Lucian Blaga was the creator of a speculative and metaphoric philosophical system that placed mystery at its very core. Mystery, according to Blaga, veils existence and represents both a stimulus and a brake for human knowledge. His articulation of this view is strongly indebted to Kant, whose transcendental philosophy he sought to extend by critically examining the forms of sensibility and categories of the understanding, not so much in relation to consciousness, but as they are duplicated, or doubled, in the (...) unconscious. The result is Blaga's stylistic apriorism, according to which the unconscious always manages consciousness through abyssal categories in terms of which different regions and peoples at once reveal and remain isolated from mystery. (shrink)

In this paper, I will survey the “received view” of the interpretation of relativity theory in Natorp and Cassirer. Neo-Kantian and non-neo-Kantian scholars (such as Hentschel or Ferrari) usually distinguish Natorp’s reading from Cassirer’s by virtue of “immunising” and “revising” strategies. “Immunisation” consists of a strict defence of Kantian philosophy, while “revision” pertains to the modification of Kantianism depending on relativity theory. In this respect, I will suggest some arguments that will put things in perspective. In particular, (...) I will show that Natorp’s interpretation is justified considering the state of physical research in 1910. By the same token, I will highlight where Cassirer leverages immunising strategies. However, I will demonstrate that, in contrast to Natorp, the influence of general relativity (GR) is pivotal to Cassirer and it does have an impact on his whole epistemology (and philosophy), implying a highly radical reform of pure intuition in light of general covariance. I will also add that Cassirer may have a bearing on Einstein as to the possibility of reconsidering his former censure of Kantian philosophy. (shrink)

This article explores the practical approach to global justice advocated by the cosmopolitan political theorists Pogge, Beitz and Buchanan. Using a comparative exposition it outlines their reliance on international law and on human rights law in particular. The essay explores the neo-Kantian influence on the practical approach and offers an original critique of this trend in contemporary international political theory.

This volume presents a selection of Robert Stern's work on the theme of Kantian ethics. It begins by focusing on the relation between Kant's account of obligation and his view of autonomy, arguing that this leaves room for Kant to be a realist about value. Stern then considers where this places Kant in relation to the question of moral scepticism, and in relation to the principle of 'ought implies can', and examines this principle in its own right. The papers (...) then move beyond Kant himself to his wider influence and to critics of his work, and the volume concludes with a consideration of a broadly Kantian critique of divine command ethics offered by Stephen Darwall. General themes considered in this volume include value, perfectionism, agency, autonomy, moral motivation, moral scepticism, and obligation, as well as the historical place of Kant's ethics and its influence on thinkers up to the present day. (shrink)

The paper gives, in the first place, a performative reading of Frege's account of non-alethic modalities. Second, it asks the question whether there is an influence of Kant's writings on Frege's notion of assertive force. It is generally acknowledged that the Neo-Kantian tradition has been essential to Frege's development. The paper shows that it can also be fruitful to look at more direct influences of Kant himself, especially on the early Frege. The paper shows that Kant's notion of (...) assertoric modality must have been an inspiration for Frege to make the distinction between judgement, including the assertoric force, and judgeable content. Kant's logical I may also have played a role in Frege's account of judgement in terms of the judging agent, the first person. The conclusion of the paper, though, is that Frege is not a Kantian philosopher, as his idea of logic as providing a positive standard of objectivity is completely new. (shrink)

The rise of the mechanistic worldview in the seventeenth century had a major impact on views of biological generation. Many seventeenth century naturalists rejected the old animist thesis. However, the alternative view of gradual mechanistic formation in embryology didn’t convince either. How to articulate the peculiarity of life? Researchers in the seventeenth century proposed both “animist” and mechanistic theories of life. In the eighteenth century again a controversy in biology arose regarding the explanation of generation. Some adhered to the view (...) that life is a physical property of matter (e.g. Buffon), others saw living entities as the result of the development of pre-existing germs (e.g. Bonnet). Naturalists, lacked a convincing account that could guide their research. In interaction with leading naturalists of his time Immanuel Kant articulated an approach to explaining generation. Kant’s account, delineated in his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of the power of judgment) (1790), is a combination of Newtonian non-reductionist mechanism in explanation, and a concept of natural end comparable to Stahl’s formal conception of organic bodies. It consists of two claims: a) in biology only mechanical explanation is explanatory, and b) living entities contain some original organisation, which is mechanically unexplainable. In the nineteenth century this approach influenced naturalists as Müller, Virchow, and Von Baer, in their physiological research. Dissatisfied with a sheer mechanistic or, on the other hand, a sheer teleological approach, they appreciated the Kantian account of mechanical explanation of natural ends. In Germany, in the second halve of the nineteenth century, Ernst Haeckel reopened the debate about abiogenesis, which still continuous. (shrink)

