Appraisal theories of emotion have had a strong impact on the development of theory and experimental research in the domain of the affective sciences. While there is generally a high degree of convergence between theorists in this tradition, some central issues are open to debate. In this contribution three issues have been chosen for discussion: (a) varieties of relevance detection, (b) varieties of valence appraisal, and (c) sequential-cumulative effects of appraisal results. In addressing these issues, new theoretical ideas are suggested (...) and an update of recent research on the sequence of appraisal processes is provided. Special emphasis is placed on nonverbal signatures of appraisal processes. (shrink)

Diagnosing emotion disturbances should be informed by current knowledge about normal emotion processes. I identify four major functions of emotion as well as sources for potential dysfunctions and suggest that emotions should only be diagnosed as pathological when they are clearly dysfunctional, which requires considering eliciting events, realistic person-specific appraisal patterns, and adaptive responses or action tendencies. Evidence from actuarial research on the reported length of naturally occurring emotion episodes (including potential determinants) illustrates appropriateness criteria for the clinical evaluation of (...) emotion duration—an essential element in the DSM-5 symptom catalogue for major depression episodes, especially in bereavement. The need for more actuarial evidence on normal emotion responses and its consideration by the clinical community is highlighted. (shrink)

Eine wissenschaftliche Methode oder Verfahrensweise, die man als ›die‹ philosophisch-wissenschaftliche Methode des Aristoteles bezeichnen könnte, gibt es nicht. Vielmehr ist es so, dass Aristoteles in unterschiedlichen Kontexten auch unterschiedliche Verfahren zur Anwendung bringt. Wenn man daher von einer einheitlichen philosophisch-wissenschaftlichen Methode bei Aristoteles sprechen wollte, so könnte man dies nur der Analogie nach tun.

Das Bild des »goldenen Berges« geht zurück auf geographische Angaben und Beschreibungen, die in der Antike als glaubwürdig angesehen wurden. In der Literatur illustriert die Metapher das Bedeutungsspektrum von Reichtum, Wohlergehen, Überfluss und Glück, spricht aber auch Warnungen aus. Dagegen werden in den philoso-phischen Interpretationen vor allem Konstitutionsprobleme des Fiktiven, auch der entia rationis, thematisiert. Die Metapher exemplifiziert Objekte, die logisch möglich sind, aber nicht wirk-lich existieren. In der Philosophiege-schichte – bis in die aktuellen Analysen der non-existent objects hinein – (...) wurde das Bild des »goldenen Berges« daher stets mit der Frage verbunden, welche Instanzen wir als »wirklich«, »möglich« oder »unmöglich« rechtfertigen kön-nen. Als Beispiel spiegelt die Metapher die Transformationen, in denen sich das Wirklichkeitsverständnis der philoso-phischen Tradition wie in einem Prisma gebrochen hat. (shrink)

I strongly endorse many of the suggestions made by the authors of the extremely useful reviews in this issue. In particular, the need to identify the complex causal mechanisms underlying the major health risk factors requires urgent attention of the research community. I suggest considering the important role of emotional disturbances as contributors to health risks given the empirically established comorbidity between mental and somatic illness. Better knowledge of these mechanisms is an essential prerequisite to develop tailored personalized prevention and (...) intervention programs, including reliable and valid assessment of deficits. (shrink)

Although still young when he wrote this book, Voegelin already demonstrates his singular analytical capacity as well as his ability to put political phenomena into a new perspective.

