In France, establishments and services of assistance through work (ESAT) are medico-social establishments in which disabled workers -supervised by employees and accompanied by medico-social and educational support- carry out activities of a professional nature aimed at economic production. Echoing their normal functioning, the options chosen in ESAT in response to the upheaval caused by the health crisis of March 2020 and its subsequent generalized lockdown showed contrasting realities. Relying on various understanding of what the notion of disability covers, arguments developed (...) by supervisors led to opposite solutions: total closure, operation with employees only or with disabled workers. Which disability constitutes a strict contraindication to work or an argument for continuity or resumption of their activities. In addition, the new organization of workshops, under health constraints, was an opportunity to look at some working conditions. The view taken of the skills of disabled workers in this context and the enhancement of their activities through the award of a bonus have showed that some ESAT reconsidered the importance of their contribution to the production carried out. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction Juliette Kennedy and Roman Kossak; 2. Historical remarks on Suslin's problem Akihiro Kanamori; 3. The continuum hypothesis, the generic-multiverse of sets, and the [OMEGA] conjecture W. Hugh Woodin; 4. [omega]-Models of finite set theory Ali Enayat, James H. Schmerl and Albert Visser; 5. Tennenbaum's theorem for models of arithmetic Richard Kaye; 6. Hierarchies of subsystems of weak arithmetic Shahram Mohsenipour; 7. Diophantine correct open induction Sidney Raffer; 8. Tennenbaum's theorem and recursive reducts James (...) H. Schmerl; 9. History of constructivism in the 20th century A. S. Troelstra; 10. A very short history of ultrafinitism Rose M. Cherubin and Mirco A. Mannucci; 11. Sue Toledo's notes of her conversations with Gödel in 1972-1975 Sue Toledo; 12. Stanley Tennenbaum's Socrates Curtis Franks; 13. Tennenbaum's proof of the irrationality of [the square root of] 2́. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Anabases. Traditions et réceptions de l'Antiquité, n° 20, 2014. Nous remercions Pascal Payen, la revue Anabases et Juliette Lormier de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : Cet article propose d'analyser deux entreprises de traduction en hexamètres français : celle des Travaux et des Jours d'Hésiode par Jean-Antoine de Baïf dans ses Étrénes de poézie fransoeze an vers mezurés, et celle de l'Iliade d'Homère par Philippe Brunet. Il s'agit de resituer ces (...) - Poétique et Études littéraires – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Juliette Roussin | : Cet article a pour objet d’interroger la tendance actuelle des démocraties à s’entourer d’institutions indépendantes au fort degré de compétence en vue de limiter et de corriger les défaillances éventuelles des corps démocratiques élus et représentatifs. La légitimité démocratique de ces institutions contre-majoritaires leur viendrait, selon certains théoriciens de la démocratie, de ce qu’elles offrent la possibilité de contester les décisions collectives lorsque celles-ci sont mauvaises ou injustes, contribuant ainsi à l’amélioration globale des performances du (...) régime démocratique. À partir notamment d’une lecture des travaux de Philip Pettit sur la démocratie contestataire et d’une réflexion sur l’approche épistémique défendue par David Estlund, nous questionnons au contraire le caractère démocratique de ces formes institutionnelles de contestation et montrons que, tant qu’elles ne font pas l’objet d’un contrôle démocratique plus étroit, elles peuvent être interprétées comme des modes de contestation de la démocratie plutôt que comme des instruments de son amélioration. | : This paper investigates a current tendency among democracies to appeal to highly competent independent institutions in order to constrain and amend the potential deficiencies of elected and representative democratic bodies. According to some democratic theorists, these counter-majoritarian institutions enjoy democratic legitimacy because they allow the contestation of ill-devised or unjust collective decisions, and hence contribute to the global improvement of democratic results. Based on a reading of Philip Pettit’s work on contestatory democracy and of David Estlund’s epistemic approach, the paper questions the democratic nature of these institutional forms of contestation and shows that, as long as they are not subjected to tighter democratic control, these institutions can be interpreted as ways of contesting democracy rather than as implements for its improvement. (shrink)

