The English Synopsis is after the text of the book. The book presents an original and generalizing substantive vision of the philosophy of science through the prism of a detailed analysis of the polysystem structure of scientific theories. Theories are considered, firstly, as complex specialized forms of developed scientific thinking about the realities studied by natural science, secondly, as constantly improving tools for producing new knowledge in interaction with experimental research, and thirdly, as carriers of ordered and verified knowledge. Emphasis (...) is placed on their nominal and ontic subsystems. The book develops personal and joint research of the authors (theoretical physicist and philosopher), the experience of teaching philosophy of physics at NaUKMA, philosophy of science at the Higher School of Philosophy at the H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and theoretical physics at the National Technical University "Ihor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute". The research is based on a significant source base covering works of modern Western researchers in natural science and philosophy of science. For students, teachers, and scientists who are interested in the problems of modern philosophy of science and have a certain amount of scientific knowledge. It will also be useful for high school students who are eager to become scientists. (shrink)

Popper’s popular critics – Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos – replace his older, Wittgenstein-style critics, now defunct. His new critics played with the idea of criticism as beneficial, in vain search of variants of these that could better appeal to the public. Some of their criticism of Popper is valid but marginal for the dispute about rationality. He was Fallibilist; they hedged about it. He viewed learning from experience as learning from error; they were unclear about it. His view resembles (...) Freud’s reality principle; they hedged about this too, as they defended the stupid idea of constructive criticism. He stressed his criticism of the view of science as inductive; they endorsed it. They differed from him significantly regarding their intended readers: he had addressed those who readily admit criticism and his popular critics addressed those who find it hard to admit openly that criticism upsets them somewhat. Current popular criticism of Popper’s ideas shows yet again the logical relation between the critical attitude and liberalism: liberalism without critically mindedness is permissible, scarcely the other way around. Hence, we better read the objection that Popper’s popular critics have launched against him not as criticism proper, but as somewhat reasonable protest against his use of the highest standards in his relentless advocacy of liberalism and of criticism in his valuation of science and of democracy as joint. (shrink)

스티브 풀러를 비롯한 일부 학자들은 쿤과 비트겐슈타인의 철학이 하나의 전통에 대한 무비판적인 추종을 옹호함으로써 보수적인 귀결을 가진다고 주장한 바 있다. 나는 다음의 논증을 통해 그들의 해석이 적절치 않음을 보일 것이다. 쿤과 비트겐슈타인이 모종의 전통에 대한 추종 없이 유의미한 활동이 불가능함을 주장한 것은 맞지만, 그들은 우리가 여러 전통을 옮겨다니는 여행자가 될 수 있다는 점을 부정하지 않았다. 이러한 여행자들은 모든 전통으로부터 초월적인 관점을 획득하지 않고도, 다양한 전통에 참여함으로써 각각의 전통이 가진 상대적인 장점과 단점을 드러낼 수 있다. 나의 반론에 대해 풀러는 이러한 여행자의 (...) 비판이 진정한 힘을 가지려면 현재 상태의 불가피성을 거부해야 한다고 주장할 텐데, 나는 장하석의 반사실적 역사를 검토함으로써 풀러의 제안이 가진 양면성을 밝힐 것이다. (shrink)

Different conceptions of scientific theories, such as the state spaces approach of Bas van Fraassen, the phase spaces approach of Frederick Suppe, the set-theoretical approach of Patrick Suppes, and the structuralist view of Joseph Sneed et al. are usually put together into one big family. In addition, the definite article is normally used, and thus we speak of the semantic conception of theories and of its different approaches . However, in The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism , starting (...) from certain remarks already made in “Theory Structure” , Current Research in Philosophy of Science, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979, pp. 317–338), Frederick Suppe excludes the structuralist view as well as other “European” versions from the semantic conception of theories. In this paper I will critically examine the reasons put forward by Suppe for this decision and, later, I will provide a general characterization of the semantic family and of the structuralist view of theories in such a way as to justify the inclusion of the structuralist view as a member of this family. (shrink)

In our century, the philosophy of science has been overshadowed by two towering figures: Popper and Wittgenstein, both Viennese emigrants, who have become subjects to the Queen (cf., e.g., Radnitzky [1987a] Entre Wittgenstein et Popper ... ). The discussion has been structured by two great controversies: from the 30s Popper versus logical positivism (or falsificationism versus verificationism/probabilism), and from the 60s 'the new philosophy of science' versus Critical Rationalism. (Exemplary contributions to thes two controversies can be found, e.g., (...) in the two collections Radnitzky and Andersson (eds.) [1978], Progress... Science, and [1979], Structure...Science.) Wittgenstein's Tractatus has been the idee directrice of the Vienna Circle and its successor, Logical Empiricism. The cynosure of 'the new philosophy of science' is Wittgenstein's later philosophy as presented, in particular, in his Philosophical Investigations. If you apply it to the philosophy of science, you will view 'normative' methodology as a counterpart of ideal language philosophy, and hence regard any methodological prescriptions as unrealistic and claim that philosophy of science cannot do more than describe the practice of science, preferably in terms of case studies culled from the history of science. You will be placed on the road to relativism (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hiibner, and others). An interesting variant of relativism is Stegmiiller's attempt, with the help of the formal methods developed by Sneed, to give Kuhn's results a more exact form (Sneed, Stegmiiller, Moulines, Mostarin)-what Feyerabend has called 'the Sneedification of science'. Today, departments of philosophy of science are dominated by philosophers who either sympathize with logical empiricism or with 'the new philosophy of science'. Critical Rationalism has an outsider position, but enjoys the sympathy of many scientists (Bartley [1989], Unfathomed Knowledge .. .; see also Bartley [198 7b], 'Philosophy of biology ... ', and Munz [1987], ' ... the mirror of Rorty'). (shrink)