In this volume, Karl Ameriks explores 'Kantian subjects' in three senses. In Part I, he first clarifies the most distinctive features-such as freedom and autonomy-of Kant's notion of what it is for us to be a subject. Other chapters then consider related 'subjects' that are basic topics in other parts of Kant's philosophy, such as his notions of necessity and history. Part II examines the ways in which many of us, as 'late modern,' have been highly influenced by Kant's (...) philosophy and its indirect effect on our self-conception through successive generations of post-Kantians, such as Hegel and Schelling, and early Romantic writers such as Hölderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis, thus making us 'Kantian subjects' in a new historical sense. By defending the fundamentals of Kant's ethics in reaction to some of the latest scholarship in the opening chapters, Ameriks offers an extensive argument that Hölderlin expresses a valuable philosophical position that is much closer to Kant than has generally been recognized. He also argues that it was necessary for Kant's position to be supplemented by the new conception, introduced by the post-Kantians, of philosophy as fundamentally historical, and that this conception has had a growing influence on the most interesting strands of Anglophone as well as Continental philosophy. -/- . (shrink)

Ethicists who have been influenced by Kant's critical moral philosophy are called ‘Kantian’. The term can also be extended to ethicists who grappled with and rejected Kant or the Kantian spirit. This chapter first discusses the core of Kant's ethics, those important theorems that provide a criterion for determining the extent to which a given ethics is indeed ‘Kantian’. It then considers the views of several Kantians, including Friedrich Schiller, Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm (...) Joseph Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche. (shrink)

Arthur Pap worked in analytic philosophy while maintaining a strong Kantian or neo-Kantian element throughout his career, stemming from his studying with Ernst Cassirer. I present these elements in the different periods of Pap’s works, showing him to be a consistent critic of logical empiricism, which Pap shows to be incapable of superseding the Kantian framework. Nevertheless, Pap’s work is definitely analytic philosophy, both in terms of the content and the style. According to Pap, the central topics (...) of analytic philosophy concern meaning, modality, and analysis. Pap was also influenced by pragmatism, especially in his dissertation, although he does not fully embrace it in either its classical or its Quinean form. (shrink)

Modern empiricism is usually thought to have emerged in opposition to the then dominant school of neo-Kantianism. True as this may be, it has blinded us to the fact that Kantian and more surprisingly even neo-Kantian elements of philosophy have also had a positive influence upon the development of the new empiricism. One episode in which this influence proves itself in fact dominant and which I will present in the following concerns the philosophical position which Popper (...) adopted vis-à-vis logical empiricism — as advocated by Wittgenstein and Schlick — in Vienna in the late twenties and early thirties of the last century. (shrink)

The paper gives, in the first place, a performative reading of Frege's account of non-alethic modalities. Second, it asks the question whether there is an influence of Kant's writings on Frege's notion of assertive force. It is generally acknowledged that the Neo-Kantian tradition has been essential to Frege's development. The paper shows that it can also be fruitful to look at more direct influences of Kant himself, especially on the early Frege. The paper shows that Kant's notion of (...) assertoric modality must have been an inspiration for Frege to make the distinction between judgement, including the assertoric force, and judgeable content. Kant's logical I may also have played a role in Frege's account of judgement in terms of the judging agent, the first person. The conclusion of the paper, though, is that Frege is not a Kantian philosopher, as his idea of logic as providing a positive standard of objectivity is completely new. (shrink)

Scholarship on German Idealism typically couches the systems of Idealism in terms of a rejection of or departure from Kant's critical philosophy. The few accounts that do look to the positive influence of Kant on the Idealists typically focus on the perceived need among the Idealists to revise Kant's system due to various shortcomings arising from his dualism. This volume seeks to reverse this norm. It does this by bringing together an original set of critical reflections on the ways (...) in which the German Idealists maintain specific and fundamental Kantian qualities in their own systems. At the same time, the aim of this volume is not a reduction of German Idealism to Kant's thought. Instead, this volume highlights a set of core ways in which the German Idealists retain specific, fundamentally Kantian principles and qualities. To that extent, this volume paves the way for new interpretations by laying the ground for identifying those significant components of German Idealism that can defensibly be called "Kantian.". (shrink)

Historians of philosophy, science, and mathematics explore the influence of Kant's philosophy on the evolution of modern scientific thought.

The article sets out to explore the international legal dimension in Jürgen Habermas' latest publications on philosophy of law. It is our view that Habermas deals with the examination of just relations beyond the nation-state first and foremost from a legal perspective, and that the key to a Habermasian reading of international justice is not through an application of discourse-theoretical models of communicative or moral action as such, but primarily through proper legal institutionalisation of the rule of law. In asserting (...) this view, we will look closer at the Kantian influence in Habermas' legal construct at the international level, and show why this institutional approach is to be sharply distinguished from and preferred to any exclusively non-institutional approach to international justice. (shrink)

While the idea that philosophy requires self-transformation is historically pervasive, it exerts considerable influence on the post-Kantians who first aim to systematize Kant’s idealism by grounding it on a first principle. In the 1790s, Fichte and Schelling offer competing accounts of the self-transformation that they regard as essential to positing a first principle. Their accounts raise two central questions. First, what makes this kind of self-transformation possible? Second, are there different possible expressions of philosophical self-transformation? In what follows, I (...) will articulate the Fichtean and Schellingian answers to these central questions. For Fichte, the one who summons me to posit a first principle makes possible my philosophical self-transformation, although the latter has an exclusively idealist expression in that I can only genuinely posit the I as first principle, which is to say that philosophical self-transformation depends on mutual recognition and vindicates precisely one philosophical system (Section 1). For Schelling, a brute act of will makes possible my philosophical self-transformation, although the latter has either an idealist or a realist expression in that I can genuinely posit either the I or the not-I as first principle, which is to say that philosophical self-transformation does not depend on mutual recognition and vindicates one of two possible philosophical systems (Section 2). Thus, whereas Fichtean self-transformation is recognitive and non-pluralistic, Schellingian self-transformation is pluralistic and non-recognitive. I conclude with a discussion of how Jacobi poses a challenge to Fichte’s and Schelling’s answers to the two central questions (Section 3). (shrink)

