Outlines a tenable version of a traditional foundationalist account\nof empirical justification and its implications for the justification\nof beliefs about physical or material objects. Presupposing the acceptability\nof other beliefs about physical objects; Concept of a basic belief;\nMetabeliefs about one's own occurrent beliefs; Beliefs about sensory\nexperience.

Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.

Despite its prominence in the abortion debate and in public policy, the discourse of 'unborn patient' has not been subjected to critical scrutiny. We provide a critical analysis in three steps. First, we distinguish between the descriptive and normative meanings of 'unborn child.' There is a long history of the descriptive use of 'unborn child.' Second, we argue that the concept of an unborn child has normative content but that this content does not do the work that opponents of abortion (...) want it to do, namely, to establish the independent moral status of fetuses and their rights, the right to life in particular. Third, we argue that the normative content of 'unborn child' should be dependent moral status, not independent moral status. We conclude that the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient should replace the discourse of “unborn child” when that phrase is used normatively. (shrink)

Bioethics has a founding story in which medical paternalism, the interference with the autonomy of patients for their own clinical benefit, was an accepted ethical norm in the history of Western medical ethics and was widespread in clinical practice until bioethics changed the ethical norms and practice of medicine. In this paper I show that the founding story of bioethics misreads major texts in the history of Western medical ethics. I also show that a major source for empirical claims about (...) the widespread practice of medical paternalism has been misread. I then show that that bioethics based on its founding story deprofessionalizes medical ethics. The result leaves the sick exposed to the predatory power of medical practitioners and healthcare organizations with only their autonomy-based rights to non-interference, expressed in contracts, to protect them. The sick are stripped of the protection afforded by a professional, fiduciary relationship of physicians to their patients. Bioethics based on its founding story reverts to the older model of a contractual relationship between the sick and medical practitioners not worthy of intellectual or moral trust (because such trust cannot be generated by what I call ‘deprofessionalizing bioethics’). On closer examination, bioethics based on its founding story, ironically, eliminates paternalism as a moral category in bioethics, thus causing bioethics to collapse on itself because it denies one of the necessary conditions for medical paternalism. Bioethics based on its founding story should be abandoned. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 65-68.

The concept of medicine as a profession in the English-language literature of medical ethics is of recent vintage, invented by the Scottish physician and medical ethicist, John Gregory (1724-1773). Gregory wrote the first secular, philosophical, clinical, and feminine medical ethics and bioethics in the English language and did so on the basis of Hume's principle of sympathy. This paper provides a brief account of Gregory's invention and the role that Humean sympathy plays in that invention, with reference to key texts (...) in Gregory's work. The paper also considers two interesting and perhaps provocative ways in which Hume can be read through Gregory: first, sympathy as a principle of scientific discovery in Hume's science of man and moral physiology; and sympathy as gendered feminine in Hume's moral philosophy. Hume's principle of sympathy is at the core of Gregory's medical ethics and the histories of Western medical ethics and bioethics pivot on Gregory - and, therefore, on Hume - as it does on few other figures. (shrink)

outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.

The reception of child immunization in Iran today can be explained by the conjunction of several factors. Firstly, the Pasteur Institute of Teheran (established in 1921) initiated the vaccine transfer, while the successive public health policies developed and systematised it. Since the Islamic Revolution, the application of the Expanded Program of Immunization has allowed the Islamic Republic of Iran to reach the fourth world-wide rank for immunisation of child populations. The socio-cultural appropriation of the technique can also be explained by (...) its integration into the popular preventive practices (such as magic and religious rituals) as well as a specific treatment of the collective/individual question. This paper describes some results of a qualitative anthropological research conducted in Teheran and the rural district of Hassanâbâd (near Isfahân) between 1991 and 1992. (shrink)

Some problems that arise in the account given by Thomasma and Pellegrino [6] of the foundations of medical ethics in a philosophy of medicine are addressed, in particular questions of a conceptual character about treating therelatum of medicine as health. Which concept of health is appropriate and which will bear the burden of the position thomasma and Pellegrino advance? It is argued that the proper relationship of medicine is one between a healer and developing embodied minds. As a consequence, the (...) project of providing a univocal account of the nature of medicine fails. Instead, pluralism infects philosophy and medicine, resulting in different philosophies of medicine. From these philosophies of medicine will follow not a single medical ethics but a variety. (shrink)