We establish a connection between T. Kuhn’s philosophy of science and a Wittgensteinian contextual realism, as we understand it, and interpret the basic concepts of the former in terms of the latter. In particular, we interpret the notion of a scientific paradigm in terms of the notion of a form of life. For instance, we speak of Newtonian and quantum mechanics as grammars of the corresponding forms of life. The incommensurability of paradigms is due to the adoption of different norms (...) (grammars). It is not absolute, as grammatical statements can change their status and become factual, and vice versa. Norms themselves evolve. We support Kuhn’s argument against Popper’s falsification principle with our interpretation of an established scientific theory as a Wittgensteinian norm (rule) for measuring reality. The norm is neither true nor false; its falsification makes no sense. We interpret Wittgenstein’s notion of a family resemblance, used by Kuhn, as the presence of a shared explicit or implicit Wittgensteinian rule (norm). We interpret Kuhn’s historical examples, in particular those with the systems of Ptolemy and Copernicus, relativity theory and quantum mechanics, and Kuhn’s view that participants in different paradigms see the world differently and that observation depends on theory, in terms of our thesis that ontology is sensitive to context. We thus resist the relativistic and constructivist interpretations of Kuhn’s position and show why it does not contradict the idea of scientific progress and the principle of correspondence between scientific theories. We also briefly compare Kuhn’s position with those of I. Lakatos, H. Chang (pragmatic realism) and J. MacFarlane (evaluative relativism), and compare our interpretation of Kuhn with his interpretation in terms of a naturalized transcendentalism proposed by M. Massimi. (shrink)

The paper deals with Kuhn’s and Lakatos’s ideas related to the so-called “historical turn” and its application to the philosophy of mathematics. In the first part the meaning of the term “postpositivism” is specified. If we lack such a specification we can hardly discuss the philosophy of science that comes “after postpositivism”. With this end in view, the metaphor of “generations” in the philosophy of science is used. It is proposed that we restrict the use of the term “post-positivism” to (...) two and only two philosophical “generations”: the one to which Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend belong, and the previous “generation” to which Wittgenstein, Polanyi, Popper and Quine (as well as the major part of logical positivists) belong. From this point of view, Bloor, Latour, Pickering, Daston and Galison belong to the “third generation” which represents the philosophy of science “after post-positivism”. The characteristic feature of post-positivism is the combination of decisive impact of logical positivism and its severe criticism. This combination inevitably makes post-positivism a transitional form in the philosophy of science. In the second part the contribution of the “big four” of post-positivist philosophers (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend) to the radical change in the philosophy of mathematics in the second half of the 20th century is analyzed. Primarily, they shifted philosophical interest from the logical analysis of formal systems to the historical dynamics of informal mathematics. They also reconsidered the sharp opposition between mathematics and the physical sciences. However, the transitional character of their philosophy manifests itself both in their treatment of mathematics and their way of understanding history. On the one hand, their “heritage” is ambiguous, on the other hand, it opens new perspectives. Neither Kuhn, nor Lakatos, have eliminated completely the methodological barrier positing the fundamental heterogeneity of mathematics and natural science. Neither Lakatos, nor Kuhn, adhered to the viewpoint of relentless historicism. Nevertheless, it is their work that has made these options open for today’s historians and philosophers of science, even for philosophers of mathematics. (shrink)

On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term (...) theoryThen we narrow our attention to one particular theory,namely quantum mechanics, in order to elucidate general matters discussed. We prove that quantum mechanics is irrefutable in a rather straightforward sense, but argue that it is refutable in a more sophisticated sense, which incorporates someobservations obtained by looking closely at the practiceof physics. We shall locate exactly where non-rigourous elements enter the evaluation of a scientific theory – thismakes us see clearly how fruitful mathematics isfor the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Perhaps it is a measure of the controversy that Popper has evoked that this should be the first two-volume addition to Schilpp’s library. Certainly the thirty-three discursive and critical essays emanate from a galaxy of philosophical and other stars: Kraft, Kneale, Quine, Putnam, Lakatos, Medawar, Maxwell, Levison, Bar-Hillel, Eccles, Watkins, Campbell, Freeman & Skolimowski, Feigl & Meehl, Musgrave, Bernays, Bronowski, Lejewski, Schlesinger, Ayer, Agassi, Settle, Margenau, Suppes, Grünbaum, Kuhn, Wisdom, Boyle, Wild, Acton, Winch, Donagan, and Gombrich. The LLP faces a (...) problem, given that it takes a long time to mature a significant philosopher, for the project always teeters on the brink of human mortality; indeed, quite a few of the above contributors themselves are now defunct. It is therefore a pleasure to have a volume devoted to a philosopher whose work is very much alive, as is evidenced by the recent publication of Popper’s works on quantum theory and the Postscript to his Logic of Scientific Discovery. Moreover these volumes bring into salience the fundamental value of this style of publication that centers on written intellectual debate. Intellectuals in modern culture, especially in the United States, are sadly dispersed—there is not an abundance of discussion groups—so it is volumes like these that allow the isolate the linkages to sustained erudite exploration. So fruitful is this style of publication, that we find it emulated recently in such journals as Current Anthropology and The Brain and Behavioral Sciences. At least on paper, philosophical debate and exploration need not involve personal antipathy. Here, on the contrary, in the focusing on crucial issues, is the opportunity for personal sympathy and the struggle for mutual understanding. For methodological reasons centered on his concept of rationality, Popper has actively sought out intellectual controversy and these two volumes are therefore his natural milieu. Yet Popper has expressed a reluctance to write quickly and perhaps this explains why these volumes were a long time in the making. Certainly some of the papers such as Putnam’s “The ‘Corroboration’ of Theories” and Campbell’s “Evolutionary Epistemology” have had wide currency for some time now. But much that is good in these two volumes remains to be recognized, not the least of which is Popper’s “Intellectual Autobiography.” These 181 pages give the reader an inspiring impression of an intellect struggling after truth. Since Popper’s work has spanned the intellectual currents of the twentieth century and, in fact, dominated some of them, it would be difficult for this autobiography to fail. Popper’s writing has always struck this reviewer as an embodiment of Bacon’s maxim that truth will emerge more readily from error than from confusion, for he strives after simplicity and clarity in his writing with the consequence that disagreement is more closely focused. In this, he has lived out his central concept of critical rationality. At a more mundane level, there are all-too-human moments recorded, such as Popper’s reception at Oxbridge. Besides some enjoyable anecdotes, there is a little gentle self-mockery too. (shrink)