One of Heidegger’s main targets of criticism in History of the Concept of Time is Husserl’s theory of intentionality. This criticism, however, has roots in Heidegger’s earliest thinking over the course of his student years and pertains to what Ernst Tugendhat called the problem of encounter as such. In this article I present how the critical appropriation of Rickert’s and Lask’s ideas shaped a unique interpretation of the subject’s existence in the early stages of Heidegger’s career, contributing to the (dis)solution (...) of the encounter problem and anticipating an independent version of phenomenology more than a decade before the publication of Being and Time. These alternative sources of influence illuminate Heidegger’s own path, which is significantly different from Husserl’s from the very start. In particular, I show in the article how Heidegger’s critical appropriation of Neo-Kantian sources allows him already during the 1910s to see the derivative status of the theoretical subject-object dichotomy and to realize the need to investigate living subjectivity in its embeddedness in the world. (shrink)

This paper proposes a reading of Kelsen’s basic norm based on Kant’s regulative ideas. I begin by exposing Kant’s conception of the principles of reason. Then I criticize an interpretation of the basic norm along the same lines made by Stanley Paulson. Thirdly I analyze two theses from Hermann Cohen that influenced Kelsen greatly and reinforce my stance on the basic norm. Lastly, I explain how the Kelsenian tenet that the basic norm is the transcendental grounding of the normativity of (...) law can be comprehended based on the role the ideas of reason play in the systematization of knowledge. (shrink)

This research intends to show a Kantian influence in Transcendental Thomism, particularly in Rahner, Lonergan and Von Balthasar. What is meant by a Kantian influence is a certain attitude regarding the problem of the universals, an attitude which is radically different from St. Thomas’. In my previous work (The Radical Difference between Aquinas and Kant: Human Understanding and the Agent Intellect in Aquinas [Chillum: IVE Press, 2021], the radical difference between St. Thomas and Kant was shown. (...) In this present research, what is argued is that Rahner, Lonergan and Von Balthasar follow Kant, not St. Thomas, with regard to the analysis of human understanding. From each Transcendental Thomist author mentioned above, I have taken one sample text, one most significant work where each author’s epistemology can be explored. Thus, I have selected Rahner’s Spirit in the World, Lonergan’s Verbum articles and Von Balthasar’s Theologic I. (shrink)

Arthur Ripstein’s conception of Kantian freedom has exerted an enormous recent influence on scholars of Kant’s political philosophy; however, the conception seems to me flawed. In this paper, I argue that Ripstein’s conception of Kantian freedom as “your capacity to choose the ends you will use your means to pursue” – your “purposiveness” – is both too narrow and too broad: (1) Wrongful acts such as coercive threats cannot choose my ends for me; instead, such acts wrongfully (...) restrict my perceived options. And (2) rightful changes to the context in which I choose that render my means insufficient for my ends restrict my capacity to choose them. Alternatively, my purposiveness reduces to my entitlements; but then freedom as purposiveness is viciously circular or fails as a new approach to the “devastating” objection that motivates it. (shrink)

In this paper, I reject Frierson’s interpretation of Kantian reductionist phenomenology. I diagnose his failure to articulate a more robust notion of phenomenology in Kant as traceable to a misguided effort to protect pure reason from the undue influence of sensibility. But in fact Kant himself relies regularly on a phenomenological and felt first personal perspective in his practical philosophy. Once we think more broadly about what Frierson calls “the space of reasons,” we must admit a robust role (...) for attentive reflection upon felt, phenomenological experience at the center of Kantian practical deliberation. (shrink)

Hermann Lotze was a key figure in the philosophy of the second half of the 19th century, influencing practically all leading philosophical schools of the late 19th and the early 20th century: (i) the neo-Kantians; (ii) Brentano and his school of descriptive psychology; (iii) the British idealists; (iv) Husserl’s phenomenology; (v) Dilthey’s philosophy of life; (vi) Frege’s new logic; (vii) the early Cambridge analytic philosophy; (viii) William James’s pragmatism. The book first presents the main ideas of Hermann Lotze’s philosophy (Part (...) I), and then traces his influence on the descriptive psychology of Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf (Part 2) and Cambridge analytic philosophy (Part 3). In addition, the book includes Bertrand Russell’s conspectus of J. E. McTaggart’s 1898 lectures on Lotze. (shrink)

John Rawls's account of Kantian constructivism is perhaps his most striking contribution to ethics. In this paper, I examine the relation between Rawls's constructivism and its foundation in Kantian intuitions. In particular, I focus on the progressive influence on Rawls's approach of the Kantian intuition that the substance of morality is best understood as constructed by free and equal people under fair conditions. Rawls's focus on this Kantian intuition, I argue, motivates the focus on social (...) contract that grounds both his accounts of the original position and of reflective equilibrium. Critics, including Onora O'Neill and Larry Krasnoff, object that Rawls's view distorts various aspects of Kantian moral reasoning. I argue that these objections (i) exaggerate the distinctions between Kant's and Rawls's decision procedures and (ii) reflect an unnecessarily constricted view of Kant's moral thought. (shrink)