La présente contribution propose une étude de la périphérie gauche au sein d’un corpus oral multigenres, représentant douze activités de communication orale, annoté syntaxiquement et prosodiquement. La segmentation discursive du corpus en unités de base du discours (BDU) résulte d’une coïncidence entre unités syntaxiques et prosodiques, correspondant à des encodages linguistiques distincts mais complémentaires. Partant du postulat selon lequel ces unités discursives remplissent une fonction cognitive dans la planification et l’interprétation du discours, nous nous intéressons à l’étude de leur périphérie (...) gauche. Ce lieu, qui constitue le point d’ancrage du message, joue en effet un rôle important dans la négociation de la structure discursive. Dans l’objectif d’étudier les stratégies discursives à l’œuvre dans les différents genres du corpus, nous faisons l’inventaire des types formels observés et étudions finalement les fonctions discursives que ces éléments périphériques peuvent revêtir. (shrink)

Too many patients are injured in the course of medical care. This truth is as distressing now as it was four years ago when it began an article in this journal’s last similar symposium. Many or most injuries seem preventable. Yet today’s systems of care and of oversight of care too often fail to prevent them, despite generations of increasing legal intervention. Few injuries are litigated, even fewer addressed through medical peer review or state disciplinary authorities. The Institute of Medicine’s (...) landmark report To Err Is Human brought patient safety to national attention when released in late 1999. Half a decade later, significant reduction of injury remains a distant prospect, despite some apparent progress. (shrink)

Connaissons-nous l'enfant? Au sortir du " siècle de l'enfant ", la différence de l'enfance ne cesse de nous interroger. Si l'exigence de penser l'enfance à nouveau est aujourd'hui partagée, les voies de cette entreprise, et plus précisément les problématiques au sein desquelles elle s'impose, sont diverses et mouvantes, à l'image du monde dont héritent ceux que Hannah Arendt appelait " les nouveaux-venus ". Emergent toutefois du foisonnement des pensées de l'enfance quelques paradigmes que l'ouvrage se propose de rendre visibles. Le (...) paradigme démocratique inscrit la question de l'enfance dans la dynamique égalitaire des sociétés démocratiques, et dans l'inéluctable effacement de la différence enfant/adulte auquel les conduit leur " passion de l'égalité ". Le développement de la " philosophie pour enfants " relève-t-il de cette passion de l'égalité? La figure de " l'enfant philosophe " participe-t-elle de cet effacement? Assurément son émergence au cours des vingt dernières années constitue l'un des faits marquants d'une histoire commune à l'enfance et à la philosophie. Que dire alors de la figure de l'enfant artiste, de l'enfance saisie dans sa proximité avec l'artiste? Elle participe d'une tentative de penser l'enfance autrement, d'une pensée esthétique de l'enfance alliant l'héritage schillérien des Lettres sur l'éducation esthétique de l'humanité aux tentations d'une pensée poétique de l'enfance. Que devient alors, dans cette pensée de l'enfance bousculée, cette autre figure qui ne cesse d'accompagner l'enfance, du moins depuis qu'on la pense comme éducable, la figure du pédagogue? Voilà peut-être l'un des points de résistance aux bouleversements postmodernes : l'impossibilité d'une connaissance de l'enfance qui n'en passe pas par l'éducation de l'enfance. Le point de vue paradigmatique n'épuise toutefois pas la question. Par-delà les paradigmes qui tentent de la saisir, quelque chose de l'enfance ne cesse de se dérober. (shrink)

De nouvelles théories, pragmatistes en particulier, de l’action collective et de l’expérimentation sociale insistent sur le rôle joué par les résistances locales dans les processus d’innovation politique. Toutefois, cette insistance ne se traduit pas nécessairement, dans les réformes de la démocratie, par une réflexion approfondie sur la manière de faire évoluer en conséquence les mécanismes d’apprentissage institutionnel. Or une telle évolution est une condition pour que le rôle joué par les résistances locales puisse dépasser le stade d’alibi ou de faire-valoir (...) de manière à transformer leur propre rapport au pouvoir et à déstabiliser les contre-résistances institutionnelles au changement. (shrink)

