ABSTRACTWhen Maurice Blondel raised the problem of Christian salvation in his thesis ‘L’Action’, he met with heavy resistance, both from the French University, striving for rationality and from the traditional Catholic philosophers who rejected the ‘modern’ method of immanence. Whereas in the sphere of knowledge Hegel starts the search for Absolute Knowledge from the uncultivated consciousness on, Blondel, exploring the sphere of the will, goes out from the most primitive willing of ‘something’ so as to climb – equally dialectically – (...) towards the object of the ultimate desire of the will. To Blondel, this path presupposes overcoming the position of positivism. Blondel reckons only with the ethical drive of the will’s desire. The way he chooses allows him to penetrate as far as to the natural desire of god, fulfilled by revelation. The act of faith, however, does not belong to philosophy. The fierce discussions after the publication gave Blondel the opportunity to expound his idea of a Christian philosophy... (shrink)

In order to understand the reactions to the publication in 1893 of l’Action by Maurice Blondel, we should investigate the philosophical climate at the end of the 19th century both at French universities and in ecclesiastical circles. In the latter, Blondel was suspected of modernism because he criticised Thomist metaphysics as losing itself in abstractions because of its distance from life. Did this perhaps show contempt of the metaphysical abilities of the intellect? In his own philosophy, moreover, Blondel presented the (...) supernatural as absolutely necessary and yet as absolutely impossible. Was this overrating the intellect? If human reason in explaining human nature deals with the metaphysical level, does not this reduce the metaphysical to the merely natural level? Blondel’s philosophy did indeed owe a debt to the method of immanence, which he thought capable of speaking about what medieval man knew as desiderium naturale Dei . At French universities, on the other hand, the principle of immanence had been raised to a quasi-dogma. The neo-Cartesians agreed with the neo-Kantians that philosophy should limit itself to that part of worldly reality which reason can master. The criticism from both sides were due to a misunderstanding of Blondel’s intentions. He intended to work out a metaphysics of the will. Within this framework, it was his conviction that all forms of thinking are threatened by abstraction as soon as they refuse to acknowledge that thinking is related to the dynamics of the will, albeit different trom the act of volition. Blondel’s metaphysics of the will is based on an extensive phenomenology of action, whose existential impact goes together with a rigorous dialectical line of reasoning. As the dialectics of Hegel’s Phänomenologie searches for the adequacy between consecutive certainties and ultimate truth, so Blondel’s dialectics goes in search of the adequacy between the consecutive aims of the will and the ultimate goal of the will’s dynamics. We discuss this analogy in the awareness that Blondel is not a Catholic Hegel. As to the theological discussion of the supernatural within a philosophical perspective, Bouillard’s interpretation is succinctly presented. (shrink)

d. 1. Van 1900 tot 1950 -- d. 2. Van 1950 tot 1998.

This paper seeks a deeper understanding of the congener as a factor in animal and human behaviour. It does so, not by concentrating on analyses of stimulus exchanges - largely specific to the species - by which a congener is recognized, but on the more general questions of why a notion of congener exists at all and why it plays such an extraordinary important role in animal and human behaviour.Three separate approaches, by way of anthropomorphic psychology, a paraphysical energy model (...) and the physical theory of the implicate order, lead to the recognition of a certain inseparability of self and congener; and to an interpretation of the content of the notion of congener and of the behaviour in relation to it, in terms of the fundamental concept of energy and the even more fundamental one of order. (shrink)

The sociobiological fashion has for a long time discouraged the development of theories of the immediate causation of behaviour. It is only recently that new approaches are being developed to improve on the classical ethological theory originated by Lorenz and Tinbergen. One new departure is behavioural field theory (BFT) which brings back the concept of energy in behaviour, without being susceptible to the drawbacks of the energy or fuel concept of classical theory. In this paper the new theory is explained (...) in some detail and it is shown to be illuminating, predictive and testable in examples of play-like and territorial behaviour. (shrink)

L'A. esamina l'interpretazione della cosmogonia platonica nel sesto libro del De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum di Filopono. Lo studio propone inoltre un breve esame della questione della relazione fra filosofia aristotelica e platonica nel neoplatonismo greco.