Recent perspectival interpretations of Kant suggest a way of relating his epistemology to empirical science that makes it plausible to regard Einstein’stheory of relativity as having a Kantian grounding. This first of two articles exploring this topic focuses on how the foregoing hypothesis accounts for variousresonances between Kant’s philosophy and Einstein’s science. The great attention young Einstein paid to Kant in his early intellectual development demonstrates the plausibility of this hypothesis, while certain features of Einstein’s cultural-political context account for (...) his reluctance to acknowledge Kant’s influence, even though contemporary philosophers who regarded themselves as Kantians urged him to do so. The sequel argues that this Kantian grounding probably had a formative influence not only on Einstein’s discovery of the theory of relativity and his view of the nature of science, but also on his quasi-mystical, religious disposition. (shrink)

In this paper, I have argued that whatever might be said about his attack on other German philosophers, Santayana’s attack on Kant, despite its subtlety, its force and its intelligence, is fundamentally misguided. Teasing out where Santayana’s attack rests on misunderstandings of Kant’s philosophy is a useful exercise: it is useful for Kantians, for it gives us a chance to show Kant at his best; it is useful for Santayana scholars, for it reminds us that Santayana, for all his brilliance, (...) was not infallible; and it is useful more generally, for the mistakes Santayana makes about Kant are, perhaps in part because of Santayana’s well-deservedly wide influence, still prevalent today. (shrink)

The ‘Platonic Ideas’ in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics are appearances. On the other hand, as the immediate objecthood of the will, they are the essences of species and the only object of true aesthetic cognition, which leads beyond mere appearance. To explain this apparent incongruence, I offer an analysis of Schopenhauer’s early metaphysics, and its transformation into the metaphysics of will, fleshing out the several and divergent concepts of ‘idea’. Specifically, first, as part of his religious and neo-Platonic early philosophy; second, in (...) the context of his ‘true criticism’ in the spirit of Kantian transcendental philosophy; third, as identical to the thing in itself as part of the metaphysics of will, heavily influenced by Kant’s notion of ideas from CR and CJ. Explaining Schopenhauer’s mature notion of Platonic Ideas genetically as a set of homonymic notions helps us better explain its divergent meanings in WWR. (shrink)

This paper re-contextualises Popper within a Kantian tradition by examining his interaction with the Vienna Circle. The complexity of Popper's relationship to the Vienna Circle is often a point of confusion as some view him as a member of the Vienna Circle while others minimise his association with this group. This paper argues that Popper was not a member of the Vienna Circle or a positivist but shared many neo-Kantian philosophical tendencies with the members of the Circle as (...) well as many of their philosophical problems and interests. By better understanding the influence of the Circle's members upon Popper, we not only remove the myths surrounding Popper's positivism, but also place the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle within its proper philosophical context. This paper further argues that it was Popper's friend during his formative philosophical years in Vienna, Julius Kraft (1921–1960) who was responsible for the way in which Popper approached Kant. Through Kraft, Popper was introduced to the thought of Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) and Jakob Fries (1773–1843) as well as a tradition of critical rationalism which Popper would continue both in his methodological orientation as well as through his late German Enlightenment intellectual values. (shrink)

Johannes Kinker (1764–1845) who tried to promote Kantian philosophy in different ways, was also interested in the phenomenon of language. His general language theory is presented in Inleiding eener Wijsgeerige Algemeene Theorie der Talen, published in 1817. An impression of that theory is given in this paper. Some important questions arise, viz. whether Kinker was influenced by others; whether his theory was an original one and what the place of the theory is in the linguistic situation of the eighteenth (...) and the beginning of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

In this contribution, the role of epistemology in understanding quantum chemistry is discussed. Quantum chemistry is the study of the behavior of atoms and molecules using the principles of quantum mechanics. Epistemology helps us evaluate claims to knowledge, distinguish between justified and unjustified beliefs, and assess the reliability of scientific methods. In quantum chemistry, the epistemology of knowledge is heavily influenced by the mathematical nature of quantum mechanics, and models can be tested, proven, and validated through experimentation. This paper also (...) discusses key concepts used in quantum chemistry, such as the wave-particle duality of matter and the uncertainty principle. This work utilizes Kant’s philosophy of science to frame debates and discussions in quantum chemistry, particularly with regard to the interplay between empirical observation and theory. Additionally, the text explores how Kant’s ideas about the role of the mind in constructing our understanding of the world can help us comprehend the counterintuitive phenomena of quantum mechanics and its applications in quantum chemistry theory. (shrink)

