta maneira, tenta-se contrariar a habitual tendência dos estudos deleuzianos de trabalharem em um espírito anti-hegeliano, isto é, a partir de uma separação teórica total com a problemática de Hegel. Descarta-se a possibilidade de centrar as críticas de Hegel em torno à sentença "omni determinatio est negatio". Também parece não ir ao coração do problema o fato de assinalar que, já que desde a afirmação absoluta não se pode progredir, o verdadeiro começo em Spinoza (e Deleuze) é a mera realidade empírica na qual os elementos se vinculam de maneira extrínseca, isto é, sem conceito. O ponto de incomensurabilidade é que Hegel afirma que é necessário que exista um movimento de retorno (zurürckkehren) para que a afirmação não se degrade ao ponto da dissolução, enquanto Deleuze prefere o movimento de eterno retorno (ewige wiederkunft) como abertura insistente no porvir. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone indagar las tesis ontológicas que subyacen a la concepción que Gilles Deleuze propone del capitalismo, a partir de sus vínculos con la caracterización deleuziana de la flosofía “barroca” de Leibniz como representación órgica. Se analizará una primera hipótesis: que los repliegues de la materia conducen “naturalmente” las almas o mónadas como centro de convergencia, cuyo rol sería dar la razón de los cuerpos y garantizar la unidad en la representación. Luego se pondrá en duda esta hipótesis (...) por dar por sentado lo que se intenta demostrar, naturalizando el pasaje entre cuerpos y almas. Se presentará entonces una segunda hipótesis, según la cual la razón de los pliegues y los repliegues, de su convergencia y su composibilidad, tiene una génesis histórica; la razón sufciente sería la relación diferencial constitutiva del capitalismo (dy / dx), producida por los azares y las contingencias de la historia universal (el encuentro del fujo libre de trabajo con el fujo libre del capital) y no, como lo quiso Leibniz en la elección de Dios del “mejor de los mundos posibles”. (shrink)

This chapter explores the notion of territory in the works of both Gilles Deleuze and Martin Heidegger. It examines whether race and its minor theatre want a dwelling place and investigates whether there is a political potential within the body without organs which offers a resistance to the homely conception of dwelling. It provides a contextualisation of this future theatre in the Deleuzo-Guattarian project of minor literature as a whole and questions the practicality of the schizo-stroll and the BWO. It (...) also discusses the notion of Heideggerian deterritorialisation. (shrink)

The concept of self-motion is not only fundamental in Aristotle's argument for the Prime Mover and in ancient and medieval theories of nature, but it is also central to many theories of human agency and moral responsibility. In this collection of mostly new essays, scholars of classical, Hellenistic, medieval, and early modern philosophy and science explore the question of whether or not there are such things as self-movers, and if so, what their self-motion consists in. They trace the development of (...) the concept of self-motion from its formulation in Aristotle's metaphysics, cosmology, and philosophy of nature through two millennia of philosophical, religious, and scientific thought. This volume contains "Self-Movers" (David Furley), "Aristotle on Self-Motion" (Mary Louise Gill), "Aristotle on Perception, Appetition, and Self-Motion" (Cynthia Freeland), "Self-Movement and External Causation" (Susan Sauvé Meyer), "Aristotle on the Mind's Self-Motion" (Michael Wedin), "Mind and Motion in Aristotle" (Christopher Shields), "Aristotle's Prime Mover" (Aryeh Kosman), "The Transcendence of the Prime Mover" (Lindsay Judson), "Self-Motion in Stoic Philosophy" (David Hahm), "Duns Scotus on the Reality of Self-Change" (Peter King), "Ockham, Self-Motion, and the Will" (Calvin Normore), and "Natural Motion and Its Causes: Newton on the 'Vis Insita' of Bodies" (J. E. McGuire). Originally published in 1994. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The ethical dilemma of whether autonomous vehicles should protect the passengers or pedestrians when harm is unavoidable has been widely researched and debated. Several behavioral scientists have sought public opinion on this issue, based on the premise that EDs are critical to resolve for AV adoption. However, many scholars and industry participants have downplayed the importance of these edge cases. Policy makers also advocate a focus on higher level ethical principles rather than on a specific solution to EDs. But conspicuously (...) absent from this debate is the view of the consumers or potential adopters, who will be instrumental to the success of AVs. The current research investigated this issue both from a theoretical standpoint and through empirical research. The literature on innovation adoption and risk perception suggests that EDs will be heavily weighted by potential adopters of AVs. Two studies conducted with a broad sample of consumers verified this assertion. The results from these studies showed that people associated EDs with the highest risk and considered EDs as the most important issue to address as compared to the other technical, legal and ethical issues facing AVs. As such, EDs need to be addressed to ensure robustness in the design of AVs and to assure consumers of the safety of this promising technology. Some preliminary evidence is provided about interventions to resolve the social dilemma in EDs and about the ethical preferences of prospective early adopters of AVs. (shrink)

