The attention being paid to ethics education in accounting has been increasing, especially after the corporate accounting scandals at the turn of the century. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the existing research in the field of ethics education in accounting. To synthesize past research, a bibliometric analysis that references 134 primary studies is performed and three bibliometric methods are applied. First, we visualize the historical evolution of ethics education in accounting research through historiography. Second, we use bibliographic coupling (...) to identify clusters of ethics education in accounting research before, during, and after major corporate scandals. Third, we perform a co-word analysis to connect the identified patterns into a map of a contextual space. The results reveal, in each decade, not only an increasing academic focus on this field of research, but also an increasing number of different research clusters. While the clusters Factors affecting moral judgement, Perception of ethics, and Lack of ethics topics in the last research period develop further from the respective clusters in the previous periods, Accounting beyond technical skills, Integration of ethics in accounting education, Use of developed ethics frameworks, and Professional values on the contrary develop anew in the last decade, as a consequence of a growing demand for teaching ethics. Overall, the paper presents the development patterns of ethics education in accounting research and sets up a research agenda that encourages future research. (shrink)

In the text the author tries to investigate Wittgenstein’s notions of action, practice and pragmatism in his book On Certainty. An attempt is made to sketch the criterion of Wittgenstein’s analysis of certainty and to define the crucial concepts such as world-picture, practice, certainty and justification. The analysis shows that Wittgenstein applies a specific form of pragmatic solution to the problem of justification, which after all, can and should be called a kind of pragmatismus. This is the subject of the (...) first and the second part of the text. The third part shows the application of this pragmatic theory of justification to Wittgenstein’s refutation of scepticism. The author suggests that his pragmatic analysis of certainty presents an adequate means for the refutation of scepticism. However, his anti-scepticism is situated in the tradition of common sense and ordinary language philosophy and epistemology (Moore, Chisholm, Lehrer, Austin, Grice, Strawson, etc.). In the conclusion the author applies this anti-sceptical solution to the so called rule-following problem (as stated in Kripke’s work) and shows that there are some far reaching consequences of this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later work to his position on language, learning, ontology and knowledge. (shrink)

Schelling begreift seine eigene Stellung in der Philosophiegeschichte auf zweifache Weise: mit seinem Frühwerk hat er zu der Entwicklung der negativen Philosophie oder der Philosophie der absoluten Identität beigetragen, so dass sie vollends ihre Verwandlung in die positive Philosophie vollziehen könnte. Parallel dazu hat er an die Begründung und Entwicklung der geschichtlichen bzw. Philosophie der Offenbarung gearbeitet. Letztere ist auch wirklicher Inhalt der positiven Philosophie. Diese Auffassung über die Begrenztheit der rationalen Philosophie kann man im gesammten Schellingschen Werk bestätigen, unabhänging (...) von der Entstehungszeit einzelner Schriften. Deshalb ist man durchaus berechtigt auch in dem früheren Werk zumindest die methodische Vorbereitung zur positiven Philosophie zu betrachten. Demzufolge sieht Schelling seine eigene Rolle in der Philosophiegeschiche als eine vermittelnde und endlich den Parallelismus zwischen der unüberwältigten negativen und unrealisierten positiven Philosophie auflösende. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. This text discusses his philosophical method in his later period, sometimes referred to as morphology.

U tekstu izlažemo rješenje razlike između Wittgensteinove uporabe modela u TLP i modeliranja u PI, RFM i OC temeljem analize razlike u izboru samih riječi i opisa pojmova fenomena u njegovim napomenama. Metoda je pojmovna analiza Wittgensteinova tretiranja znanstvenih modela i modeliranja. Dodatno, tekstualna raščlamba i poredba korištena je pri istraživanju njegovih glavnih napomena na tu temu. Ako je otkrivena razlika između modela i modeliranja i kontinuitet ovisnosti oba pojma o pojmu slike, pri čemu je razlika slike i oslikavanja uzeta (...) kao zadana, zaključujemo kako je Wittgenstein svoj stari pojam modela nastojao inkorporirati u novi pojam modeliranja. Eksplicirana razlika i inkorporiranje pridonosi pojašnjenju teme Wittgensteinovog posrednog i neposrednog utjecaja na filozofiju znanosti. (shrink)