The article explores the influence of Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy on a prominent philosopher and educator, Yevhen Vasyliovych Spektorskyi’s (1875–1951) views regarding the nature and methodology of social sciences. First, it explores Spektorskyi’s consideration of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) as a philosopher of science, emphasizing the critical aspect of his philosophy and its significant prospects for ethics and social philosophy. Next, it investigates how Spektorskyi became acquainted with and was influenced by Neo-Kantian philosophy, especially the Marburg school. (...) The main problem through the lens of which Spektorskyi analyzed their achievements was the idea of “pure” ethics as a firm foundation for social science, while criticizing Herman Cohen (1842–1918) for claiming this foundation to lie in jurisprudence. Despite being an adherent of the Baden school, Bohdan Kistiakivskyi (1868–1920) presented views that were quite similar to Spektorskyi’s regarding the exceptional status and methods of social science. The emphasis on logical procedures and the need for rational discussion allows us to draw a parallel between Spektorskyi and the development of Kantian ideas in the 20th-century communicative philosophy. The justification of the “moral” sciences led Spektorskyi to criticize the Baden Neo-Kantians, advocating for the moral nature of social sciences and their importance in constructing social reality. The project of rational social science aimed at governance and politics is reminiscent of Kant’s “anthroponomy”. (shrink)

Fichte is the first great Post-Kantian Idealist and his debt to Spinozism has been acknowledged by virtually all of his commentators. However, the extent of Spinoza’s influence on Fichte has not been spelled out in much detail. In response to this I propose to do two things. Firstly, I propose to provide a typology of interpretations of Fichte’s Absolute I, as some commentators seem to get entangled in these different interpretations, which can be very confusing to their readership. (...) Secondly, I wish to demonstrate that the Fichtean system is better understood in the light of its Spinozist influences. (shrink)

The coercive authority of the Kantian state is rationally grounded in the ideal of equal external freedom, which is realized when each individual can choose and act without being constrained by another's will. This ideal does not seem like it can justify state-mandated economic redistribution. For if one is externally free just as long as one can choose and act without being constrained by another, then only direct slavery, serfdom, or other systems of overt control seem to threaten external (...) freedom. Yet Kant endows the freedom-based state with considerable powers of economic redistribution. I argue that recent commentary has misunderstood both Kant's account of why poverty is a form of freedom-threatening dependence and the extent of the Kantian state's powers for remedying poverty. Criticizing Arthur Ripstein and the Kantianism of the “Toronto-School,” I argue that the most salient notion of dependence at issue within the Kantian framework is not the direct control of the choice-making capacities of another but asymmetrical influence in a power relationship. For Kant, poverty is fundamentally a problem of structural disempowerment. (shrink)

Bondeli shows that Schiller’s reading of Kant’s critical philosophy was since 1787 guided by Reinhold and that Schiller’s own philosophical-aesthetic thinking after 1790 was influenced by Reinhold’s post-Kantian system of Elementary Philosophy, which in its practical part contains a theory of aesthetic pleasure as well as a drive theory and a doctrine of free will. Furthermore, Bondeli demonstrates that after 1789 Reinhold and Schiller began a fruitful discussion on an authentic Kantian concept of morality and on the role (...) which aesthetic reason can play in this realm. The author points out that in this context Reinhold criticised an ethics of benevolence, which Schiller advocated in his second dissertation of 1780, and that Reinhold disagreed with Schiller’s attempt to elevate the pleasure we derive from tragic objects to an effective means of promoting moral behaviour. A final relevant result is that Schiller himself approximated a Kantian moral standpoint but nonetheless defended, against Kant and Reinhold, the primacy of an aesthetic kind of freedom. (shrink)

The article considers the influence of I. Kant’s ideas on the development of philosophical and bioethical discourse on animal rights. The doctrine of I. Kant, with its inherent anthropocentric attitude, is usually regarded as opposed to the spirit of the biocentric po­sition that has been characteristic of Anglo-Saxon utilitarianism since the time of I. Ben­tham. The Kantian approach is supposed to ignore the issue of animal rights. In the arti­cle, the author argues that the teachings of I. Kant (...) had a significant impact on the for­mation of the discourse on animal rights not only in the sense that animal rights activists perceived the ideas of I. Kant as arguments of their ideological opponent, which should be questioned, but also in the sense that they were accepted and developed in the 20th cen­tury as part of the biocentric discourse and were used to protect animal rights. (shrink)

Nietzsche's perspectivism claims that every view is only one view. This claim raises serious self-referential difficulties: if Nietzsche's view is not to refute itself, then any argument offered on its behalf must be merely perspectival, but no such reasons would be convincing to Nietzsche's dogmatic opponents. This dissertation takes a historical approach, arguing that Nietzsche's perspectivism is a development and transformation of Kant's transcendental idealism. Our perspectival notions, like the Kantian categories, are conceptual resources that we bring to experience (...) to organize it. Nietzsche does not accept Kant's transcendental interpretation of our conceptual scheme, however. He offers arguments against the claims to necessary knowledge on which Kant's transcendental approach is based, and also against the coherence of the notion of the thing in itself, which Kant shares with traditional metaphysical realism. These arguments have the force of "internal reasons" against Kant and the realist; they are given from within Nietzsche's own perspective, but they appeal to cognitive standards which Nietzsche shares in common with his dogmatic opponents. They therefore count as reasons in favor of perspectivism, even within the terms of the alternative perspectives, despite the fact that they make no claim to universal, aperspectival validity. Nietzsche can thereby avoid the self-referential difficulties facing his argument. This interpretation also allows Nietzsche to develop "theory-internal" conceptions of truth and objectivity. These conceptions are found to provide a better account of our cognitive practices than the traditional, externalist alternatives. (shrink)

