The prisoner 's dilemma game has acquired large literatures in several disciplines. It is surprising, therefore, that a good definition of the game is hard to find. Typically an author relates a story about captured criminals or military rivals, provides a particular payoff matrix and asserts that the PD is characterized, or illustrated, by that matrix. In the few cases in which characterizing conditions are given, the conditions, and the motivations for them, do not always agree with each other or (...) with the paradigm examples elsewhere. In this paper we describe several varieties of PD's. In particular, we suggest there are two distinctions among PD's with philosophical significance, the pure/impure and the utilitarian/nonutilitarian distinctions. In the first section, we explain and characterize the two distinctions. In the second, we discuss an issue of moral philosophy that illustrates the significance of the former. (shrink)

This is first English edition of Ethical Concepts and Problems (1971) by the great Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905-81). Løgstrup presents key elements of his ethical and political thinking, on topics from duty, responsibility, will, and choice to cultural policy, democracy, and the right of resistance.

Taubes, Badiou, Agamben, Žižek, Reinhard, and Santner have found in the Apostle Paul's emphasis on neighbor-love a positive paradigm for politics. By thoroughly reexamining Pauline eschatology, L. L. Welborn suggests that neighbor-love depends upon an orientation toward the messianic event, which Paul describes as the "now time" and which he imagines as "awakening." Welborn compares the Pauline dialectic of awakening to attempts by Hellenistic philosophers to rouse their contemporaries from moral lethargy and to the Marxist idea of class consciousness, emphasizing (...) the apostle's radical spirit and moral relevance. (shrink)

I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.

Comment fonctionne l’image sur le vase François ? Parmi les associations thématiques ou formelles que François Lissarague met en évidence sur ce cratère, on relèvera ici celles qui établissent un rapport entre l’épopée et l’histoire, notamment celle que vit Athènes depuis sa refondation par Solon.The Athens of Solon on the François Vase. How does the François Vase function? Among the thematic and formal associations, underlined by François Lissarague, this study emphasises those establishing a connection between the epic and history, notably (...) Athenian history since the Solonian “refoundation”. (shrink)

S'il est un point que les réflexions contemporaines sur le temps ont mis en relief et inscrit profondément dans notre conscience, c'est que l'avenir qu'on espère dépend directement du présent qu'on réalise. Telle est notre attitude en face du présent, telle elle sera inéluctablement en face de l'avenir; et donc l'avenir lui-même, puisque ce dernier n'est rien sinon un présent caché encore, au cœur d'un présent déjà actuel, et explicite. Il est en effet de l'essence même de notre condition humaine (...) d'avoir un présent structuré et comme stratifié. Certes on peut imaginer le présent comme un point sans épaisseur, comme la limite évanescente entre un segment de ligne qui marque le passé à jamais révolu, et l'avenir qui se meut vers nous pour basculer inexorablement vers le non-être en franchissant ce présent. Mais cette image, utile pour bien des tâches, ne correspond d'aucune manière à la réalité vivante de la conscience humaine et des activités qui lui sont propres. Nous sommes dans le présent ce que nous sommes et ce que, en un sens, nous croyons pouvoir dire que nous avons été. Une grande partie de ce que nous appelons le passé, notre passé personnel et sans doute notre passé spécifique, est présent, non seulement à titre de souvenir, pouvant être, ou non, évoqué, mais à titre de schéma dynamique modifiant notre être-au-monde, notre présente réaction au réel le plus réel, à la situation où nous avons à déployer notre activité. (shrink)

1. Falsafat al-rūḥ -- 2. Falsafat al-ʻaqūl -- 3. Raḥīq al-nafs -- 4. al-Qadāʼ wa-al-qadar.

Le philosophe Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) a-t-il vraiment existé? Que reste-t-il de lui? "Une élégance certaine de la pensée", affirme l'un de ses meilleurs interprètes, François L'Yvonnet. Le philosophe de La Société de consommation, des Stratégies fatales et des Cool Memories s'attachait à l'idée du fragment comme mode de pensée : car dans le détail, tout est parfait, c'est dans sa reproduction que tout se complique. François L'Yvonnet explore cinq fragments de la philosophie de Jean Baudrillard et de sa biographie pour (...) mieux saisir l'éclat et la jubilation d'une pensée toujours vivante et contemporaine. (shrink)

