This paper employs theory of normal organizational wrongdoing and investigates the joint effects of management tone and the slippery slope on financial reporting misbehavior. In Study 1, we investigate assumptions about the effects of sliding down the slippery slope and tone at the top on financial executives’ decisions to misreport earnings. Results of Study 1 indicate that executives are willing to engage in misreporting behavior when there is a positive tone set by the Chief Financial Officer, regardless of the presence (...) or absence of a slippery slope. A negative tone set by the CFO does not facilitate the transition from minor indiscretions to financial misreporting. In Study 2, we find that auditors evaluating executives’ decisions under the same conditions as those in Study 1 do not react to the slippery slope condition, but auditors assess higher risks of fraud when the CFO sets a negative tone. Overall, our results indicate that many assumptions about the slippery slope and tone at the top should be questioned. We provide evidence that pro-organizational behaviors and incrementalism yield new insights into the causes of ethical failures, financial misreporting behavior, and failures of corporate governance mechanisms. (shrink)

This study explores how financial executives retrospectively account for their crossing the line into financial statement fraud while acting within or reacting to a financialized corporate environment. We conduct our investigation through face-to-face interviews with 13 former C-suite financial executives who were involved in and indicted for major cases of accounting fraud. Five different themes of accounts emerged from the narratives, characterizing executives’ fraud immersion as a meaning-making process by which the particulars of the proximal social context and individual motivations (...) collectively molded executives’ vocabularies of fraud immersion. Our executives’ narratives portray their fraud entanglement as typically occurring in small, incremental steps. Their accounts expand our understanding of the influence of socialization on executive-level financial fraud beyond the individualized focus of the fraud triangle model. (shrink)

One can remember events and one can remember facts: to remember an event (e.g. the barista's pouring my coffee this morning), one needs to have personally witnessed this event. To remember a fact (e.g. that the barista was trained in Italy), it suffices to have learned this fact from some other source. The distinction between event-directed (i.e. experiential) and fact-directed (or propositional) attitudes is an established distinction in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that is also exemplified by other attitudes (incl. (...) seeing, imagining, and dreaming). Until recently, semantics and the philosophy of language have assumed that experiential attitudes can be more or less straightforwardly reduced to propositional attitudes. However, new work has identified some key properties of experiential attitudes that cast doubt on this reducibility. The present paper discusses the most notable of these properties, focusing on experiential attitude reports. It links these properties to recent developments in formal and philosophical semantics in an effort to foster the development of a rigorous, empirically adequate account of experiential attitudes. (shrink)

Current education paradigms were informed by the classical Newtonian worldview of brain functioning in which the mind is simply the physical activity of the brain, and our thoughts cannot have any effect upon the physical world. However, researchers in the field of quantum mechanics found that the outcomes of certain subatomic experiments are determined by the consciousness of the observer, leading philosophers to propose that the observed and the observer are linked. Quantum mechanics also demonstrates that distant minds may behave (...) in simultaneous correlational ways, in the absence of being linked through any known energetic signal. Further, researchers in this field propose that an external memory space is operating in the human brain, suggesting that this proposed external memory space may be a quantum field surrounding the brain and interacting with other fields, generating a global mental field of information flow. This article proposes that current education paradigms, which have been informed by a classical Newtonian physics worldview may need to be expanded to include a quantum mechanics worldview. The author seeks to understand if, and how, quantum mechanics could inform education practices, theories and paradigms and invites discussion, debate and speculation on the implications this would have for education systems. (shrink)

The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at issue here are not so (...) much conceptual but rather metacognitive abilities. (shrink)

The subject matter of the essay is the autonomy of art, which will be analysed from a Jungian perspective. What Jung had in mind with his notion of the independence of the artistic process is its freedom from the conscious mind of an artist, rather than its independence from the current social, political or cultural conditions. Art, according to Jung, is autonomous if it comes from deeper levels of the human psyche, and that is unconsciousness. To test the validity of (...) Jung’s "autonomous complex", I will be checking the empirical reality of artistic creation, by providing professional artists’ accounts of the creative process. Also, I will challenge the categorically laid and the deeply rooted idea of a close link between artistic talent and mental illness, trying to see if the artistic process can be independent of an artist’s psychological state. In Jung’s view, art happens instead of and not because of potential illness of an artist. Additionally, I am going to contrast his view with Freud’s, for whom an artwork is a sublimation of sexual drive or a product of neurosis. This idea was not acceptable to Jung, as he believed in the existence of not only sexual but also art complex. Finally, I will try to argue that Jung’s view is more accurate in the depiction of artistic process than Freud’s and that his emphasis on the autonomy in art, although radical, deserves more attention from scholars in philosophy and psychology of art. (shrink)