: We argue that healthy people should be allowed to sell one of their kidneys while they are alive—that the current prohibition on payment for kidneys ought to be overturned. Our argument has three parts. First, we argue that the moral basis for the current policy on live kidney donations and on the sale of other kinds of tissue implies that we ought to legalize the sale of kidneys. Second, we address the objection that the sale of kidneys is intrinsically (...) wrong because it violates the Kantian duty of respect for humanity. Third, we address a range of consequentialist objections based on the idea that kidney sales will be exploitative. Throughout the paper, we argue only that it ought to be legal for an individual to receive payment for a kidney. We do not argue that it ought to be legal for an individual to buy a kidney. (shrink)

Existing research has shown that norm violations influence causal judgments, and a number of different models have been developed to explain these effects. One such model, the necessity/sufficiency model, predicts an interac- tion pattern in people’s judgments. Specifically, it predicts that when people are judging the degree to which a particular factor is a cause, there should be an interaction between (a) the degree to which that factor violates a norm and (b) the degree to which another factor in the (...) situation violates norms. A study of moral norms (N = 1000) and norms of proper functioning (N = 3000) revealed robust evidence for the predicted interaction effect. The implications of these patterns for existing theories of causal judgments is discussed. (shrink)

Perhaps the gradualist position on abortion has re-emerged repeatedly because it corresponds to pastoral experienceAt one level David Albert Jones’s paper is very successful. Despite the high reputation of the late Gordon Dunstan, first as a mediaeval historian, then as an ethicist of considerable influence within the Anglican church, and finally as a pioneer medical ethicist, his crucial 1984 article appears to be overdrawn. Some caution is now needed before endorsing his claim that the Christian tradition according the embryo the (...) full moral status of a human person from conception is “virtually a creation of the later nineteenth century”. Dr Jones produces a wealth of historical scholarship to challenge it.At another level, however, Dr Jones is not concerned about nuancing a historical claim but about demonstrating that “licensing destructive research on human embryos for the sake of medical progress…cannot be justified…on the basis of the Christian tradition”.1 Unfortunately there is quite a large gap between these two claims. Manifestly “the Christian tradition” is not a unified tradition even within Jones’s own historical account. He admits himself that the Roman Catholic tradition diverged at times from what he clearly regards as the norm . And he is less than frank in admitting that many Reformed Christians …. (shrink)

One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists — such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and John Balguy — held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists — such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume — held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In addition to arguments, the rationalists and sentimentalists developed rich analogies. The (...) most significant analogy the rationalists developed was between morality and mathematics. The most significant analogy the sentimentalists developed was between morality and beauty. These two analogies illustrate well the main ideas, underlying insights, and accounts of moral phenomenology the two positions have to offer. An examination of the two analogies will thus serve as a useful introduction to the debate between moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism as a whole. (shrink)

The Gendered Cyborg brings together material from a variety of disciplines that analyze the relationship between gender and technoscience, and the way that this relationship is represented through ideas, language and visual imagery. The book opens with key feminist articles from the history and philosophy of science. They look at the ways that modern scientific thinking has constructed oppositional dualities such as objectivity/subjectivity, human/machine, nature/science, and male/female, and how these have constrained who can engage in science/technology and how they have (...) limited our ideas of the possibilities for both humanity and science. Later sections contain readings that present key feminist theories about representation to examine how gender and technoscience are represented in areas of particular contemporary interest: the new human reproductive technologies, science fiction, film and the Internet. The readings constantly ask "Is this for women, for human beings?" Contributors: Alison Adam, Anne Balsamo, Lynda K. Bundtzen, Barbara Creed, Mary Ann Doane, Dion Farquhar, Jennifer González, Evelynn M. Hammonds, Donna Haraway, Fiona Hovenden, Luce Irigaray, Linda Janes, Gill Kirkup, Nina Lykke, Sadie Plant, Rosalind Pollack Perchesky, Londa Schiebinger, Vivian Sobchack, Deborah Lynn Steinberg, Nancy Leys Stepan, Nina Wakeford, Kathryn Woodward. (shrink)

This paper presents a poststructuralist, postcolonial and feminist interrogation of the ‘Girl Effect’. First coined by Nike inc, the ‘Girl Effect’ has become a key development discourse taken up by a wide range of governmental organisations, charities and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). At its heart is the idea that ‘girl power’ is the best way to lift the developing world out of poverty. As well as a policy discourse, the Girl Effect entails an address to Western girls. Through a range of (...) online and offline publicity campaigns, Western girls are invited to take up the cause of girls in the developing world and to lend their support through their use of social media, through fundraising and consumption. Drawing on a wide range of policy documents, media outputs and offline events, this paper explores the way in which the Girl Effect discourse articulates notions of girlhood, empowerment, development and the Global North/south divide. (shrink)