I respond to Rupert Read's highly critical review of my Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul Science . In contrast to my pro-Popper take on the debate, Read promotes a Wittgenstein-inflected Kuhn, whom I dub "Kuhnenstein." Kuhnenstein is largely the figment of Read's—and others'—fertile philosophical imagination as channeled through scholastic philosophical practice. Contra Read, I argue that Kuhnenstein provides not only a poor basis for social epistemology but Kuhnenstein's prominence itself exemplifies a poor social epistemology for philosophy. (...) Nevertheless, like Read, I wish to speak in favor of amateurism in philosophy; for me, the exemplar is the dialectical Popper rather than the gnomic and dogmatic Kuhnenstein. Key Words: Kuhnenstein • social epistemology • Kuhn • Popper • Wittgenstein • skepticism • language therapy • amateurism. (shrink)

SummaryIn this essay I critically discuss the views of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend on the succession of scientific theories. I argue that, if Karl Popper's desiderata for theory succession are properly explicated, they constitute a basis for refuting the “incommensurability“ thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Popper's claim that a new theory must constitute an “improvement” over the old implies that the new theory must be able to be interpreted as referring to most of the phenomena as its predecessor.RésuméDans cet (...) essai, je discute les vues de Thomas Kuhn et de Paul Feyerabend sur la succession des théories scientifiques. Je montre que si les desiderata de Karl Popper pour la succession des théories sont correctement explicités, ils constituent une base pour réfuter la thèse ?incommen‐surabilité de Kuhn et de Feyerabend. Ľexigence de Popper selon laquelle une nouvelle théorie doit améliorer la précédente implique que la nouvelle théorie doit pouvoir être interprétée comme se référant à une plus grande part des phénoménes que ses prédécesseurs.ZusammenfassungIn der vorliegenden Arbeit werden Thomas Kuhns und Paul Feyerabends Auffassungen über die Frage, wie wissenschaftliche Theorien sich ablösen und folgen, erörtert. Ich zeige, dass Karl Poppers Forderungen für einen rationalen Theorienwechsel, wenn einmal richtig erläutert, eine Grundlage fiir die Widerlegung der Inkommensurabilitätsthese von Kuhn und Feyerabend lie‐fern. Proppers Forderung, dass eine neue Theorie gegenüber der alten eine Verbesserung darstellen müsse, impliziert, dass die neue Theorie so interpretiert werden kann, dass sie sich auf die meisten Phänomene bezieht, von denen auch in der Vorgängerin die Rede war. (shrink)

Four current accounts of theory reduction are presented, first informally and then formally: (1) an account of direct theory reduction that is based on the contributions of Nagel, Woodger, and Quine, (2) an indirect reduction paradigm due to Kemeny and Oppenheim, (3) an "isomorphic model" schema traceable to Suppes, and (4) a theory of reduction that is based on the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. Reference is made, in an attempt to choose between these schemas, to the explanation of (...) physical optics by Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, and to the revisions of genetics necessitated by partial biochemical reductions of genetics. A more general reduction schema is proposed which: (1) yields as special cases the four reduction paradigms considered above, (2) seems to be in better accord with both the canons of logic and actual scientific practice, and (3) clarifies the problems of meaning variance and ontological reduction. (shrink)

Karl Popper’s Objective Knowledge stands at the threshold of his last major philosophical phase, the period from his retirement from the London School of Economics in 1969 until his death in 1994. The two great books that he wrote before he came to London, Logik der Forschung and The Open Society and Its Enemies, contain much more than the innovations in the theory of scientific method and the theory of democracy for which they are famous. Logik der Forschung, translated into (...) English as The Logic of Scientific Discovery, is by no means just a tract, even a revolutionary one, on the methods of science, since about one third of the text is devoted to searchingly original treatments of the frequency theory of probability and of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, whilst the unpublished manuscript on which the book was based, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie, at whose content it often hints, presents a wealth of significant material on the psychology of human learning and its biological context. Popper had, after all, been a student of Karl B¨uhler, and had absorbed the theories of problem solving developed within the W¨urzburg School. The Open Society and Its Enemies, for its part, is not so much a book defending democratic liberalism as a defence of democratic liberalism nestling within a book that discusses every other topic under the sun. It offers profound and provocative studies of the thought of Plato and Marx, an abundance of scholarly, if often controversial, historical interpretations of the work of Heraclitus, Aristotle, Hegel, J. S. Mill, Wittgenstein, Mannheim, and others, the elements of a new theory of rationality, and many elucidations of the workings of science that go beyond what is explicit in Logik der Forschung. One insight worth mentioning, since it is little known, is the clear recognition in section II of Chapter 11 that most important advances in science are revolutionary, not cumulative; a commonplace today perhaps, but one that many philosophers attribute to Kuhn. Another insight, also often forgotten, is the emphasis in Chapter 23 on the social character of science, which acts as the main custodian of its claim to objectivity. (shrink)

The present article, more than to deepen in the polemic classic Popper - Kuhn regarding the progress of the science, seeks to indicate some fundamental pillars that should be kept in mind as possibility for the elaboration of a curriculum in the teaching of the sciences. It is rescued of this discus..