This article reports from the first studies on voluntary childlessness in Sweden and addresses a so far neglected issue – the embodied experiences of childfree women. These childfree women reject and resist pronatalist understandings that conflate being a woman with being a mother. However, instead of explaining their childlessness by external factors, mentioned in previous research, the interviewed women created a positive feminine identity separated from motherhood with reference to their ‘silent bodies’, i.e. bodies without a biological urge to reproduce. (...) Reducing voluntary childlessness to a mere result of biological determinism, the article argues, establishes a legitimate, natural position, less provocative and stigmatized in a pronatalist society. Nevertheless, paradoxically, drawing on biological determinism both challenges and reinstates pronatalism as it builds on the simultaneous acceptance of, and detachment from, the biological reproductive urge. The study hence highlights how persistent the social and cultural link between motherhood and womanhood is, but also how this relationship can be challenged. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to do the following: I will discuss the notions of intentionality and self-understanding of Dasein as developed in Heidegger's Basic Problems of Phenomenology. In doing so, I will try to show the interrelation of Dasein's always being intentionally directed towards something and its self-interpretation. As we will see, the everyday world has, for Heidegger, a character of "equipmental contexture." This means that Dasein returns to itself from out of things, equipment, tools, or - quite differently (...) - the work of art. In a word, Dasein is mirrored back toward itself from the things made, from the products of techne. From this will follow the important distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. There is a sense in which the following pairings could be discerned: tools or pieces of equipment link up with inauthenticity, while the work of art links up with authenticity. I will say more on the subject of tools a bit later in the essay. Both kinds of things are things insofar as they are entrenched in techne. The common root seems almost inexplicable in the light of the vast difference between tools and the artwork. Moreover, both Dasein and techne seem to have another equally enigmatic common root: that of temporality. Temporality is the essential bond between Dasein and the double sense of techne, which suggests the double-sidedness of temporality itself. It is precisely this doublesidedness that I would like to have as the backdrop to my discussion as a whole. Finally, I will turn to a few pages of Heidegger's Being and Time and Bernard Stiegler's book Technics and Time I in order to complicate this notion of the two senses of temporality, the owned and disowned, originary and everyday, and its relation to work and techne. The overarching question here will be: Can the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity be sustained? (shrink)

Current empirical work suggests that early social experiences could have a substantial impact on the areas of the brain responsible for representation of the body. In this context, one aspect of functioning that may be particularly susceptible to social experiences is interoception. Interoceptive functioning has been linked to several areas of the brain which show protracted post-natal development, thus leaving a substantial window of opportunity for environmental input to impact the development of the interoceptive network. We first introduce a biopsychosocial (...) model of interoceptive development. In our proposed model of interoceptive development, attachment related processes are purported to affect the development of interoception by influencing the growth of neural architecture and by modifying functioning of the HPA axis. Further, the idea that patterns of caretaking affect children’s development of interoception is presented. This model explains both normatively developing interoception and accounts for instances in which dysfunctional attachment related processes can lead to either a hypersensitivity or a blunted awareness of bodily cues. Second, we report findings from two existing datasets showing significant relationships between attachment related processes and interoception. In the first study, looking at a sample of healthy young adults (n = 132, 66 males), we assessed self-reported interoceptive awareness and attachment style. We found relationships between aspects of interoception and attachment style such that avoidant individuals reported lower interoceptive functioning across several dimensions (r’s (130) = -.20 to -.26, p’s<.05). More anxious individuals, on the other hand, reported heightened interoceptive across several dimensions (r’s(130)=.18 to.43, p’s <.05). In the second study, we examined the congruence between a person’s self-reported negative emotion and a measure of sympathetic nervous system arousal (SCL). The congruence score was positively associated with parental rejection of negative emotion. These results suggest that parenting style, as reported by the mother, are associated with a child’s ability to coordinate their self-reported emotional and physiological responding across a series of independent assessments, r(108)= -.24, p<.05. In other words, the more maternal reported parental rejection of child negative emotions, the less congruent a child’s self and physiological reports of distress. (shrink)