RésuméLa notion de «rationalité de l'Univers » a varié au cours du temps, le long dialogue de l'esprit et de la nature ayant toujours abouti à ce que Le Roy appelait « l'évolution de l'évidence et la plasticité de la raison ».L'échec de l'explication mécanique de l'Univers a conduit James Jeans à déclarer que le monde ressemble plutôt « à une grande pensée » qu'à une grande machine », car on ne peut en donner qu'une description mathématique. En réalité, la (...) physique moderne n'est ni plus ni moins mathématique que l'ancienne; elle est seulement plus générale. James Jeans confond les mathématiques pures et les mathématiques appliquées.Eddington prétend déduire les lois générales et les constantes physiques de la nature de considérations épistémologiques a priori. C'est un retour à Kant. Malheureusement les postulate dont il part comme évidents n'ont point paru tels au XVIIe siècle et n'ont été admis que sous la contrainte de l'expérience. Sa théorie ne prévoit ni les neutrons ni les mésons. Elle est vouée à l'échec.La possibilité de trouver un formalisme mathématique applicable à un domaine expérimental ne préjuge en rien la rationalité de l'Univers, car un mathématicien habile sera toujours capable de faire rentrer même un monde « erratique » dans un vêtement mathématique approprié. (shrink)

A vigorous, critical examination of Descartes' conception of knowledge and method contained in the early unfinished Regulae. Bold, brief, and accurate, Joachim's lectures are model for the analytical explication of philosophical texts. Joachim ends by constructing a theory of concrete unities as a more satisfactory basis of explanation than the Cartesian method of reduction of complexes to simples.--C. L.

Mrs. Warnock opens her discussion with a warning against the attempt to define existentialism, or to treat it as a single, unified position. With this warning in mind, she then proceeds to trace some of the general features of existentialist "ethics" through the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre. Mrs. Warnock sees the common aim of these thinkers as the attempt to "free people from illusion." She particularly stresses 1) the breakdown of the distinction between thinking and feeling, and the (...) resultant blurring of the line between an ethics and the rest of each thinker's philosophy; and 2) the breakdown of the distinction between feeling and acting—in Sartre's words "we try to change the world." Throughout the volume the import of the role of freedom, choice, and anguish are emphasized.—C. L. H. (shrink)

Arguing that religion is both false and harmful, Russell asserts the prerogative of the scientific intelligence over dogma, faith and custom. The editor has written and appended an account of how Russell was excluded from teaching at the City College of New York.--C. L.

Paperback reprint of a classic study first published forty years ago. Allen examines the practical dimensions of Paul's missionary activity and urges the contemporary relevance of these same methods.--L. S. F.

An attempt to reinterpret American literature "as a kind of imaginative and experimental projection" of the "American Dream"--the ideal of perfect freedom and democracy. The author's critical and methodological principles, unfortunately, are never quite made clear.--L. H.

This book is essential for those interested in Russell, or in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. Only two of the fifteen selections are readily available elsewhere: "On Denoting" and "Mr Strawson on Referring." Amazingly, three substantial selections have never been published previously: "On the Substitutional Theory of Classes and Relations," "The Regressive Method of Discovering the Premisses of Mathematics," and "Is Mathematics Purely Linguistic?". Three other papers have appeared previously only in French : one of these is a better (...) introduction to the theory of types than the classic "Mathematical Logic as based on the Theory of Types." Finally, of the five remaining papers, which are not easily available, three are commentaries on Meinong, one is a note on the axiom of infinity, and the most substantial piece is a discussion of three notions of sets—in effect, Zermelo-Frankel, New Foundations, and Russell’s own "no-classes" theory, which required a theory of types applied to propositional functions. What is striking throughout these essays—all but one from the first decade of the century-is Russell’s persistent sympathy with some sort of realism in foundation theory, and his perception that the theory of definite descriptions, the "no-classes" proposals, and the theory of types, were very closely interrelated. Also included are three bibliographies. The chronological bibliography includes several still unpublished mss in the McMaster University Russell Archives.—J.L. (shrink)

Four papers that first appeared elsewhere, though within the last few years. Probably the best source for Chomsky’s recent technical work and a good source for his recent views about linguistic theory and about language and cognition generally. The introduction and the first two essays, "Questions of Form and Interpretation" and "On the Nature of Language," speak to the more general questions and the linguistics will not overburden the philosophical reader. From the middle sixties to the early seventies, many linguists (...) proposed ever more abstract and idiosyncratic syntactical analyses, often invoking vague and overly powerful "rules" without much concern for how they could fit within a learnable system of rules. What motivated these linguists was a desire to give some account within a rich grammar for nearly any sort of semantic, logical, or cognitive feature that comes up in our use of language. Much of Chomsky’s recent work has been concerned with a principled reduction in the power of grammatical rules; since this reduces the sorts of rules and grammars that may be proposed, it makes grammatical analyses more testable. The reduction is "principled" in that what one is after are the universal constraints of human language that derive from the child’s language acquisition capacities. In "Conditions on Transformations" and "Conditions on Rules of Grammar" Chomsky proposes various limitations on the power of transformational rules within the context of a similarly-restricted base. The logico-semantic role in the strict explication of linguistic competence is restricted to "logical form," which is read off a surface level of syntax into something like the familiar structures of predicate logic. The trace theory of movement rules is a powerful and relatively simple way of accounting for features of pronominalization and anaphor, reference and logical form, without sacrificing testability or system; it also permits the expression of some elegant generalizations and lends itself to the exploitation of the universal—particular grammar distinction. Trace theory also permits logical form to be read off from surface structure alone. And the logical form so read off appears to be the familiar variable-employing one and not the sort suggested by Montague.—J.L. (shrink)