Classical ethology, with its emphasis on separability of parts, has largely failed to do justice to the wholeness of the individual animal, to the integrity of group behaviour and to the continuity between observable behaviour and consciousness. Field theory has potentialities to do better, as illustrated in this paper with reference to morphogenetic and behavioural fields. A behavioural domain is delineated — playlike behaviour — where field theory is particularly relevant. It is shown that the concept of symmetry can suggest (...) new questions as well as explain some generally known phenomena of group behaviour. New interpretations of displacement activities and of etho-ecological adaptations are offered, both of which involve the whole individual animal. (shrink)

Displacement acts, once a hot topic in ethology, but wrapped in silence for two decades since, have recently been suggested to indicate and relax social tension (Maestripieri et al., 1992; Wiepkema, 1987). The first of these contentions seems to be in contradiction with some of the classical ethological studies of displacement behaviour, in particular those supporting the disinhibition hypothesis, since the latter would not predict any positive correlation between amount of tension (i.c. intensity of the conflict) and the occurrence of (...) displacement acts.A critical examination of these studies reveals that a positive correlation of the sort has been found, but that proponents of the disinhibition hypothesis tried to explain it in terms of their own model, rather than taking it at its face value. (The reason for this is that they viewed it as pleading for the surplus hypothesis which they rejected). It can be shown that at least some of their explanations are grounded on assumptions which are arbitrary. Also, the disinhibition hypothesis does not account for the occurrence of displacement behaviour in contexts with tension but without conflict. (shrink)

Locke & Bogin's (L&B's) main thesis can be extended to the acquisition of the phrasal vocabulary in that the acquisition of much phrasal vocabulary combines the acquisition of linguistic knowledge with pragmatics and performance and in that the apprenticeship system for such learning begins to flower in adolescence.

In the wake of the 1980 CSCE follow-up meeting US human rights objectives should be defined contextually so as to include besides the traditional human rights ingredients, i.e. the right to personal integrity, civil and politica! liberties, such values as peace, national security, nuclear non-proliferation, economie growth and redistribution. To this effect, the US should stress more a proper «world order» as its ultimate policy goal. Doing so would provide it at once with the flexibility needed in the international forum (...) and with the credibility needed on the domestic scene, in order to achieve some visible results. A high-pitched declaratory policy in favor of human rights leads to ineffectiveness with Communist nations and to arbitrary pressures on authoritarian countries which somehow rely on US assistance.Thus, the US should proceed contextually on the basis of a more balanced «human rights» concept. (shrink)

The paper tries to develop some of the main characteristics of Dilthey’s “phenomenology of metaphysics” in the second part of the Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. It is argued that we have to understand this phenomenology as an attempt to go beyond both Kant’s and Comte’s criticism of metaphysics. According to Dilthey the core of all metaphysics is its ideal of a logical coherence of the world: in contrast to modern science, Dilthey says, metaphysics is based on the conviction that there (...) is an objective and internal coherence of reality behind the phenomena. Even if this coherence is reduced to its minimal form, that is to the combination of substantiality and causality, even then, Dilthey argues, it constitutes a projection of the living unity of human consciousness into extramental reality, and this prevents metaphysics from being science. Gradually the Christian metaphysics of the Middle Ages has been replaced by science, both in our knowledge of nature and in our knowledge of our spiritual self. Consequently metaphysics as a scientific project is for Dilthey a historical phenomenon, which irrevocably belongs to the past. The apparent completion of metaphysics in the ‘private metaphysical systems” of the Modern Age is in fact, Dilthey claims, the “euthanasia” of metaphysics, its unconscious noble and gentle suicide. For they conceive nature as a “colossal fantastic reflection of the metaphysician’s own self”, and in that way achieve a complete transformation of objective into subjective reality. By so doing, however, metaphysics destroys itself at the very moment of the complete fulfilment of its task. In the systems of Leibniz, Hegel etc. the old ideal of a total understanding of the world is apparently realised. But at the same time this means, according to Dilthey, that objective reality as such no longer exists. The total disclosure of the metaphysical secret is for Dilthey nothing else but the disclosure of the illusory nature of all metaphysics. (shrink)