What is epistemically required of the rationally hopeful? In this paper, I propose that, as a subject becomes hopeful that p, she also adopts an inquiring attitude toward the question of whether p. Moreover, remaining rationally hopeful requires maintaining an inquiring attitude toward those possibilities we are hopeful about. On top of being led by a particular practical goal (that of attaining p), I suggest that the hopeful agent is also led by the epistemic goal of knowing whether p. Adding (...) the “inquiry” criteria to rational hopefulness helps explain our intuition that there is something wrong with being hopeful that p and not disposed to inquire into whether p. It also helps us further distinguish hopefulness from other positive attitudes we adopt in the face of uncertainty, such as optimism, and faith. (shrink)

Precise spatiotemporal control of gene expression during normal development and cell differentiation is achieved by the combined action of proximal (promoters) and distal (enhancers) cis‐regulatory elements. Recent studies have reported that a subset of promoters, termed Epromoters, works also as enhancers to regulate distal genes. This new paradigm opened novel questions regarding the complexity of our genome and raises the possibility that genetic variation within Epromoters has pleiotropic effects on various physiological and pathological traits by differentially impacting multiple proximal and (...) distal genes. Here, we discuss the different observations pointing to an important role of Epromoters in the regulatory landscape and summarize the evidence supporting a pleiotropic impact of these elements in disease. We further hypothesize that Epromoter might represent a major contributor to phenotypic variation and disease. (shrink)

Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...) the practical factors relevant to the task at hand, by sig- naling the need for increased cognitive processing and evidence gathering in high- stakes situations. I hypothesize that dysfunctional or ill-calibrated epistemic anxiety might play an important role in the motivation driving persons with obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) to invest high amounts of cognitive resources into the resolution of apparently simple and innocuous questions. As I argue, OCD might be conceived as a case in which epistemic anxiety is inappropriately elicited, represent- ing these as high-stakes questions, and inadequately signaling a need for cognition. In this paper, I thus make use of the concept of (epistemic) anxiety as developed in the philosophy of emotion and in epistemology, to propose an account of the role of anxiety in the pathological doubt that is central to obsessive-compulsive disorder. (shrink)

Is mathematics 'entangled' with its various formalisations? Or are the central concepts of mathematics largely insensitive to formalisation, or 'formalism free'? What is the semantic point of view and how is it implemented in foundational practice? Does a given semantic framework always have an implicit syntax? Inspired by what she calls the 'natural language moves' of Gödel and Tarski, Juliette Kennedy considers what roles the concepts of 'entanglement' and 'formalism freeness' play in a range of logical settings, from computability (...) and set theory to model theory and second order logic, to logicality, developing an entirely original philosophy of mathematics along the way. The treatment is historically, logically and set-theoretically rich, and topics such as naturalism and foundations receive their due, but now with a new twist. (shrink)

How does doubt come about? What are the mechanisms responsible for our inclinations to reassess propositions and collect further evidence to support or reject them? In this paper, I approach this question by focusing on what might be considered a distorting mirror of unreasonable doubt, namely the pathological doubt of patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals with OCD exhibit a form of persistent doubting, indecisiveness, and over-cautiousness at pathological levels (Rasmussen and Eisen in Psychiatr Clin 15(4):743–758, 1992; Reed in Obsessional (...) experience and compulsive behaviour: a cognitive-structural approach, Academic Press, Cambridge, 1985; Tolin et al. in Cogn Ther Res 27(6):657–669, 2003). I argue that the failure in OCD is of an affective nature, involving both excessive epistemic anxiety and hyperactive feelings of uncertainty. I further argue that our adaptive disposition to inquire about the right matters—that is, about propositions which are both epistemically risky and imply harmful possibilities—might depend on these affective mechanisms. (shrink)

Depuis les années 2009-2010, plusieurs revues de sciences sociales en langue française ont donné une visibilité à des enquêtes en cours articulant études sur le genre et la sexualité et sociologie du vieillissement et des parcours de vie. L’ouvrage collectif coordonné par Monique Legrand et Ingrid Voléry qui réunit des contributions de sociologues, et en nombre plus limité, de chercheuses et chercheurs en psychologie, sciences de l’information et de la communication et anthropologie, particip...