In the paper, the author analyzes and compares cube examples in Wittgenstein’s works, especially the cube from TLP and the cube from PPF. There is no direct evidence that the PPF–cube is a reaction to the “grave mistake” of the TLP–cube. Also, there is no evidence that the TLP–cube is a representation of the Necker’s cube, although it resembles the Jastrow’s cube. These are negative results. Both cubes present important ideas of TLP and PPF. Also, Wittgenstein writes that he “purposely (...) chose” the example of the cube in PI and PPF, perhaps to show one of the “grave mistakes” of the TLP–cube. By analysis of the Necker’s cube and comparison of drawings and accompanied text of the TLP–cube and the PPF–cube the author tries to explicate some possible implicit pictorial aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought and of the general nature philosophical thinking as pictorial. (shrink)

In the paper the author explores the question ‘Did Wittgenstein (re)invent emoticons?’ in three sub-questions. What did he draw and for which purposes? What are emoticons? Are there similarities and differences between his drawings and emoticons? The answers are following. Wittgenstein has drawn faces from the 1930s to the 1940s which are graphically and by use like emoticons. He presented a philosophical problem of interpretation of faces. Emoticons as made of written and typed punctuation marks or as drawings were invented (...) and used centuries before the 1930s, but common and popular use started in the 1960s. Previous inventions were probably unknown to Wittgenstein, and his faces probably didn’t influence later inventions. His faces and emoticons are graphically similar and made with the similar purposes. Differences are that he only used drawings and never written or typed punctuation marks, and he used them to deal with problems of emotions and perception (similar to his problems of the duck-rabbit head). These answers are connected to available textual and interpretative evidence, interpretations are given in propositions from (a) to (p), and summarized in the conclusion (r). Some consequences of visual thinking on philosophical thinking are also drawn in terms of a future research. (shrink)

In the 1st part authors investigate Wittgenstein as the morphologist. They explicate his notion of overview and seeing connections as his description of the method and they also make a few notes on authors which influenced him on this matter . Besides that they summarise some places from Wittgenstein and commentaries regarding his morphological method and some of the obvious applications of it. The main goal is to comment on PI: 122 and GB: 133. Perspicuous presentation seems to be a (...) conceptual investigation which consists in finding similarities and analogies between many and at first glance completely different and disconnected cases which is in fact morphology as a method. In the 2nd part authors investigate Wittgenstein as the morphologist. They discuss the nature of morphology regarding grammar, customs and institutions and try to make sense of advantages and disadvantages of morphology regarding the method of philosophical inquiry. Acknowledging the role of morphology helps us to better understand the later Wittgenstein. It gives us perspicuous presentation of of PI. In the paper they also try to come up with an answer to few important objections to the morphological method by quoting Wittgenstein. That which is morphologically important is organisation of phenomena, their pattern which should be seen in order to be understood. There is also the distinction within the notion of morphology, namely morphology as a method, when it is applied and the morphology as a structure or organisation, when it is explicated from the phenomena. (shrink)

In the paper authors present, examine, and test elements of the vital idea of the philosophical morphology as a method and a technique of philosophical investigation. The paper consists of some applications mostly concerning the method applied by L. Wittgenstein in PI and related later works, and of a series of examples concerning daily phenomena. In the first part the philosophical morphology is explicated as a method, and in the second and in the third part basic “commandments” of morphological technique (...) are described and examined, namely the first one – which says that one should “look-at exhaustively”, and the second one – which says that one should “see-as and describe synoptically”. In these parts some objections and replies to crucial morphological ideas are provided and accompanied with examples. (shrink)

Książka jest poświęcona analizie statusu dowodów matematycznych. Na proces dowodzenia w matematyce można patrzeć jako na pewnego typu argumentację, która jest ujęta w precyzyjnie skodyfikowane reguły. Jednak standardy dowodowe ewoluują, nieuchronnie pojawiają się też w nich elementy uznaniowe - przyjęcie pewnych reguł jako powszechnie akceptowanych odbywa się bowiem na etapie preteoretycznym. Co więcej, dowody matematyczne znane z praktyki odległe są od wersji sformalizowanej. Ta rozbieżność prowadzi do ciekawych problemów filozoficznych. W książce analizowane są: (1) problem relacji między realnymi, znanymi z (...) praktyki dowodami matematycznymi a dowodami traktowanymi jako formalne ciągi symboli (będącymi przedmiotem zainteresowania teorii dowodu), (2) problem rozumienia w matematyce i zagadnienie eksplanacyjnej roli dowodów matematycznych, (3) kwestia empirycznych elementów w dowodach matematycznych i empirycznego zapośredniczenia wiedzy matematycznej. (shrink)