L’article se propose de vérifier le caractère néoplatonicien de la métaphysique d’Ammonius, fils d’Hermias, dans le dialogue intitulé Ammonius de Zacharie de Mytilène. Jusqu’à présent la recherche a cru pouvoir conclure de ce texte que la pensée d’Ammonius se rapprochait à certains égards du christianisme. Plusieurs éléments dans l’ Ammonius prouvent pourtant sans équivoque que le chef d’école alexandrin est resté fidèle au néoplatonisme païen, et notamment à la distinction proclusienne entre l’éternité divine et la perpétuité du monde.

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

This essay discusses an interdisciplinary art history/philosophy course cotaught by a professor from each discipline. Fundamental questions about how we experience, understand, and communicate about art can be answered more effectively through such interdisciplinary collaboration than through each discipline alone. Students in the course tended to think of art either in purely subjective terms, in which art was simply an expression of personal taste, or entirely essentialist ones, in which the artness of a work resided completely within the object. Readings (...) and class discussions helped students articulate these extreme viewpoints and challenge them. As a result, many of the students developed more sophisticated understandings of art and the experiences of art that avoided the pitfalls of subjectivism and essentialism. Insights from selected student papers are presented to demonstrate the kinds of thinking fostered by the course. In sum, the essay argues for the importance and success of interdisciplinary approaches to teaching art, art history, and the philosophy of art. (shrink)

Profielen van twaalf structuralistische en post-structuralistische Franse filosofen.

Since the early seventies, when English translations of Jürgen Habermas’ principal works became available to English-speaking scholars, there has been a virtual “Habermas explosion” of research papers, dissertations and books. Informative and penetrating discussions already exist discussing Habermas’ encounter with positivism and his relationship to the “Frankfurt school.” There are however few detailed discussions of the theoretical relationships between Habermas’ project of a critical theory of society and Hegel’s system. We attempt to correct this previous omission in the following paper.The (...) central thesis of Jürgen Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests is that theoretical discourse is fundamentally tied to human experience. Habermas wishes to show that all theoretical statements about the world have their genesis in the experience of everyday life and practices. His particular understanding of this approach to the question of the possibility of knowledge has its origins in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The Phenomenology defines the development of knowledge in terms of a science of experience and must therefore constitute the main text in locating the philosophical parameters of Habermas’ thought. Our paper is an exercise in hermeneutics addressed to this task.In rejecting both Hegel’s philosophy of identity and Marx’s ontology of nature, Habermas has forced himself into a position where he must elaborate exactly how knowledge is possible at all. That is, the question which he confronts concerns the underlying basis of human experience. Hegel and Marx in Habermas’ opinion, were both unsuccessful in developing an adequate account of human life precisely because they tended to give an absolute basis to the the structure of the world. Knowledge itself, was considered as knowledge of something which existed beyond the scope of human control. Habermas attempts to overcome these difficulties by developing an explicitly ontological account of man through his theory of cognitive interests. Thus the process of reflection is ‘guided’ by certain cognitive interests. These interests perform the same function in Habermas’ system as does the notion of Geist in Hegel’s or Nature in Marx’s. They determine the conditions by which ‘knowledge’ can be generated and thus constitute the grounds upon which our world-view is constituted. (shrink)

While ethical and empirical interest in so-called secondary variants and incidental findings in clinical genetics contexts is growing, critical reflection on the ethical foundations of the various recommendations proposed is thus far largely lacking. We examine and critique the ethical justifications of the three most prominent disclosure positions: briefly, the clinical geneticist decides, a joint decision, and the patient decides. Subsequently, instead of immediately developing a new disclosure option, we explore relevant foundational ethical values and norms, drawing on the normative (...) and empirical ethical literature. Four ethical signposts are thereby developed to help guide disclosure discussions. These are: respectful sharing of the clinician’s expertise; transparent communication; epistemic modesty; and respect for the embedded nature of the patient. We conclude by considering the most common current disclosure positions in the light of the four ethical signposts. (shrink)