Two questions should be considered when assessing the Kantian dimensions of Kuhn’s thought. First, was Kuhn himself a Kantian? Second, did Kuhn have an influence on later Kantians and neo-Kantians? Kuhn mentioned Kant as an inspiration, and his focus on explanatory frameworks and on the conditions of knowledge appear Kantian. But Kuhn’s emphasis on learning; on activities of symbolization; on paradigms as practical, not just theoretical; and on the social and community aspects of scientific research as (...) constitutive of scientific reasoning, are all outside the Kantian perspective. Kuhn’s admiration for Kant is tempered by his desire to understand the processes of learning, of initiation into a scientific community, of experimentation using instruments, and of persuasion, drawing on the work of familiar influences, including Piaget, Koyré, and Wittgenstein, and less familiar ones, including Langer, Demos, and Frank. Both Kuhn and Kant were interested in the question: what is the status of science, and what is the role of the scientist in its development and justification? But Kuhn presents science in a much more messy, historically contingent, and socially charged way than Kant does. The paper’s conclusion evaluates Kuhn’s reception among researchers including Richardson and Friedman, assessing the prospects for future work. (shrink)

In Impartial Reason, Stephen Darwall presents an account of rational agency in which reasons to act are both motivational and normative in nature. On the one hand, they are facts about an action reflective awareness of which can genuinely influence preference and conduct. On the other hand, they are also capable of justifying action, of showing in an all-things-considered sense that a particular action is at least as choiceworthy as are alternatives to it. Furthermore, these two aspects of reasons (...) to act are intimately related, since, ideally, at any rate, an agent's conduct is motivated by his awareness of himself as a particular subject of a given set of norms. (shrink)

Nas universidades alemãs do período em que Nietzsche esteve intelectualmente ativo, a tradição kantiana foi amplamente substituída por duas escolas independentes e que, desde então, têm sido rotuladas de "neokantismo". Este artigo apresenta quatro teses principais da filosofia da história neokantiana, mostra como elas são uma decorrência de sua adaptação da tradição kantiana e como Nietzsche se envolve criticamente com os mesmos temas na formação de sua própria teoria histórica. Embora não haja uma influência muito direta entre estas escolas, o (...) contraste com a tradição neokantiana nos permite situar melhor a filosofia da história de Nietzsche em seu contexto apropriado. In the German academies of Nietzsche's period of writing, the Kantian tradition was largely displaced in favor of two independent schools that have since been labeled "Neo-Kantianism." This paper presents four key theses about philosophy of history from four Neo-Kantian thinkers, how they follow from their adaptation of the Kantian tradition, and how Nietzsche critically engaged the very same issues in the formation of his own historical theory. Although there is little direct influence between orthodox Neo-Kantianism and Nietzsche, their comparison on these points will illuminate their unique adaptations of the Kantian tradition. (shrink)

The concept of “organism” has been central to modern biology, with its definition and philosophical implications evolving since the nineteenth century. In contemporary biology, the divide between developmental and physiological approaches and evolutionary approaches has influenced the definition of organism. The convergence between molecular biology and evolutionary biology has led to the term “suborganismal biology,” while the return to the organism has been characterized by animal behavior studies and Evo-devo. The philosophical approach to the concept of individual is divided between (...) a Kantian understanding of organism, which defines necessary and sufficient conditions for any X to be a “natural purpose,” and an evolutionary approach, which considers what a biological individual is and confers natural selection a key role in this definition. While the former aims to find necessary and sufficient conditions for an organism, the latter thinks in terms of conceptual spaces, being much more liberal in pointing out organisms in the world. The paper examines possible connections between these two approaches and assesses the prospects of a reconciliation between them. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the relation of Kant’s theory of free will to that of K.L. Reinhold. I argue that Reinhold’s theory addresses several problems raised in the reception of Kant’s practical philosophy, particularly the problem of accounting for free immoral acts. Focusing on Reinhold’s account of free will as a condition for the conceivability of the moral law shows that the historical focus on Reinhold’s break from Kant’s own account and his alleged reliance on facts of consciousness obscures Reinhold’s decidedly (...) ‘Kantian’ argument. This approach provides a new foundation for free will and demonstrates the significance of Reinhold’s practical philosophy as an attempted corrective to Kant. Chapter 1 examines the influence of Rehberg, Ulrich, and Schmid on Kant’s and Reinhold’s respective theories of free will. Chapter 2 investigates the epistemic foundation of Reinhold’s theory of free will and, contrary to the dominant view in scholarship, argues that his account is not based merely on facts of consciousness. Chapter 3 illuminates a tension between the phenomenology of moral agency and Kant’s account of free agency. It is argued that while Kant talks about overcoming inclinations and adopting maxims by virtue of their lawful form, which would seemingly have to take place at the phenomenal level and be available to consciousness, Kant’s account of free agency is restricted to the noumenal, which precludes availability to consciousness. Reinhold’s theory of free will avoids this tension by positing consciousness of possible courses of action as a necessary condition for self-determination to one such action. Chapter 4 discusses the relation of Reinhold’s theory of free will to Kant’s Religion, a text that Reinhold uses as a basis for his charge that Kant’s theory is either “unintelligible” or “untenable.” I argue that although Reinhold fundamentally misunderstands Kant’s doctrine of supreme maxim adoption, Reinhold is correct in his assertion that Kant is committed to the thesis that the free spontaneity of the power of choice is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Chapter 5 explicates the Kant-Reinhold Controversy to argue that given Kant’s own commitment to the conditions for moral responsibility, Reinhold was ultimately correct that free will ought to be defined as choosing for or against the moral law. (shrink)