A meticulous examination of the logical and axiological principles of analogical inference in legal reasoning. The first part presents an elementary but useful survey of traditional and modern logical analyses of analogy and analogical inference. In the second part, these concepts are examined in their juridical applications. Much is made of the conclusion that analogical inference cannot be rendered "binding" by logical considerations alone; to make up for this in legal reasoning, axiological principles must be employed.--L. K. B.

The autobiography of a medium and investigator of extra-sensory phenomena.--L. F.

Althusius is significant as an early and rigorous contract theorist who explored the concepts of confederation and social symbiosis. This work is the first English translation of a large part of the Politics. In most cases the translation is clear and readable. Both a preface by Carl J. Friedrich and an introduction by the editor provide short surveys of the general Althusian theory.—L. C.

In this lecture to the British Academy, Strawson points to inter-personal, "reactive attitudes" such as those of resentment, gratitude and forgiveness, as the key to getting around the usual arguments between "optimists" and "pessimists" concerning the alleged moral consequences of the thesis of determinism. These calculative arguments, he thinks, over-intellectualize the facts; the moral sentiments are given along with human society, and are not to be externally justified.--W. L. M.

The professed aim is to make a Thomistic theory of knowledge relevant to contemporary analytic movements. Stress is laid on the dynamism of intellection, and on supraphysical esse as the only constituent of divine knowledge and as the essential feature of human knowledge. Miller also argues that knowledge through affective connaturality must be combined with intellection. Little concession is made to those not steeped in scholastic terminology. --W. L. M.

L'article explore la notion wébérienne de «domination rationnelle» comme outil pour analyser les rapports entre les efforts de gestion des populations indigènes par l'État colonial, et le développement d'une forme spécifique de rationalité scientifique, prenant pour objet ces populations: les savoirs anthropologiques. En s'appuyant sur le cas de l'Afrique coloniale française, on s'efforce de montrer comment les dimensions d'instrumentation (avec la production d'instruments d'identification et de compréhension) et de légitimation sont essentielles dans l'émergence de savoirs sur les sociétés et les (...) cultures indigènes, d'abord au sein des appareils administratifs, mais aussi dans les institutions savantes métropolitaines. L'appui au développement de la science de l'homme se fait dans le cadre de projets de « rationalisation » de la colonisation qui rapprochent des savants et des réformateurs liés à l 'École coloniale, voulant redéfinir la profession d'administrateur colonial comme «spécialiste des indigènes». (shrink)

Le but de ce texte est de mettre en évidence les équi­valences entre la façon dont le concept de conatus résout, dans l'Éthique, le problème de l'unité modale complexe. en rendant consis­tant le concept de chose singulière en tant que celle-ci doit être consi­dérée comme un légitime sujet d'attribution d'états, et la façon dont ce même concept dessine le rapport cognitif de l'esprit avec lui-même, rapport par lequel l'esprit se saisit comme sujet de ses états et qui ca­ractérise la notion (...) moderne de subjectivité. Ainsi, en éclairant cet as­pect du concept spinoziste de chose singulière. on comprendra aussi, de façon indirecte, l'une des conditions par lesquelles les choses peuvent, dans la doctrine spinoziste, devenir des objets ou des signes pour la connaissance humaine. (shrink)

Suppose that the ultimate point of ethics is to make the world a better place. If it is, we must face the question: better in what respect? If the good is prior to the right — that is, if the rationale for all requirements of the right is that they serve to further the good in one way or another — then what is this good? Is there a single fundamental value capable of underlying and unifying all of our moral (...) categories? If so, how might it defeat the claims of rival candidates for this role? If not, is there instead a plurality of basic goods, each irreducible to any of the others? In that case, how do they fit together into a unified picture of the moral life? These are the questions I wish to address, in a necessarily limited way. To many the questions will seem hopelessly old-fashioned or misguided. Some deontologists will wish to reverse my ordering of the good and the right, holding that the right constrains acceptable conceptions of the good. For many contractarians, neither the good nor the right will seem normatively basic, since both are to be derived from a prior conception of rationality. Finally, some theorists will reject the classification of moral theories in terms of their basic normative categories, arguing that the whole foundationalist enterprise in ethics should be abandoned. In the face of these challenges to the priority of the good, and in light of the many current varieties of moral skepticism and relativism, I cannot provide a very convincing justification for raising the questions I intend to discuss. (shrink)