Here Julie Landsman chronicles one year as a teacher in a program for students in such serious trouble they are asked to leave their middle schools and attend a special program for disruptive students. She allows her readers to get to know the students, their home and street situations, and how their stories develop over the year, and in doing so, shows the complexity of young people, their beauty, and their individuality.

The introduction provides an overview of the ontological and the methodological individualism-holism debates. Moreover, these debates are briefly discussed in relation to two kindred disputes: The micro-macro and the agency-structure debates. Finally, the contributions to this book are briefly presented.

An article in The Chronicle of Higher Education of June 30, 1993, reported, “Two decades after it began redefining debates” in many other disciplines, “feminist thinking seems suddenly to have arrived in economics.” Many economists, of course, did not happen to be in the station when this train arrived, belated as it might be. Many who might have heard rumor of its coming have not yet learned just what arguments are involved or what it promises for the refinement of the (...) profession. The purpose of this essay is to provide a low-cost way of gaining some familiarity. (shrink)

A virtue account is focused on the character of those who argue. It is frequently assumed, however, that virtues are not action guiding, since they describe how to be and so fail to give us specific actions to take in a sticky situation. In terms of argumentation, we might say that being a charitable arguer is virtuous, but knowing so provides no details about how to argue successfully. To close this gap, I develop a parallel with the thick-thin distinction from (...) ethics and use Hursthouse’s notion of “v-rules”. I also draw heavily from the work in argumentation by Daniel Cohen to develop Wayne Brockriede’s notion of arguing lovingly. But “argue lovingly” has a delicious ambiguity. For Brockriede it describes how we engage with others arguers. It can also mean, however, a loving attachment to knowledge, understanding, and truth. Applying the thick-thin distinction to argumentation in general and loving argumentation in particular shows that a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation is valuable for two reasons: it can provide one articulation of what it means to be a virtuous arguer and provide some insights into how to become one. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to determine how Locke understands suspension and the role it plays in his view of human liberty. To this end I, 1) discuss the deficiencies of the first edition version of ‘Of Power’ and why Locke needed to include the ability to suspend in the second edition, then 2) analyze Locke’s definitions of the power to suspend with a focus on his use of the terms ‘source’, ‘hinge’, and ‘inlet’ to describe the power. I (...) determine from these descriptions that the ability to suspend is a passive power and is a necessary condition for the rational deliberation that Locke takes to be necessary for acting as a free agent. In 3) I connect Locke’s view of the power to suspend to his discussion in the sections that precede ‘Of Power.’ I argue that the kind of judgment that Locke endorses in his discussion of the Molyneux problem is also at work in acts of suspension. In 4) I apply my interpretation to Locke’s description of the connection between the power to suspend and liberty. In 5) I conclude with a discussion of a passage from the fifth edition of the Essay. Locke adds this passage to address worries raised by Limborch over the course of their correspondence. According to Chappell, it lends evidence to the view that Locke takes suspensions to be caused by undetermined volitions. (shrink)

When we consider early modern philosophers who engage with sceptical arguments, Nicolas Malebranche is not usually among the first names to come to mind. But, while Malebranche does not spend much time with this topic, the way in which he responds to it when he does is nevertheless valuable. This is because his response underlines the central role of a particular principle in his system: the utter dependence of all created things on God. In this paper, I argue that the (...) end of Malebranche’s engagement with scepticism in general is to show that it is a position, like atheism, that is only possible if one has a disordered imagination. And, importantly, one feature of a disordered imagination is the questioning or denial of what Malebranche takes to be a foundational principle of human knowledge: that we, and all other finite things, utterly depend on God for everything. (shrink)