I argue that Rawls’ reading of Kant has been a major influence on the work of some contemporary Kantian scholars. Rawls’ influence on the new Kantian moral theory can be recognized in several points: a) the conception of philosophy as a “deeply practical project”, which leads to the adoption of a first-person approach to ethics; b) the reception of Kant’s philosophy within a pragmatic context, which leads to play down the metaphysical implications of Kant’s dualisms, in (...) favor of an interpretation which seems plausible within a political culture given in advance c) a characteristic interpretation of Kant’s moral constructivism, which while stressing the primacy of the right over the good, tries to specify the ways in which the good plays a role in morals, thereby opening a way to show the relevance of the empirical in Kant’s ethics d) an approach to Kant’s practical reason which stresses the complementarities between the Hypothetical and the Categorical Imperative, interpreted in the light of Rawls’ distinction between the Rational and the Reasonable; e) the central role played by the concept of “rational nature” in the new Kantian moral theory, which may likewise be related to Rawls’ concern for clarifying the conception of the person behind his approach to practical reason. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of Rudolph Otto's understanding of the structures of human consciousness making possible the appropriation of revelation. Already in his dissertation on Luther's understanding of the Holy Spirit, Otto was preoccupied with how the " outer " of revelation could be united to these inner structures. Later, in his groundbreaking Idea of the Holy, Otto would explore the category of the numinous, an element of religious experience tied to the irrational element of the holy. This paper (...) first provides a brief account of Otto's account of the holy, especially its numinous, irrational elements. Second, the paper analyzes Otto's understanding of the structures of consciousness grounding the experience of the numinous and allowing the irrational element to be " schematized " by the rational element. Otto's exposition of these structures is heavily influenced by his reception of Kant's analysis of the two stems of human cognition, namely understanding and sensibility, and their possible relation to a common root, which Otto identified with what the mystics called the ground of the soul. Yet it is in Otto's reception of Kant's Critique of Judgment that all of these ideas find their completion, and it is here where we must look to understand the relation between the religious a priori and Otto's category of the numinous. Kant's aesthetic idea is a singular representation given in intuition; it is infinitely saturated and as such intimates the ideas of God, the soul, and the world as a whole. I show how Otto appropriates Kant's aesthetic idea and its relation to ideas of reason in order to make sense of how an empirically given revelation, for instance, an experience of the numinous, can connect with the inner structures of consciousness and thereby have the singular import that it does. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche’s Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His ThoughtDaniel SchumanR. Kevin Hill. Nietzsche’s Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. xvi + 242. Cloth, $45.00.This important book presents a broad and systematic study of Kant's influence on Nietzsche. Hill contends that Nietzsche, throughout the course of his philosophical career, wrestled with fundamental ideas presented in all three of Kant's Critiques. In (...) the preliminary chapter, Hill chronicles Nietzsche's familiarity with Kant by briefly examining the nineteenth century interpretations of Kant that Nietzsche was known to have read, namely those of Kuno Fisher, Friedrich Lange, and Schopenhauer. Hill also details Nietzsche's references to Kant throughout the published and unpublished writings, even providing a table that lists the number of references to Kant in five-year increments from 1865 through 1889 (19). Whether or not one agrees with the arguments in the remainder of the book, this first chapter stands alone as a useful historical introduction and reference guide for anyone interested in Kant and Nietzsche in light of early Neo-Kantianism.Chapters 2 and 3 focus upon Nietzsche's early encounter with the Critique of Judgment. Hill offers an interpretation of the third Critique that focuses on the centrality of reflective judgment in that text. The author shows how both aesthetic and teleological judgments are reflective, as opposed to determinative, in the sense that they exemplify ways that the subject is driven to interpret or conceive of the world, e.g., "as if" it were designed (70). He argues that Kant's conception of reflective judgmenthad a significant influence upon Nietzsche's early views on teleology and aesthetics. Hill also proposes that Nietzsche's early published and unpublished writings, including the Birth of Tragedy, are more indebted to Kant's metaphysics and conception of the supersensible, than they are to Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will. Though Nietzsche retained a conception of the noumenal, Hill argues that he rejected Schopenhauerian determinative judgments about noumena in favor of Kantian reflective judgments similar to those in the third Critique (94).Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this book deal with Kant's influence on Nietzsche's mature critiques of metaphysics and epistemology. Hill contends that Nietzsche's naturalism and empiricism were a response to, and outgrowth of, a variety of specific metaphysical and epistemological claims made in the first Critique. For example, by focusing on space and time, he compares Kant's transcendental idealism with Nietzsche's naturalism. Hill shows that Nietzsche generally accepted Kant's contention that the spacio-temporal structure of the phenomenal or natural world is "mind-dependent" (127). However, he also proposes that because Nietzsche had access to more advanced empirical theories, he eventually came to the conclusion that Kant's rigid a priori, Euclidian characterization of the phenomenal stands as a "falsified" interpretation of nature (132, 191). Hill contends that while Nietzsche [End Page 503] accepts that nature is a product of the mind, he was also committed to the idea that there may be better or more accurate ways of characterizing nature. In this section of the book, Hill could have done more to clarify how, for Nietzsche, nature is both dependent upon the mind (what Hill labels "panpsychism"), yet still somehow "transcends us" (138). Nonetheless, one does gain from these chapters an appreciation of the influence that Kant's theoretical philosophy had on Nietzsche.The final chapter investigates the ways that the three essays of the Genealogy of Morals confront various aspects of Kant's practical philosophy (Hill does provide evidence that Nietzsche read the second Critique prior to writing the Genealogy [202]). Hill claims Nietzscheian genealogy is employed as an attack upon various aspects of Kant's rational conception of morality, including his dependence upon moral intuition (202, 205, 206). He also details Nietzsche's reaction against Kant's dependence upon the noumenal as the foundation for moral freedom and responsibility (219, 222-29). Nonetheless, Hill finds points of agreement between Kant and Nietzsche on morality. For instance, he argues that Kant and Nietzsche share somewhat similar conceptions of moral agency in the sense that Nietzsche "agrees with Kant's characterization... (shrink)