In his article, Jakub Lampart addresses the social, cultural, and historical functions of various forms of knowledge (and of science in particular) as they can be reconstructed on the basis of the few descriptive remarks found in Paul Feyerabend’s works in the three periods of his scholarly career: moderate, transitional, and radical. Lampart interprets Feyerabend’s views on the relationship between knowledge and society as influenced by the following: the early concepts of Karl Popper (in the moderate period), some of the (...) theses of Benjamin L. Whorf and the late Ludwig Wittgenstein (in the radical period). The article also contains: a) a juxtaposition of Feyerabend’s views with the theories of these thinkers; (b) an attempt to explain Feyerabend’s use of the term “ideology”; (c) a description of two trends characterizing different systems of knowledge: isolation and interaction; d) a description of the two types of ideal members of a given tradition: rationalists and pragmatists. (shrink)

This paper discusses critically the fundamental elements of the Stegmüller/Sneed-reconstruction of Kuhn's normal science concept. It is argued that a) Kuhn himself cannot accept this reconstruction if he wants to describe theory dynamics in the past; b) the reconstruction is not based on a pure non-statement view; c) to have a theory in the sense of Kuhn, should be related to the ordered pair <K,Iₒ> to ensure the desired constancy over time; d) the reconstruction implies, contrary to Kuhn, the ability (...) of rejecting a theory without having an alternative one; e) the rejection of a theory can be the result of a falsifying procedure and, therefore, theories are not immune from falsification; f) the reconstruction still contains rationality gaps; g) the reconstruction shows more precisely than Kuhn's work that Popper is right when he attacks normal scientist's behaviour; h) the positions of the Kuhnians and of the criticists could be reconciled partially. (shrink)

Esta obra compila los estudios presentados en las I Jornadas de Filosofía del Instituto CEU de Humanidades Ángel Ayala y está prologada por Abelardo Lobato, O. P. Los filósofos tienen el deber de buscar y alcanzar la verdad apelando a las fuerzas de la razón, la cual, por cierto, no impide otras vías genuinas de conocimiento, como la fe. La búsqueda intelectual exige un trabajo de análisis que debe afinarse ante las obcecaciones que a menudo se interponen en el horizonte (...) de la existencia humana. En no pocos momentos de la historia ha habido claudicaciones generalizadas ante esa búsqueda, olvidos más o menos conscientes de que las verdades se alcanzan si se mantiene la esperanza de sabiduría y el amor a ella. El relativismo y el escepticismo se presentan casi como el polo opuesto de esa esperanza y ese amor; como una consecuencia de la “con-fusión” cultural, de las mentiras interesadas y de la desidia moral de algunas sociedades. La nuestra, la europea occidental, es una de ellas. El relativismo afecta al modo de pensar y de comportarse del hombre y es habitual que le lleve por vericuetos que a la postre terminan dañándole a él y a sus congéneres. En este libro se analizan algunos errores que han llevado a suscribir las tesis del relativismo y a rechazar la posibilidad de dar con algunas verdades comunes para todos. La obra tiene dos partes, una histórica y otra temática. Las páginas con enfoque histórico estudian las tesis que sobre el relativismo han mantenido algunos pensadores o corrientes de la filosofía. De su lectura se puede extraer la conclusión de que el fenómeno del relativismo es tan viejo y tan actual como el propio hombre y su apertura inteligente a la verdad. Filósofos de la época antigua de la talla de Protágoras, Pirrón o los “Académicos” coetáneos de San Agustín; modernos como Descartes; contemporáneos como Wittgenstein o Kuhn han dejado huellas que luego abrieron el camino hacia un régimen de pensamiento en que el hombre abandona la posibilidad de admitir verdades universales. Algunos argumentos favorables al relativismo —y, más aún, algunas actitudes “propedéuticas” de él— se han ido instalando culturalmente hasta consolidarse de manera cada vez más indiscutida. La segunda parte analiza el relativismo de forma temática, como un asunto abordable desde las diversas ramas del saber filosófico. Así, se tratan las repercusiones que tiene esta forma de pensamiento en la pragmática, la lógica, la estética o la religión, y se intentan desenmascarar los tópicos y falsos argumentos que justifican un comportamiento ético o religioso “abierto a todas las opciones”. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s laconic observation about self and history elicits thought about the interventions of history into our private consciousness. Although “the world” may end with the end of my consciousness, I could hardly claim that my consciousness exhausts the world, or that there are no presences, realities, objects, and events that do not come into my consciousness from elsewhere, creating for me a distinct ever-present awareness of mine and other, inner and outer, recollection and recognition. A plaintive refrain, similar to (...) that in Wittgenstein’s reflection, appears in much modern criticism that sets itself the task to understand and interpret works of art. Among such efforts there are theories whose main assumption is that a particular art, such as poetry, may indeed put forward a claim to the truth of an assertion, but it is not necessary to poetry as poetry that it asserts anything at all, and therefore it is irrelevant to poetry as poetry to be tested by reference to the world, to history, through the canons of verification and the principles of plausibility relevant to empirical inquiry. We might rewrite Wittgenstein’s aphorism this way: “What has poetry to do with the world? The poem is the first and only thing.”. (shrink)

This impressive volume presents the results of a symposium on the structure of scientific theories held at the University of Illinois, Urbana, on March 26-29, 1969; lest this create the wrong impression, let it be noted at the outset that the volume is much more than a collection of papers. Indeed, when one takes into account Frederick Suppe’s book-length introduction, the editing of the critical comments, the extensive bibliography, and the fine index, the work must be seen as the best (...) account of scientific theory now available, one that surely commends itself to every philosopher of science with the slightest interest in metaphysics. The thrust of the symposium was to examine the view of scientific theories that has enjoyed great vogue among logical positivists, who have seen such theories as "axiomatic calculi in which theoretical terms and statements are given a partial observational interpretation by means of correspondence rules." Suppe refers to this as the "Received View," although it has been increasingly questioned in recent years, particularly by philosophers who have some proficiency in the history of science and by scientists who question its fidelity to actual scientific practice. One of the major aims of the symposium was to subject the Received View to analysis and debate by its proponents and by its critics, to assess its present status, and to see if any consensus has begun to develop on this topic—which plays such a key role in the philosophy of science. Suppe performs the analytic function in his critical introduction, and Stephen Toulmin adds a postscript that attempts to chart a course for future research. The message seems to be that the Received View has run its course and has proved to be more a hindrance than a help to philosophizing about science; what will take its place, however, does not emerge with any clarity. Participants in the symposium include all the luminaries in the philosophy of science movement: Carl Hempel, Patrick Suppes, David Bohm, Hilary Putnam, Thomas Kuhn, and Dudley Shapere, among others. Especially noteworthy are Suppe’s account of the development of the Received View and the criticisms that have been lodged against it, viz., its reliance on the analytic-synthetic distinction; the tenability of the observational-theoretical distinction; the notion of partial interpretation; its failure to include models as integral components; its analysis of correspondence rules; and its reliance on axiomatization. Suppe also details some of the proposed alternatives to the Received View, giving in the process lucid expositions of the thought of Toulmin, Kuhn, Hanson, Popper, and Feyerabend—all of which he treats under the rubric of "Weltanshauungen [[sic]] Analyses." Those interested in the relationships between history of science and philosophy of science will find the interchange between I. Bernard Cohen and Peter Achinstein stimulating as well as illuminating. Kuhn takes this occasion to offer his "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," and Shapere continues his criticism of both Kuhn and logical positivism—now more constructively than heretofore—with a penetrating essay entitled "Scientific Theories and their Domains." About the only thing that is lacking is a treatment of recent developments in England, particularly the work of Rom Harré at Oxford and related thinkers, who likewise reject the Received View and offer interesting alternatives to it that have yet to be appreciated and critiqued in the U.S.—W.A.W. (shrink)