Background and purpose Educators’ ethical competence is of crucial importance for developing students’ ethical thinking. Previous studies describe educators’ ethical codes and principles. This article aims to widen the understanding of health- and social care educators’ ethical competence in relation to core values and ethos. Theoretical background and key concepts The study is based on the didactics of caring science and theoretically links the concepts ethos and competence. Methods Data material was collected from nine educational units for healthcare and social (...) service in Finland. In total 16 semi-structured focus group interviews with 48 participants were conducted. The interviews were analysed with a thematic analysis according to Braun and Clarke. Ethical considerations The study is approved by the Declaration of Helsinki, the legislation regarding personal data and the General Data Protection Regulation. The study received ethical permission from the University of Jyväskylä. Informed consent was obtained from all the educational units and participants in the study. Findings The findings are presented based on three general patterns, an ethical basic motive, an ethical bearing and ethical actions. Subthemes are Humane view of students as unique individuals with individual learning, Bearing of tactfulness and firmness, Bearing of perceptiveness and accessibility, Bearing of satisfaction and joy over student learning, Valuing bearing towards each oneself and colleagues, Ability to interact and flexibility, Collegiality and a supportive work community and Educators as role models and inspirators. Conclusion Educators’ personal and professional ethos is crucial to student learning, personal growth and ethical reasoning. Therefore, it is important to further develop educators’ training regarding ethical competence. (shrink)

Unfortunately, business is often associated with unethical behavior. While research has offered a number of explanations for why business might encourage unethical behavior, we argue that how a person frames a situation may provide important insight. Drawing on the decision frame literature, the goal of the current research is to identify the differences in cognitive processing associated with two decision frames dominant in the business ethics literature—business and ethical—and, with that knowledge, examine ways to mitigate the detrimental influence of frame (...) on unethical behavior. We first demonstrate the causal link between frame and misrepresentation, and then identify several differences in cognitive processing—cost–benefit analyses, concern for others, and construal level—that distinguish business and ethical frames, and investigate their effects on misrepresentation. In our final set of studies, we demonstrate that the influence of these frames on misrepresentation can be altered by manipulating these cognitive processes, both mitigating and exacerbating a decision maker’s engagement in misrepresentation. We conclude by summarizing our findings and their potential impact on unethical behavior more broadly. (shrink)

Acute aerobic exercise has been shown to improve fine motor skills and alter activation of the motor cortex. The intensity of exercise may influence M1 activation, and further impact whole-body motor skill performance. The aims of the current study were to compare a whole-body motor skill via a piano task following moderate-intensity training and high-intensity interval training, and to determine if M1 activation is linked to any such changes in performance. Nine subjects, aged 18 ± 1 years completed a control, (...) MIT, and HIIT trial followed by administration of a piano performance task. M1 activation was evaluated by measuring oxyhemoglobin and hemoglobin difference changes during post-exercise piano performance using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. The results indicate that piano performance scores were higher after the MIT trial, but not HIIT trial, compared to the control trial. A negative relationship was detected between heart rate during HIIT and post-HIIT piano scores. M1 activation was significantly increased after the HIIT trial. M1 activation was also positively associated with piano performance when exercise trials and all trials were combined. We found that acute moderate-intensity exercise led to an improvement in complex motor skill performance while higher-intensity exercise increased M1 activation. These results demonstrate that moderate-intensity exercise can prime the nervous system for the acquisition of whole-body motor skills, suggesting that similar exercise protocols may be effective in improving the outcomes of other motor tasks performed during regular routines of daily life. In addition, it appears that improvements in motor task performance may be driven by M1 activation. Our findings provide new mechanistic insight into the complex relationship between exercise intensity, M1 activation, and whole-body motor skill performance. (shrink)

In this book, Kristina Musholt offers a novel theory of self-consciousness, understood as the ability to think about oneself. Traditionally, self-consciousness has been central to many philosophical theories. More recently, it has become the focus of empirical investigation in psychology and neuroscience. Musholt draws both on philosophical considerations and on insights from the empirical sciences to offer a new account of self-consciousness—the ability to think about ourselves that is at the core of what makes us human. -/- Examining theories (...) of nonconceptual content developed in recent work in the philosophy of cognition, Musholt proposes a model for the gradual transition from self-related information implicit in the nonconceptual content of perception and other forms of experience to the explicit representation of the self in conceptual thought. A crucial part of this model is an analysis of the relationship between self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Self-consciousness and awareness of others, Musholt argues, are two sides of the same coin. -/- After surveying the philosophical problem of self-consciousness, the notion of nonconceptual content, and various proposals for the existence of nonconceptual self-consciousness, Musholt argues for a non-self-representationalist theory, according to which the self is not part of the representational content of perception and bodily awareness but part of the mode of presentation. She distinguishes between implicitly self-related information and explicit self-representation, and describes the transitions from the former to the latter as arising from a complex process of self–other differentiation. By this account, both self-consciousness and intersubjectivity develop in parallel. (shrink)