In this commentary on Carse and Rushton’s call for reorientation of moral distress, we state agreement with the authors that the discourse of moral distress should refocus on the moral components of integrity. We then explain how our philosophical taxonomy of moral distress, mentioned by the authors, appeals to moral integrity. In this process, we clarify our taxonomy’s appeal to Aristotle’s concept of akrasia. We conclude by offering support of Carse and Rushton’s challenge to organizations to strengthen moral integrity by (...) fostering resilience. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s challenge to philosophy has two main prongs. The first is the challenge intrinsic to philosophy, the theoretical challenge to discover the truth; in Nietzsche this ultimately became the challenge to understand the perhaps deadly truth that to be is to be will to power and nothing besides—what Strauss called the “fundamental fact.” The second is the chief derivative challenge of philosophy proper, the practical challenge compelling philosophy to translate truth or an approximation of truth into a culturally livable form—what (...) Strauss recognized in Nietzsche as the challenge for philosophy to rule religion. The two parts of my paper deal with these two challenges. Besides his theoretical and practical challenges, Nietzsche makes a subsidiary, tactical challenge especially relevant to Strauss, a challenge regarding truth-telling or esotericism, namely, telling the truth about philosophy. I will deal with that challenge as an interlude. (shrink)

“One, two, three—but where’s the fourth?” When Socrates counts to open the paired dialogues Timaeus-Critias he points to the three who are present, but he points most emphatically to a fourth who is absent—“sick,” Timaeus reports. Who are one, two, and three? But especially who, is the fourth, that ostentatiously absent fourth?

The temptation in clinical research to sacrifice the interests, the health, and sometimes even the lives of research subjects to the advancement of the interests of science and society, and to the advancement of researchers' own careers, is a hardy weed which can grow anywhere. Pursuant to a commendable EU Directive a new law, the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 was brought into effect in the UK. That law makes it illegal for anyone to start a clinical (...) trial unless a Research Ethics Committee has expressed a favourable opinion upon its protocol. It gives to Research Ethics Committee members the legal power, and imposes upon them the legal duty, to protect research subjects from those who have strong financial and other temptations to mistreat them. The new law specifies what standard of protection the Research Ethics Committee members shall insist upon. The Royal College of Physicians, which has been reluctant to declare its own conflicting interests, in 2007 issued some guidelines which it hopes Research Ethics Committee members will follow. Those Guidelines on the practice of ethics committees in medical research with human participants urge Research Ethics Committee members to express a favourable opinion of clinical trials which they believe, for example, do not give to research subjects the protection the new law demands. But Research Ethics Committee members have a clear legal duty not to follow any course of conduct calculated to subvert the excellent and necessary 2004 law. (shrink)

This book confronts the key questions surrounding comparative secularism in historical perspective. The contributions critically consider the normative ideas and alternative political arrangements that govern religion’s relation to politics and to the public and private spheres. Containing contributions by world-renowned scholars such as Michael Walzer, Asma Afsaruddin and Sudipta Kaviraj, this book recounts the arguments, debates, and disputations regarding secular arguments for accommodating religion. It does so in both critical and appreciative ways and describes some of the outcomes in actually (...) existing institutions, policies, and practical arrangements. With the addition of many non-Western experiences and viewpoints on how secularism is theorized and lived, politically and historically and from Europe and Asia to Africa and the Americas, this volume is of great value political philosophers across the globe. (shrink)

This article comments on the treatment of critical-care ethics in four preceding articles about critical-care medicine and its ethical challenges in mainland China, Hong Kong, Japan, and the Philippines. These articles show how cultural values can be in both synchrony and conflict in generating these ethical challenges and in the constraints that they place on the response of critical-care ethics to them. To prevent ethical conflict in critical care the author proposes a two-step approach to the ethical jus tification of (...) critical-care management: (1) the decision to resuscitate and initiate critical-care management, which is based on the obligation to prevent imminent mortality without permanent loss of consciousness; and (2) the decision to continue critical-care management, which is based on the obligation both to prevent imminent death without permanent loss of consciousness and to avoid unnecessary, significant iatrogenic costs to the patient and psychosocial costs to the family when the reduction of morta lity risk is marginal. Physicians and hospitals should restore the critical-care physician's authority and power - against prevailing cultural values, if necessary - to control when critical-care intervention is offered, when it is recommended to continue, and when it is recommended to be discontinued and the patient allowed to die. (shrink)