Wolfgang Stegmüller, the leading German philosopher of science, considers the status of scientific revolutions the central issue in the field ever since "the famous Popper-Lakatos-Kuhn discussion" of a decade and a half ago, comments on "almost all contributions to this problem", and offers his alternative solutions in a series of papers culminating with, and summarized in, his recent "A Combined Approach to Dynamics of Theories. How To Improve Historical Interpretations of Theory Change By Applying Set Theoretical Structures", published in Gerard (...) Radnitzky and Gunnar Andersson, editors, The Structure and Development of Science, issued in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science series, volume 59, 1979, pp. 151-86. Popper views scientific revolutions as rational and due to empirical refutations, but there are no refutations in science. Lakatos agrees and assumes that research programs are refutable and their replacements to be revolutions, but the same arguments he launches against Popper apply to him; moreover, applying his philosophy to itself makes it collapse anyway . Kuhn's view was interpreted to be one of scientific revolutions as quite irrational and as arbitrary as mob action. Stegmüller presents revolution in another interpretation of Kuhn - as non-rational, as based on hopes and value judgment but not on facts. He thinks there are big and small revolutions. And he uses his own modifications of J. D. Sneed's famous formal analysis of scientific theory to make his point. After presenting a summary of Stegmüller's ideas in our own way, which seems to us a clarification of presentation with no change of content, especially due to our stressing all differences of opinion, we apply Stegmüller's idea to itself, the way Stegmüller has done with the view of Lakatos, and with similar results. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's _Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ has sold over a million copies in more than twenty languages and has remained one of the ten most cited academic works for the past half century. In contrast, Karl Popper's seminal book _The Logic of Scientific Discovery_ has lapsed into relative obscurity. Although the two men debated the nature of science only once, the legacy of this encounter has dominated intellectual and public discussions on the topic ever since. Almost universally recognized as the (...) modern watershed in the philosophy of science, Kuhn's relativistic vision of shifting paradigms -- which asserted that science was just another human activity, like art or philosophy, only more specialized -- triumphed over Popper's more positivistic belief in science's revolutionary potential to falsify society's dogmas. But has this victory been beneficial for science? Steve Fuller argues that not only has Kuhn's dominance had an adverse impact on the field but both thinkers have been radically misinterpreted in the process. This debate raises a vital question: Can science remain an independent, progressive force in society, or is it destined to continue as the technical wing of the military-industrial complex? Drawing on original research -- including the Kuhn archives at MIT -- Fuller offers a clear account of "Kuhn vs. Popper" and what it will mean for the future of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

In diesem Artikel wird skizziert, wie sich mithilfe der Kuhn-Sneedschen Wissenschaftstheorie literaturwissenschaftliche Theorien ihrer logischen Struktur nach analysieren und systematisch darstellen lassen. Die systematische Darstellung läßt sich von den zentralen theoretischen Prämissen bis zu den einzelnen Verwendungen einer Literaturtheorie durchführen, wobei an das mengentheoretische Verfahren Sneeds das satzanalytische Poppers angeschlossen wird. Dabei werden zwei Fragen andeutungsweise geklärt: Erstens wird das Verhältnis von Literaturtheorie und Hypothesenbildung der literaturwissenschaftlichen Einzeluntersuchungen näher bestimmt, zweitens das Abhängigkeitsverhältnis der Hypothesen, des Gegenstandsbereichs und der Methodiken von (...) der Literaturtheorie genauer untersucht. (shrink)

Until the middle of the present century it was a commonly accepted opinion that theory change in science was the expression of cumulative progress consisting in the acquisition of new truths and the elimination of old errors. Logical empiricists developed this idea through a deductive model, saying that a theory T superseding a theory T must be able logically to explain whatever T explained and something more as well. Popper too shared this model, but stressed that T explains the old (...) known facts in its own new way. The further pursual of this line quickly led to the thesis of the non-comparability or incommensurability of theories: if T and T are different, then the very concepts which have the same denomination in both actually have different meanings; in such a way any sentence whatever has different meanings in T and in T and cannot serve to compare them. owing to this, the deductive model was abandoned as a tool for understanding theory change and scientific progress, and other models were proposed by people such as Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Sneed and Stegmüller. The common feature of all these new positions may be seen in the claim that no possibility exists of interpreting theory change in terms of the cumulative acquisition of truth. It seems to us that the older and the newer positions are one-sided, and, in order to eliminate their respective shortcomings, we propose to interpret theory change in a new way.The starting point consists in recognizing that every scientific discipline singles out its specific domain of objects by selecting a few specific predicates for its discourse. Some of these predicates must be operational and they determine the objects of the theory concerned. In the case of a transition from T to T, we must consider whether or not the operational predicates remain unchanged, in the sense of being still related to the same operations. If they do not change in their relation to operations, then T and T are comparable. If the operational predicates are not all identical in T and T, the two theories show a rather high degree of incommensurability, and this happens because they do not refer to the same objects. Theory change means in this case change of objects. But now we can see that even incommensurability is compatible with progress conceived as the accumulation of truth. Indeed, T and T remain true about their respective objects, and the global amount of truth acquired is increased. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, apresentamos e comparamos as perspectivas epistemológicas sugeridas por Kuhn, por Popper e pelo Empirismo Lógico. Inicialmente tratamos dos principais elementos envolvidos na proposta de Kuhn, como as concepções de pré-ciência, paradigma, ciência normal, quebra-cabeça, anomalia, crise e revolução. Expomos, em linhas gerais, as outras duas posturas epistemológicas consideradas e comparamos as três propostas, tomando como ponto de partida a noção de progresso científico. Finalizamos o artigo com uma breve reflexão sobre a adequação destas concepções de ciência e de (...) progresso científico. (shrink)

