We extend the concept that life is an informational phenomenon, at every level of organisation, from molecules to the global ecological system. According to this thesis: living is information processing, in which memory is maintained by both molecular states and ecological states as well as the more obvious nucleic acid coding; this information processing has one overall function—to perpetuate itself; and the processing method is filtration of, and synthesis of, information at lower levels to appear at higher levels in complex (...) systems . We show how information patterns, are united by the creation of mutual context, generating persistent consequences, to result in ‘functional information’. This constructive process forms arbitrarily large complexes of information, the combined effects of which include the functions of life. Molecules and simple organisms have already been measured in terms of functional information content; we show how quantification may be extended to each level of organisation up to the ecological. In terms of a computer analogy, life is both the data and the program and its biochemical structure is the way the information is embodied. This idea supports the seamless integration of life at all scales with the physical universe. The innovation reported here is essentially to integrate these ideas, basing information on the ‘general definition’ of information, rather than simply the statistics of information, thereby explaining how functional information operates throughout life. (shrink)

To understand better why evidence of student cheating is often ignored, a national sample of psychology instructors was sampled for their opinions. The 127 respondents overwhelmingly agreed that dealing with instances of academic dishonesty was among the most onerous aspects of their profession. Respondents cited insufficient evidence that cheating has occurred as the most frequent reason for overlooking student behavior or writing that might be dishonest. A factor analysis revealed 4 other clusters of reasons as to why cheating may be (...) ignored. Emotional reasons included stress and lack of courage. Difficult reasons included the extensive time and effort required to deal with cheating students. Fear reasons included concern about retaliation or a legal challenge. Denial reasons included beliefs that cheating students would fail anyway and that the worst offenders do not get caught. The reasons why instances of academic dishonesty should be proactively confronted are presented. (shrink)

Concerned with the nature of the human body, the nature of the human mind, and how the body and mind interact. This investigation into what is, then, the nature of man himself is one of the most crucial philosophical questions and is preliminary to the broader investigations of logic, metaphysics and epistemology.

The genetic stability of living cells is continuously threatened by the presence of endogenous reactive oxygen species and other genotoxic molecules. Of particular threat are the thousands of DNA single-strand breaks that arise in each cell, each day, both directly from disintegration of damaged sugars and indirectly from the excision repair of damaged bases. If un-repaired, single-strand breaks can be converted into double-strand breaks during DNA replication, potentially resulting in chromosomal rearrangement and genetic deletion. Consequently, cells have adopted multiple pathways (...) to ensure the rapid and efficient removal of single-strand breaks. A general feature of these pathways appears to be the extensive employment of protein–protein interactions to stimulate both the individual component steps and the overall repair reaction. Our current understanding of DNA single-strand break repair is discussed, and testable models for the architectural coordination of this important process are presented. BioEssays 23:447–455, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Sensitivity Accounts — Direct and Indirect The Attack by Counterexample on Sensitivity Accounts — And Why SCA Seems on the Right Track Nonetheless Sosa's Safety Account Sosa's Account as a Sensitivity Account — and His Counterexamples Safety and the Problem of True/True Subjunctives Other Formulations of Safety Safety and Strength of Epistemic Position Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism Intuitive Complexity: Do We Know that We're Not Brains in Vats?

An explanation of the system of textual references employed in this paper may perhaps be of convenience to the reader. As a rule, references to other works have here been incorporated in the main body of the text, with the aid of abbreviations usually derived from the initial letters of the main words in their titles. Thus "HLL, p. 21." refers to page twenty-one of Thomas Hobbes: Leben and Lehre, by F. Tonnies.

The notion of simulation in dreaming of threat recognition and avoidance faces difficulties deriving from (1) some typical characteristics of dream artifacts (some “surreal,” some not) and (2) metaphysical issues involving the need for some representation in the theory of a perspective subject making use of the artifact. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo].

The three main kinds of theory in normative ethics, namely, consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, are often presented as the ‘palette’ from which we may choose, or use as a starting point for an investigation. However, this way of doing ethics and philosophy, by the palette, may be leading some of us astray. It has led some to believe that all that there is to ethics, and to ethics of AI, is given in terms of these already devised petrified categories (...) of theory. It has also led others to abandon normative ethics and philosophy altogether and to resort to descriptive methods that are then used to justify action. I wish to argue that (1) we should not abandon traditional philosophical approaches, but (2a) this does not entail that the petrified palette should constitute the beginning of our philosophical investigations. Further, (2b) I recommend a non-methodological approach in which it is instead radical questions that spur these investigations, which arise through consideration of the practical actions (potential or otherwise) of machines and their programmers. (shrink)

Offers an original reading of Wittgenstein's views on such topics as radical scepticism, the first- and third-person asymmetry of mental talk, Cartesianism, and rule-following.

The evidence for a kinematics of the mind is confounded by uncontrolled properties of pictures. Effects of illumination and of picture-plane geometry may underlie some evidence given for a process of mental rotation. Pictured rotation is confounded by picture similarity, gauged by gray -level correlations. An example is given involving the depicted rotation of Shepard-Metzler solids in depth. [Hecht; Kubovy & Epstein; Shepard; Todorovic].