The ethics of Kant and the ethics of Crusius are strikingly similar. This is manifested in a whole range of principles and concepts. Crusius’ moral teaching hinges on the rigorous moral law which has to be obeyed absolutely, and which makes it different from other prescriptions that are binding only to a relative degree. This is very close to the Kantian distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Another salient feature of Crusius’ moral teaching is the stress laid on the (...) sphere of internal motives. It is the inner motive that determines the morality of an act, rather than the external form of the act. These and some other features of Crusius’ ethics suggest a possible influence of Crusius on Kant. The possibility of such influence has repeatedly come under close scrutiny. The first works devoted to this problem date to the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pointers to the possibility of such influence are semantic and structural similarities of the two thinkers’ systems. Besides, it is an unchallengeable fact that Kant was fairly familiar with the main theses of Crusian philosophy. Some scholars proceed from the study of Kantian vocabulary. Some of the terms Kant uses, especially in his early works which later formed the basis of his ethical teaching in the critical period, can be traced to the terms of Crusian philosophy. However, an alternative view is that Kant was primarily influenced by Wolffian philosophy (mainly through Baumgarten), while the direct influence of Crusius remains unproven. I examine both points of view and propose my own solution to the problem. (shrink)

Recent work on the early development of episodic memory in my laboratory has been fuelled by the following assumption: if episodic memory is re-experiential memory then Kant’s analysis of the spatiotemporal nature of experience should constrain and positively influence theories of episodic memory development. The idea is that re-experiential memory will “inherit” these spatiotemporal features. On the basis of this assumption, Russell and Hanna (Mind and Language 27(1):29–54, 2012) proposed that (a) the spatial element of re-experience is egocentric and (...) (b) that the temporal element of re-experiencing involves order/simultaneity. The first of these assumptions is immediately problematic for two reasons. In the first place, if we assume that early episodic recall mediated by processing in the hippocampus, then (a) is clearly in tension with the fact that spatial coding in the hippocampus is allocentric/environment-centred. Second, two of our own recent experiments (described here) show that when only egocentric cues are available in a What/When/Where episodic memory task it is not possible to distinguish young children’s performance from semantic memory. I argue that this tension should be resolved by recognising that the egocentric coding of the original experience as being of an objective scene relies upon allocentric representations and these are preserved in re-experiential memory, allowing a recollection of the objective nature of the scene on which one takes a subjective view. (shrink)

I argue that Nietzsche’s criticism of the Kantian theory of disinterested pleasure in beauty reflects his own commitment to claims that closely resemble certain Kantian aesthetic principles, specifically as reinterpreted by Schiller. I show that Schiller takes the experience of beauty to be disinterested both (1) insofar as it involves impassioned ‘play’ rather than desire-driven ‘work’, and (2) insofar as it involves rational-sensuous (‘aesthetic’) play rather than mere physical play. In figures like Nietzsche, Schiller’s generic notion of play—which (...) is itself influenced by Kant’s claim that aesthetic pleasure is orthogonal to desire-satisfaction—becomes decoupled from his (further) Kantian view that aesthetic play essentially involves a harmony of sensuous receptivity and rational spontaneity. The result, I suggest, is a self-standing opposition between desires and passions. This motivates a recognizably Romantic vision of aesthetic disinterestedness, as freedom from desire realized in a state of creative determination by passion. (shrink)

German Idealism is arguably the most influential force in philosophy over the past two hundred years. This major four-volume work is the first comprehensive survey of its impact on science, religion, sociology and the humanities, and brings together fifty-two leading scholars from across Europe and North America. Each essay discusses an idea or theme from Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, or another key figure, shows how this influenced a thinker or field of study in the subsequent two centuries, and how that (...) influence is felt in contemporary thought. Crossing established scholarly divides, the volumes deal with fields as varied as feminism, architectural history, psychoanalysis, Christology and museum curation, and subjects as diverse as love, evolution, the public sphere, the art of Andy Warhol, the music of Palestrina, the philosophy of Husserl, the literature of Jane Austen, the political thought of fascism and the foundations of international law. (shrink)