This article discusses the famous Popperian terms of 'empirical content' and 'falsifiability' or 'refutability'. They are all synonymous with another and are all fundamental principles, not for Popper's philosophy exclusively, but for Lakatos's and for Sneed's rational reconstruction of the ideas of Kuhn's book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

In the early sixties there broke out a fierce controversy concerning rationality in science which was labelled as the Popper-Kuhn controversy. It can be conceived in terms of the rationalism-relativism opposition. This may seem dubious, for the proper contrast to rationalism is irrationalism, and the one to relativism is absolutism. What is at issue, however, is whether scientific change comes about in consequence of argument or in consequence of-to use Kuhn's favourite dictum-conversion. The notion of argument does not involve here (...) anything absolute, while the one of conversion is intended to cover not merely the idea of irrationality of change, but the idea of self-authentication and constitution as one among many possible patterns of rationality. Thus the main message is that of break of communication between otherwise rational agents and not of their apparent irrationality. These are my reasons for thinking this unusual opposition better than the usual ones pointing at the substance of the controversy. I think also this opposition has in fact been implicit in the resulting debate. This explains, for instance, why in the first decade of the debate Feyerabend was commonly perceived as Kuhn's comrade and, consequently, largely misunderstood. Conflation of two different oppositions into one, on the other hand, results in some obscurity. This is perhaps why different commentators have rather freely qualified some participants of the debate to one or other faction. Among those who have been subjected to such a treatment there are found, in the first place, the authors of such mediational conceptions of the seventies as Lakatos (methodology of scientific research programmes), Sneed and Stegmiiller (non-statement view), Laudan (research traditions), and, in my country, Amsterdamski (ideals of science). It may well have been expected that Larry Laudan, who has recently put forward a new mediational conception of his own (see Laudan [1984]), again will be treated in the same way. This is due to the clear Popperian and Kuhnian inspirations of his work and his fidelity to his masters which is surprisingly great consider. (shrink)

The famous definition of landscape by Joachim Ritter unmistakably names the aesthetic act of construction that makes landscape vision possible: “Landscape is nature that is aesthetically present in the sight for a feeling and sensing observer”. Landscape is an aesthetic construct, in whose act of construction, however, social, cultural, individual and other constitutional factors flow. Following Karl Popper’s 3-world theory, a physical landscape (world 1), an individual landscape (world 2) and a social landscape (world 3) can be distinguished. In each (...) case, aesthetic and other constitutional factors are interconnected in a complex and complicated way. In addition, this situation is aggravated by the fact that different scientific basic positions (essentialism, positivism, constructivism) find their way into corresponding analyses (partly unreflected) and make scientific understanding difficult. Finally, this scientific starting position produces different paradigms, theories and terminology, which are often played off against each other and can lead to unfruitful dissent in science. The lecture counters this with a “neopragmatic” approach that can show that and how different paradigms, theories and conceptualisations can be related to each other in such a way that unfruitful dissent can be avoided and instead the advantages of the scientific plurality of theories, concepts and paradigms can be used and made fruitful for concrete research goals. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere[1], is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is (...) to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. [Back to Top]. (shrink)

Popper repeatedly emphasised the significance of a critical attitude, and a related critical method, for scientists. Kuhn, however, thought that unquestioning adherence to the theories of the day is proper; at least for ‘normal scientists’. In short, the former thought that dominant theories should be attacked, whereas the latter thought that they should be developed and defended (for the vast majority of the time). -/- Both seem to have missed a trick, however, due to their apparent insistence that each individual (...) scientist should fulfil similar functions (at any given point in time). The trick is to consider science at the group level; and doing so shows how puzzle solving and ‘offensive’ critical activity can simultaneously have a legitimate place in science. This analysis shifts the focus of the debate. The crucial question becomes ‘How should the balance between functions be struck?’. (shrink)

Some think that issues to do with scientific method are last century's stale debate; Popper was an advocate of methodology, but Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others are alleged to have brought the debate about its status to an end. The papers in this volume show that issues in methodology are still very much alive. Some of the papers reinvestigate issues in the debate over methodology, while others set out new ways in which the debate has developed in the last decade. The (...) book will be of interest to philosophers and scientists alike in the reassessment it provides of earlier debates about method and current directions of research. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band enthalt sechs teilweise stark iiberarbeitete Aufsatze, die in der Zeit zwischen der Niederschrift des Buches Theorienstrnkturen und Theoriendynamik, Springer-Verlag 1973, im folgenden mit [Theoriendynamik] bezeichnet, und der Monographie The Strncturalist View of Theories. A Pos­ sible Analogue of the Bourbaki Programme in Physical Science, Springer-Ver­ lag 1979, im folgenden kurz [Strnkturalismus] genannt, entstanden sind. In diesen Abhandlungen werden jeweils gewisse Aspekte des strukturalistischen Theorienkonzeptes behandelt. Am starksten iiberarbeitet wurden die Auf­ satze II, IV, V und VI, die (...) urspriinglich in englischer Sprache erschienen waren. Vier der sechs Arbeiten, namlich I, III, IV und VI, bilden auBerdem erweiterte Fassungen von Vortragen. Obwohl das zweite Buch [Strnkturalismus] durch P. Feyerabends ausftihr­ liche Diskussion der strukturalistischen Auffassung im British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Dezember 1977, angeregt worden ist, stellt es seinem Ansatz und Aufbau nach eher den Versuch einer systematischen Kurzdarstel­ lung des strukturalistischen Vorgehens nach seinem letzten Stande dar. Dem­ gegeniiber entstanden die hier verOffentlichten Artikel stets aus einem ganz be­ stimmten AnlaB. Diese Anlasse konnte man schematisch in drei Klassen unter­ teilen: Entweder ging es darum, eine anschauliche intuitive Ein/iihrnng zu lie­ fern (I und V); oder die Aufgabe bestand darin, die Beziehung zu anderen philosophischen Positionen. wie z. B. derjenigen L. Wittgensteins, H. Putnams, K. Poppers oder T. S. Kuhns. zu analysieren (II. III und IV); oder es sollte zu den wichtigsten und bis dahin verOffentlichten Kritiken Stellung bezogen wer­ den (wie in VI). (shrink)