The main thesis of this article is that in Christian Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik, empirical sources of knowledge play important if not foundational roles and that inductive methods of reasoning are extensively applied. It is argued that experiential self-awareness plays a foundational role and that empirical evidence, phenomena, and scientific theories from the empirical sciences of Wolff’s time are used for inferential purposes. Wolff also makes use of inductive reasoning, i.e., abduction to hidden causes of empirical phenomena, and inferences to the (...) best or to the only possible explanation. Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik is therefore a prefiguration and an interesting case of inductive metaphysics in the contemporary sense. From this contemporary perspective, Wolff draws the distinction between valid and speculative abductions in a different way – but it is also different from that of his more empirically oriented contemporaries. (shrink)

This introduction consists of two parts. In the first part, the special issue editors introduce inductive metaphysics from a historical as well as from a systematic point of view and discuss what distinguishes it from other modern approaches to metaphysics. In the second part, they give a brief summary of the individual articles in this special issue.

A lively debate has emerged regarding the ethics of using biomedical technologies to alter feelings of love. Earp and Savulescu et al. generally argue that biotechnologies can be ethically used to enhance or diminish feelings they call “love,” a term they use to describe feelings of lust, attraction and attachment in adult romantic relationships. McGee’s intervention in this debate, as I understand it, is to argue that not all of the feelings categorized as “love” by Earp and Savulescu et al. (...) should actually be considered “love properly so called.” According to McGee, these “not... (shrink)

This paper argues that while regulatory frameworks in aged care authorise restraints to protect vulnerable persons living with dementia from harm, they also serve as normalising practices to control challenging monstrous Others. This argument emerges out of an observed unease in aged care discourse where older people living with dementia are described as ‘vulnerable’, while dementia behaviours are described as ‘challenging’. Using narrative analysis on a case study from the Final Report of the Australian Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality (...) and Safety (RCAC), this paper investigates how the RCAC (re)produced constructions of persons with dementia as ‘vulnerable monsters’. Drawing upon monstrous theory about ‘unruly and leaky’ bodies, extracts from the case study reveal how the RCAC repeated and reinforced monstrous constructions of dementia. Dementia behaviours, particularly ‘wandering’, were constructed through a dehumanising crisis frame that produced ‘challenging’ bodies and legitimised ‘last resort’ normalising practices, such as physical and chemical restraints. In failing to resist monstrous constructions of dementia behaviours, the RCAC accepted and authorised a regime of scaled responses leading to restrictive practices for control of challenging bodies in aged care. Although dementia care and restrictive practices received substantial attention in the RCAC, this paper reveals a missed opportunity for deeper review of institutionalised use of restraints that has relevance for ongoing reform of Australian aged care following conclusion of the RCAC. (shrink)

When perceiving a face, we can easily decide whether it belongs to a human or non-human primate. It is thought that face information is represented by neurons in the macaque temporal cortex. However, the precise encoding mechanisms used by these neurons remain unclear. Here we use face stimuli of humans, monkeys and monkey-human hybrids (morphs) to gain a better understanding of these mechanisms, in particular of the categorization of faces into different species, and how learning affects representation of these stimuli.

While triage protocols share a common goal—maximizing life by selecting patients who would most benefit from critical care—there are many variations in the selection of criterion to respond to situ...

Baranova, J., Duoblienė, L., 2020. Filosofija vaikams ir multimodalus ugdymas. Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 223 p. ISBN 978-609-07-0423-3 Recenzentė Kristina Petrošienė.