The educational design research movement asserts that the use of new tools or innovative devices is a powerful vector for the professional development of teachers, to the benefit of pupils' learning. It recommends that these tools be designed using a participatory approach that translates the knowledge gained from research into resources for action. The design-in-use approach shares the same presupposition. As part of our thesis work, we adopted this approach to co-design a teaching aid. With the help of a student (...) in training practice and engineering, we studied the effects of this participatory approach on the professional development of the sixteen co-designing teachers. This study enabled us to identify and categorize the professional contributions perceived by the practitioners. This work encouraged reflection on the "meta" processes used by teacher-designers to self-evaluate their professional development. (shrink)

In this article I examine the role of anxiety in our motivation to reassess our epistemic states, by taking as a starting point a proposal put forward by Levy, according to which anxiety is responsible for the ruminations and worries about threatening possibilities that we sometimes get caught up into in our everyday life. Levy’s claim is that these irrational persistent thoughts about possible states of affairs are best explained by anxiety, rather than by beliefs, degrees of belief, or other (...) mental states. I will take Levy’s article as a starting point into my study of the role of anxiety in our inclinations to question the epistemic quality of our cognitive states. While I believe that Levy is right in directing our attention to the role of anxiety in these cases, his claim calls for further explanation into the nature of anxiety, and into the mechanisms through which anxiety generates these doubts. Although the relation between anxiety and doubt has already been highlighted, there has been little effort to elaborate on the mechanisms through which an affective state like anxiety generates a motivation to reassess our beliefs. This paper is an attempt at providing such an elaboration. Clarifying the role of anxiety in these phenomena will lead me to revise a common assumption about the interactions between anxiety and higher-level cognitive processes, such as the ones involved in representing hypothetical threatening scenarios through mental imagery. (shrink)

For creatures like us, entertaining possible future scenarios of how our life might play out is often accompanied or “charged” with emotions like hope and anxiety. What will interest me in this article is whether the epistemic profile of hope and anxiety, and in particular the fact that they are directed at uncertain outcomes, might pose a threat to the stability of their valence. Hope and anxiety are not emotions which relate us to evaluative properties of actual events, they relate (...) us to evaluative properties of relevant possibilities (Gordon, 1969; Kurth, 2018; Benton, 2019). I will present and discuss two philosophical accounts according to which hope and anxiety do not have a proprietary and consistent valence. According to the first account, anxiety is an intrinsically ambivalent emotion, as a result of involving an awareness of conflicting possibilities or ways in which the future might unfold (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2015). According to the second, hope is not a strictly positive emotion, as certain specific occurrences of hope are negatively valenced (Stockdale, 2019). Finally, I argue that an evaluative theory of valence helps us clearly conceive of hope and anxiety as two polar opposite experiences of uncertainty. (shrink)

There has been a renewed interest in the role of hope for our ability to act rationally under uncertainty, where accounts have tended to focus on either one of two (apparently contradictory) aspects of this attitude. On the one hand, like faith, hope is viewed as an attitude which grants us resolve and determination to continue striving towards uncertain goals. On the other hand, like worry, hope is also viewed as a process in which we cognitively engage with possible futures, (...) motivated to reduce the epistemic uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of goal-relevant outcomes. I spell out how an emotional account of the psychological nature of hope is able to accommodate both of these claims, as well as classic challenges (such as cases of “recalcitrant hopes”). Within this framework, hope is both a positive emotion (it consistently evaluates its object as good) and also an “emotion of uncertainty” or epistemic emotion, through which we apprehend that a given goal-relevant outcome is possible, albeit uncertain. (shrink)

Rousseau avait tout lieu, dans la controverse qui oppose au xviii e siècle partisans et pourfendeurs des voyages d’éducation, de prendre position contre ces voyages, suivant en cela les déclarations de Béat de Muralt, qu’il approuvait dans une large mesure. Nous constatons pourtant qu’en abordant « la question des voyages », l’auteur de l’Émile se voit obligé, tout en condamnant cette « mode », à la manière de Muralt, d’opérer un glissement théorique et de conférer à l’expérience du voyage, comme (...) expérience critique de la pluralité et de la liberté, une place essentielle dans son système, place rendue nécessaire par sa théorie des affects politiques. (shrink)

This article analyses a recent discourse of responsibility that accompanies states’ foreign aid provision. States adopt this discourse of National Social Responsibility to show their complian...