Jerry H. Gill provides a fresh angle of interpretation for the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein by exploring his use of metaphor, as well as the implications of this use for new insights into his view of language in particular and philosophy in general. The first part of the work catalogs the major metaphors in the Tractatus, the Philosophical Investigations, and On Certainty. The second part explores what these metaphors mean in the context of a broader interpretation of Wittgenstein—an approach (...) that has not been developed by other interpreters. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Hägel’s book is timely. As economic inequality has been on the rise, the increasing number of billionaires and their political activities have come under public scrutiny. The book contributes to such scrutiny and allows to ask questions about responsibility, accountability, and legitimacy. It also adds to scholarship on individuals in world politics. Our comment provides a critical discussion of two specific aspects of Hägel’s analysis. First, we clarify that most of the book focuses on billionaires as transnational actors while (...) few billionaires seem to exert influence on broader structures or processes of global governance. This clarification helps to understand the character of billionaires’ activities in world politics. Second, we reverse the perspective from which Hägel looks at billionaires. We point out that, while Hägel tends to look over the shoulders of the billionaires and mainly observes how they exercise influence in world politics, we argue that the other actors matter, too. More specifically, we maintain that billionaires’ roles in global governance are shaped through their specific recognition by international society (state actors) and/or by world society (non-state actors). This change in perspective sheds additional light on the conditions that affect the role(s) billionaires can play in world politics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.4 (2000) 529-548 [Access article in PDF] Shaftesbury's Two Accounts of the Reason to be Virtuous Michael B. Gill College of Charleston 1. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), was the founder of the moral sense school, or the first British philosopher to develop the position that moral distinctions originate in sentiment and not in reason alone. Shaftesbury thus (...) struck the initial blow in the battle waged by sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume against rationalists such as Cudworth and Clarke.Such is a common view of Shaftesbury's place in the history of moral philosophy.1 But while this common view is accurate in a very general sense, it also oversimplifies in a manner that threatens to misrepresent the development of modern ethical theory and obscure what is most interesting about Shaftesbury.2 The view suggests, in particular, that the most important distinction in early modern British moral philosophy was between sentimentalism and rationalism. There was, however, a distinction ontologically deeper than [End Page 529] that, which explains how Shaftesbury, even while developing his moral sense theory, could at times be much closer to his rationalist predecessors Cudworth and Clarke than to his sentimentalist followers Hutcheson and Hume.In this paper I will elucidate this deeper ontological distinction by examining two different accounts that Shaftesbury gives of the reason to be virtuous. Both of Shaftesbury's accounts are in a sense sentimentalist, but only the second of them constitutes a sharp break from his rationalist predecessors. Shaftesbury himself does not seem fully aware of the radical implications of his second account, but the implications are there nonetheless. And by exposing them we will gain a view not only of a crucial ambiguity in Shaftesbury's thought but also of a central faultline in the history of British moral philosophy. We will also come to see that while Shaftesbury does pave the way for a new ontology of morals, he does so more by accident than by design.3 2. Shaftesbury believes that to be virtuous is to have a benevolent character or a deep non-derivative commitment to promote the "publick Interest."4 He also believes that a person who has a benevolent character will always be happier than a person who does not, and that this constitutes a sufficient reason for each of us to "embrace" virtue (Inquiry 48).5 But of course some will deny that the benevolent person is always happiest and so Shaftesbury sets out to prove that there exists between benevolence and happiness a natural and necessary connection.How does Shaftesbury establish the connection between benevolence and happiness? In two different ways.6 The first way of establishing the connection [End Page 530] can be called the teleological account, and the second way can be called the mental enjoyment account. Let us first examine the teleological account.The initial claim of Shaftesbury's teleological account of the reason to embrace virtue is that benevolence is what is most natural for humans, or their proper end or telos.7 As he puts it just after explaining "whatVirtueis," It has been already shewn, that in the Passions and Affections of particular Creatures, there is a constant relation to the Interest of a Species, or common Nature. This has been demonstrated in the case of natural Affection, parental Kindness, Zeal for Posterity, Concern for the Propagation and Nurture of the Young, Love of Fellowship and Company, Compassion, mutual Succour, and the rest of this kind. Nor will any-one deny that this Affection of a Creature towards the Good of the Species or common Nature, is as proper and natural to him, as it is to any Organ, Part or Member of an Animal-Body, or mere Vegetable, to work in its known Course, and regular way of Growth. 'Tis not more natural for the Stomach to digest, the Lungs to breathe, the Glands to separate juices, or other Intrails to perform their several Offices; however they may by particular Impediments... (shrink)

In man-machine communication, there is a relationship between what may be described as tacit (human) and explicit (machine) knowledge. The tacit lies in practice and the explicit in the formulation of the processes and content of this practice. However, when a human communicates with another human face to face, we may describe them as communicating aspects of the tacit and explicit dimension of their knowledge, i.e. the expression and its background of meaning for the particular situation. When this is unsuccessful (...) in being communicated, some mediator (not necessarily a third person) is needed to provide the bridge for the particular discrepant aspects of the tacit and explicit dimensions to meet. This is achieved by making the tacit nature of the discrepancy in the communication explicit to both participants such that they both understand the background to their discrepancy. Once they become aware, it is possible for them to begin to resolve it. (shrink)

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