Residential rent control is a contentious issue in many jurisdictions throughout the world. While tenant groups have often argued vociferously in defence of control, landlord groups and the vast majority of economists have been equally vehement in their criticisms. This paper examines some key normative issues involved in rent control. In particular I examine arguments in favor of control based on the alleged unfairness of winfall profits, upon affordability, and finally on the creation of rights to security of tenure. Various (...) objections by libertarian and free market philosophers and economists are examined. I conclude with a somewhat limited defense of rent control as used in specific situations as part of a more comprehensive policy to satisfy the normative demands at the root of tenant pressure for rent control. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Coase's now famous paper, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, argues that social harms caused by industry are best addressed through a policy which would be optimal in terms of market efficiency. I argue that this narrowly based policy represents a classic example of the failure of many welfare economists to consider adequately the ethical implications of their recommendations. I also indicate the manner in which Coase's recommendations conflict with intuitively well‐established ethical principles. I conclude that only an approach that (...) considers many more features than market efficiency can produce an optimal policy for dealing with the social costs of production. (shrink)

During the last decade, there has been a wave of mergers and hostile takeovers throughout the corporate world. This wave has been accompanied by various defensive strategies of managers to defend target firms from these takeovers. These include: greenmail, golden parachutes, and leveraged management buyouts. This paper examines hostile takeovers and defenses against them from a stakeholder point of view; that is, from a consideration of the various obligations a firm has to the different groups that have a stake in (...) the firm. I conclude that many stakeholders, such as workers and communities, have unjustly suffered as a result of hostile takeovers and the associated defenses, and that their rights as stakeholders have been violated. Finally, I suggest some possible reforms to protect these stakeholders in the future. (shrink)