In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. In the first part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third and final part, I shall argue that Rawls's reflective equilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach. (shrink)

I introduce the concept of ‘fused descriptive and normative proposition.’ I demonstrate that and how this concept has a basis in reality in lawyers' propositions de lege lata, and I point out that and why we do not find fused modality in language qua language, morals and the relationship between parents and children. The concept of ‘fused descriptive and normative proposition’ is of interest in a number of contexts, inter alia in relation to law, cf. the debate about the status (...) of lawyers' propositions de lege lata (“exactly what kind of propositions are lawyers' propositions about what is the law?”), and in relation to philosophy, cf. the debate about the relationship between ‘the is‘ and ‘the ought.’ As a consequence of the reality basis and interest of this concept, I see the concepts of ‘descriptive proposition’ and ‘normative proposition’ as the extreme points on a graduated dimension, from the purely descriptive to the purely normative. (shrink)

Transversality occupies a central place in Guattari's thought, appearing in his early writings on institutional analysis and on through to his final work, Chaosmosis. Transversality is thus particularly pertinent to understanding Guattari's critique of semiocapitalism and his goal of re-imagining forms of institutional subjectivisation as a way to free the unconscious from structures of lack and the desire for punishment, the very structures upon which capitalism relies for its reproduction. If there is one institution that has taken advantage of semiocapitalism's (...) ability to mask its role in the reproduction of capitalist subjectivity, however, it is the contemporary neoliberal University. This essay thus brings transversality to bear upon the question of the University in semiocapitalism, focusing on the discourses that speak in defence of the humanities. Though defences of the humanities are intended to argue for the humanities’ usefulness in contemporary society, transversality exposes such discourses as the speech of a ‘subjugated group’ whose only effect is to reinforce existing structures of lack and punishment. (shrink)

In the Western media, stories about China seem to fall into one of two categories: China’s astounding economic development or its human rights abuses. As human rights discourses follow increasingly hegemonic conventions, especially with regard to China, many of their key assumptions remain unexamined. This special issue—the second in a two-part series beginning with “Cosmologies of the Human”—critically investigates the relationship between China and the human as it plays out in law, politics, biopolitics, political economy, labor, medicine, and culture. The (...) contributors interrogate the evolving meanings of “China” and “the human,” both inside China and internationally. The issue tracks the ways in which global discourses treat China—still officially socialist—as similar to, different from, and alternative to Western capitalist modernities. Several essays probe the modern theoretical underpinnings of human rights abuses in China, including a crucial distinction between “the human” and “the people.” Others review the impact of Maoism on Marxist debates in China and in the West, as well as the specific influences of Mao’s writings on French politics and theory in the 1960s. A visual dossier compares eight contemporary Chinese artists, directors, and public image-makers in order to discuss the figure of the human from Tiananmen Square to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. While many contributors discuss China and the West comparatively, the issue interrogates the universalizing claims of both Western and Chinese norms of the human by privileging the local, particular, and eccentric. Contributors: Ackbar Abbas, Michael Dutton, David L. Eng, Doug Howland, Petrus Liu, Camille Robcis, Teemu Ruskola, Shuang Shen, Shu-mei Shih, Wang Xiaoming David L. Eng is Professor of English, Comparative Literature, and Asian American Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of _The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of Intimacy_ and _Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America_, both also published by Duke University Press. Teemu Ruskola is Professor of Law at Emory University and Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University. Shuang Shen is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature and Chinese at Pennsylvania State University. (shrink)

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart'sThe Concept of Lawand Alf Ross'sOn Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken.The Concept of Lawdoes not go beyondOn Law and Justicein so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived (...) by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward inThe Concept of LawandOn Law and Justiceare very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality. (shrink)

Previous research on corporate community involvement (CCI) initiatives indicates that such behaviour is critical for building neighbourhood relationships and extending corporate influence in the community, but there is little theoretical work that provides a clear picture of managing the nature of the initiatives from different stakeholder management approaches. Drawing from theoretical insights of stakeholder theory and the concept of social capital, this article proposes nine strategic directions for CCI initiatives, and concludes by discussing the management implications of the proposed strategic (...) directions. Our proposed approaches have the potential to improve current understanding and practice of corporations and their CCI initiatives. (shrink)

This essay conducts a reading of Jean-Luc Nancy’s and Jacques Rancière’s respective theorizations of the image. Using Nancy’s notion of literary communism, I first show how he and Rancière conceive the image as a site of community’s open writing and contestation. My reading then demonstrates how this “communism of the image” exposes Rancière’s repetition of an ontological gesture that he has attempted to dismiss as Heideggerian.