Brian Barry attacks the `resource account' of power providing a set of definitions through which power should be analysed. While there might be different, equally good, ways of defining power, I argue that the formulations provided by Dowding are superior to those of Barry as they produce fewer anomalies and provide a better foundation for empirical research. The article defends the resource account against Barry's criticisms and argues for the utility of the ideas of luck and `systematic luck'. Key Words: (...) power • luck • systematic luck • resources • Barry • Dowding • Harsanyi • capitalists. (shrink)

Everyday reasoning requires more evidence than raw data alone can provide. We explore the idea that people can go beyond this data by reasoning about how the data was sampled. This idea is investigated through an examination of premise non-monotonicity, in which adding premises to a category-based argument weakens rather than strengthens it. Relevance theories explain this phenomenon in terms of people's sensitivity to the relationships among premise items. We show that a Bayesian model of category-based induction taking premise sampling (...) assumptions and category similarity into account complements such theories and yields two important predictions: First, that sensitivity to premise relationships can be violated by inducing a weak sampling assumption; and second, that premise monotonicity should be restored as a result. We test these predictions with an experiment that manipulates people's assumptions in this regard, showing that people draw qualitatively different conclusions in each case. (shrink)

Nicholas Saunders claims that, in my view, divine action requires and is confined to indeterminacies at the quantum level. I try to make clear that, in speaking of “gaps” in physical causality, I mean that the existence of intentions entails that determining law explanations alone cannot give a complete account of the natural world. By “indeterminacy” I mean a general (not quantum) lack of determining causality in the physical order. Construing physical causality in terms of dispositional properties variously realized in (...) more or less creative ways in different contexts may be most helpful in developing an account of divine action. (shrink)

Reason has co-opted our conception of autonomy. My purpose is to set autonomy free. Here is the problem: some philosophers, Kant most notably, have said that governing your life by reason or by being responsive to reason is the source of autonomy. But there is a paradox concealed in these plausible claims. On the one hand, a person can be enslaved to reason and lack autonomy because of this kind of bondage. On the other hand, if reason has no influence, (...) then it appears that one would be the slave of one's passions, and, however eloquently Hume might have written about reason being the slave of the passions, there is something odd about the idea that a person who is enslaved by his passions is autonomous. The paradox, which I shall call the paradox of reason, is that if we are governed by reason in what we choose, then we are in bondage to reason in what we choose, and we are not autonomous. Yet, if we are not governed by reason, then we do not govern ourselves in what we choose, and again we are not autonomous. (shrink)

A funny thing happened to Cartesian dualism on the way to the twenty-first century. After three hundred-odd years the irreconcilable dualism between `mind' and `matter' is still with us but, especially since the 1950s it has undergone a startling change. Matter has gotten fatter while mind is hard to find. I refer in particular to the domain of thought which has been transferred from res cogitans to res extensa in the guise of the computational brain. For Descartes, the body was (...) an automaton motivated by purely material forces to which the thinking mind was completely inessential . Now, however, the thinking mind has become the neural processor which is part of the same automaton. The only vestige of res cogitans which remains is sentience , i.e. conscious awareness. Thought is represented in sentience by what might be called `thought experience', i.e. the wispy but cognitively irrelevant stuff that takes place behind our foreheads. The rest of consciousness is made up of such things as sights, sounds, smells, tastes, elations, depressions, agonies and ecstasies -- our qualia. Some cognitive scientists deny we have qualia; they say we only seem to have them. But even those who admit we have them are increasingly inclined to follow their famous French predecessor and declare consciousness irrelevant to physical information processing. The latest doctrine of this persuasion is conscious inessentialism which is defined by Owen Flanagan as the view that `for any intelligent activity i, performed in any cognitive domain d, even if we do i with conscious accompaniments, i can in principle be done without these conscious accompaniments'. (shrink)

This essay shows that truth cannot be divorced from human experience and an individual’s world view, his or her weltanschauung. There exist different weltanschauungen that favour alternative truths. Thus, loosely speaking, truth is determined by context. It may be socially acceptable to prefer one among the alternative truths as truly true, but this goal necessarily involves taking an ideological perspective on what is perceived and accepted as the sole truth. In other words, it is prejudiced. The truth value assigned to (...) the proposition God exists starkly illustrates this claim, but in the course of this essay I demonstrate that alternative truths are widespread and that conflicting truths can co-exist within a community even when they create dissension. A hegemonic group will assert a preference for one truth over its alternatives, but that does not eliminate the existence of alternative truths. Alternative weltanschauungen need to be managed somehow, and the recognition that alternative truths exist is one step in their management. (shrink)

This article explores home dissatisfaction using methods modelled on those used to understand negative body image and its causes. We found that a substantial proportion of UK participants (13–39%) expressed dissatisfaction with their homes. Although the strongest association was between home dissatisfaction and reported physical problems, there was evidence that dissatisfaction is also predicted by experiencing pressure from the media and your family to improve your home, as well as reporting a greater tendency to compare your home to others’. The (...) results of the study provide initial evidence for a sociocultural explanation of home dissatisfaction, analogous to sociocultural explanations of body dissatisfaction. (shrink)

A philosopher, rabbi, religious historian, and Gnostic, Jacob Taubes was for many years a correspondent and interlocutor of Carl Schmitt, a German jurist, philosopher, political theorist, law professor -- and self-professed Nazi. Despite their unlikely association, Taubes and Schmitt shared an abiding interest in the fundamental problems of political theology, believing the great challenges of modern political theory were ancient in pedigree and, in many cases, anticipated the works of Judeo-Christian eschatologists. In this collection of Taubes's writings on Schmitt, the (...) two intellectuals work through ideas of the apocalypse and other central concepts of political theology. Taubes acknowledges Schmitt's reservations about the weakness of liberal democracy yet distances himself from his prescription to rectify it, arguing the apocalyptic worldview requires less of a rigid hierarchical social ordering than a community committed to the importance of decision making. In these writings, a sharper and more nuanced portrait of Schmitt's thought emerges, as well as a more complicated understanding of Taubes, who has shaped the work of Giorgio Agamben, Peter Sloterdijk, and other major twentieth-century theorists. (shrink)