The term social license is generally understood as an intangible representation of ongoing approval or acceptance of a project by affected communities, which can be withdrawn at any time, distinct from a legal or regulatory license granted by a government. This paper looks at the concept through the lens of the extractive sector in the developing world and explores the history of violations of land and human rights of indigenous and rural communities living around these resources. While corporate actors often (...) maintain that acquiring a social license is voluntary and different from obtaining consent, this paper suggests instead that the idea of a license that can be withdrawn represents an assertion of power by people whose land and human rights have been consistently violated, and a recognition of that power by the corporate sector. This article will explore the relationship between the need for a social license and institutional characteristics related to land rights; the FPIC and CSR constructs as respo.. (shrink)

Cet article analyse le risque de corruption que les arrêts Citizens United de 2010 et l’apparition des Super-PACs font peser sur le système électoral états-unien. Lors de la dernière campagne présidentielle, plus de 730 millions de dollars ont été investis dans des publicités électorales par de riches contributeurs et des entreprises privées regroupés en Super-PACs. Nous montrons que cet afflux d’argent consacré à des publicités politiques expose la démocratie américaine à trois formes de « corruption grise », en favorisant la (...) banalisation de pratiques contestables et en troublant la frontière entre ce qui est licite et ce qui ne l’est pas. (1) Déplafonné, le soutien financier aux candidats risque de s’apparenter à de la subornation; (2) certaines des techniques publicitaires employées semblent réduire l’exercice de conviction démocratique à une tentative de corruption de l’électeur; (3) enfin les immenses inégalités d’influence politique que ce système de financement induit participent de la corruption des affaires démocratiques en favorisant leur captation par un petit nombre d’individus fortunés. Nous mettons en évidence que le refus systématique de la Cour Suprême d’envisager ces phénomènes comme des vecteurs de corruption se fonde sur une conception discutable de la démocratie comme système de libre concurrence pour le pouvoir politique. Comprendre la démocratie à partir de son impératif d’égalité permet à l’inverse de rendre visible la corruption à laquelle son système de financement électoral expose la démocratie américaine. (shrink)

Checking is one of the most common compulsive actions performed by patients with Obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) (APA, 2013; Abramowitz, McKay, Taylor, 2008). Incessant checking is undeniably problematic from a practical point of view. But what is epistemically wrong with checking again (and again)? The starting assumption for this paper is that establishing what goes wrong when individuals check their stove ten times in a row requires understanding the nature of the doxastic attitude that compulsive re-checkers are in, as they (...) go back to perform another check. Does the re-checker know that the stove is off, and is thus looking for more of what she already has? Or is she an inquirer who repeatedly loses her knowledge and finds herself inquiring again and again into the same question? In this paper I present and discuss what I see as the three main hypotheses currently available on the market, and I suggest a refinement. (shrink)

PIERRE-YVES MONIN. — Que dit la chanson?JULIETTE. — La chanson ne dit rien. Et la chanson peut tout dire. Cela doit dépendre de la bouche qui la fredonne et l’invente. Elle reflète peut-être le monde, la société qui l’a vue naître. Elle reflète peut-être aussi la Vérité, la vraie, celle qui sort, toute nue, de son puits. Mais elle...

We ask, when is a property of a model a logical property? According to the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion this is the case when the property is preserved by isomorphisms. We relate this to model-theoretic characteristics of abstract logics in which the model class is definable. This results in a graded concept of logicality in the terminology of Sagi [46]. We investigate which characteristics of logics, such as variants of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, Completeness theorem, and absoluteness, are relevant from the logicality (...) point of view, continuing earlier work by Bonnay, Feferman, and Sagi. We suggest that a logic is the more logical the closer it is to first order logic. We also offer a refinement of the result of McGee that logical properties of models can be expressed in $L_{\infty \infty }$ if the expression is allowed to depend on the cardinality of the model, based on replacing $L_{\infty \infty }$ by a “tamer” logic. (shrink)

L'étude des formes, celle des thèmes figurés sur les vases grecs ne sont pas sépara ble· d'une connaissance aussi précise que possible des lieux et des conditions de trouvaille des documents considérés. On donnera ici l'exemple des cratères corinthiens dont l'iconographie aristocratique s'explique par le type de vie et l'idéologie funéraire des clients privilégiés de cette série de vases, les notables de Cerveteri.