I offer a reply to criticisms of the Strong Programme presented by Stephen Kemp who develops some new lines of argument that focus on the ‘monism’ of the programme. He says the programme should be rejected for three reasons. First, because it embodies ‘weak idealism’, that is, its supporters effectively sever the link between language and the world. Second, it challenges the reasons that scientists offer in explanation of their own beliefs. Third, it destroys the distinction between successful and unsuccessful (...) instrumental action. Kemp is careful to produce quotations from the supporters of the programme as evidence to support his case. All three points deserve and are given a detailed response and the interpretation of the quoted material plays a significant role in the discussion. My hope is that careful exegesis will offset the numerous misinterpretations that are current in the philosophical literature. Particular attention is paid to what is said about the normative standards involved in the application of empirical concepts. The operation of these standards in the face of the negotiability of all concepts is explored and misapprehensions on the topic are corrected. The work of Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn and Hesse is used to illustrate these themes.Keywords: Strong Programme; Social constructionism; Idealism; Monism; Finitism; Relativism. (shrink)

This paper is a supplement to, and provides a proof of principle of, Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level. It illustrates how calculations may be performed in order to determine how the balance between different functions in science—such as imaginative, critical, and dogmatic—should be struck, with respect to confirmation (or corroboration) functions and rules of scientific method.

Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn were friends of science because they shared some values—the value of science for humanity, especially. My thesis is that their different accounts of science could not sa...

Engaging, accessible, and up-to-date, this work introduces the central debates of English language philosophy since 1945. It begins with a brief description of philosophical debate during the first half of the twentieth century, offering fascinating discussions of writings by Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Quine, and Sellars. It then describes several ensuing philosophical debates that have shaped philosophical discussions since the 1960s, addressing the Davidson/Dummett debate on language; the Kripke/Lewis debate on possible worlds; the Popper/Kuhn debate on the justification in epistemology; (...) the debates on materialism, functionalism, and dual-aspect theories of mind; and recent work in moral psychology, metaethics, and normative ethics. It also includes a critical discussion of Rorty's metaphilosophical skepticism and pays extensive attention to writings of Strawson, Putnam, Evans, McDowell, Williams, Nagel, and many other contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

The report gives a survey of the Hungarian philosophy of science after 1973. The report throws some light on the history of Hungarian philosophy in the context of the political circumstances of the late sixties and seventies. It starts with the not so well-known history of 'persecution of philosophers' in 1973. Then it treats the emergence of the philosophy of science focussing on the most significant representatives of this branch of philosophy, which was up to that time almost unknown in (...) Hungary. Due to the fact that the important results in Hungarian philosophy of science run parallel with the reception and translation of the significant products of Western philosophy, such as Wittgenstein's, Popper's, Kuhn's, or Polanyi's works, the report gives relatively significant room to treat these achievements. The last part of the report presents a survey of the younger generation of the philosophers of science, concentrating on the most important insights. (shrink)

This volume examines Popper's philosophy by analyzing the criticism of his most popular critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos. They all followed his rejection of the traditional view of science as inductive. Starting from the assumption that Hume's criticism of induction is valid, the book explores the central criticism and objections that these three critics have raised. Their objections have met with great success, are significant and deserve paraphrase. One also may consider them reasonable protests against Popper's high (...) standards rather than fundamental criticisms of his philosophy. The book starts out with a preliminary discussion of some central background material and essentials of Popper's philosophy. It ends with nutshell representations of the philosophies of Popper. Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos. The middle section of the book presents the connection between these philosophers and explains what their central ideas consists of, what the critical arguments are, how they presented them, and how valid they are. In the process, the author claims that Popper's popular critics used against him arguments that he had invented (and answered) without saying so. They differ from him mainly in that they demanded of all criticism that it should be constructive: do not stop believing a refuted theory unless there is a better alternative to it. Popper hardly ever discussed belief, delegating its study to psychology proper; he usually discussed only objective knowledge, knowledge that is public and thus open to public scrutiny. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the alleged war between Kuhn and Popper, extending the discussion to incorporate two of their lesser known, but important, protagonists, Lakatos and Feyerabend. The argument presented here is that the four can fruitfully be considered together, and that it is possible to go beyond the surface tensions and clashes between them to fashion an approach which takes advantage of the insights of all. The implications of this approach for management are then considered, using the concept (...) of co-creation in two different contexts to illustrate this. (shrink)

L'article propose une analyse comparative des positions de Popper et de Kuhn sur quatre points liés : la comparaison des « cadres théoriques » ou des « paradigmes scientifiques » ; le pouvoir contraignant que sont susceptibles d'avoir les arguments invoqués dans les discussions critiques ; les éléments qui, en fin de compte, pèsent ou doivent peser sur les praticiens lorsqu'il s'agit d'élire un cadre théorique au détriment d'un autre ; et enfin, la conception qu'ont chacun des deux auteurs de (...) ce que Kuhn a nommé la « science normale ». On commence par discuter en détails les comptes-rendus dans lesquels Popper explique pourquoi les choix scientifiques de Galilée et de Kepler sont conformes à la méthodologie falsificationniste. On montre de là, premièrement, qu'à suivre à la lettre ces comptes-rendus, il faut conclure que les données expérimentales non problématiques – les énoncés de base unanimement acceptés – ne suffisent pas à elles seules à imposer en droit la falsification empirique (puisque sur la base des mêmes mesures de Tycho Brahé, Kepler a eu raison d'admettre que l'hypothèse des orbites circulaires était empiriquement réfutée, tandis que Galilée a eu raison d'admettre le contraire). On montre alors, deuxièmement, qu'au-delà des différences importantes entre Popper et Kuhn au niveau des lexiques et de l'idéal de scientificité, la méthodologie poppérienne, bien qu'elle se revendique « logique », ne donne concrètement pas plus que la conception kuhnienne pourtant si souvent stigmatisée comme « sociologique », lorsqu'il s'agit d'indiquer ce qu'un bon scientifique devrait faire, que ce soit en période « révolutionnaire » ou en période de « science normale ». (shrink)