Recent debates about inequality have focused almost exclusively on the distribution of wealth and disparities in income, but little notice has been paid to the distribution of free time. Free time is commonly assumed to be a matter of personal preference, a good that one chooses to have more or less of. Even if there is unequal access to free time, the cause and solution are presumed to lie with the resources of income and wealth. In Free Time, Julie (...) Rose argues that these views are fundamentally mistaken. First, Rose contends that free time is a resource, like money, that one needs in order to pursue chosen ends. Further, realizing a just distribution of income and wealth is not sufficient to ensure a fair distribution of free time. Because of this, anyone concerned with distributive justice must attend to the distribution of free time. On the basis of widely held liberal principles, Rose explains why citizens are entitled to free time—time not committed to meeting life's necessities and instead available for chosen pursuits. The novel argument that the just society must guarantee all citizens their fair share of free time provides principled grounds to address critical policy choices, including work hours regulations, Sunday closing laws, public support for caregiving, and the pursuit of economic growth. Delving into an original topic that touches everyone, Free Time demonstrates why all citizens have, in the words of early labor reformers, a right to "hours for what we will.". (shrink)

Richesse et complexité d’une pensée intégrative mais non réductionniste Dans l’introduction de cet ouvrage, Marie Gaille met en lumière la dimension plurielle du parcours de Cabanis, « formé à la médecine et engagé dans l’histoire politique de son temps, […] auteur d’une réflexion sur les institutions de soin, les prisons et les hôpitaux autant que d’écrits épistémologiques et relatifs à l’enseignement de la médecine ». Cette pluralité d’approches, de thématiques de réflexion et de domaines d...

In this chapter, I make three main points. First, I argue that, on Locke’s view, the power of human freedom is good because it allows us to be determined by the goods we have chosen for ourselves. Under ideal conditions, this power allows intellectual beings to attain happiness. There is, however, ample evidence that many intellectual beings are unhappy. This observation leads me to my second point. For Locke, bad choices are no less freely made than good ones. This is (...) because bad decisions come from bad judgments about the intrinsic value of things, not from weakness of will. I next pose the question of how Locke understands the mechanism of our evaluation of the intrinsic value of things. I advance my third point by noting that while Locke thinks that many of our inclinations are engrained in childhood, it is possible for even the most inveterate sinners to change the way they perceive value, thereby changing their behavior. (shrink)

This article discusses what is involved in having full moral status, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status and surveys different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.

Acknowledgments THROUGHOUT this book I cite the many people who have provided information on individual programs and activities. ...

This paper contributes to a special issue on methodology in the history of philosophy. I consider contemporary contextualism and reflect on prospects for an increasingly pluralistic, global, and decolonial historical scholarly practice.

This article analyses Mad Men’s relationship to creativity. Considering popular, industry-specific and scholarly understandings, it uses close readings of the show and its narratological techniques to demonstrate how these potentially contradictory concepts and practices of creativity overlap in the show’s fourth season. The points at which these understandings collide become sources of tension between characters and are marked by narrative gaps that conceal deceptive creativity. The conflicts centre on three primary debates: a) the role of alcohol in the creative process, (...) b) industry-specific norms of creativity, and c) the popular perception that creativity is about expression. Consequently, this article approaches questions about creativity using the show’s own partially elided debates and undermines widely-held romantic beliefs about the creative ‘type’ and the what exactly it means to sell creativity in a corporate setting. (shrink)

The introduction provides an overview of the ontological and the methodological individualism-holism debates. Moreover, these debates are briefly discussed in relation to two kindred disputes: The micro-macro and the agency-structure debates. Finally, the contributions to this book are briefly presented.

The importance of voice and myth of the 'voiceless' -- Community pespective, experience and voice -- Glebelands Hostel, Durban -- Xolobeni, Eastern Cape -- Thembelihle community, Johannesburg -- Dominant media telling and elite communication -- The polical economy of dominant power and storytelling -- media diversity and voices(s) -- Rethinking media freedom, revamping media ethics -- Planting the seeds of change.