Social context is generally thought toinfluence how humans act. Here we argue thathumans rarely accept the context as it isgiven, but rather undertake conscious actionsto make it favourable. The example chosen isfrom northern Cameroon, where nomad herdsmeninduce the sedentary farmers to trust them, bydifferent means: creation of interpersonallinks, exhibition of good behaviours byrespecting certain norms. Trust is consideredas an element of the context, necessary forthem to perform acts that present a certainrisk. An attempt was made to translate one ofthe traditional (...) behaviours into a model,implemented in an artificial society:autonomous agents would make gifts in order tocreate an image of themselves in a group. Inthe simulations, a form of reputationstratification appears in time. One notes thatan agent can build the image it wants only ifthe part of the population that wants to beinvolved in the same dynamic is big enough. Asa conclusion, we suggest that althoughindividuals try to create consciously a contextfor their living, this is not just anindividual choice, but needs a commonbackground of rules, a context enabling contextcreation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a dual conception of democratic legitimacy. According to this conception, political decisions and actions must have specific procedural and substantive features to be democratically legitimate. The aim of the paper is both to seek to specify the nature of these features, and to clarify how they can be articulated together. I show that the procedural and substantive components of democratic outcomes correspond to two sets of equally necessary, but not individually sufficient, conditions for democratic (...) legitimacy. I then proceed to argue that respect for procedural requirements should nevertheless be granted a certain priority in the evaluation of democratic legitimacy. (shrink)

Peut-on justifier l’emploi de procédures démocratiques de décision en invoquant le désaccord irrémédiable qui existe entre les citoyen·nes sur les questions sociales, de justice et de droit? Forgé par Rawls pour penser le statut des conceptions morales, philosophiques et religieuses dans une société libérale, le concept de « désaccord raisonnable » a été étendu par certain·es théoricien·nes de la démocratie, notamment Jeremy Waldron, pour englober toutes les questions politiques et juridiques. Cet article montre qu’une telle extension a des effets contre-productifs (...) pour la justification de la démocratie. D’une part, elle aboutit à relativiser l’importance de la décision démocratique. D’autre part, elle fait paradoxalement apparaître le mode de décision démocratique comme injustifié. (shrink)

Quelles sont les implications de la philosophie de Condorcet pour les théories épistémiques de la démocratie? Ces dernières réduisent souvent l’argument épistémique de Condorcet en faveur de la démocratie au théorème du jury. Or le philosophe montre que c’est seulement quand elle devient le vecteur de l’indépendance politique, économique et intellectuelle des citoyens que ses vertus épistémiques se font jour. En se concentrant sur les procédures de décision susceptibles de favoriser de bons résultats politiques, les approches contemporaines ne proposent qu’une (...) analyse partielle des embarras démocratiques, et se privent de bases pour un argument épistémique plausible en faveur de la démocratie. (shrink)

Cet article analyse la position réaliste de Lukács en ontologie sociale, à partir d’une comparaison avec la perspective ontologique de John Searle. Relevant de traditions théoriques que tout oppose, ces deux ontologies se rejoignent sur trois points : elles se proposent d’appréhender le social d’un point de vue ontologique ; l’enquête ontologique elle-même est conçue par les deux auteurs comme une enquête de type génétique ; et chacune de ces approches octroie une place décisive au langage dans la définition de (...) la réalité sociale. Ce dernier point détermine la différence entre le constructivisme de Searle et le réalisme de Lukács. Pour l’un, la réalité sociale suppose le langage, pour le second le langage suppose la réalité sociale, et plus précisément le travail. On évalue chacune de ces positions au regard de l’autre, pour faire apparaître les difficultés que peuvent faire émerger les approches génétiques du social. (shrink)