Language & Logic -- Glossary -- Aristotle's syllogisms -- Russell's paradox & Frege's logicism -- profile: Aristotle -- Russell's theory of description -- Frege's puzzle -- Gödel's theorem -- Epimenides' liar paradox -- Eubulides' heap -- Science & Epistemology -- Glossary -- I think therefore I am -- Gettier's counter example -- profile: Karl Popper -- The brain in a vat -- Hume's problem of induction -- Goodman's gruesome riddle -- Popper's conjectures & refutations -- Kuhn's scientific revolutions -- Mind (...) & Metaphysics -- Glossary -- Descartes mind-body problem -- Brentano's intentionality -- Fodor's language of thought -- Parfit's persons -- profile: René Descartes -- Chalmer's zombies -- Zeno's paradoxes -- Kant's left hand -- Theseus' ship -- Laplace's demon, determinism, & free will -- Ryle's ghost in the machine -- Ethics & Political Philosophy -- Glossary -- Aristotle's ethics -- States of nature and the social contract -- Kant's categorical imperative -- profile: Immanuel Kant -- Mill's utilitarianism -- Marx's historical materialism -- The trolley problem -- Religion -- Glossary -- Aquinas' five ways -- Anselm's ontological argument -- profile: Thomas Aquinas -- Epicurus' riddle -- Paley's watchmaker -- Pascal's wager -- Hume against miracles -- Grand Moments -- Glossary -- Socrates' method -- Plato's cave -- Aristotle's four causes -- Lucretius' atomism -- profile: Ludwig Wittgenstein -- Berkeley's idealism -- Kant's synthetic a priori -- Hegel's dialectic -- James' pragmatism -- Moore's common sense -- Wittgenstein's picture theory of language -- Continental Philosophy -- Glossary -- Nietzsche's Superman -- profile: Friedrich Nietzsche -- Derrida's deconstruction -- Heidegger's nothing -- Sartre's bad faith. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend und Imre Lakatos kritisieren Poppers Wissenschaftsauffassung mit den Argumenten, dass die Erfahrung keine sichere Grundlage für Falsifikationen von Theorien gibt, und dass falsifizierte Theorien in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte selten vollständig aufgegeben werden. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine kritische Diskussion von fehlbaren Prüfsätzen möglich ist, und dass es nicht notwendig ist, falsifizierte Theorien vollständig aufzugeben. Mit diesen Argumenten kann Kuhns, Feyerabends und Lakatos’ Kritik zurückgewiesen werden.

The purpose of this article is to tackle the way postmodernists have attacked science. Departing from the doctrine of relativism, postmodernists have long claimed that science does not deserve any priority over pseudoscientific or even anti-scientific approaches. Regrettably, in the 20th Century, some philosophers were part of this trend. Claude Levi Strauss’ views on rationality and irrationality, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “language games”, Paul Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism, and Thomas Kuhn’s theories about paradigms and their incommensurability, are objects of critique (...) in this article. This article also defends some of Karl Popper’s views on the philosophy of science, and addresses the way some postmodernists have erroneously used Popper’s philosophy to advance their own views. (shrink)

Pythagoras -- Confucius -- Heracleitus -- Parmenides -- Zeno of Elea -- Socrates -- Democritus -- Plato -- Aristotle -- Mencius -- Zhuangzi -- Pyrrhon of Elis -- Epicurus -- Zeno of Citium -- Philo Judaeus -- Marcus Aurelius -- Nagarjuna -- Plotinus -- Sextus Empiricus -- Saint Augustine -- Hypatia -- Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius -- Śaṅkara -- Yaqūb ibn Ishāq aṣ-Ṣabāḥ al-Kindī -- Al-Fārābī -- Avicenna -- Rāmānuja -- Ibn Gabirol -- Saint Anselm of Canterbury -- al-Ghazālī -- (...) Peter Abelard -- Averroës -- Zhu Xi -- Moses Maimonides -- Ibn al-'Arabī -- Shinran -- Saint Thomas Aquinas -- John Duns Scotus -- William of Ockham -- Niccolò Machiavelli -- Wang Yangming -- Francis Bacon, Viscount Saint Alban (or Albans), Baron of Verulam -- Thomas Hobbes -- René Descartes -- John Locke -- Benedict de Spinoza -- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz -- Giambattista Vico -- George Berkeley -- Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu -- David Hume -- Jean-Jacques Rousseau -- Immanuel Kant -- Moses Mendelssohn -- Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet -- Jeremy Bentham -- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel -- Arthur Schopenhauer -- Auguste Comte -- John Stuart Mill -- Søren Kierkegaard -- Karl Marx -- Herbert Spencer -- Wilhelm Dilthey -- William James -- Friedrich Nietzsche -- Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege -- Edmund Husserl -- Henri Bergson -- John Dewey -- Alfred North Whitehead -- Benedetto Croce -- Nishida Kitarō -- Bertrand Russell -- G.E. Moore -- Martin Buber -- Ludwig Wittgenstein -- Martin Heidegger -- Rudolf Carnap -- Sir Karl Popper -- Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno -- Jean-Paul Sartre -- Hannah Arendt -- Simone de Beauvoir -- Willard Van Orman Quine -- Sir A.J. Ayer -- Wilfrid Sellars -- John Rawls -- Thomas S. Kuhn -- Michel Foucault -- Noam Chomsky -- Jürgeb Gabernas -- Sir Bernard Williams -- Jacques Derrida -- Richard Rorty -- Robert Nozick -- Saul Kripke -- David Kellogg Lewis -- Peter (Albert David) Singer. (shrink)