In “Redescription, Reduction, and Emergence: A Response to Tobias Hansson Wahlberg,” Elder-Vass takes the opportunity to reply to my criticism of his theory in “Holism, Emergence, and the Crucial Distinction.” In this response, I show how methodological individualists may respond to his argument against their position and I argue that Elder-Vass fails to provide reasons as to why his particular distinction between individualist and holist explanations should be adopted.

This chapter analyses Malebranche’s theory that the human, finite mind participates in two separate and, at least prima facie, incompatible unions: one with the body to which it is joined and one with God. By looking at the way that Malebranche borrows from both the mechanical philosophy as articulated by Descartes and Augustine’s dictum that we are not “lights unto” ourselves, the unique, difficult, and at times problematic Malebranchean philosophy of mind is revealed. This discussion is divided into two main (...) parts. First, it situates Malebranche’s view of the nature of mind in relation to Descartes’ and Augustine’s views by way of discussion of the roles of intellect and will, the intelligibility of mind, and the manner in which the mind is involved in sensation, imagining, and passionate responses. These are the operations that depend on the mind’s relationship to its body. Second, the chapter moves to explore Malebranche’s view of the operations of the mind as united to God: ideation, which involves a discussion of Malebranche’s famous doctrine of the Vision of All Things in God, and pure understanding. In this second part, attention is paid to Malebranche’s disputes with Antoine Arnauld, Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and Dortous de Mairan over the central philosophical principle that underwrites the Malebranchean view of ideas: intelligible extension. While intelligible extension is the legitimate object of critique, it is suggested here that Malebranche, by relying on faith, can answer his critics. The chapter concludes by articulating the manner in which that Malebranche sees the relationship between the two unions of the mind, with body and with God, in his science of man. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in this process, to defend Pierre Bourdieu’s ability theory against Stephen Turner’s objections. In part I, I outline ability theorists’ conception of practices together with their objections to claims about rule following and rule explanations. In part II, I turn to the question of what ability theorists take to be the alternative to rule following and rule explanations. Ability theorists have offered, and been ascribed, (...) somewhat different answers to this question, just as their replies, or positive accounts, have been heavily criticized by Turner. Due to this state of the debate, I focus on the positive account advanced by a single—and highly famous—ability theorist of practice, Pierre Bourdieu. Moreover, I show that despite Turner’s claims to the contrary, his arguments do not refute Bourdieu’s positive account. (shrink)

La defense d'un profond humanisme dont les racines puisent dans la Renaissance ainsi que le souci permanent d'une pedagogie exemplaire ont guide Genevieve Giudicelli-Delage durant toute sa carriere. Professeur emerite de l'Universite Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, ou elle a notamment dirige pendant de nombreuses annees le DEA devenu Master II de droit penal et politique criminelle en Europe, redactrice en chef de la Revue de science criminelle et de droit penal compare pour les editions Dalloz, presidente de l'Association de recherches penales (...) europeennes (ARPE), directrice de l'Ecole du Centre Ouest des avocats a Poitiers, Genevieve Giudicelli-Delage n'a cesse d'oeuvrer pour un depassement des frontieres disciplinaires et geographiques dans l'approche du phenomene criminel, ce dont temoignent en particulier son engagement en faveur du developpement du droit compare et son attachement a repousser les lignes d'horizons juridiques. Son regard sur le droit penal a profondement marque des generations d'etudiants et de doctorants. Par ses recherches individuelles, comme par les recherches collectives qu'elle mene admirablement, elle a egalement contribue au rayonnement doctrinal du droit penal en general, et de certaines de ses disciplines telles que le droit penal des affaires, le droit international penal, le droit penal europeen ou la procedure penale. C'est donc au chercheur comme au pedagogue que nous avons souhaite rendre hommage par ces Melanges regroupant une soixantaine d'auteurs, anciens eleves/collegues/amis, universitaires et/ou praticiens reunis autour du theme Humanisme et justice, que le Professeur Giudicelli-Delage a, par un soin constant, nourri et questionne durant toutes ses annees d'exercice. (shrink)