The tension between economic policy and health policy is a longstanding dilemma, but one that was brought to the fore with the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement in 1994. The pharmaceutical industry has long argued that intellectual property protection is vital for innovation. At the same time, there are those who counter that strong IPP negatively impacts the affordability and availability of essential medicines in developing countries. However, actors on both sides of the debate were (...) in agreement that something needed to be done to address the HIV/AIDS crisis, especially in developing countries. In response to sustained and significant pressure from civil society groups, members of the World Trade Organization agreed to the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 2001. The Declaration clarified that countries unable to manufacture the needed pharmaceuticals could obtain more affordable generics elsewhere if necessary. (shrink)

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) demonstrate poor social functioning, which may be related to atypical emotional face processing. Altered functional connectivity among brain regions, particularly involving limbic structures may be implicated. The current magnetoencephalography (MEG) study investigated whole-brain functional connectivity of eight a priori identified brain regions during the implicit presentation of happy and angry faces in 20 7 to 10-year-old children with ASD and 22 typically developing controls. Findings revealed a network of increased alpha-band phase synchronization during the (...) first 400 ms of happy face processing in children with ASD compared to controls. This network of increased alpha-band phase synchronization involved the left fusiform gyrus, right insula, and frontal regions critical for emotional face processing. In addition, greater connectivity strength of the left fusiform gyrus (maximal 85 to 208 ms) and right insula (maximal 73 to 270 ms) following happy face presentation in children with ASD compared to typically developing controls was found. These findings reflect altered neuronal communication in children with ASD only to happy faces during implicit emotional face processing. (shrink)

Ever since Jonathan Bennett wrote about Huckleberry Finn's conscience in 1974, Mark Twain's young hero has played a small but noteworthy role in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literature. Following Bennett, philosophers read Huck as someone who consistently follows his heart and does the right thing in a pinch, firmly believing all the while that what he does is morally wrong.1 Specifically, according to this reading, Huck has racist beliefs that he never consciously questions; but in practice he consistently (...) defies those beliefs to do the right thing in the context of his relationship with his Black companion, Jim. Because of this, Huck is morally admirable, but unusual. Perhaps he is an "inverse... (shrink)

This paper inquiries into the complex issue of informed consent applying artificial intelligence in medical diagnostic consultations. The aim is to expose the main ethical and legal concerns of the New Health phenomenon, powered by intelligent machines. To achieve this objective, the first part of the paper analyzes ethical aspects of the alleged right to explanation, privacy, and informed consent, applying artificial intelligence in medical diagnostic consultations. This analysis is followed by a legal analysis of the limits and requirements for (...) the explainability of artificial intelligence. Followed by this analysis, recommendations for action are given in the concluding remarks of the paper. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article I examine Axel Honneth’s positive theory of recognition. While commentators agree that Honneth’s theory qualifies as a positive theory of recognition, I believe that the deeper reason for why this is an apt characterisation is not yet fully understood. I argue that, instead of considering only what it is to recognise another person and what it means for a person to be recognised, we need to focus our attention on how Honneth pictures the practice of recognition as (...) a whole, which according to him works to make societies into places of greater freedom. This conception of recognition as a freedom-enhancing practice is supposed to provide a solution to a key problem of Frankfurt School critical theory, namely of how to determine the emancipatory practice in which critical theory is rooted, which becomes apparent as soon as one turns to the context in which Honneth originally develops his theory of recognition. At the end of the article, I offer a few reasons for doubting the overly positive picture of the practice of recognition that Honneth provides us with. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to describe the use of cognitive convenience in color naming and to find possible cognitive, physical, pragmatic, and logical reasons for such a phenomenon. By the term cognitive convenience, we mean the naming of or referring to objects of a certain color, for which their hue is not as important as their brightness, in which case, they might fall under another focal color. For example, in various languages, grapes are “white” and “black”, even though (...) their real hue is usually a certain shade of green or purple. Along with a brief typological comparison of examples of cognitive convenience in unrelated languages, we report the results of a survey demonstrating that vagueness and brightness context influenced color naming, thus confirming our main hypotheses. We concluded that in conversation, the main criterion for choosing and identifying a referent of an NP with a color adjective—when the choice is based on color—is the proximity of its shade to the prototypical shade of the named color. In this process, contextual factors may affect the speaker’s and hearer’s preciseness. We claim that this phenomenon can be explained not only from a philosophical and pragmatic standpoint, but from an information-entropy standpoint as well. For an overall unifying theory, we will connect the informational entropy to the pragmatic notion of semantic vagueness and then inspect the overall choice of a fuzzy predicate logic that is able to incorporate such references. (shrink)