Through the twofold meaning of nature for man-rhythmically-of which he is a part and from which he is apart, the situations of psychosis and of ageing "cross over." In both are manifested the imperious sway of that nature of which we are a part: in the earlier half of life-largely-as psychosis, in the latter half of life through ageing. It is in the midst of the life-span, with the transition from predominant instinctuality to awareness of its recession, that psychosis and (...) ageing are disclosed as complementary perspectives, the vanishing point of the former toward the bodily birth of the individual, that of the latter toward the death of the individual body. Together they intimate the possibility of an individuality which can encompass the human meanings of both. In psychosis and ageing alike, the sway of that nature of which we are a part is coupled with a heightened awareness of our own nature as apart, in the former instance passively, with an accent on one's helplessness as mechanical mind, in the latter with the realization of one's own active part over and apart from the body. In psychosis the self is overwhelmed by that nature of which its body is a part as the latter's complexion is mediated by the world. In ageing the presence of the self stands out more clearly from the ebbing instinctuality with which it was earlier alloyed. To the negative defusion of instinctuality and individuality in psychosis corresponds the possibility of a positive separation in ageing. If in psychosis, "uprightness" , "eccentricity" , "being in the world over and beyond the world" , has been early flawed, ageing enables individuality to emerge in relief from the detritus of imperfect projects. "When gods die they become men, when men die they become gods." . While bodily membership in nature pervades emerging individuality in the first half of life, self-assumption of responsibility emerges with the discovery of ebbing instinctuality in the middle of life. The body as a hinge between nature of which we are a part and nature from which we are apart, and whose ambiguity is rhythmically reflective of the world and of self, now becomes apparent. With this the possibility of a "depth psychology" is reached, that is, a reopening of the archives of one's history for a commemorative rereading . This moment of discovery, traditionally conveyed in the analogical imagery of late summer and the Mediterranean experience of noon and afternoon, recurs throughout the opus of Freud, from his "Gradiva" essay , through "The Uncanny" to his "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis" , with undertones both of psychotic derealization and of the purifying ordeal of ageing. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. (shrink)

This paper investigates the actual use of truth as a criterion in the setting up of and choice between descriptive characterisations. The consideration for truth is often weighed against other considerations. This weighing character is illuminated through examples from everyday life, politics, law, and science. In everyday life the weighing character shows itself inter alia through the categories of ‘white lies’ and ‘great questions’, and in politics, inter alia through the categories of ‘personal character’ versus ‘the party’. In law there (...) are numerous examples of norms that increase the probability of untrue characterisations being taken as a basis for the application of the law. This paper focuses on the categories of ‘exclusion of evidence’, ‘burden of proof’, and ‘adjusting of facts as a means to concretely reasonable and just results’. The paper concludes by showing that burden of proof considerations are also found in an area in which many people assume that the truth criterion is paramount, namely science. The method is thus casuistic. However, the aim is a certain representativity in relation to the problem aspects. (shrink)

The word _meṇḍaka_, a derivative of _meṇḍa_ (“ram”), is generally translated as “made of the ram” or “about the ram” or “horned.” However, in the Pāli _Milindapañha_ (_Questions of Milinda_), the word _meṇḍakapañha_, literally, a question about the ram, is also rendered as a logical conclusion that refutes an imaginary dilemma. Hence, in this treatise, the word _meṇḍaka_ is a special logical term which means an imaginary dilemma that can be logically refuted. This raises the question as to why the (...) word _meṇḍaka_ has come to be associated with this logical technique. To answer this question, this paper examines various aspects of the word and its possible connections to a dilemma and its refutation. The discussion ranges from the meaning of this word in a tale in the _Jātaka_ (Birth Stories), within the contextual usage in a _meṇḍaka_ question, to a relatively recent commentarial text (_aṭṭhakathā_) which gives a different perspective on the etymology of the word. The _Milindapañha_ is explicit in defining a _meṇḍaka_ question as knotty, hard to penetrate, and difficult to resolve, some of which an opponent puts forth to undermine certain aspects of the Buddhist system. However, the way certain _meṇḍaka_ questions are framed, though not directly stated, seem to utilize the principles of logic in a dilemmatic form of argument. With that, a _meṇḍaka_ question, at least in the _Milindapañha_, could also mean “a dilemmatic expression put forth by a challenger to undermine an opponent, but which can be logically refuted.”. (shrink)

This article re-examines speculations about school affiliation of the Milindapañha (Questions of King Milinda) and traces its presence from North West India in the early centuries CE up to Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century. As there are significant differences between the textual traditions of the Pali Text Society’s Milindapañho and the Siamese printed edition, the Milindapañh?, I will discuss the little-known textual characteristics of the Siamese recensions which were circulating in Central Siam from at least the seventeenth century. This (...) is possible with the discovery of several Ayutthaya period Milindapañha manuscripts kept at a temple and the National Library of Thailand. By the end of the eighteenth century, at least three different recensions were circulating in Central Siam. This paper will present some of their dissimilarities as well as their probable textual lineages. The newly discovered manuscripts also partly demonstrate that the shape of the textual tradition of a text, at least for the Milindapañha in Siam, reflects a function of the textual community that preserved and transmitted it. (shrink)

The theme of Darwin's struggle between reason and imagination is perhaps most clearly shown in his efforts in the Origin to conceive of how the eye of the body might have developed through natural selection. Thus he wrote:To arrive, however, at a just conclusion regarding the formation of the eye, with all its marvellous yet not absolutely perfect characters, it is indispensable that the reason * should conquer the imagination; but I have felt the difficulty far too keenly to be (...) surprised at others hesitating to extend the principle of natural selection to so startling a length. (shrink)

Brings the figure of the voice and the problem of mimesis in Heidegger and post-Heideggerian continental thought to bear on the dismissal of language by the affective and aesthetic turns of contemporary critical theory.

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...) equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to point out the salient patterns of agreement and dis‐ agreement between Alf Ross and Hans Kelsen's analyses of valid law and efficacy. I argue that the disagreement has the character of systemic postulation on the part of both interlocutors. My main thesis is that the disagreement is not one of philosophical principle, but one that must be resolved on the basis of pragmatic considerations, i.e., the choice between the two valid‐law schemes pertains neither (...) to necessity nor to truth, but to expediency and values. (shrink)

When people interact with social robots, they treat them as real social agents. How people depict robots is fun to consider, but when people are confronted with embodied entities that move and talk – whether humans or robots – they interact with them as authentic social agents with minds, and not as mere representations.