The goal of this paper is an interpretation of Aristotle's modal syllogistics closely oriented on the text using the resources of modern modal predicate logic. Modern predicate logic was successfully able to interpret Aristotle's assertoric syllogistics uniformly , that is, with one formula for universal premises. A corresponding uniform interpretation of modal syllogistics by means of modal predicate logic is not possible. This thesis does not imply that a uniform view is abandoned. However, it replaces the simple unity of the (...) assertoric by the complex unity of the modal. The complexity results from the fact that though one formula for universal premises is used as the basis, it must be moderated if the text requires . Aristotle introduces his modal syllogistics by expanding his assertoric syllogistics with an axiom that links two apodictic premises to yield a single apodictic sentence . He thus defines a regular modern modal logic. By means of the regular modal logic that is thus defined, he is able to reduce the purely apodictic syllogistics to assertoric syllogistics. However, he goes beyond this simple structure when he looks at complicated inferences. In order to be able to link not only premises of the same modality, but also premises with different modalities, he introduces a second axiom, the T-axiom, which infers from necessity to reality or - equivalently - from reality to possibility. Together, the two axioms, the axiom of regularity and the T-axiom, define a regular T-logic. It plays an important role in modern logic. In order to be able to account for modal syllogistics adequately as a whole, another modern axiom is also required, the so-called B-axiom. It is very difficult to decide whether Aristotle had the B-axiom. The two last named axioms are sufficient to achieve the required contextual moderation of the basic formula for universal propositions. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's habilitation under the title: Endlichkeit und Vernunftanspruch. Zur Deutung eines fundamentalen Spannungsverhèaltnisses im Selbstverstèandnis des Menschen.

In this paper which consists of two parts (Teil I and Teil II) we champion Diophantus of Alexandria and Isabella BaÅ¡makova against Norbert Schappacher. In two publications ([Schappacher 1998a] and [Schappacher 1998b]) he puts forward inter alia two propositions: Questioning Diophantus’ originality he considers affirmatively the possibility that the Arithmetica are the joint work of a team of authors like Bourbaki. And he calls BaÅ¡makova’s claim (in [BaÅ¡makova 1972]) that Diophantus uses negative numbers, a nonsense , reproaching her for her (...) thoughtlessness . Teil I: First, we disprove Schappacher’s Bourbaki thesis. Second, we investigate the semantic meaning and historical significance of Diophantus’ keywords $ λvarepsilon tildeιψιζ and ὕπαρξιζ. Next, we discuss Schappacher’s epistemology of the history of mathematics and defend BaÅ¡makova’s methods. Finally we analyse in detail three problems from Diophantus’ Arithmetica (and their solutions) given by Thomas Heath and Helmuth Gericke as proof of the their claim that Diophantus did not use negative numbers. Teil II: In this Part, we give 33 places where Diophantus uses negative quantities as intermediate results; they appear as differences a − b of positive rational numbers, the subtrahend b being bigger than the minuend a; they each represent the (negative) basis ( πλvarepsilonυρacuteα ) of a square number ( τvarepsilonτρacuteαγω ν o ζ ), which is afterwards computed by the formula (a - b) 2 = a 2 + b 2 - 2ab $ . Finally, we report how the topic Diophantus and the negative numbers has been dealt with by translators and commentators from Maximus Planudes onwards. Und er kommt zu dem Ergebnis: ≪Nur ein Traum war das Erlebnis. Weil≫, so schlieβt er messerscharf, ≪nicht sein k a n n, was nicht sein d a r f.≫ CHRISTIAN MORGENSTERN: Palmstrm. (shrink)

The literature on human ethos evinces terminological arbitrariness, which can in my opinion be overcome in only one way: through historical reflection of the meaning which the moral-philosophical concepts have expressed at the very beginning of European philosophy. The first part of the paper is therefore dedicated to the reflection on Greek notions and then its Latin translations. In this respect there appears a fundamentally historical and substantial difference between classical Greek “ethos” and modern “morality”. The second part begins with (...) the nowadays prevailing impression that “ethos” is foredoomed to disappearance for the sake of “morality”. Attempts at rehabilitating the ethos of virtues in contrast to modern morality, undertaken by communitarily inclined philosophers after the publication of Alisdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, have for the most part been justly criticized. By means of the phenomenological method of stepping back to originary experience, I would like to approach this matter from a different and new angle. My thesis is that “ethos” represents the normality of the world of experience. “Morality” of the modern world is based upon the borderline case of such “normality”, which is elevated to the level of a normal case. In conclusion, I will try to provide a phenomenological explanation of this historical development by interpreting it as the process of “idealization”. (shrink)