This article presents a typology of discursive discrimination, discrimination carried out through the use of language. It is argued that such a typology should fulfil certain criteria in order to be useful for empirical research. The proposed typology consists of four main concepts: (1) exclusion from discourse; (2) negative other-presentation; (3) objectification; and (4) proposals pointing towards unfavourable non-linguistic treatment. The related concept of othering - the creation of a psychological distance to people understood to belong to groups others than (...) ‘us’ - is also presented. The manner in which the different forms of discursive discrimination and othering can be operationalized is demonstrated through examples from empirical studies of discourses of people categorized as mentally deficient, as deaf, and as immigrants in public debate in Sweden in the past 75 years. (shrink)

Summary The article aims at addressing a sport sociological research desideratum: the question of acting in sport. So far, this question has mainly been dealt with in human kinetics and sport psychology. Here, action theories refer to action as a rational-reflective and individual phenomenon whose cognitive and ideational foundations must be given particular attention. Recently, however, the focus has begun to be shifted to embodied, pre-reflective, and relational dimensions of action in these sub-disciplines of sport science. Similar reorientations can be (...) observed in sociology, where the mentalism and individualism inherent in action theories is undermined by practice theories emphasizing the bodily, tacit, and collective properties of practice. Practice theories promise additional advances and insights into practical action in sport insofar as they explicitly take into account dimensions of practice widely abstracted from by approaches of human kinetics and sport psychology. By means of a praxeological reflection of the existing approaches to action in sport, the article identifies their blind spots and presents initial ideas for overcoming them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Sanctity of Life—The Sanctity of ChoiceKristina HallettWhat do you do when helping someone means advocating for his death?I am a Board Certified Clinical Psychologist and have been in practice since 1993. I entered the field, as most do, to be of assistance and support to people in dealing with the difficult, the unimaginable, and the often painful circumstances of life. The goal has always been simple: to help. (...) The manner may differ, but the central goal is the same: to help. I have encountered many challenging situations in my work: times when I felt unbelievably sad upon hearing someone’s story; when I felt righteous indignation at injustices encountered; when I worried for someone’s safety; when I laughed and rejoiced in someone’s experience. In each of these situations the path to helping was clear of moral dilemma. But what about when helping results in execution – the state enforcing the legally imposed punishment of the death penalty? While some decisions involve the potential for moral and emotional distress, there is usually a way of understanding “helping” as giving voice to an individual’s right to choose. What do you do when helping someone means advocating for his death as punishment?Several years ago while I worked for a state Department of Corrections (DOC), an inmate on death row was executed. The state had not conducted an execution for decades. I was the Supervising Psychologist for the DOC facility, and as such it was my role to facilitate mental health treatment for this inmate. I was also the liaison to DOC custody staff regarding policies, treatment, and the impact of the process of an execution on staff, the involved inmate and other inmates in the facility. The DOC staffers were split in their views of the situation. Some staff were adamantly opposed to the death penalty, a portion were relatively neutral and the largest number of staff were strong proponents of the death penalty—some to the point of relishing the execution.He had confessed and been convicted of heinous crimes, including the rapes and murders of several young women. Innocence was not a question. He readily admitted his responsibility for these crimes. The legal process was long and involved, including several different trials and penalty hearings, all with the same result: he was sentenced to death. Now all mandatory appeals associated with the death penalty were exhausted. Having already spent a great many years on death row, he did not want to pursue further appeals. He made the “choice” to [End Page 95] not file a voluntary appeal and instead to proceed with the death penalty process.It is a curious thing, but when the required appeals (the checks and balances of the legal system) were completed and this man said, “I want to proceed with the imposition of my sentence,” all the rules changed. This individual, who had been competent to assist in his defense and his appeals to fight his sentence for over twenty years, was suddenly seen as “incompetent” to choose to accept his sentence. Opponents of the death penalty viewed execution as “state–assisted suicide” and believed the inmate had “death row syndrome,” and therefore was not competent to make the decision to move forward with his sentence. Those who agreed with the death penalty believed he was fully competent and supported the completion of his sentence through lethal injection. And then there was me.I had always been against the death penalty. From a moral perspective, I believed in the sanctity of life, that we do not have the right to take the life of another human being. I shared in others’ horror and outrage at horrific crimes, but felt justice belonged to the legal system (through incarceration) and to God. I did not believe in retribution or revenge, although I supported consequences and accountability. I argued against the death penalty in high school debates, college round–table discussions and in theoretical conversations with my peers, family and friends.When faced with this situation as a psychologist, I found myself splitting a very fine hair. I did not support the death penalty, but I did support the ability of... (shrink)